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ABSTRACT 
 
The existing conceptual and terminological anarchy in the literature about the 
Central (Inner or Middle) Asian region was a starting point of this dissertation. Thus, 
the basic objective for this study was to review the literature as to which terms were 
used by whom, when and with what kinds of motives? With the final objective of trying 
to bring some clarifications to the field.  
This is a historical study with an eventual international relations repurcassions in 
mind. Historically, the term Turkestan has been used by many. It differs from most of 
its contemporary alternatives. It is not only a geographic and political term but also a 
politico-ethnic one, in Persian, Turkestan means “the country of Turks.” The term has 
also been used in the literature to cover four different names and areas: Western or 
Russian (then Soviet) Turkestan, Eastern or Chinese Turkestan, Southern or Afghan 
Turkestan as well as the Greater (Uluğ) Turkestan to encompass all.  
Extensive review of encyclopedical and primary sources and the researcher’s 
numerous interviews and long-time field observations on the subject reveal significant 
findings. First of all, the region was called with different names by different peoples 
throuought its history. However, from the 7th Century AD on, the name Turkestan has 
been the longest survived one. Furthermore, toward the end of the 19th and at the 
beginning of the 20th centuries, the rise of Turkestanism among the political elite of 
Turkestanis was witnessed. It is most likely that the liberal athmosphere of February 
1917 Revolution resulted in the declaration of Turkestanist national statehoods in the 
region, namely Turkestan Autonomy, Bukharan and Khorezmian People’s Soviet 
Republics and Alaş Orda Government. The 1924 national-territorial demarcation 
(razmezhevanie) was not totally a product of central planning in Moscow but have had 
an important native initiative too. During the period between 1924 and 1991, Turkestani 
intelligentsia at home and abroad continued their Turkestanist stance at different levels 
while reaching its height when Nazi Germany decided to establish Turkestan Legions to 
“liberate” Turkestan from the Bolshevik tyranny. Even after 1991, when all five Union 
Repulics gained their independences, a search for regional integration and strengthening 
already existing common Central Asian-Turkestani solidarities continued with an 
increasing degree on the both ruling elite and opposition camps in the regional states.    
Although, historically, while there exists: no “Turkestani nation” in western 
meanings of the term, no single “Turkestanish language” in modern terms, no 
contemporary political entity called Turkestan, and no consensus over its geography; 
the concept of Turkestan has survived through the centuries and its heritage has been 
claimed by the modern political cadres of the region.  
It is hoped that, the study may provide new visions for those bewildered by the 
complexities of the daily politics of the region. This study explains that history and 
common Turkestani identity are key to understand inreasing integration efforts of 
Central Asian leaderships in the post-Soviet period. However, in this process the Soviet 
legacy and the very definitions of the ethnic identities during the Soviet period are still 
quite in affect despite the efforts to re-write Turkestani history by the regional 
administrations in the 1990s. It is also underlined that just like all three Turkestani 
movements at beginning of the 20th century, Basmacıs, Jadids of Turkestan Autonomy 
and Alaş Orda and National Communists were all Turkestanists in different levels, in 
the post-Soviet period, leaderships and oppositions of the independent Central Asian 
states use Turkestan idea and Turkestanism in different levels as well. Thus, ultimate 
purpose of this work is to outline the dynamics of the Turkestani regional identity and 
its reflections on the daily politics of Central Asian states. 
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ÖZET 
 
Bu tezin başlangıç noktası literatürde Merkezî (Orta veya İç) Asya bölgesi 
hakkında var olan kavramsal ve terminolojik karmaşayı incelemek idi. Bu sebeble 
çalışmanın temel amacı literatürün detaylı bir araştırmaya tabi tutulması yolu ile bu 
bölge için hangi terimlerin, kimler, ne zaman aralıklarında ve ne tip motifler ile 
kullanıldığını tesbit etmekti. Elbette bunu takib eden amaç ise saha çalışmalarındaki 
terminolojik kargaşaya biraz olsun son vermekti 
Bu çalışma sonuç olarak uluslararası ilişkiler merkezli bir tarih araştırmasıdır. 
Tarihi olarak Türkistan terimi pekçok şekilde kullanılmıştır. Bu terim pekçok modern 
alternatifinden ayrıdır. Çünkü Türkistan sadece bir coğrafi ve politik kavram değil aynı 
zamanda etno-politik bir kavramdır. Farsça bir kelime olan Türkistanın sözlük anlamı 
“Türklerin ülkesi” dir. Literatürde bu kavram dört ayrı terimi ve bölgeyi kapsayacak 
şekilde kullanılmıştır. Batı veya Rus (Sovyet) Türkistanı, Doğu veya Çin Türkistanı, 
Güney veya Afgan Türkistanı ve bunların hepsini kapsayan Uluğ (Büyük) Türkistan.  
Konu hakkında detaylı ansiklopedik ve birincil kaynak taramalarının yanı sıra 
araştırmacının röpörtajları, uzun süreli saha gözlemleri bir dizi önemli bulgu ile 
neticelenmiştir. Öncelikle bu bölge tarih boyunca farklı halklar tarafından farklı 
kavramlar ile adlandırılmıştır. Ancak Milâttan sonra 7. asırdan bu yana kullanılan 
Türkistan terimi tüm bu adlar ve kavramlar içinde en uzun süre yaşayan olmuştur. Öyle 
ki 19. asrın sonu ve 20. asrın başlarında Türkistanlıların siyasi seçkinleri arasında, 
Türkistancılık adı konulmamış bir siyasi hareket haline dönüşmüştür. 1917 Şubat 
ihtilalinin liberal atmosferinden yararlanan Türkistanlılar millî-Türkistancı devletlerini 
kurmuşlardır. Bunlar Türkistan Muhtariyeti, Alaş Orda Hükümeti, Horezm ve Buhara 
Halk Cumhuriyetleri idi. Bu tezin bir başka bulgusu ise 1924 yılında gerçekleşen millî-
sınırların tesbiti(razmezhevanie)nin şimdiye kadar sanılanın aksine sadece Moskova’nın 
değil aynı zamanda önemli ölçüde yerli millî Komunistlerin inisiyatifleri ile 
gerçekleşmiş olduğudur. 1924-1991 yılları arasında hem Türkistandaki hem de 
sürgündeki Türkistan seçkinleri farklı düzeylerde Türkistancılıklarına devam 
etmişlerdir. Bu hareket İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Nazi Almanyasının Türkistanı 
Bolşevik zulmünden “kurtarmak” için Türkistan Lejyonlarını kurması ile doruk 
noktasına ulaşmıtır. 1991 yılında Orta Asya devletlerinin bağımsızlıklarını 
kazanmalarından sonra dahi Türkistan merkezli entegrasyon ve birleşme arayışları 
hükümetler ve muhalefetler nezdinde mevcut entegrasyonu arttırma siyasetine 
dönüşmüştür.  
Her ne kadar tarihi olarak batı standartlarında bir “Türkistan milleti”nden, 
modern anlamda bir “Türkistan dili”nden, yaşayan ve Türkistan adını taşıyan siyasi bir 
yapıdan, hatta ve hatta terimin anlamı ve kapsadığı coğrafya hakkında mevcut bir fikir 
birliğinden bahsetmek mümkün olmasa da, Türkistan kavramı  yüzyıllar boyunca 
yaşamış ve bölgedeki modern siyasi kadrolar tarafından şu anda sahiplenilmektedir.  
Bu çalışmanın bölgedeki gündelik siyasi hayatın karmaşık yapısından açmaza 
düşen araştırmacılara yeni vizyonlar sunması ümid edilmektedir. Bu çalışma Sovyet 
sonrası dönemde bölgedeki liderliklerin entegrasyon çabalarını anlamada tarihin ve 
ortak Türkistanlı kimliğinin anahtar olduğunu açıklamaktadır. Ancak aynı zamanda 
1990’larda bölgedeki hükümetlerin yeni tarih yazımındaki çabalarına karşın Sovyet 
mirası terminolojinin mevcut etkisine de dikkat çekilmektedir. Ancak aynı 20. asrın ilk 
çeyreğinde olduğu gibi farklı kamplardaki Türkistanlı seçkinler, aynı Basmacıların, 
Cedidlerin ve Milli Komunistlerin farklı seviyelerde Türkistancı olmaları gibi, Sovyet 
sonrası dönemde de Orta Asya ülkelerinin liderlikleri ve muhalefetleri arasında farklı 
seviyelerde Türkistancılığın ve Türkistan fikrinin kullanıldığı gözlemlenmektedir. 
 vii
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Writing this dissertation has been one of the most exiting, instructing and fruitful 
experience, which the researcher has had. Number of people have contributed: some 
providing excellent academic, physical and psychological environment; some helping 
with the content and methodology; and yet others displaying their deep belief in me 
under all conditions.  
In this context, Bilkent University has provided the most outstanding 
contribution, which made all others possible. Dissertation advisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. 
Hakan Kırımlı is the person with the lion’s share in the success. Throughout the PhD 
program and during the dissertation work, he has provided excellent guidance, support 
and encouragement, always with admirable patience. I have been very lucky to know 
him and work as his research assistant during my doctoral studies, which has made my 
experience at Bilkent University a memorable one.  
Some during the study but some at the dissertation committee: Prof. Norman 
Stone, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Timur Kocaoğlu, Assist. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı and Dr. Sergei 
Podbolotov provided insightful comments and extended their warm appreciation which 
made the researcher feel that he has done a valuable work. 
With their contributions at different times, colleagues and friends at the 
Department of International Relations made the life rich and enjoyable and thus worth 
remembering. Friends here in Turkey, in Russia, in the United States, in Hungary, in 
Uzbekistan, in Kyrgyzstan and in Kazakstan have always had a special place in the life 
of the researcher.  
Last but not the least, one has to understand that, there could have been no 
success in this arduous and painstaking project without the tremendous help, 
encouragement, incredible patience, and above all continued love of the researcher’s 
parents V. Güler and Niyazi Karasar.  
The researcher is grateful to all of these people and others who have made it 
possible for the researcher to accomplish his goals and take a significant step in 
realizing his dreams in academic life.  
 
 
 viii
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  
ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................xii 
CHAPTER 1 ...................................................................................................................1 
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1 
1.1 Problem.....................................................................................................................1 
1.2 Purpose of the Study .................................................................................................5 
1.3 Methodology .............................................................................................................6 
CHAPTER 2 ...................................................................................................................9 
“TURKESTAN” IN THE ENCYCLOPEDICAL-REFERENCES..................................9 
2.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................9 
2.2 Definitions, Descriptions and Explanations...............................................................9 
2.3 A Geographical, Political and Ethno-National Concept ..........................................12 
2.4 A Historical or Contemporary Term?......................................................................19 
2.5 Turkestan: Central Asia or Middle Asia? ................................................................23 
2.6 Summary.................................................................................................................34 
CHAPTER 3 .................................................................................................................37 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TURKESTAN UNTIL THE 1917 REVOLUTION ..............37 
3.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................37 
3.2 Turkestan:  Until the Mongols of Chengiz Khan.....................................................38 
3.2.1 The Flux of Arian-Persian Conquerors.............................................................38 
3.2.2 Turks Arriving in Turkestan .............................................................................41 
3.2.3 Arabs in Turkestan: Mā warā' al-Nahr..............................................................42 
3.2.4 Samanids and Islamization of Turkestan: Muslim geography in 10th Century..46 
3.2.5 The Advance of Turkification in Middle Asia ..................................................49 
3.2.6 Turkestan Before the Mongols in the 12th Century ...........................................51 
3.3 Unification Under the Mongols...............................................................................52 
3.3.1 Geographers’ Turkestan concept During the Chengizid-Çağatay Rule.............53 
3.3.2 Unification Under Timur and the "Golden Days of Turkestan"........................57 
3.3.3 Timurid Heritage and the Arrival of Shaybanid Uzbeks to Turkestan ..............60 
3.3.4 The Concept of Turkestan Under the Rule of Shaybanid Uzbeks.....................63 
3.3.5 The Russian Advance and the Changing Dynasties in Turkestan .....................66 
3.4 Russian Empire in Turkestan and Kazak Resistance ...............................................70 
3.4.1 Turkestan as a Russian Colonial Province........................................................73 
3.4.2 Khanates Surrendering .....................................................................................78 
3.4.3 Jadidism and National Reform Among the Turkestanis....................................81 
 ix
3.4.4 World War I and Turkestan ..............................................................................87 
3.5 Summary.................................................................................................................90 
CHAPTER 4 .................................................................................................................92 
TURKESTAN UNITED AND DISUNITED................................................................92 
4.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................92 
4.2 Turkestan On the Eve of the 1917 Revolution.........................................................92 
4.3 Turkestan Between February and October 1917......................................................95 
4.4 National(ist) Statehood in Turkestan, 1917-1924 ....................................................99 
4.4.1 Turkestan [Khokand] Autonomy......................................................................99 
4.4.2 Alaş Orda .......................................................................................................105 
4.4.3 Bukhara ..........................................................................................................108 
4.4.4 Khorezmian PSR............................................................................................115 
4.4.5 Turkestan: As An Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic..............................120 
4.5 National Territorial Delimitation-Demarcation (Razmezhevanie) of Turkestan.....131 
4.6 Post-Razmezhevanie Turkestan-Conclusions ........................................................138 
CHAPTER 5 ...............................................................................................................141 
ÉMIGRÉ POLITICS AND THE "TURKESTANIST" POSITION.............................141 
(1925-1945) ................................................................................................................141 
5.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................141 
5.2 Early Émigré Organizations ..................................................................................141 
5.3 Relations with Russian and Other Émigré Organizations ......................................146 
5.3 Propaganda Tactics of the Émigré Movement .......................................................148 
5.4 The Emphasis on Soviet-Russian Colonialism and Diplomatic Efforts .................153 
5.5 Geography and Ethnical Identity ...........................................................................155 
5.6 Political Affiliations-Program ...............................................................................157 
5.7 Çokayoğlu versus Zeki Velidî and Atsız ...............................................................161 
5.8 Alaşism .................................................................................................................164 
5.9 Jadidism ................................................................................................................164 
5.10 Nativization.........................................................................................................165 
5.11 Linguistic Policies ...............................................................................................167 
5.12 Russification........................................................................................................169 
5.12 Historiography ....................................................................................................171 
5.13 The Great Russian Chauvinism ...........................................................................172 
5.14 The Geography of Eastern Turkestan ..................................................................172 
5.15 Independence of Eastern Turkestan.....................................................................173 
5.16 National Communists and Red Terror .................................................................173 
 x
5.17 Turkey.................................................................................................................178 
5.18 Tribalism.............................................................................................................179 
5.19 Demarcation ........................................................................................................180 
5.20 Basmacıs .............................................................................................................184 
5.21 Turkestanis between Nazis and Soviets: Turkestan Legions ...............................187 
5.22 Summary .............................................................................................................197 
CHAPTER 6 ...............................................................................................................200 
NATIONALISM, TRIBALISM AND TURKESTANISM: ........................................200 
A STORY OF POST-WAR TURKESTAN ................................................................200 
6.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................200 
6.2 Global Picture: “Razmezhevanie” .........................................................................200 
6.3 Tribal or Regional Groups and Political Fractionalism .........................................201 
6.3.1 The Pahtakar Events: Nationalism or Hooliganism? ......................................204 
6.3.2 Tolerance in Nationalist Literature .................................................................207 
6.3.3 Political Tribalism Revisited ..........................................................................209 
6.4 Eastern Turkestan: Where is Western Turkestan? .................................................211 
6.5 Émigré Turkestanism ............................................................................................213 
6.5.1 Türkeli, Türkili, Türkistan and Uluğ Türkistan ..............................................214 
6.5.2 Decolonization of Turkestan ..........................................................................215 
6.5.3 The Languages of Turkestan ..........................................................................216 
6.5.4 Millî Türkistan and Veli Kayyum’s Turkestanism .........................................217 
6.5.5 Fall of a Movement: Turkestanism Monopolized ...........................................221 
6.6 The Road to Independence: Turkestan in the 1980s ..............................................223 
6.6.1 The Politics of Literary “Turkestanism”.........................................................224 
6.6.2 Corruption and Native Cadres ........................................................................226 
6.6.3 Gorbachev in Power .......................................................................................228 
6.6.4 December (Jeltoksan) 1986 ............................................................................231 
6.6.5 Turkestanism Resurrected in Turkestan..........................................................234 
6.6.6 The Case for Turkmenistan: A Separate History and Identity ........................238 
6.7 Summary...............................................................................................................241 
CHAPTER 7 ...............................................................................................................243 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND UNIFICATION EFFORTS ...............................243 
IN THE POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA ................................................................243 
7.1 Introduction...........................................................................................................243 
7.2 The First Phase: Official Initiatives - Summit Diplomacy 1990-1991...................243 
7.3 The Second Phase: Post Soviet Chaos 1991-1993.................................................244 
7.4 The Third Phase: Summit Diplomacy of the "Troika" 1993-1998.........................251 
7.4.1 Uniting Central Asia: Single Economic Zone and Central Asian Economic 
Union (CAEU) ........................................................................................................253 
 xi
7.4.2 Nazarbayev the Eurasianist ............................................................................254 
7.4.3 Kerimov the Turkestanist ...............................................................................261 
7.4.4 A Step Towards Eurasia: CIS Customs Union ...............................................266 
7.4.5 Security and the Taliban Threat......................................................................270 
7.4.6 CAU versus Customs Union...........................................................................272 
7.4.7 A New Approach Against the Taliban............................................................274 
7.4.8 Revisiting History and Brotherhood ...............................................................281 
7.5 The Fourth Phase: CAU Enlargement and the Central Asian Economic Community 
1998-1999 ...................................................................................................................283 
7.5.1 Ideology and Integration: the Kyrgyz View ...................................................289 
7.5.2 The Uzbek-Tajik Confrontation Revisited......................................................292 
7.6 The Fifth Phase: Reign of Terror 1999-2001.........................................................294 
7.7 Eurasian Dream Realized ......................................................................................301 
7.8 Turkestan re-Divided or re-United-Conclusions....................................................303 
CHAPTER 8 ...............................................................................................................305 
CONCLUSIONS.........................................................................................................305 
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................318 
Archives ......................................................................................................................318 
Encyclopedias .............................................................................................................319 
Books and Chapters ....................................................................................................324 
Articles........................................................................................................................340 
Interviews....................................................................................................................382 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ASSR   Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
CAEC   Central Asian Economic Community 
CAEU   Central Asian Economic Union 
CAU   Central Asian Union 
CENTRALAZBAT Central Asian Battallion (TsentralAzBat) 
CIS   Commonwealth of Independent States 
CU   Customs’ Union 
ECO   Economic Cooperation Organization 
EEU   Eurasian Economic Union 
ET    Erkin Too 
EU   Eurasian Union 
GUUAM  Gerogia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova 
IMU   Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
KPT   Communist Party of Turkestan ASSR 
MT   Milliy (Millî) Türkistan 
NYT   The New York Times 
OA   Ozbekistan Avazı 
PSR   Peoples’ Soviet Republic 
QE   Qazaq (Kazak) Eli 
RFE-RL  Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty 
RKP   Russian Communist Party 
RSFSR  Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic  
SSR   Soviet Socialist Republic 
SWB   Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC) 
TIP Turkestan Islamic Party 
TMB Türkistan Milli Birliği (Turkestan National Union) 
TsIK   Central Executive Committee 
TsK   Central Committee 
TTGB Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği (Union of the Turkestani Turkish 
Youth) 
Turkrespublika Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
UTO United Tajik Opposition 
YeT   Yeni Türkistan 
YT   Yaş Türkistan 
ZhN   Zhizn Natsional’nostei 
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem 
The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in an unexpected 
independence for the five Soviet Asian Union Republics: Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The International community saw new flags 
being raised at the UN, competitions for national anthems, a writing of new 
constitutions and the a re-writing of history by these “new nations”. Were they really 
new? Or, were they really already “nations”? 
At the time, there was even a problem in describing these republics and their 
region as a whole. Was it Central Asia? Middle Asia? Inner Asia? The Near East? Or 
the traditional and conventional term Turkestan?  There were also the Soviet versions, 
which were readily bought by Western academia as the “politically correct” 
terminology during 1960s and 1970s, such as “Middle Asia and Kazakstan” or “Central 
Asia and Kazakstan.” These last terms were intended to draw clear lines between the 
two parts of a region. All these developments gave a new question to students of the 
region. Do the countries of the region constitute historically, culturally and organically 
integrated parts of a larger whole or are they practically lands and peoples which just 
happened to be neighbors? Does one have to find a single term to refer to the whole of 
this geography or not? It is not a continent like Europe. It is not a group of united states 
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or under one state rule any longer. However, among all others, there is a single and a 
very particular term for the region: Turkestan.   
It was clear from a review of the literature that there was a conceptual and 
terminological lack of consensus among scholars on the issue of naming the “region” as 
a whole. Students of the history and politics of the region recognize the fact that 
different terms used for the region usually represent the political stance of their authors 
on the issue of national identity and regional integration. Sometimes, even the different 
spellings of the word Turkestan may be used to indicate a somewhat differing historical 
and political views.1        
 As a physical entity, the region is quite well defined and circled by natural 
borders. For instance, compared to the so-called Middle East, the region under analysis 
in this dissertation is easily distinguished from its neighboring countries. As for the term 
Middle East, one might easily ask, “whose East?” and “whose Middle?” Quite similarly, 
questions concerning the terms like “Central”, “Inner” and “Middle Asia” could be 
asked without incontrovertible answers. 
 The term Turkestan differs from most of the contemporary alternatives. It is not 
only a geographic and political term but also a politico-ethnic one. In Persian, Turkestan 
means “the country of Turks”. It is usually accepted as the legendary land of Turan. The 
latter, being a mythological country of the Turks, did not imply a concretely defined 
region or geography. In fact, the term Turkestan was also subject to gradual changes in 
its defined borders. Together with the advance of Turks, its borders shifted towards the 
southwest; whereas Iran retreated even further to the southwest. The term Turkestan 
                                                
1 The term Turkestan is spelled differently in different languages, such as Túrk'astan, Turkistan, 
Türkistan, Turkesztan, Türkisztan, Toorkisthan, Turquestan , Turkestan. However, the usage of Turkistan 
for a long time in 19th century by scholars was a sign of its adoption by the British through firstly  Afghan 
Turkestan. Russians, most probably adopted the term from Western academia, decades after its first uses 
in Western literature, in the form of “Turkestan.” The latter version, in turn, seems to be adopted by the 
Anglo-Saxon literature from the Russians in the late-19th century.   
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was also used for other geographical areas populated by the Turks, such as Western and 
Central Anatolia, and even Egypt at some point. The term was also used in the literature 
to cover four different names and areas: Western or Russian Turkestan, Eastern or 
Chinese Turkestan, Southern or Afghan Turkestan as well as the Greater (Uluğ) 
Turkestan to encompass all of them. In the past and contemporary scholarly writings, 
when the term Turkestan was used, unless otherwise stated, it meant “Western 
Turkestan”, which covers more or less the contemporary territories of Kazakstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. 
 Throughout history, the term Turkestan co-existed with other terms used by 
foreigners for the lands that were meant to include parts or the whole of Turkestan. 
Such as: Deşt-i Kıpçak (Kipchak Steppes), Siberia, Mā warā' al-Nahr-Transoxiana, 
bilād al-Turk (land of the Turks), la Grande Turchia, country of Dokuzoğuz, Fifth 
Climate, Turān, Türk İlleri, Türkeli, Türkili, Harkavat (Tents’) Lands, Steppe of the ten 
thousand Kirghiz, Great Turquie, Tartary, Greater Tartary, Tataristan, bilâd-ı 
Turkistân, Turan Zamin, Asya-yı Vüsta, etc. However, though at times along with these 
other names, for the natives, throughout the course of history, the term has consistently 
remained “Turkestan”. Even before the late 19th century, when Russians established 
their Turkestan Governorship, the people of the region had a Turkestani identity, which 
was a loose regional identity, nothing comparable to the modern definitions of the term 
“nation”. Thus, this is a concept, which seems to have survived through centuries, since 
the 7th century AD, along with the local, tribal, religious, dynastic changes in the region.  
 There have been two different modes of life in Turkestan. One is of the settled 
portion of the population, Uzbeks and Tajiks, who historically shared the irrigated oases 
of the region. Another is the semi-nomadic Kyrgyz, Kazaks and Turkmens who shared 
the arid and semi-arid steppes and deserts of this vast territory. Their identities and 
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politics change accordingly. The first two based their identities and politics on a city-
based localism whereas the latter three still live in a manner oriented towards clan and 
tribe.  
The first step taken by the natives of Turkestan during the 1917 revolutions was 
to set up a short lived independent Turkestan State in Khokand. One of the most 
important turning points in its history was the 1924 national-territorial delimitation of 
borders in Soviet “Middle Asia”, which eventually produced the contemporary “nation” 
states and  “national identities” in Turkestan. From 1924 on, the Soviet power made a 
great effort to erase this term from the minds of the natives. New national identities, 
states, autonomous regions, minorities were created. Turkestan became the “melting 
pot” for the nations of the Soviet Union, with a view to the fusion of all these different 
peoples into a stereotype; homo Soveticus. In 1991, many agreed that this policy had not 
succeeded-achieved the reverse as it strengthened a series of tribal, local and other new 
identities.  
However, the period between 1924-1991 witnessed a very important trend 
amongst the Turkestani intelligentsia at home and abroad. This is called “Turkestanism” 
in this dissertation.  Started with the émigré efforts of Mustafa Çokayoğlu, Osman 
Hoca, Zeki Velidî Togan and others, Turkestanism was at its height when Nazi 
Germany decided to establish Turkestan Legions to “liberate” Turkestan from the 
Bolshevik tyranny. The Cold War facilitated the survival of Turkestanism through 
Western efforts to keep the struggle warm. However, at the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s, Turkestanism resurrected surprisingly in the “Soviet” Central 
Asia, mainly due to the efforts of native intelligentsia led by Olcas Süleymanov, 
Muhammed Salih, Rauf Parfe and Çıngıs Aytmatov. Following the full oppression of all 
democratic-Turkestanist opposition within the country, Turkestanism has been a major 
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foreign policy tool since the mid-1990s, albeit in rhetoric, at the hands of the Uzbek 
leadership.  
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
The major purpose of this study is to illustrate the historical development of the 
Turkistan Concept in Central Asia. Specific questions intended to be addressed are: 
1. How the Turkistan Concept has developed in the course of its history? 
 
2. What have been the basic factors or motives shaping the concept? Which 
groups and/or nationalities influenced or tried to influence the concept, and 
in which directions and why? 
  
3. How for the present developments reflect or do not reflect the historical 
development of the Turkistan Concept in Central Asia? 
 
 The problem under review is a conceptual one. It is aimed at finding out how a 
traditional politico-ethnic term, Turkestan, has survived through the centuries, 
especially the 20th century, during which it became a hope for native elites to create a 
“Turkestani nation”, a “Turkestanish” language and an independent “Turkestan 
Statehood” in line with the modern definitions of the term “nation” 
This study deals with vastly differing definitions of the term Turkestan in world 
literature - the long history of the concept from its first uses until modern times. It also 
covers the stories of the struggles of the native elites against the colonial Russian 
elements during the course of the 20th century; as well as the émigré political struggles 
of these native elites, together with the issues concerning the national-territorial 
demarcation of the region by the Soviets, which have shaped today’s map of Turkestan. 
The study also deals with the other side of the coin: tribalist and localist struggles 
among the native elites, which were mainly fueled within the USSR after the Second 
World War. The last and probably one of the most important segments of the history 
covered is the 1990s, the post-Soviet period. It was during this period that all of the 
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independent states of Central Asia tried very hard to produce new formulas of 
unification amongst themselves - such as the already functioning Central Asian 
(Economic) Union, the Customs Union which became the Eurasian Union. At this point, 
the main question to ask may be: “why should one give this region a single name at all? 
And why should these countries [Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan] need economic, political, regional and other forms of unification?”  
 
1.3 Methodology 
 The thesis is basically a historical study, which based on various sources and 
individuals whom had been available and accessible to the researcher.  
Conceptually, the two prominent names having written about the history of 
Central Asia, V.V. Barthold and Zeki Velidî Togan produced volumes of historical 
material on “Turkestan”. Barthold’s “Turkestan” article, first published in 
Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar and then in his Sochinenie and in the Encyclopedia of 
Islam’s first edition, remains the best account ever produced on the history of the term. 
Zeki Velidî was a very special character, a scholar of Turkestani history and a tireless 
supporter of his own version of “Turkestanism” in the field. He contributed an 
enormous amount to scholarly knowledge by producing several articles, pamphlets, a 
map and chapters on the conceptual problems of modern Turkestan history, including 
the very term Turkestan itself. Zeki Velidî also contributed to the terminological 
anarchy by inserting his own version of the term, a Turkified form of the term 
Turkestan, Türk İli or Türkili.  
Apart from these, there is a vast amount of literature on the subject, with 
different definitions of the term Turkestan, together with different names for the region. 
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However, most of them failed to develop a scholarly conceptual framework adequate to 
developments in the region. 
In many respects, the works of these two scholars (Barthold and Togan) 
provided the groundwork for this thesis because appropriate conceptualization of the 
matter is vital if we are to understand likely future developments in the region.  
With a view for clarifying the concept, the thesis starts with a review of the 
encyclopedic literature on the different definitions of the term Turkestan. In the 
following chapters primary-sources have been deployed as far as possible. To 
accomplish this, travel books, memoirs, contemporary geography books, contemporary 
annals, archival documents, contemporary journals and the like have been used 
extensively. Naturally, due to the time period covered, in the last chapter, a considerable 
amount of secondary sources were utilized as vast amounts of information had at the 
time of writing become available on the subject.  
 The lack of consensus among scholars of the region on a unified form of 
transcription as to the names, terminology and languages of Turkestan, necessitated the 
employment of a rather unique system of transcription. All of the Western, including 
Russian, words were transcribed using the standard Library of Congress system. 
However, Turkic, Turkish and Muslim terminology and names were transcribed in 
accordance with the current Turkish Alphabet, which is the most suitable for the task.  
Methodologically, in the text, a chronological order of events has been followed 
to make it easier to trace the development of the term Turkestan along with other terms 
used for the region historically. A special sensitivity had shown as regards the usage of 
not only Western Russian and Turkish texts but also native Turkestani original sources 
as well. Additionally, a substantial amount of the researcher’s first-hand personal field 
observations, pertinent interviews with the individuals and experience with the 
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Turkestani intelligentsia have also been employed in gathering, analyzing and 
interpreting the data on the subject.  
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CHAPTER 2 
“TURKESTAN” IN THE ENCYCLOPEDICAL-REFERENCES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The basic objective of this chapter is to review the concept of “Turkestan” in 
existing encyclopedias, encyclopedical dictionaries and other reference sources 
published in different languages in late the 19th and mostly the 20th Centuries. Basic, 
definitions, descriptions and explanations of the concept of “Turkestan” in light of the 
geographical-political and historical framework of the last century, were listed, 
analyzed and compared to each other in a chronological order. Thus, through these basic 
sources, it can be assumed that, the most common perception of the world’s intellectuals 
towards the concept of Turkestan is described. 
  
2.2 Definitions, Descriptions and Explanations 
The region referred to as Turkestan in most of the late 19th century sources had a 
rather limited meaning in political sense. This was simply because of the existence of 
the Russian Turkestan General Governorship as an administrative unit and the loosely 
defined Northern Afghan province of Turkestan in Afghanistan.1 This limited-political 
definition of the region can best be observed in many other western reference sources.  
                                                
1 Histoire Générale, 1815-1847. Tome X  (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1898). See pages 963-9 for a 
detailed sketch of the region in the 19th century and the beginnings of the “Great Game” in Turkestan, 
also for the then-limited definition of the region of Turkestan as the Russian General Governorship, 
Khiva, Bukhara and Herat.  
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Towards the end of the 19th century the Russian general-reference source, 
Bol’shaya Entsiklopediya was first published. There were a series of articles about 
Turkestan, including Turkestanskaya Tuzemnaya Gazeta, Turkestanskiy Basseyn, 
Turkestanskiy Khrebet, Turkestanskaya Vidomosti, Turkestan (both the town and the 
region), Turkestan Afganskiy, Turkestan Vostochniy, and Turkestan Russkiy. The article 
“Turkestanskiy Basseyn” points out a geographical description of the Turkestan basin, 
including Northern Afghanistan in the South and Turkmen-Khorassan Mountains in the 
Southeast up to the Balkash-Irtish line on the North, excluding the Northwest and 
Southeast of what was defined before as Turkestan in a broader geographical context.2 
However, it was still a rather geographical approach to the term. 
In the article entitled Turkestan, the term is used to mean the land of Turkic 
peoples (stranatyurkov).3 The concept is described as a common geographical name for 
what is called Turkestanskiy Basseyn in the West and The Tarim Basin in the East and 
the Northern tier of Afghanistan as the Southern part of Turkestan.4 There are different 
articles defining the boundaries of Afghan and Eastern Turkestan-Kashgaria. Russian 
Turkestan, however, defined as the land of the Imperial Russian Colony of Turkestan 
including the oblasts of Syr-Darya, Samarkand, Ferghana, Semirechie and Zakaspi. An 
important part of Northern Turkestan, which was then called Steppnaya Guberniya, has 
not been included in the political definition of the concept.  
                                                
2 Bol’shaya Entsiklopediya: Slovar obschedostupnyh’ cvidiniy po vcem’ otraslyam znaniya. Tom. 18  (S. 
Petersburg: Tipo-litografiya knigozgatel’skogo T-va ‘Prosvischenie’, 1896). (However this volume, 18, 
has been published sometime at least after 1899 and probably after 1902, because there is a reference to 
the dictionary of Brokgauz’ and Efron’, in which Turkestan article was published in 1902.) pp. 41-42  or 
656-657.  
3 The difference between the Russian words Turok and Tyurk should be noted carefully here. The first 
term means “Turk” and the second one “Turkic”. However it is difficult to assume that, at the end of the 
last century, there could be a very clear line of separation between these two terms: Turk and Turkic.  
4 Ibid., p. 42 or 657. 
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The first and a quite detailed Turkestan article in various reference sources of the 
20th century appeared in the famous Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ in 1902.5 This article 
starts with a definition calling the Western-Central Eurasian plain, with all the lands on 
it  “Turan” or “Turkestan,” simply meaning the land of “Turkic” peoples.6 The 
boundaries of this land were drawn as almost a square of Urals, Caspian Sea, Persia, 
Afghanistan, Chinese Frontiers, Altay, Tobolsk and Tomsk.7 With this first definition, 
being heavily geographic in nature, Barthold made a distinction between the northern 
steppes and the southern part of the region, which is divided into two different 
administrative units by the Russian Empire.8 While explaining the old history of the 
region, Barthold used the term to mean “the land of Turk” (strana Turok)9 rather than 
the Turkic peoples. He explains broader - geographical and rather limited political 
meanings of the concept. However, this approach has not been followed by most of the 
other sources seen in successive years.   
One of the first Western encyclopedias of the 20th century was the French La 
Grande Ecyclopedie of 1885-1902. It has an eight page long Turkestan article in 
addition to a full two-page map of Turkestan. The concept first described the common 
geographical name of the two basins of Central Asia: Aral-Caspian Basin and Lob-Nor 
Basin. Southern boundaries of the concept were the Tibet-Tien-Shan-Pamir-Iran line 
leaving the Northern boundaries of the concept undefined.10 Russian Turkestan was 
                                                
5 Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’. Tom’ XXXIV (S. Peterburg’: Tipografiya Akts. Obsh. Brokgauz’-Efron’, 
1902). This Encyclopedical dictionary, also known as the dictionary of Brokgauz’ and Efron’, started in 
1890. Turkestan article was written by W. Bartold’ and it is 33 pages long, containing many subtitles. 
There are also separate articles on the town of Turkestan, Afghan Turkestan, Eastern Turkestan in the 
same source. This article also contains a good list of reference sources published before 1902 about 
Turkestan.  
6 Ibid., p. 174. 
7 Ibid., p. 174.  
8 Also the map between the pages 199-200, basically shows us the area from east of the Aral Sea to 
Eastern Turkestan town Aksu and the area from north of Narin in Afghanistan to the north of Akmola 
Oblast.  
9 Ibid., p. 203. 
10La Grande Encyclopedie, Inventaire Raisonne. T. 31 (Paris: Societe Ananyme de la rande Encyclepedie. 
1885-1902). This volume in 1902, p. 503.  
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simply the territories of Russian Turkestan General Governorship plus the lands of 
Khanates. Chinese Turkestan was described rather as the lands of ancient Kashgaria 
around the Tarim basin.11 It is possible to see several references to ancient term Turan, 
applied in the text for the region. The map is a square one with Oren burg, 
Semipalatinsk, Khotan and Astrabad in each corner. North of the Aral Sea is marked 
Steppe Government General but most of the Southern Step Government General was 
included with Turkestan in the map. P. Lemosof wrote this article on Russian 
Turkestan. There is also a separate article about the town of Turkstan (p. 540), which 
describes it as a “village” in the Siberian region.  
 
2.3 A Geographical, Political and Ethno-National Concept 
Turkestan is a unique concept with geographical, political and ethno-national 
meanings. That makes its definition quite difficult compared to other similar terms. One 
of the main English-language history references of the beginning of the century had a 
long volume about Central Asia, which contained mainly four separate parts about 
Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan and Baluchistan.12 The source used the Middle and 
Central Asia terms quite interchangeably at the beginning. However, the authors also 
used the term “Tartar” quite often just to imply different types of Turkic peoples. The 
terms like Kyrgyz, Kurd, Kalmuck, Sart, Turkoman, Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara also existed 
in the text just to underline the colorful ethnic structure of the region. Kashgar is 
referred to as the capital of Eastern Turkestan.13 In the Turkestan part, authors made a 
                                                
11 Ibid., p. 505.  
12 Harmsworth History of the World. Second Volume. Ed. Arthur Mee (London: Carmelite House, 1908).  
The part about Central Asia is between the pages: 1437-1552. This part divided Turkestan into Chinese 
and Russian Turkestan. And the Northern part of Chinese Turkestan is limited by the undefined borders 
with Zhungaria.  
13 Ibid., p. 1461.  
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clear distinction between Eastern or Chinese Turkestan and the Western or Russian 
Turkestan.  
 Révai Nagy Lexikona, an early Hungarian Source used both Turkesztan and 
Turkisztan spellings, explaining the meaning of the word as the land of Turks in 
Çağatay (Dzsagataj).14 This article underlines that the whole of Eastern and Western 
parts are called Turkestan, while defining the Eastern Part only as The Tarim Basin and 
the western part as the former Tsarist General Governorship.15 This political approach 
to the definition was one of the first examples in this sense. In fact, this approach may 
be called a “limited-political definition” of the concept.  
 The famous Spanish reference source, Encyclopedia Universal of 1929 had a 
thirty-eight page long Turkestan article. This article included political and geographical 
maps of the region too. However, the political map included only the boundaries of the 
Former Tsarist General Governorship oblasts of Syr Darya, Semirechie, Samarkand and 
Ferghana. Even the lands of Emirates-Emirates were excluded from the political 
definition of the concept.16 The term was considered a Persian word meaning the ‘land 
of Turks’. Authors used the terms Turquestan and Central Asia as synonyms, 
highlighting the term ‘Asia Centrale’ which was introduced in the first half of 19th 
century.17 Even the broad geographical definition of the concept excluded the Northern 
Chinese Sinkiang by calling it Zungaria, as a separate historical-political entity.  
In one of the first German general reference sources of the century, Meners 
Lexikon, Turkestan is defined as the ‘land of Turks’ which is a part of the central Asian 
region. A specific description of the exact boundaries of the Russian General 
                                                
14 Révai Nagy Laxikona: Az Ismeretek Enciklopédiaja. Kötet XVIII (Budapest: Révai Testvérek Iroldami 
Intézet Részvénytársaság, 1925), p. 534.  This is the first and last source, which explained the roots of the 
term in Chagatai-Turkî rather than in Persian.  
15 Ibid., p. 534.  
16 Encyclopedia Universal Ilustrada. T. LXV ( Madrid&Bilbao: Espasa-Calpe, S. A., 1929), pp. 450-1.  
17 Ibid., p. 448. However the rough boundaries of the loose geographical concept was defined as Caspian, 
Siberia, Mongolia and Tibet, leaving the southern boundaries undefined. In the text, the former names of 
the region as Alta Tartaria, Alta Asia and Asia Interior can also be found.  
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Governorship in Central Asia18 has appeared as the only geographic description in the 
text. Turkestan being a part but not a synonym of Central Asia, started to become a 
separate approach roughly after these years.  
In the 1933 edition of the Larousse, there were five different articles about 
Turkestan; including Turkestan Town, Turkestan General Governorship, Turkestan 
Region, Afghan Turkestan and Eastern or Chinese Turkestan. This article clearly 
separated the definitions of the General Governorship and the Region. Turkestan is 
defined as a part of Central Asia from the Caspian Sea to Mongolia and Tibet roughly, 
which includes the Northern Afghan provinces of Mazar, Balkh, Koundouz, Tash-
Kourgan and the whole of Eastern Turkestan (Chinese Sinkinag). Russian Turkestan 
was specifically defined as the lands of Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs.19 
This article, while considering Turkestan as a part of the Central Asian region, still 
stuck with the broader geographical definition of the concept.   
W. Barthold wrote one of the best articles on the concept for the Encyclopedia of 
Islam published in 1934. This article is a summary of Barthold’s Turkestan article in his 
collected works and an earlier article in Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar. Both spellings of 
the word as Turkistan and Turkestan were used in this article, meaning ‘land of the 
Turks’ in Persian, which was exactly the southern frontier of the land of the Turks to the 
Persians, the frontier against Iran.20 One of the best instances on the first uses of the 
term can be found in his short historical piece:  
Tabari (i. 435 sq.): the Oxus was settled by an arrow-shot of İrash as the frontier 
between the Turks and the ‘territory (amal) of the Persians’. According to the 
Armenian Sebeos (seventh century A.D.) the Vehrot, i. e. The Oxus, rises in the 
land of Türkastan (Historire d’Heraclius par l’eveque Seveos, trans. By Fr. 
Macler, Paris, 1904. P. 49.; J. Marquart, Eransahr, p. 48): in another passage in 
                                                
18 Meners Lexikon. B. 12 (Leipzig: Bibliographiches Institut, 1930), p. 204. There is a separate article on 
the town of Turkestan in p. 205.  
19 Larousse Du XXe Siecle en six volumes. V. 6  (Paris: Librarie Larousse, 1933), p. 845.  
20The Encyclopedia of Islam: A Dictionary of the Geography, Ethnography and Biography of the 
Muhammadan Peoples. V. IV  (Leyden: Late E.J. Brill Ltd., 1934), p. 895.  
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the same work (p. 43; Marquart, p. 73) T’urk’astan is associated with Delhastan 
i.e. Dehistan (in the neighborhood of the Caspian Sea, North of Artek)... By the 
victories of the Arabs, the Turks were driven back to the north; for the Arab 
geographers of the third (ninth) and fourth (tenth) centuries, Turkestan therefore 
began, not immediately north of the Oxus, north of the area the Arab culture 
knew as the ‘lands beyond the river’ Mā wārā al-nahr. The town of Kasan in 
Ferghana north of the Sir-darya was where the land of Turkistan begins (Yakut, 
IV. 227)21   
 
For the conqueror Russians the name Turkistan implied a more arbitrary 
meaning than the first Persian-Arab geographers. After the Uzbek conquests in the 16th 
century, the south of Amu-Darya also became Turkistan. Barthold, in this article, 
suggests that especially the British, who were quite active in the region already, 
introduced the concept of Turkistan to the scientific literature of the 19th century, 
underlying the fact that it was not a choice of Russians but the British. The use of the 
term in the general references of English language as Turkistan, not in its Russian form 
Turkestan, might be an interesting support to the Barthold’s comment in this respect. 
However, Barthold explains the introduction of the term Srednyaya Aziya (meaning 
Middle Asia, but Barthold translated it as Central Asia) quite weakly by saying “mainly 
on ethnographical grounds the word Turkestan has gradually dropped out of use in 
Soviet Russia... for Turkestan in such cases the expression Central Asia (Srednyaya 
Aziya) is used”.22   
The use of the term Middle Asia by the Soviets was a political decision from 
1923-1924 on, especially after the national territorial delimitation (Razhmezhevanie) of 
1924, rather than a decision on ethnographical concerns.  
In 1931, renown Persian scholar Allameh Ali Akbar Dekhoda started the 
publication of his Loghat Nameh Dekhoda with its first chapter. Its last chapter was 
published in 1981. It is simply an encyclopedic Dictionary of Persian language, in 
                                                
21 Ibid., p. 895.  
22 Ibid, p. 896.  
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which there is a long and explanatory Turkestan article. According to this reference 
source, the term Turkistan means all the lands Northeast of Iran, populated by Turks. 
Although Southern (Afghan) Turkestan and Eastern Turkestan were not included into 
the concept, Kazak steppe was shown as a part of the geographical meaning of 
Turkistan.23 
The Encyclopedia Italiana is also one of the first general-reference sources, 
which has a quite long Turkestan article with many details in it. The Turkestan maps in 
several pages exclude southern and eastern parts of the region but interestingly enough 
include the whole of Kazak SSR into the region.24 The article described the boundaries 
of Turkestan region as the Siberian Steppe in the north, Altay-Gobi line in the East, 
Hindukush Range in the South and Caspian-Ural line in the west. The meaning of the 
word was given as the Persian version of “Turchia”, Turkey. It was referred in Marco 
Polo as la Grande Turchia (or Greater Turkey).25 The article considers Turkmen, 
Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz SSRs’ lands as the former lands of Turkestan.26 This is 
also an example of the broader-geographical approach to the definition of the 
boundaries of the region.  
Der Neue Brockhaus of 1938 separated the Russian and Chinese Turkestans but 
pointed out that the word Turkestan was a common term both for the Western and the 
Eastern Turkestans.27 The absence of Afghan Turkestan in the definition and by 
referring to the parts as Russian and Chinese Turkestans, the source in this article seems 
to follow the limited political approach. 
                                                
23 Allameh Ali Akbar Dekhoda, “Turkistan,” Loghat Nameh Dekhoda, CD Version, no page numbers.  
24 Encyclopedia Italiana: Di Scienze, lettere ed arti. T. 34 (Roma: Istituto Della Encyclopedia Italiana 
Fondata da Giovanni Trecciani, 1937). See the maps in pages 562-3and 4.  
25 Ibid, p. 559.  
26 Ibid., p. 560.  
27 Der Neue Brockhaus. V. 4 (Leipzig: F. U. Brockhaus, 1938), p. 493.  
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In 1942, Hungarian Uj Idök Lexikona published a very exceptional Turkestan 
article under which the word ‘Türkisztan’ was given as a synonym for Turkmen SSR. 
There was no word of Russian Turkestan at all. The second meaning of the word was 
given as the land of Eastern Turkestan, Sinkiang or ‘Türkisztan Kinai’, with its capital 
Urumichi. 28 It is quite difficult to understand this ‘mistake’ simply because of the 
existence of broader explanations of the term in the previous Hungarian literature.  
In the first 1947 edition of Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, the Turkestan 
concept was used as a term in Russian geography, including all regions of Middle 
(Srednyaya) Asia, Western China and Northern tier of Afghanistan and Tsarist Middle 
Asian Province of Russian Turkestan. The territory of pre-Soviet Turkestan was 
described as the lands of Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz SSRs.29 It is interesting to 
see at this point, the geographical-broader approach began to co-exist with the limited-
political definition of the term in the Soviet literature at the height of Stalinism.   
The 1948 edition of Quillet described Turkestan as a region of Central Asia. 
Russian Turkestan was described as the area between the Caspian Sea in the West and 
the Pamir Range in the East - basically Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, Kirgiz SSRs and 
Southern Part of Kazak SSR. There is also a definition of Chinese Turkestan under the 
general Turkestan article. This definition did not include the Afghan part of the land.30 
The American Family Encyclopedia of the same year defined Turkestan as a vast region 
of Central Asia, surrounded by Mongolia, China and Tibet in the east and the Caspian 
                                                
28 Uj Idök Lexikona. V. 12  (Budapest: Singer Es Wolfner Iroldami Intezet Rt. Kiadasa, 1942), p. 5945. 
29 Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. T. 55  (Moskva: Gosudarstvenniy Nauchniy Institut “Sovetskaya 
Entsiklopediya”, 1947). Started in 1926, p. 238. The exclusion of all of Kazak SSR lands from the 
literature describing Turkestan started at this point very clearly. Because the former limited approach to 
Tsarist General Governorsip, being the boundaries of Turkestan included at least the Southern part of 
Kazak SSR into the definition.  
30 Dictionnaire Encyclopedique Quillet: Edition du cinquantenaire. T. 5 (Paris: Librarie Aristide Quillet, 
1948), p. 4875.  
 18
Sea in the West.31 In the same year a Spanish Encyclopedical Dictionary defined the 
town of Turkestan in Southern Kazak SSR, leaving the geographical-region definition 
untouched.32  
All of these different approaches in different reference sources of the same year 
were marking the beginning of the conceptual anarchy on the concept that was to 
become effective in coming decades.  
The Columbia Encyclopedia of 1950 used the English spelling ‘Turkistan’ rather 
than the Russian spelling of ‘Turkestan’ but implied that they were the same words. It 
defines it as a geographical region including the lands of Turkmen, Uzbek, Tajik, 
Kyrgyz and Southern Kazak SSRs. The article made the distinction between Western 
and Eastern-Chinese Turkestan too and called the two a single region, despite the 
existence of political-historical reasons to separate them.33 Another American 
encyclopedia of the same year described the region as a part of Central Asia circled by 
Caspian Sea, Siberia, Mongolia and the Gobi desert, Tibet, India and Afghanistan. 34 
Northern Kazakh SSR, or Northern Turkestan (Steppe), as a geographical concept, was 
excluded from this time on in many sources, which try to give a historical-geographic 
and political definition in a combined form. 
 However the efforts of keeping the rough-broader geographical approach alive, 
continued to exist. Encyclopedia Judaica Castellana of 1951 defined Turkestan roughly 
                                                
31 American Family Encyclopedia: A Library of World Knowledge. V. 8 (New York: Unicorn Publishers, 
Inc., 1948), p.2302. 
32 Diccionario Enciclopédico Salvat: Segunda Edición. T. XII (Barcelona: Salvat Editores, S. A., 1948), 
p. 325.  
33 The Columbia Encyclopedia in One Volume. Ed. By William Bridgwater and Elizabeth J. Sherwood 
(Second Edition. New York: Clumbia University Press, 1950. P. 2023.  
34 New Masters Pictoral Encyclopedia. V. 8  (New York: Book, Inc., 1950), p. 1364. The second edition 
of this encyclopedia was published in 1956 with a different name, The World Wide Encyclopedia. 
Turkestan article in Vol. 9 (New York: Books, Inc., 1956). No page numbers in this edition. There are no 
changes made in the article.  
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the lands between the Caspian Sea and Tibet, including the whole of Eastern Turkestan 
(Chinese Sinkiang) and all of Russian Middle Asia including Kazakstan.35  
A Spanish source in 1952 defined the term as a region in Central Asia. He made 
the distinction between Western and Eastern Turkestan, included only southern part of 
Kazak SSR into the definition and limited the boundaries with the Tsarist General 
Governorship’s boundaries.36 From the early 1950s on, the absence of a political entity 
called  Turkestan in the region made it difficult for many to give concrete descriptions 
of the region. In the following years, a strong emphasis on the historical-geographical 
nature of the concept was made.  
 
2.4 A Historical or Contemporary Term? 
By the mid-20th Century, the problem about the term Turkestan was simply to 
determine whether it was an ancient-historical concept which did not exist anymore or a 
contemporary-living term with a certain group of supporters. The Encyclopedia of 
Geography of XXth Century in 1953 defined Turkestan as a part of the Central Asian 
region and also limited it with the boundaries of Former Tsarist General Governorship, 
despite the geographical nature of the source.37 In the same year, a Danish source also 
defined the term as a region in Central Asia, but included a rather different geographical 
concept with Southern Siberia being a part of the term. The term was also used to mean 
to represent the ‘land of Turks’. The word ‘Turan’ used as a synonym and this 
definition included the whole of Eastern Turkestan (Chinese Sinkiang).38 The use of this 
                                                
35 Encyclopedia Judaica Castellana: En Diez Tomos. T. X  (México: Editorial Encyclopedia Judaica 
Castellana, S. De R. L., 1951), p. 329.  
36 Neuva Encyclopedia Sopena: Diccionario Illustrado. T. V  (Barcelona: Editorial Ramón Sopena, S. A., 
1952), p. 836.  
37 Encyclopédie Géographique Du Xxe Siécle  (Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1953), pp. 150-3.  
38 Hagerups Illustrerede Konversations Leksikon. B. X  (København: H. Hagerup, 1953), p. 215.  
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word ‘Turan’ was quite common in the reference sources, especially in those about the 
ancient history of the region.  
The New York edition of 1954 Grolier also used ‘Turkistan’ spelling rather than 
Turkestan, highlighting that both meant the same thing: the ‘Turk-land’ in Persian. The 
region was defined as a part of Central Asia, where Western Turkistan was Russian 
Turkistan plus Afghan Turkistan, which is the area between the Amu-Darya or Oxus 
and the Hindu-Kush Range - an ancient Bactria. Russian Turkistan was defined as the 
lands of five SSRs in Central Asia; and Eastern Turkistan was defined as the Chinese 
Sinkiang province.39 One of the first modern Turkish reference sources of the 20th 
century Resimli Yeni Lügat ve Ansiklopedi had a short ‘Türkistan’ article drawing its 
boundaries as Afghanistan, the Caspian and the Aral Sea, roughly as the lands of The 
Turkestan Autonomous Republic or Turkestan General Governorship. Distinction 
between Eastern and Western Turkestan was made without any detailed explanations.40 
This Turkish source was one of the rare examples of the sources giving a most-limited 
description of the region.  
The second edition of Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya in 1956 came out 
with a series of differences. Turkestan (land of Turks) was defined as a historical-
geographical term for the regions of Middle (Srednyaya) and Central (Tsentralnaya) 
Asia. Southern Kazak SSR was included in the definition of Western Turkestan in 
addition to the concept of ‘Modern Middle Asia’ This article described the Eastern 
Turkestan as the whole of Chinese Sinkiang and Southern Turkestan as Northern 
                                                
39 Grolier Encyclopedia. V. 10  (New York: The Grolier Society Publishers, 1954), pp. 222-3.  
40 Resimli Yeni Lûgat ve Ansiklopedi (Ansiklopedik Sözlük). C.5  (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1954), p. 2851. 
(Started in 1947)  
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Afghanistan. It was also stated that Northern Turkistan included the most of Kazak 
SSR.41  
This explains the reasons for calling Turkestan Central Asia and Kazakstan. 
Simply because they started to call The Tsarist Turkestan General Governorship first 
Middle Asia (by an official decree) and then Central Asia (in the literature), which in 
fact did not cover most of Kazakstan as an administrative unit. Probably, it was a 
painful task for the authors of these articles to name the region geographically and 
politically in different manners.  
The World Book Encyclopedia of 1956 pointed out that Turkestan had no 
definite boundaries.42 The ‘Turkistan’ spelling was preferred in this volume again. It 
was called a vast region in Central Asia and a geographical region in the Soviet Union, 
China and Afghanistan. It is roughly circled by Siberia, China proper(excluding Eastern 
Turkestan, Mongolia and Tibet), Tibet, Afghanistan and the Caspian Sea.43 These were 
the last examples of descriptions to include the whole lands of Chinese Sinkiang, to be 
exact, even a broader definition of Turkestan in a detailed sketch.   
In 1957, Der Grosse Brockhaus defined Turkestan as the ‘land of Turks’ in 
Persian and called Western-Soviet Turkestan Kazak, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and 
Uzbek SSRs’ lands, while East (Chinese) Turkestan was described to be roughly the 
Tarim basin.44 An American encyclopedia of 1957 used the terms Turkestan and Central 
Asia to mean the same thing. It was pointed out that the Tien-Shan range divides the 
region into two: Eastern and Western parts. Afghan Turkestan was included in Western 
Turkestan while the rest of it was called  Russian Turkestan or Soviet Central Asia, 
                                                
41 Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. T. 43 (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatel’stvo 
“Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya”, 1956). (Started in 1949). P. 439. See also pages 439-442 for 
other articles about Turkestan.  
42 The World Book Encyclopedia. V. 16  (Chicago: Field Enterprises, Inc., 1956), p. 8207. 
43 See the map on the same page, which includes most of Kazak SSR, all other Soviet Central Asia, 
Chinese Turkestan excluding its northern part and Northern Afghanistan.  
44 Der Grosse Brockhaus. B. 11 (Weisbaden: F.A. Brockhaus, 1957), p. 696.  
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which includes the Kazak SSR. The root of the name represented the population, 
Turks.45  
In another American encyclopedia of the same year, there was a more concrete 
definition of the land excluding Northern Sinkiang from the Eastern Turkestan, 
including Soviet Central Asia and most of Kazakstan into Western Turkestan but 
leaving northern Afghanistan outside.46 A Canadian Encyclopedia of 1957 also 
preferred to use the spelling  Turkistan and defined it as a large region of Middle Asia, 
circled by the Caspian Sea, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Chinese province of Sinkiang.47 
However, the same volume excluded the northern part of Kazakstan and important 
amount of land of Eastern Turkestan (Chinese Sinkiang) from the definition.48 
In 1959, with different spelling, the term “Turkistan” was used instead of 
“Turkestan” in an encyclopedia. It was defined as a region in Western and Central Asia, 
roughly East of the Caspian Sea. Western Turkistan was defined as the lands of five 
SSRs in Central Asia in addition to Northern Afghanistan, whereas Eastern Turkistan 
was defined as Chinese Sinkiang.49  
In the same year, another encyclopedia explained that ethimologically the name 
Turkestan meant “the territory occupied by Turkish peoples.”50 The region was said to 
be circled by Siberia, Mongolia, and the Gobi desert, Tibet, India, Afghanistan and 
                                                
45 Compton’s Pictured Encyclopedia and Fact-Index. V. 14 (Chicago: F.E. Compton & Company, 1957), 
pp. 247-8.  
46 The Home University Encyclopedia. V. 12  (New York: Books Inc. Publishers, 1957), p. 4578.  
47 The New Educator Encyclopedia. V. 10  (Toronto: General Press Service Ltd., 1957), p. 3682.  
48 In fact it is said only “the Western part of Sinkiang has been known as Turkestan” in p. 3682. Which is 
quite unusual simply because all other limited definitions of Turkestan excluded only the northern part of 
Sinkiang.  
49 The American College Encylopedic Dictionary. Edited by Clarence L. Barnhart. V. 2 (Chicago: 
Spencer Press, Inc., 1959), p. 1307.  
50 World Scope Encyclopedia. V. 11 (New York: World Scope Encyclopedia Corp., 1959). (no page 
numbers in this volume)  
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Caspian Sea. However, Kazak SSR ’s lands were not included at all in the Russian 
Turkestan. Finally, Eastern Turkestan was defined roughly as the Tarim basin. 51 
One year later, another encyclopedia used the “Turkistan” spelling again.52 It 
meant the ‘land of Turki.’53  There was a separate second Turkistan article describing 
Southern Turkestan only: “the northern division of Afghanistan with the Amu Darya 
(Oxus River) on the North, Badakshan on the East, the Hindu-Kush and the Kohi Baba 
Mountains and the Hari River on the South and the USSR on the West and 
Northwest.”54 
Encyclopedia Britannica of 1962 also used the ‘Turkistan’ spelling of the word. 
It was described as being the home of the “Turkic Peoples”. Turkestan was also 
described as a region in Central Asia. A distinction was made between the Eastern and 
Western parts; and Kazak SSR was included into the Western (Russian) part 
completely.55 As it can be seen from the debate between the mostly unknown authors of 
these articles, the inclusion of Northern Kazakstan was quite common in different 
sources.  
 
2.5 Turkestan: Central Asia or Middle Asia? 
In 1963, a Russian Encyclopedical Dictionary defined Turkestan as the whole 
Middle and Central Asian regions, including the western part of China and northern 
Afghanistan. This definition did not include any part of Kazak SSR into Turkestan.56 
The combined use of Middle and Central Asian terms in a Russian source was a good 
example of the different meanings given to the two separate terms. However, the 
                                                
51 Ibid.  
52 The American Peoples Encyclopedia. V. 19  (Chicago: Spencer Press, Inc., 1960), p. 141.  
53 Ibid., p. 141.  
54 Ibid., p. 142.  
55 Encyclopedia Britannica. V. 22  (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1962), p. 620.  
56 Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’ v dvuh tomah. T. 2  (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya”, 
1963), p. 535.  
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authors were always careful about the inclusion or exclusion of Southern (or sometimes 
the whole) Kazak SSR into the broad definition of the term. In the same year, another 
encyclopedia again used the Turkistan spelling and described it as a historic region of 
Central Asia. In this definition, Western or Russian Turkestan included Southern Kazak 
SSR. Chinese and Afghan Turkestan were described separately. The meaning of the 
word was explained to be the “land of Turks” in Persian.57  
Another Russian source, published in 1964, included most of the Kazak SSR 
into Turkestan by defining its northern boundaries as Caspian-Aral-Irtish line. But in the 
same source, it was pointed out that Turkestan was called Middle Asia after the Great 
October Revolution. This article also made the distinction among Western, Eastern and 
Southern Turkestan.58 At this point, it is quite interesting to see that the Soviet authors 
continued to suffer quite extensively as they tried to find the proper name for the region.  
Everyman’s Encyclopedia of 1967 had definitions of both Turkestan as a town 
and as a region. As a region, it was described as an area consisting of Russian 
(Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik SSRs), Chinese (Sinkang) and Afghan (Northern) 
Turkestan.59 This kind of rough description continued to appear in many other western 
sources, but still, there was a total absence of Kazak SSR in the definition of Russian 
Turkestan.  
In 1968, a British Encyclopedia argued that, in modern geographical usage “the 
name Turkestan is only applied to a small town 150 miles Northwest of Chimkent in 
South Kazak SSR .”60 In the same article, it was also said that the term was the former 
name of Soviet Central Asia, including the Southern Kazak SSR. While, the Eastern or 
                                                
57 The Columbia Encyclopedia. Third Edition  (New York & London: Columbia University Press, 1963), 
p. 2182.  
58 Entsiklopedii Slovari Spravochniki  (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia”, 1964), p. 160.  
59 Everyman’s Encyclopedia. Fifth Edition. V. 12 (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1967), p. 153. The 
exact same article appeared in the International Everyman’s Encyclopedia. V. 19 (Sixth Edition. New 
York: Encyclopedia Enterprises, Inc., 1970), p. 7283.  
60 Chamber’s Encyclopedia: Newly Revised Edition. V. 14 (London: International earning Systems 
Corporation Limited, 1968),  p.1.  
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Chinese Turkestan was mentioned briefly, the Afghan part was not mentioned at all.61 
Of course, in a modern geographical usage, it was quite appropriate to say that the term 
is used for the town of Turkestan, and also for the Turkestan Military District in 
Uzbekistan; but both the broader geographical and limited-political meanings of the 
concept continued to appear in many other sources in the literature. Therefore, it is quite 
difficult to see the logic of limiting the use of the term to the town of Turkestan.  
For example, Encyclopedia International of 1970, while calling Turkestan a part 
of Soviet Central Asia, included Northern Afghanistan in the historical Turkestan 
definition. Chinese Turkestan was mentioned separately as Sinkiang in the same 
source.62 But, what was called Soviet Central Asia at that time was basically four SSRs 
excluding Kazak SSR, which was only a part of the term Turkestan. In this respect, 
calling Turkestan a part of Soviet Central Asia does not make any sense.  
An Encyclopedical Area Handbook for the Soviet Union published by the 
American Government in 1971, it was said that the arrival of Turks after the Seventh 
Century A.D. in the region was the simple reason for the region to be still called  
Turkestan.63 This kind of ethnic emphasis on the name has appeared in most of the 
articles on history. 
A Russian Encyclopedia of 1973 had a different feature in its definition of the 
concept. It was stated that Turkestan (land of the Turkic peoples) was a historical-
geographic term for the Middle and Central Asia of Turkic peoples. The authors draw 
the northern boundaries from Ural-Caspian-Tomsk-Tobolsk-Altay-China line, covering 
                                                
61 Ibid., p. 1. 
62 Encyclopedia International. V. 18  (New York: Grolier Incorporated, 1970), p. 276.  
63 Area Handbook of the Soviet Union  (Washington D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, US Government 
Printing Office, 1971), p. 175.  
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most of Kazakstan. 64 However, Kazak SSR, in this article, was excluded from the term 
Soviet Middle Asia.65 Still, all the efforts to exclude Kazak lands from the concept was 
in vain; for the simple fact that even the most limited historical-political definitions of 
the concept included at least Southern Kazak lands.  
Brockhaus of 1974 defined Turkestan as a historical-geographical term, while 
Russian or Western Turkestan was basically called Soviet Middle Asia and Kazakstan. 
Chinese or Eastern Turkestan was called the Tarim Basin.66 From the early 1970s on, 
even a more conscious Western approach to the Soviet-creation of new and constantly 
changing conceptualizations for the geography of region is observed.  
The third edition of Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya of 1977 also described 
Turkestan as a historical-geographical term of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The 
territories of modern Middle Asia and Kazakstan (Southern) were defined as the 
historical-geographical Turkestan, which was still populated by Turkic people67, which 
was called Central Asia. The distinction between Eastern, Western and Southern 
Turkestan was made. And it was also stated that, after the Razhmezhevaniye of 1924-5, 
the region was called Middle (Srednyaya) Asia.68 The emphasis on the concept being 
historical in nature and belonging to the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
century was one of the last Soviet positions on the issue.  
Just two years later, an article appeared in a German encyclopedia which stated 
that the term was originally in Russian and meant the area surrounded by the Caspian 
Sea, Siberia, Chinese Turkestan, Afghanistan and Iran. Eastern Turkestan was defined 
                                                
64 Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya. T. 14  (Moskva: ızdatel’stvo “Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya”, 
1973), pp. 524-5. See also articles about Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (p. 525-9), 
Turkestan Commission (p. 529-30) and Turkestan Commissars (p. 530-1).  
65 See also the map in p. 525 of Turkestan Autonomous SR, Excluding Northern Kazakstan. 
66 Brockhaus Enzyklopädie. V. 19  (Weisbaden: F. A. Brockhaus, 1974), pp. 136-7.  
67 Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya. T. 26  (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya,” 
1977),  p. 338 (1002).  
68 Ibid., p. 338 (1002).  
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as the Tarim Basin and Sinkiang.69 The broader-geographical description approach 
continued to exist, or even achieved some progress in Western literature even in late 
1970s, after more than fifty years of the disappearance of the last political entity in 
Russian, Turkestan referred to with the specific term Turkestan.  
In 1981 a Turkish encyclopedia described ‘Türkistan’ as a region in Middle 
Asia, covering all five SSRs in the West and all of Sinkinag in the East.70 This was in 
fact a good example of the Turkish intellectual approach of accepting the broadest 
possible political definition, while it was also a good example of the acceptance of the 
Soviet version of the Middle (Orta) Asia term for the region.71  
In 1982, an article by Elizabeth E. Bacon in Encyclopedia Americana stated that 
Turkestan or Turkistan, as a region in Central Asia, “politically includes the Uzbek, 
Tadzhik and Kyrgyz SSRs, the Southern Part of the Kazak SSR and the Eastern 
Turkmen SSR; Northern Afghanistan; and in China, the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous 
Region.”72 However, in the same article, Turkestan was also described geographically 
as the area north of the Kun-lun Mountains, the western Himalayas and the Hindu-Kush 
and Paropamisus Ranges in Afghanistan.73 In the same year, a Turkish encyclopedia 
described the same region as a vast area in Middle Asia populated by Turks, which was 
also called Türkeli or Türkili.74 The World Book Encyclopedia of the same year uses 
both Turkestan and Turkistan spellings of the word and states that the region had no 
                                                
69 Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon. V. 24  (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1979), pp. 37-38.  
70 Görsel Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. C. 6  (İstanbul: Görsel Yayınlar, 1981), pp. 1207-8. The 1984 
edition of the same encyclopedia in V. 14. pp. 8540-41 had the same definition but included a bit longer 
historical data.  
71 In most instances of the Turkish literature, the term ‘Orta Asya’ is used for Middle Asia. However also 
the term ‘Central Asia’ (Merkezi Asya) was commonly translated into Turkish as ‘Orta Asya’. There exist 
no nuances between these two in Turkish literature.  
72 The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition. V. 27 (Danbury, Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 
1982), p. 246. (Same article appeared in the 1984 edition of the same encyclopedia.)  
73 Ibid., p. 246, but also see the map in p. 247 for a limited description of Turkestan.  
74 Yeni Hayat Ansiklopedisi. C. 6 (İstanbul: Yeni hayat, 1982), p. 3072. See also the map of greater 
Turkestan in the same page. In this article Turkestan included Soviet (whole Middle Asia including whole 
Kazak SSR, Eastern and Afghan Turkestans.) Some very important part of Turkish Intelligentsia stuck 
with rather Turkified forms of the term, like Türkeli and Türkili, rather than using the Persian word 
Türkistan.   
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definite boundaries. The boundaries roughly described were: Siberia, Tibet, India, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.75 Among these, Bacon’s article was the representative 
of the most limited-political definition of the term, but Southern Kazak SSR  and Some 
important parts of Turkmen SSR were still included in the concept.  
It was interesting to observe that, in 1983, two important Soviet encyclopedias 
had no articles about the term Turkestan as such. One of them had several articles about 
Turkestan-related subjects, like the Turkestan Army, the Turkestan Soviet Republic, 
Turkestan Commissars for five pages but not a description of the term itself.76 The other 
encyclopedia also had no direct explanatory article about the term itself but thirteen 
other articles about Turkestan-related subjects like Turkestan Kommissars, Turkestan 
Viloyatining Gazeti, etc. the term used here was the former Tsarist General 
Governorship and the area of Turkestan Soviet Republic.77 In the same year, in another 
source, the term was described as a geographical region in Asia divided between the 
USSR and China – with the English spelling as Turkistan and the French spelling as 
Turkestan.78 In another source of the same year, Turkestan was defined as the former 
name of the area of Soviet Central Asian Republics plus Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang of 
China) and Northern part of Afghanistan;79 or as the region covering the four SSRs in 
Middle Asia and Southern part of Kazak SSR. The Eastern Turkestan was referred to as 
Chinese Sinkiang, whereas the Southern Turkestan was named Northern Afghanistan.80 
                                                
75 The World Book Encyclopedia. V. 19  (Chicago: World Book-Childcraft International, Inc., 1982). The 
author of this article is named as Theodore Shabad. (This volume is the new edition of 1956 Wold Book 
Encyclopedia) 
76 Grazhdanskaya Voyna i Voennaya Interventsiya v SSSR Entsiklopediya  (Moskva: “Sovetskaya 
Entsiklopediya”, 1983), pp. 601-6. The only surviving one among the articles about Turkestan was the 
one about the Turkestan Military District, established by a degree of Peoples Komissars in 4th of May 
1918.  
77 Tashkent Entsiklopediya (Tashkent: Glavnaya Redaktsiya Uzbekskoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii, 1983), 
pp. 345-8.  
78 Okyanus Ansiklopedik Sözlük C. 9. By Pars Tuğlacı (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1983), p. 2922. 
79 Companion to Russian History. By John Paxton (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1983), p. 404.  
80 Gelişim Hachette: Alfabetik Genel Kültr Ansiklopedisi. C. 11 (İstanbul: Gelişim Yayınları, 1983), p. 
4390-1. 
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The article by Cevat R. Gürsoy in Türk Ansiklopedisi of the same year emphasized the 
use of the term Türkistan for only Soviet Turkestan.81 This type of limited uses of the 
term, constantly excluding Eastern and Southern parts of the region were only seen in 
some Turkish sources.   
The 1984 Encyclopedia of Asian Civilizations made an effort to limit the region 
to the area between the Aral Sea in the North, the Caspian in the West, Afghanistan in 
the South and China in the East. Here, the Türkistān spelling was preferred.82 A Turkish 
encyclopedia of the same year included Azerbaycan and excluded Tajikstan from the 
exact definition of the region of Turkestan.83 This was most probably done so by 
mistake, or as a result of a conscious effort to include another Turkic-speaking country 
into the concept.  
A rather nationalist Turkish encyclopedical publication in 1985 had a quite long 
article about the concept, calling Turkestan the land of Eastern Turks, the area covering 
the whole of Western Middle Asia and a bit of the Eastern European Continent.84 A 
rather interesting expression in the text stated that “Turkestan is connected with the real 
Western Turkestan-(Turkey) through the Caspian Sea and Azerbaycan.”85 
An article by Rhoads Murphy in 1986, excluded Northern Kazak SSR and 
Northern Chinese Xinjiang but included Northern Afghanistan into the definition of the 
concept.86 As it can be seen in the previous definitions of the Eastern Turkestan, the 
                                                
81 Türk Ansiklopedisi. C. 32 (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi-Devlet Kitapları, 1983), pp. 309-11. There 
was also a detailed description of the boundaries of the region as: Lower Volga, the Caspian Sea in the 
West, Mongolia and the Altay Range in the East, Kopet-Hindu Kush- Kuenlun Mountains in the South 
and Aral-Balkash line towards Kyrgyz Steppes in the North. The region in this article was also called  a 
geographical and historical one and did not include all Kazakstan.  
82 Encyclopedia of Asian Civilizations. V. 9.  By Louis Frederic (London: Editions Jean-Michel Place, 
1984), p. 245. In the same article not all of Xinjiang was included with Eastern Turkestan and it is 
emphasized that the region is currently called  Middle Asia by the Soviets.  
83 Baskan Lexikon: Alfabetik Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. C. 4  (İstanbul: Baskan Yayınları A.Ş., 1984), p. 
931. But despite this, the article separated the Chinese, Russian and Afghan Turkestans.  
84 Yeni Türk Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 11  (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1985), pp. 4289-92.  
85 Ibid, p. 4290.  
86 Merit Students Encyclopedia. By Rhoads Murphy (New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 
1986), p. 403. 
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emphasis on the Tarim Basin, being the core of it, meant the exclusion of Northern 
Xinjiang from the concept, which was separately called Dzungaria in many sources.  
In 1988, the same approach to exclude Northern Kazak SSR  and Northern 
Chinese Xinjiang but to include Northern Afghanistan was used by another source. 
However, the same article by Elizabeth E. Bacon used a strange definition of the term 
by saying that “Originally the name applied to the vast area extending from the Muslim 
lands of Southwest Asia to China.”87 It seems to be quite wise to include such a 
statement into a brief article on the description of the concept, simply because this name 
really applied independently to almost everywhere in the Western Asian continent by 
various authors in different times.  
Two main Kyrgyz encyclopedias were published in 1990. In the first one, the 
Kyrgyz spelling of the word Turkstan was defined as the name of a region in Central, 
Middle Asia and Kazakstan at the end of the 19th and beginning of 20th centuries where 
Turkic people lived. Turkstan in this article was divided into two main parts. The 
Western Turkstan was Middle Asia and Northern Afghanistan and Eastern Turkestan 
was Chinese Sinkiang.88 However, the second Kyrgyz encyclopedia did not have any 
separate article about the Turkstan word although it is a more specialized encyclopedia 
on the geographical names of Middle Asia.89 In the same year, three significant Turkish-
language encyclopedias provided different approaches to the definition of the region. 
Ana Britannica defined the region by excluding Northern Kazakstan but including the 
whole of Chinese Sinkiang and underlined the meaning of the concept as the ‘land of 
                                                
87 Collier’s Encyclopedia with Bibliography and Index. V. 22. By Elizabeth E. Bacon (New York: 
Macmillan Educational Company, 1988), p. 524.  
88 Kırgız Tarıhı: Kıskaça Entsiklopediyalık Sözduk (Frunze: Kırgız Soviet Entsikloediyasının Başkı 
Redaktsiyası, 1990), pp. 178-180. There are six in total articles about Turkstan.  
89 Kırgız Jergesi: Entsiklopediya. Jer-Suu attarı ( Frunze: Kırgız SSR Ilimler Akademiyası, 1990), pp. 
299-300. In these pag4es there are only two articles about Turkstan mountain ranges and geobotanical 
provinces.  
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Turks.’90 Büyük Lûgat of the same year contained three different Turkestan articles. The 
first one described it as a region in Northern Afghanistan, as the region north of 
Paropamisus and the Hindu Kush mountains. The second one was about Eastern 
Turkestan and referred to the Sinkiang article of the same volume. The last one defined 
Türkistan as a region in Asian USSR and included all five SSRs in the region.91 The 
third encyclopedia gave a description of the region including all of Kazak SSR  and 
stated that it is a region in Middle Asia partitioned among USSR, China and 
Afghanistan.92  
An encyclopedia published in 1991, defined Turkestan as the region north of the 
mountain wall of India, and stated that was usually called Central Asia. In this 
description, all of Kazakstan was included in Turkestan and it was stated that “its 
boundaries were never clearly defined.”93 In 1992, Türkistan was defined as a region in 
Middle Asia, including Kazakstan and Chinese Sinkang as a whole.94 
The 1993 edition of the Macmillan Family Encyclopedia used the Turkistan 
spelling again and gave the Turkestan spelling in parentheses and defined it as a 
historical name for the Central Asian region, also covering the whole of Kazakstan and 
the Sinkang province of China.95 In the same year, a Turkish encyclopedia published a 
rather long and detailed Turkestan article defining it as a region in Asia. This article was 
different from the others as it brought the concept of the division of Turkestan into four 
                                                
90 Ana Britannica Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 21 (İstanbul: Ana Yayıncılık A.Ş. ve Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Inc., 1990), pp. 279-80. In this article the boundaries of Turkestan defined as; Siberia, Gobi 
Desert, Tibet, India, Aghanistan, Iran and Caspian Sea.  
91 Büyük Lûgat ve Ansiklopedi. Cilt 12 (İstanbul: Meydan yayınevi, 1990), pp. 352-3. In the same article it 
s stated that “despite the soviet geographers called it as Middle Asia, Turkestan term remained as a 
geographical concept.” There is also a small section about the usages of the word during the different 
periods of history.  
92 Alfabetik Okul Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 11 (İstanbul: Görsel Yayınlar, 1990), p. 307.  
93 Compton’s Encyclopedia and Fact-Index. (A new edition of the 1957 volume) vol. 33 (Chicago: 
Compton’s Learning Company, 1991), p. 317. On the same page a detailed description of Afghan 
Turkestan is given by counting the Balkh, Faryab, Jowzjan and Samangan provinces.  
94 Grand Master Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 6  (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1992), p. 1469.  
95 The Macmillan Family Encyclopedia. V. 19  (London: Academic American Encyclopedia, 1993), p. 
347.  
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main pieces, mainly Eastern (Chinese), Western (Russian), Afghan (Southern) and Iran 
(Southeastern) Turkestan. The western part included the whole of Kazakstan and the 
Iranian part - including the Esterabad and Deregiz provinces of Iran.96 The Turkish 
edition of Grolier International Americana of the same year defined the term as the 
historical name of the Turkish populated areas of Middle Asia - however, including 
only the Southern Part of Kazakstan.97 Also in 1993, another source defined Turkestan 
as the former name of the historical area of Soviet Central Asia, Sinkiang and Northern 
Afghanistan.98 However, the 1993 edition of Brockhaus has a rather shorter article on 
Turkestan including all Kazakstan and Northern Afghanistan into Western Turkestan 
but limiting the Eastern Turkestan only to the Tarim Basin.99 
Another source published in 1994 has excluded Kazaks from the Turkestani 
concept while including the Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Karakalpak and Pamiri 
peoples. It was stated that, “the term Turkestani is an older, generic reference to the 
indigenous peoples living in what used to be known as Turkestan including today’s 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzia.”100 This exclusion may be 
considered as a serious “mistake”. Because, taking even the most limited definition of 
the concept into consideration, there were still many Kazaks in Jetisu (Semirechie) and 
around Aral. Also the ethnographic differences between the Kazak and Kyrgyz were 
only set by the Soviets clearly after the Revolution.  
                                                
96 Yeni Rehber Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 19  (Istanbul: Türkiye Gazetesi, 1993), p. 247.  The article is between 
the pages 247-253. The article included the Tajiks into the Turkic family and has a map of Greater 
Turkestan in p. 248.   
97 Grolier International Americana Encyclopedia. Cilt 12  (İstanbul: Grolier Incorporated-Sabah, 1993), 
p. 319.  
98 Encyclopedia of Russian History: From the Christianization of Kiev to the Break-up of the USSR. By 
John Paxton ( Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1993), p. 408.  
99 Brockhaus Enzyklopädie. V. 22 ( Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1993), pp. 501-2.  
100 An Ethnohistorical Dictionary of the Russian and Soviet Empires. Ed. By Jhames S. Olson (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1994), p. 645.  
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In 1995, a Turkish source defined ‘Türkistan’ as a region in Middle Asia and 
interestingly called the “part in Siberia” Russian or Western Turkestan.101 Britannica of 
the same year used the Turkistan spelling and defined it as the regions of Central Asia 
circled by Siberia, Tibet, India, Afghanistan, Iran, the Gobi Desert and the Caspian Sea 
- excluding northern Kazakstan but including all of Chinese Sinkiang.102  Another 
English language source of the same year excluded the Northern part of the Chinese 
Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous province from the definition of the region.103 An Italian 
encyclopedia of the same year spelled the word as Turchestan, and gave the Russian 
version as Turkestan with the Persian version as Turkistān in parentheses. It defined the 
term as a vast region in Central Asia encircled by Siberia, Altay, Gobi, Nan Shan, 
Altındag, Hindu-Kush, Kopet Dag, Caspian and China.104 
The 1996 edition of Encyclopedia Americana also preferred a limited definition 
of Turkestan (Turkistan). In this volume, most of Kazakstan and Turkmenistan and 
Dzungaria in Northern Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang) were excluded from the area 
described as Turkestan.105  
A Historical Dictionary of Russia, published in 1998, defined the term as a 
“rather old name for Central Asia, which in practice did not exist anymore”.106 
                                                
101 Medya Alfabetik Genel Kültür Ansiklopedisi. Cilt 7  (İstanbul: Görsel yayınlar, 1995), p. 1526.  
102 The New Encyclopædia Britannica. V. 12  (15th edition. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1995), 
p. 61. Same article stated that “western Turkistan was known as Soviet Central Asia, administratively 
excluding Kazakstan.”  
103 The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia. V. 7  (Oxford: Helicon, 1995), p. 2968. In the same article 
it has been said that “Stalin subsequently carved up the area into separate republics to prevent a 
resurgence of separatist sentiment.” 
104 La Piccola Treccani: Dizionario Enciclopedico. V. 12 (Roma: Istituto Della Encyclopedia Italiana 
Fondata da Giovanni Treccani, 1995), pp. 438-9. The definition of Turkestan in this article included the 
whole of Kazakstan and Northern Afghanistan in Western Turkestan but only the Southern Part of 
Chinese Sinkiang into Eastern Turkestan.  
105 The Encyclopedia Americana International Edition. V. 27 . Article by Elizabeth E. Bacon (Danbury, 
Connecticut: Grolier Incorporated, 1996), p. 245. “Turkestan: a region in Central Asia. The political units 
that make up Turkestan (also Turkistan) include the republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; 
Southern Kazakstan, Eastern Turkmenistan, Northern Afghanistan and in China the Sinkiang Uighur 
Region.” However the northern Sinkiang was excluded in the map. See also the map in p. 246.  
106 Historical Dictionary of Russia. By Boris Raymond & Paul Duffy (London: The Scerecrow Press, Inc., 
1998), p. 330. This type of definition shows us the pure political approach to the nature of the term.  
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The latest edition of the Encyclopedia of Islam made slight changes in the 
Barthold’s article in the 1937 edition but still kept the Türkistān spelling. In this edition 
the term was defined as a Persian word meaning simply the lands to the north of modern 
Persia.107 
 
2.6 Summary 
Most of the encyclopedical reference sources examined here, use different 
definitions, descriptions and explanations about the term Turkestan. The region has 
been variously referred to with the names like Tartary, Greater Turkey, Middle 
(Srednyaya-Orta) Asia, Central (Tsentralnaya- Merkezî) Asia, Inner Asia, Near East and 
various spellings of the word Turkestan in different languages, such as Turkistan, 
Turchestan, Türkistan, Türkestân, Türkisztán, Turkezstán, Turquestan or Turkestan’. 
All of these names have been used in the literature mostly interchangeably, for varying 
territorial and political entities then called “Turkestan” at different times in the history 
of the region. 
However, while using the same or similar terminology, there are serious 
difficulties faced in locating the exact geographical borders for Turkestan in the context 
of the early 20th century in different reference sources. Some describe the region as 
extensively as the whole “Central Asia” or “the area extending from the Muslim lands 
of Southwest Asia to China” and yet some as a small town. It is quite interesting to see 
that Soviet authors suffered quite extensively, for finding the proper name for the 
region. However, almost all of the sources connect the term to the ethnic presence of 
Turks in the region, at least as the historical (“original”) homeland of the Turks.  
                                                
107 The Encyclopedia of Islam. New Edition. Vol X  (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 679-80. The meaning of the 
word as “the land of the Turks” also appears in this volume.  
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Almost a century has passed since the publication Barthold’s first Turkestan 
article in the Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar, but apparently there is still no better 
alternative to this first and interesting Turkestan article in the reference literature. 
Students of the region still have to start with his explanations, definitions and 
descriptions. Apart from the common perceptions of the Western Academia, the 
Barthold school somehow survived among the Soviet authors of different 
encyclopedias, which could easily be seen from their “suffering efforts” in trying to 
write on the lines of Bolshevik propaganda but at the same time stating the minimal 
amount of truth in their articles. Barthold himself, a bit painfully, stated the same thing 
in his contribution to first Encyclopedia of Islam. The very common “Turkistan” 
spelling in the Western sources can also be taken as a support for Barthold’s argument 
that the concept had not been directly imported from Russian literature.  
As a conclusion, it is quite possible to argue that there had been two mainstream 
lines in the encyclopedical literature of the last century, concerning the Turkestan 
concept. The first one may be called the limited-political approach, which also 
underlines the historical nature of the concept. This approach limits the geographical 
boundaries with the territories of former Tsarist Turkestan General Governorship and 
Eastern Turkestan with the Tarim Basin-Kashgaria.  The term Turkestan was used alone 
for the Western Turkestan or Russian Turkestan in general. Eastern Turkestan was 
called Sinkiang, Xingiang, Kashgaria or basically the Tarım Basin. Southern Turkestan 
was called Afghan Turkestan. There were also many cases in which Afghan or Southern 
Turkestan was included in the concept of Western Turkestan or Turkestan alone. The 
main characteristic of this approach was to mix historical terms with the new ones.  
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The very term Turkestan was usually referred to as a historical one in nature, 
which does not exist politically anymore. However its former territories were defined 
with the territories or parts of the territories of new political entities.  
The second line of thought might be called the broader-geographical approach. 
This is a more of a historical in nature. It either sets very narrowly defined boundaries 
or leaves some or all boundaries undefined. At times, strictly defined examples a square 
of Orenburg-Mongolia-Tibet-Astarabad can be seen, while at some other times all 
Northern Turkestan Steppe, Northern Eastern Turkestan, Northern Afghanistan and 
even Northeastern Iran might be incorporated into the concept.  
However, most of the encyclopedical literature of the 20th century seems to be as 
a mixture of these two approaches, which in fact, has created serious sets of problems in 
using the terms. At this point, these findings can only be considered as to provide a 
good starting point for in-depth diagnoses of the problem on terminology used in the 
political, historical and geographical contexts: so that, not only the historical and 
present paradigm used by public at large about Turkestan, but also feasible future 
political options might be envisioned. 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TURKESTAN UNTIL THE 1917 REVOLUTION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a chorological history of “Turkestan” is summarized from the 
very beginning to the 1917 revolution for its “territorial” and “national” identity. It 
covers the developments before the Mongols to the Russian Empire, including the first 
arrivals of Turks and the relations with Arabs, Persians and the likes.  There is no 
scholarly consensus established on various issues of early history of Central Asian 
region, such as the clear ethnic roots of its early inhabitants. This lack of consensus, 
concentrated especially on the issue of the ethnicity of the early or first inhabitants of 
the region.  
The major objective of this historical review is to shed light on the conceptual 
development of the term Turkestan. Thus, all historical data provided in the chapter 
have been scrutinized mainly to support this objective.1    
                                                
1 Some classics about the early history of Central Asia are; J. Marquart. Eransahr Nach der Geographie 
des Ps. Moses Xorenac'i (Berlin: Wiedmansche-Buchhandlung, 1901); A. Zeki Velîdî Togan. Umûmî 
Türk Tarihine Giriş (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları No: 1534, 1981); A. 
Zeki Velîdî Togan. Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistân) ve Yakın Tarihi (İstanbul: Enderûn Kitabevi, 1981); 
Denis Sinor (Ed.) The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990); Herodotus. The History. Trans. By David Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1987); Tamara Talbot Rice. The Scythians (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957); Peter B. Golden. An 
Introduction to the History of the Turkic Tribes (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992); V.V. Barthold. 
Moğol İstilasına Kadar Türkistan. (Hazırlayan: Hakkı Dursun Yıldız) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Basımevi, 1990); L. V. Bazhenov. Srednyaya Aziya v Drevniy Period (Tashkent: 1937); V. V. Barthold. 
Vostochno-Iranskiy Vopros (Peterburg: IGAIMIK, 1922); V. V. Barthold. Istoriya Turetsko-Mongol'skikh 
Narodov (Tashkent: 1928).  
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3.2 Turkestan:  Until the Mongols of Chengiz Khan 
There is no scholarly consensus on various issues of the early history of the 
Central Asian region. This lack of consensus especially concentrated on the issue of the 
ethnicity of the early or first inhabitants of the region.  
Togan believes that, Arians arrived in Turkestan around 2000 BC and then in 
1700 BC they captured India and renamed the Indus River the Sind. They  established 
themselves in the Northern Afghanistan-Bactria, Mā warā' al-Nahr 2-Soghdiana and 
Khorezm.  
In classical history, it is assumed that the origin of the Bactrians goes back to 
Persians, Soghdians as Scyhtian and Khorezmians as Massaget, respectively. In the 9th 
century BC, Scythians3 and Cimmerians fought near Amu Darya for the hegemony in 
the region. According to Herodotus, it was after this battle the Cimmerians fled to the 
Northern Black Sea costs.4 
 
3.2.1 The Flux of Arian-Persian Conquerors 
In the 6th Century BC, the Achaemenids of Persia, under Darius I and Cyrus, 
invaded Transoxiana5.  From the 4th century BC on, the Sarmatians6 began to absorb the 
Scythians.7 Writing in the 5th century BC, Herodotus defined a plain in Asia surrounded 
                                                
2 This term extensively used by the Arabs in later periods basically meaning the lands beyond the river. 
Here used with the Encyclopedia of Islam transcription, but hereafter Mawaraannahr.  
3 A. Zeki Velîdî Togan, Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi 
Yayınları No: 1534, 1981), See p. 33, especially around 8th century BC there was an important Scyhtian 
existence in middle Tien Shan. See also p. 34, where Togan agreed with Minns, Triedler and Lauferle in 
accepting that Scyhtians with common Turkic roots.  
4 A. Zeki Velîdî Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistân) ve Yakın Tarihi (İstanbul: Enderûn Kitabevi, 1981. 
Written in 1947), p. 91-93.  
5 A. Zeki Velîdî Togan, Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş, p. 38-39.  
6 They were the other large group of Iranian-speakers, in fact kin to Scyhtians, somehow they have co-
existed in the steppes from the 7th century BC to the 4th century BC. See A.I. Melyukova, “The Scyhtians 
and Sarmatians,” in Denis Sinor (Ed.) The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 97. 
7 However, Emel Esin argues that there was a Turkic presence in the region even in the first millennium 
BC, and she is quite certain of this presence especially from the 2nd century BC on. See Emel Esin. 
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by mountains, where Chorasmians8 live with other people like Parthians9, Soghdians, 
Gadarians and Dadicae as well as Bactrians.10 This was the rough definition of the 
Turkestan basin at that time. Although most of the remnants of the Scythian civilization 
were found in the area of the Kuban-Dineper line, evidence shows that there were also 
Scythian existences in the Northern Mongolian, Central Asian and Altay regions. In 
fact, the whole of Transoxiana as well as the Eastern and the Western parts of the region 
was subject to Scythian rule in different times.11 Although they never had strictly drawn 
boundaries, their territories can roughly be estimated through archeological findings.12 
However, their race-roots have still been debated among the scholars.13 
In 328-9 BC, the invasion of the Transoxiana and the capture of Samarkand by 
the Greeks of Alexander the Great who established the city of Alexandria Eschate14 
there15(today’s Hocend), resulted in the Greek Seleucids' rule in Bactria16 and 
                                                                                                                                            
İslâmiyetten Önceki Türk Kültür Tarihi ve İslâm'a Giriş. Türk Kültürü El Kitabı, II, Cilt I7b’den 
Ayrıbasım (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1978), p. 28.  
8 Khorezmians, Herodotus, The History. Trans. By David Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), See Book III, verse 117: ‘there is a plain in Asia shut in on every side by mountains. This 
plain was once owned by the Chorasmians; it lies on the borders of Parthians, Sarangians, and 
Thamaneans; afterwards, when the Persians conquered, the land became the property of the Great King.” 
9 They were a nomadic people settled in the ancient province of Parthia. They have disappeared after the 
rise of Selucid power in Iran. Their boundaries were limited with Oxus and they did not cross to 
Transoxiana. See Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World (New York & Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), p. 627.  
10 Herodotus, The History. Trans. By David Grene (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), see 
Book VII, verse 66 for different peoples of the region then.  
11 Tamara Talbot Rice, The Scythians (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957). See p. 20-40 and see the 
maps in p. 41 and 105. See also N.N. Bondan, “Targovye snoshleniya olvii so skifii v 6-5 v,” S.A. XXIII, 
1955 and S. I. Rudenko “Skifskaya problema i Altayskaya nahodki,” Izvestiya AN SSSR Seria Istorii i 
Filosofii, 1944, No 6. Renate Rolle. The World of the Scythians (Trans. By F.G. Walls from German Die 
Welt der Skythen) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).  
12 See the map in Ekrem Memiş, İskitlerin Tarihi (Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1987), pp. 15-19 
for the exact geographical locations of Scyhtian archeological sites in Central Asia.  
13 Memiş p. 22. Mullenhaff, Tomaschek, Rostotzeff argued that they were Persian origined. Grigoriev, 
Zabelin, Ilovaiskiy argued that they might be Slav origined. Geza Nagy and Mins argued that they were 
of a Turanid-Mongolian Stock. See also M. Rostowzew, Skythien un der Bosporus, Band II (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993), for the Western Schytians.  
14 Meaning Alexandria the furthest or the last one. ( another version of spelling is eskhate)  
15 See also Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon. A Historical Biography (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1991), p. 353 In fact Alexander had crossed Oxus several times, for campaigns on 
Samarkand, and the towns on the shores of Jaxartes.   
16 For a detailed analysis of the annals of the Alexandrian conquest of Central Asia and the historical 
Greek historiography of the region, See I.V. P’yankov, Srednyaya Aziya v antichnoy geograficheskoy 
traditsii: istochnikovebcheskiy analiz (Moscow: Izdatel’skaya firma Vostochnaya literature, RAN, 1997).  
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Soghdiana.17 It was from this time on that the other side of Transoxiana (Northern 
Jaxartes-Turkestan) became a safe heaven for the fugitives.18 In 250 BC, the Parthians 
took Soghdiana from the Greeks leaving only the Bactria19 for them to live in. It was 
around 200 BC the Hsiung-nu (i.e. Huns) emerged on the Western borders of China. 
During the 2nd century BC, the Huns attacked Yüeh-chih  (Tocharians)20 in Central 
Asia. Fleeing from the Huns, they overran the Bactrian Kingdom and renamed it 
Tocharistan. The Chinese defeated the Huns in 121 BC, and started their westward 
drive. In 102 BC, the Huns captured the Khokand region, but soon, in 51 BC, they split 
into two hordes and in AD 48 their empire disappeared completely from the sources 
seen. In AD 50, the Kushan21 Empire with a Buddhist tradition was established.22 
During this century, the Chinese drive to the west continued from the north and in AD 
                                                
17 In fact, Sogdians resisted against Alexander quite long. See Frank L. Holt, Alexander the Great and 
Bactria (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 54-55. See also pages 58-9 for the resistance of the remnants of 
Scyhtians in the region fighting against Alexander the Great.  
18 Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon. A Historical Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1991), p. 356 and 367. “... Marcanda [Samarkand] and Jaxartes [Syr-Darya] marked the furthermost 
north-eastern boundary of the Persian empire.” And “for Soghdian leaders” they kept their soldiers in 
Turkestan, waiting for Alexander to go. Although Alexander did not cross the Jaxartes, he had soldiers 
form the other side of the river. P. 393. In the Alexanders forces there were "... cavalry units from 
Bactriana and Turkestan and a special force of Schtyian horse-archers." See also N.G.L Hammand, 
Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1980), pp 190-
207 for a detailed sketch of Alexander’s activities in Central Asia. And see also Quintus Curtius Rufus, 
The History of Alexander. Trans. By John Yardley (London: Penguin, 1984), parts about years 329 and 
327.  
19 Greco-Bactrian kingdom survived for almost another century. For details about the Greco-Bactrian 
State see S.P. Tolstov (Ed.), Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR. (Tom I. Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk 
Uzbekskoy SSR, 1955), pp. 74-82.  
20 In some linguistic bases, Tocharians are suggested to have important commonalities with Indo-
Europeans, even with Hittites. See A.K. Narain, “Indo-Europeans in Inner Asia". P. 154. In Denis Sinor 
(Ed.) The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia  (Ambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
21 Kushan ethnic identity is still a matter in controversy. There have been attempts to explain it in 
Mongolian, Iranian, Tocharian and Turkic roots. They were speaking an eastern Persian language and 
using Greek script. This might lead us to think a continuation of the Bactrian tradition. See Peter B. 
Golden, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Tribes (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1992), p. 55.  
22 It was the Kushans who carried Buddhism to Central Asia. See Chester G. Starr, A History of the 
Ancient World (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. P. 633. See also S.P. Tolstov (Ed.) 
Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR. Tom I. (Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR, 1955). For 
more details for the Kushan period in Central Asia see pp. 94-102.  
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97, they reached the Caspian Sea. In the 3rd Century AD, the Parthian and the Kushan23 
empires were dissolved as they were captured by the Persian Sasanian dynasty.24  
Although there exists no strong evidence, one might argue that these Persian 
Sasanians could have first used the term Turkestan,25 given the Persian suffix of the 
word. Following this, in the 4th Century, the Mongolian Juan-Juan Empire was 
established roughly in what is today Mongolia. Simultaneously a new Hun drive 
towards Europe took place. In the 5th Century, the Hephthalites (either the Ak-Huns or 
Avars) moved south from the Altay range and captured the Khurasan region and Bactria 
and moved further south to India.26  
 
3.2.2 Turks Arriving in Turkestan 
Ancient Turks were living around the Altay range and north of the Irtish River at 
the end of the 5th century as subjects of the Juan-Juans. The Turkic Kagan [Hakan] 
Tümen revolted in 546, and destroyed Juan Juan state in 552. Tümen appointed his 
brother İstemi to the Western part of his land. In 25 years, the Turkic Khaganate 
extended its lands from Manchuria to the Crimean peninsula.27 Bukan and İstemi, allied 
with the Persian Sasanian ruler Khusrev Anushirvan in 566, destroyed the Hephthalites 
(Ak Huns or Avars). Taking advantage of this power vacuum in the region, Turks 
                                                
23 We can still see the examples of modern Turkish historiography considering the Kushans as a native 
Turkic population of the region, which are mostly nationalistic in nature. See Zekeriya Kitapçı. Türkistan 
Milli Tarih ve Kültür Davamızın Temel Meseleleri (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1933), 
pp. 258-260. He argues not only Kushans but also even Hephthalites and other so-called Persian speakers 
were all Turkic natives of Turkestan.  
24 Peter B. Golden. An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Tribes (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 
1992), p. 55-56.  
25 Central Asian Review, No.1 1965. As an appendix to Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey 
in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 285. 
“It was first used by the Persians during the Sasanian dynasty (226-637) as referring in a derogatory sense 
to the land of the Turks lying beyond the Amy Darya [Oxus].” 
26 S.P. Tolstov (Ed.), Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR. (Tom I. Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoy 
SSR, 1955), pp. 103-113.  
27 Ahmet Taşağıl, Gök Türkler (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), p. 31. Turks dominated the 
lands from Mediterranean to China only after conquering the Soghdian populated cities of Western 
Turkestan by İstemi Yabgu.  
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captured Bactria, Bukhara and Samarkand. The southern frontier was Oxus (Amu-
Darya).28 The Hephthalites, fleeing from the Turkic conquest, moved northwards to 
Russian steppe and established the Avar Khanate. Soon, the relations between the Turks 
and the Sasanid Persians were worsened and finally broke down completely. Turks 
continued their conquests while exchanging a number of embassies with the Byzantine 
Empire29 for establishing an east-west alliance.30 Finally they conquered Tocharistan31 
at the end of the century from Persians and established their rule all over the region.32 
Towards the end of the century, the Khaganate was split into two parts and weakened 
enormously. At the beginning of the 7th century, the Tang dynasty in China occupied the 
Eastern Turkic Khaganate in Mongolia and entered the Tarim Basin.  
 
3.2.3 Arabs in Turkestan: Mā warā' al-Nahr 
Between 642-51, the Sassanians suffered heavy defeats at the hands of the Arabs 
and consequently dissolved. Arabs entered Herat in 651 and Bactria in 652, whose name 
was changed to Balkh. When Chinese forces entered Transoxiana (Western Turkic 
Khaganate) and reached the Oxus River, news of the political struggle in the Arab 
peninsula stopped the Arabic advance temporarily. Termiz was captured twice in 689 
and in 704 by the Arab armies. During the reign of Caliph Umar (634-43), after 
defeating Byzantium in Syria, The armies of Islam turned to Iran. Quoting Taberī, 
Kitapçı argued that Caliph Umar strictly banned Arab armies from crossing Amu Darya 
                                                
28 László Rásonyi, Tarihte Türklük (Dördüncü Baskı. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 
1996), p. 96. See also the part titled ‘The Motherland of Turks’, pp. 1-7.  
29 It was the question of silk trade, which brought the two together. See George Ostrogorsky, History of 
the Byzantine State. Trans. By Joan Hussey (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), p. 74. (In mid- 6th century) 
“Like the Byzantians, they had fallen out with the Persians over the Silk trade. Justinian’s successor 
Justin II, concluded a treaty with them, and they supported Byzantium against the Persian Empire.” 
30 It should also be noted here that, P. B: Golden argues that Byzantians called Hungary  western Turkia 
and the Khazar lands eastern Turkia. See P. B. Golden, "The Peoples of the Russian Forest Belt." In D. 
Sinor (ed.) The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
p. 38.  
31 Note that the use of -istan, meaning basically land of Tochars.  
32 Rásonyi, p. 97.  
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(Oxus) - what was then the southern border of Turkestan.33 The first attack on Lower 
Turkestan was in 673 by an army commanded by Ūbeydullah bin Ziyad.34 Kitapçı also 
provides a good account of the first conversions among the Turkic nobility in the 
region.35 
Barthold starts the history of the region from this time on.36 He argued that 
Mawaraannahr was not included in the concept of Turkestan by the Muslim 
geographers in the middle ages.  For them, Turkestan or bilād al-Turk was the land 
between China and the Islamic world, populated by Turkic and Mongolian nomads in 
the steppes.37 Amu Darya was also the classical border between the historical Iran and 
the legendary-mythological Turan.38 In an attempt to find the first usages of the term 
Turkestan, Barthold quotes Marquart3940 where Marquart in turn quoted from the book 
of 7th century Armenian priest Sebēos41 who referred to the region as Túrk'astan.42  
                                                
33 Zekeriya Kitapçı, Türkistan’da Müslüman Olan İlk Türk Hükümdarları (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası 
Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1988), p.15. Kitapçı in this book uses the term Lower Turkestan in p. 32 for the 
cities like Bukhara and Baykent in Mawaraannahr and also p. 69 he uses Turkestan for the Arab 
controlled territories, still south-west of Mawaraannahr.  
34 Kitapçı, p. 15. Taberī also uses Lower Turkestan term for Baykent when explaining Kutaybe’s tough 
conquest, quoted in Kitapçı p. 15-6, Taberi, Volume IV. P. 424. According to Kitapçı, the lands beyond 
the river (actually beyond the Arab realm) were basically Lower Turkestan. Which is quite acceptable.  
35 But still, one may argue that the examples Kitapçı is giving are quite extreme ones, simply because of 
the continuing "Turkish" struggle   struggle against the Arabs.  
36 V.V. Barthold, Moğol İstilasına Kadar Türkistan (Hazırlayan: Hakkı Dursun Yıldız) (Ankara: Türk 
Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1990 - İlk Baskıları 1900 ve 1928, orjinalleri), see pages 1-66 for the early 
sources on the history of Turkestan, including Arab, Persian, Turkic and other travelers' accounts as well 
as geography books.  
37 Barthold, p. 67.  
38 Barthold, p. 67. See also pages 195-344 for a detailed sketch of history of Turkestan from Arab 
conquest to 12th century.  
39 J. Marquart, Eransahr Nach der Geographie des Ps. Moses Xorenac'i (Berlin: Wiedmansche-
Buchhandlung, 1901).   
40 Turkistân. W. Barthold, The Encyclopaedia of Islam: A Dictionary of the Geography, Ethnography and 
Biography of the Muhammadan Peoples (Leyden: Late E.J. Brill Ltd., 1934), p. 895.  
41 J. Marquart, p. 45-75.  
42 Sebēos. Historie d'Héraclius par l'évèque Sebēos, transl. By Fr. Macler (Paris: 1904), p. 43 and 49 
where he has associated Turkestan with two locations, first was along with the oxus river a second was 
the Dihistan locality near the Caspian. Barthold quoted both as the first uses of the term. This text was not 
checked from an original Armenian copy, though and not very reliable for our sake.  
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From the 680s on, Arabs have attacked the region in the north of the 
Transoxiana.43 It was before then, from 667 on that the Arabs crossed the Oxus and 
started their raids. In 691, the Eastern Turkic Khaganate was re-established in the Tarim 
Basin as a result of Turkic revolts against Chinese during the 680s.  
Umayyads44 appointed a new governor to the Khurasan province in 705, 
Kutayba Bin Muslim. This wise commander was especially skilled at causing intrigues 
between the Soghdian princes and the Khorezmian rulers. In two years, he captured 
Bukhara. In 712, he captured Samarkand and Ferghana, while the Turks launched an 
attack on Soghdiana. Arabs managed to hold on in Samarkand for another year. 
However, having received fresh reinforcements in 714, they crossed Jaxartes (Syr 
Darya) and captured Kesh [Tashkent]. After Kuteybe’s execution in 715, Arabs started 
to retreat, while the Chinese encroachments into the region began. The Chinese 
commanders supported the Turkic and Soghdian nobility in the region in the latter’s 
struggle to recover their statuses and privileges. From 719 to 727, the Turks in 
Soghdiana rebelled continuously. The Arabs heavily punished all of these. The Arabs 
established a defense line from the Zarafshan Valley and to Kashga Darya-Demirkapı 
[Irongate]. In 728, the Arabs declared that everyone who converted to Islam would be 
exempt from all taxes. The treasury was empty; but mass conversions took place. 
However this was not enough to stop the Turkic influx into Soghdiana in the 730s. Also, 
Su-lu, Khan of Turgish (or Turgesh), resisted very decisively against the Islamic armies 
until 737-8.45 On the East of the region, Dokuzoğuz-Uygurs settled themselves in 
                                                
43 Jean-Paul Roux, Orta Asya: Tarih ve Uygarlık (İstanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2001). Çeviren: Lale 
Arslan. (Original: L’Asie Centrale-Historie et Civilisations. Fayard, 1997) p. 180-5.  
44 Umayyad (Emevī) Dynasty ruled over the Islamic Realm after the period of Four Caliphs, the name of 
a major Arabic Tribe. 
45 Barthold, p. 202-3.  
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Karabalasagun in the Orkhun Basin and started their rule from 745 on, which lasted 
almost a century.46 
After years of war, a terrible famine began. From 734 till 747 several rebellions 
in the region weakened the position of the Arabs and resulted with the re-emergence of 
former-religions. In 747, the new governor Ebū Müslim of Khurasan arrived in Merv 
and established a just and tolerant rule, immediately gaining the support of local 
population. It was in 748, he started his march against the Umayyad governor of 
Nishaphur and arrived in Iraq in 750. The Umayyad Caliph escaped from Iraq and 
Abbasids captured control of the region. Then, Ebū Müslim was appointed the 
Governor of Khurasan Province. He suppressed the Mazdeist and the great Shia 
uprisings, both quite ruthlessly, massacred thousands and destroyed several cities. In the 
same year, Chinese armies attacked Kesh (Tashkent) and sacked the city. Kesh asked 
for aid from the Arabs and Karluqs.47 In 751, Arabs from the South and Karluqs from 
the North attacked the Chinese armies and destroyed a whole army in Talas. This heavy 
defeat seems to have postponed the Chinese ambitions over Turkestan for several 
centuries to come. However, Ebū Müslim was too powerful for Baghdad; the Abbasid 
Caliph executed him in 755, when he was only 35. Suddenly, he became a legend in 
Turkestan. Between 755-783 many of his followers and friends organized uprisings 
against the Abbasids in Mawaraannahr, none of them with any considerable success.48 
At the end of the 8th century, Karluqs were in Eastern Syr-Darya while the Oğuz were 
                                                
46 A. Zeki Velîdî Togan, Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş, p. 56.  
47 Kazak SSR Tarihi: Köhne zamannan Buginge Deyın. In five volumes (Almatı: Kazak SSR-ining Ğılım 
Baspası, 1980), T. I. p. 381 explains the political environment of the time by quoting el-Ya'kûbî, Kitâb al-
buldân, p. 295, “Turkestan and Turks is divided into a number of countries and peoples, including Karluk, 
Dokuzoğuz, Kimak and Oğuz. They all have their own domains and keep fighting each other.” See for a 
contemporary explanation of the population of Turkestan Zeki Velidî Togan. İbn Al-Fakih’in Türklere Ait 
Haberleri: 45 Sayılı Belleten’den Ayrı Basım (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1948).  
48 Roux, p. 185-94. See also A.N. Frye, “The Role of Abu Muslim in the Abbasid Revolt,” The Muslim 
World, New York: 1947, p. 28-38. Gibb, The Arab Conquests in Central Asia (London: 1923). (New 
York: AMS Press, 1970.) Le Strange, The Lands of Eastern Caliphate (London: 1966). 
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on the western side of the river, while in Eastern Turkestan, the Uygurs were converted 
to Manichaeism.49 
 
3.2.4 Samanids and Islamization of Turkestan: Muslim geography in 10th Century 
In the 9th Century, the Tahirid Emirate of Persia extended its lands to 
Transoxiana while the Kirghiz50 drove Uygurs out of Mongolia and forced them to re-
establish themselves in Turfan. Tahir fought in 811 on the side of the Caliph Me’mūn 
and he became the governor of Khurasan in 821, but died in the following year. His son 
Talhā succeeded him and ruled the region up to 828.51 Bilād al-Turk [country of Turk] 
concept was introduced by the Arab geographers such as al-Câhîz in 820s; according to 
him the term basically had a meaning of the lands beyond (north and northeast of) the 
province of Khurasan.52 In the mid-century, the Shia Safarid dynasty started to rule in 
Persia. After a period of continuously changing governors, from 820 on a dynasty from 
Sāmān53 in Bactria) captured Ferghana, Samarkand, Kesh (Tashkent) and Herat. In 875, 
Samanid Naser Bin Ahmed, in the name of the Caliph,54 declared himself the ruler of 
Mawaraannahr; and the Persian Sunni Samanid Kingdom was established.55 In 886 İbn 
Hurdâdbih defined the limits of the country of Dokuzoğuz, as bordering China, Tibet, 
Karluqs, Kimaks, Oğuz, el-Jifr, Pechenegs, Turgish, Ezgish, Kipchak and Kirghiz 
                                                
49 A. Zeki Velîdî Togan. Umûmî Türk Tarihine Giriş, p. 56. It was their famous Khan Bögü (759-780) 
who accepted Mani religion.  
50 Although there are several explanations about the root of the term Kirghiz, current Kirghiz 
historiography sticks somehow centuries old explanation of Kırk-Kız or Kır-gız. See Yuliy 
Khudyakov,“Enisey Kırgızdarının Tarihı; Kırgız etnonimi jönündö.” In Keneş Yusupov (Ed.) Kırgızdar: 
Sanjıra, Tarıh, Muras (Bishkek: Kırgızstan Baspası, 1993), pp. 118-144.  
51 Barthold, p. 224-5. 
52 Ebû Osman Amr b. Bahr el-Câhîz, Manâkîb Cund el-Hilâfa ve Fazâîl el-Etrâk. In Hilâfet Ordusunun 
Menkıbeleri ve Türklerin Faziletleri. Trans. By Ramazan Şeşen (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma 
Enstitüsü, 1988). Although he uses bilād al-Turk for the lands beyond Khurasan, in p. 59 he claims that 
Turks were natives of Khurasan.  
53 The roots of Samanids were from the Sāmān village in Belh. Their forefathers were the Sasanian 
political fugitives to Turks in 591 under Bahram Chūbin. Barthold, p. 225.  
54 This also meant that the complete control of Mawaraannahr by the Islamic armies was achieved this 
year by the efforts of both Samanids and Tahirids. See Barthold, p. 227.  
55 Roux, p. 194-6.  
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lands.56 Ya’kûbî writings, in 891, used the word Turkestan very exceptionally, basically 
to imply the northern borders of the Arab realm.57 
At the beginning of the 10th century, Samanids defeated Saffarids and captured 
Persia. By this time, most of the groups in the south of Mawaraannahr, Khurasan, 
Khorezm, Bactria, Soghdiana, Persia were Iranian or New Persian (Farsi-Dari) 
speakers, better to name as the first Tajiks.58 Writing in 903, İbn Rusteh used bilād al-
Turk for the region and described it as the lands starting from the country of Ye’cûc and 
Me’cûc (China) were also called Uygur (Dokuzoğuz) and "Turk lands."59 In 924, 
Mongol Khitays defeated Kirghiz and drive them off southwards. In 920s, another 
Muslim geographer, Mes’ûdî, also used bilād al-Turk to describe the regions between 
Khurasan and the land of Dokuzoğuz.60 He also pointed out that the region around 
Balkash was populated by Turks.61 He was one of the first geographers arguing that 
some Turks were quite advanced and had cities and forts.62 Almost simultaneously, 
                                                
56 Ibn Hurdādbih, El-Mesālik ve’l-memālik (886) (Leyden: De Goeje, 1967),p. 30. Parts published in 
Ramazan Şeşen, İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü 
Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 184.  
57 Ya’kūbī, Kitāb el-büldān (891) (Leyden: De Goeje, 1892), pp. 288-295. Parts published in Ramazan 
Şeşen. İslâm Coğrafyacılarına göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma 
Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 187. However in p. 186 explains to us that Ferghana had a large Turkic population. 
And the border with Turkistan was drawn simply as the Amu-Darya line as Tokharistan, Sogd, 
Semerkand, Shash, Ferghana, Khurasan and Sicistan.  
58 N.N. Negmatov, “The Samanid State”. In History of Civilizatiıons of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part 
One. M.S. Asimov and C.E. Bosworth (Eds.) (Paris: UNESCO, 1998), p. 77. “... although such middle 
Iranian languages as Khwarizmian and Soghdian were still in use in certain regions-in case of the former, 
for some four centuries, subsequently. The terms Tazik/g (Middle Persian) and Tazi (New Persian-Dari), 
originally coined in Western Persia to denote the conquering Arabs, now came in Khurasan and 
Transoxiana to be applied to all the Muslims there,..., in distinction to the largely pagan Turks of the 
adjacent steppe lands... very soon it became used for the Persians as against the incoming Turkish tribal 
or military ruling class.” 
59 İbn Rusteh, El-a’lāk el-nefīse (Leyden: M.J. de Goeje, 1892), p. 98.  
60 Mes’ūdī. Mürūc el-zeheb. (Paris: Barbier de Meynard, 1861-74), p. 262. Parts published in Ramazan 
Şeşen, İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma 
Enstitüsü, 1998), pp. 43-44.  
61 Mes’ūdī, El-tenbīh ve’l-işrāf (Leyden: De Goeje, 1894), pp. 62-64.  
62 Mes’ūdī, Acā’ib el-dünyā. (Bursa: Hüseyin Çelebi), 746(H), pp. 63-64. Parts published in Ramazan 
Şeşen, İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma 
Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 57.  
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writing in 926, Kudâme b. Cafer used rather bilād al-Turk or the country of Dokuzoğuz 
interchangeably.63 
According to Lazslo Rasonyi, however it was not until 996, when Karahanids 
conquered Khoten and Yarkend and dominated Tarim Basin, this region was called 
Turkestan.64 The Karahanid65 dynasty was established in Kashgar in 932.66 In the mid-
century, conversion to Islam of the Karahanid-Uygurs was begun under Satuk Buğra 
Khan (d. 955). In 962, the Turkic Ghaznavid67 dynasty was established in Afghanistan. 
It was around this time, in the 950s, el-İstahrî also used the term bilād al-Türk for the 
Turkish lands to the north of Khurasan.68 However the north of Khorezm is also called 
as the land of Oğuz too.69 For Ghaznavids, of course, Turkestan meant far North, after 
Mawaraannahr, a safe place for the fugitives again and a source for the Turkic slaves-
gulam.70 Ebu’l-Kâsım Muhammed b. Havkal, in 977 used again bilād al-Turk version 
for the region and called Ozkend in Ferghana as the main Gate to the Turks.71  
                                                
63 Kudāme b. Cafer, Kitāb el-harāc. Leyden: De Goeje, 1967. p. 264. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, 
İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 
1998), p. 190.  
64 L. Rasonyi. Dünya Tarihinde Türklük (Ankara: İdeal Matbaa, 1942), p. 97.  
65 See E.A. Davidovich, “The Karahanids”. In History of Civilizatiıons of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part 
One. M.S. Asimov and C.E. Bosworth (Eds.) (Paris: UNESCO, 1998), pp. 119-143. For the further 
details about the history of Karahanids, being solely Eastern Turkestan state.  
66 See Svat Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 83. 
"Arabic Muslim sources called this dynasty al-Khaqaniya, 'That of the Turkic Khaqans,' while Persian 
sources often preferred the name Al-i Afrasiyab, 'The Family of Afrasiyab,' on the basis of the legendary 
kings of pre-Islamic Transoxiana."  
67 For Ghaznavids see Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and 
Eastern Iran 994-1040 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1992).  
68 El-Istahrī, Mesālik el-memālik (Leyden: de Goeje, 1927),pp. 245, 253 and 286. Parts published in 
Ramazan Şeşen, İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü 
Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 161. Interestingly he also tells us about the existence of a huge Turkic 
population in Afghanistan between Kabul and Vakhan and the lands down to Mongolia, Halaç Turks. P. 
160.  
69 El-İstahrī, p. 292, in Şeşen, p. 161-162.  
70 Erdoğan Merçil, Gazneliler Devleti Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989). See pages 
35-36, 56 and 61.  
71 Ebu’l-Kāsim Muhammed b. Havkal, Surāt-el-arz. (977) (Beirut: Dār Mektebet al-Hayāt), pp. 419-421. 
Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk 
Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 173.  
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For the first time, it was an anonymous Persian geography book of 982, Hudūd 
al-'Ālam used the term Turkestan in several occurrences. In this book, Khurasan,72 the 
whole of Transoxiana,73 the towns of Isbijab,74 Kath,75 and Gurganj76 were all 
considered to be either the frontiers or the “Gates of Turkistan”.77 Only twice did the 
unknown author use the term Turkestan alone, in one case he drew its northern 
frontier78 as Taraz and Shilji and in the second case it was defined to be a single region 
ruled by the Dokuzoğuz [Uygurs]79 in history. The comment of Minorskiy at the end 
clarifies that the term Turkestan that was applied extensively to the lands beyond 
Transoxiana.80 In 985, Seljuks moved into Bukhara. Towards the end of the century, 
pro-Shia Buwayhis captured Iraq and Iran and ended Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad. In 
999, the Ghaznavids defeated the Samanids in Khurasan and the Karahanids captured 
Bukhara, then Samanid capital.81  
 
3.2.5 The Advance of Turkification in Middle Asia 
Early in the 11th Century, the Ghaznavid rule was extended from Iraq to India. 
Turkestan was divided between the two Turkic dynasties: Ghaznavids in the south and 
southwest and Karahanids in the north and northeast. This was the real period when 
                                                
72 Hudūd al-'Ālam. 982AD. The Regions of the World. An Anonymous Persian geography. Trans. By V. 
Minorsky (London: Messrs, Luzac & Co., 1937), p. 102 “This country (Khurasan) produces horses and its 
people are warlike, it is the gate of Turkistan.”.."The Mir of Khorasan resides at Bukhara; He is from the 
Saman family and from Bahram Chubin’s descendants.” 
73 Hudūd al-'Ālam, p. 112 (Transoxiana) “is the Gate of Turkistan and a resort of merchants.” 
74 Hudūd al-'Ālam, p. 118. “Isbijab, a region on the frontier between the Muslims and the infidels. It is an 
extensive and pleasant locality on the frontier of Turkistan, and whatever is produced in any place of 
Turkistan is brought here.” 
75 Hudūd al-'Ālam, p. 121. “Kath, the capital of Khwarizm and the Gate of the Ghuz Turkistan. It is the 
emporium of the Turks, Turkistan, Transoxiana and the Khazar.” 
76 Hudūd al-'Ālam, p. 122. “The town abounds wealth, and is the Gate of Turkistan and resort of 
merchants.” 
77 Hudūd al-'Ālam, see Barthold’s Preface in p. 38 too.  
78 Hudūd al-'Ālam, p. 61. “...between the towns of Transoxiana and the towns of Turkistan up to the 
confines of Taraz and Shilji...” 
79 Hudūd al-'Ālam, p. 94. “The kings of the whole of Turkistan in the days of old were from the 
Toghuzghuz.” 
80 Hudūd al-'Ālam, p. 351. 
81 However it is still a mystery for us who were the exact fathers-roots of the Turkic Khagans who ended 
Samanids. See Barthold, p. 273.  
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Turkestan began being Turkified.82 At that time, another Muslim geographer, İbn el-
Fakîh, in 1002 used the term Seventh Climate for the land of Turks, or bilād al-Turk.83 
Written between 980-1003 and completed around 1003-4, Firdevsî's84 Shahnameh is 
one of the main references on the history of Iran-Turān relations. Turkestan in 
Shahnameh85 was well defined: united political entity86 under one Shah,87 with a 
homogenous Turk-Tatar88 population, however always inferior to Iran89 and backwards.  
Towards the mid-century the Karahanid state was split into two: one in 
Transoxiana and one in the Tarim Basin. And in 1040, Seljuks defeated the Ghaznavids 
in the battle of Dandanakan. The Ghaznavid historian Gerdîzî of Afghanistan, in 1041, 
in his Zeyn el-ahbâr used the term Turkestan extensively for the region.90 In 1051, 
Bîrûnî, used the term Fifth Climate for Turkestan and limited it with China (the county 
of Ye'cûc) goes through Kashgar, Balasagun, Rast, Ferghana, İsbicab, Shash, 
Samarkand, Bukhara, Khorezm to Caspian Sea.91  
                                                
82 Wilfried Nölle, Türkistan Tarihinin Yazımında Karşılaşılan Sorunlar. Trans. By Gültekin Oransay. 
Belleten Cilt XLIV, sayı 174 (Nisan 1980)'den Ayrıbasım (Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1980), 
p. 366. See also p. 348 where the author argues that Iranians used to call the region as Turan, which was 
basically the land of Barbarians.  
83 Ibn el-Fakīh, Kitāb el-büldān (Leyden: De Goeje, 1885), p. 6 Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, İslâm 
Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 
191. 
84 Firdevsī, born in Tāberan village of Tūs. His real name was Ebül-Kāsım. He has presented his book to 
Muhmud of Ghazna but not appreciated much, probably because of the humiliation of Turks extensively 
in the book. Died around 1020-1025. 
85 Although there are many translations of Shahnāmah, here used is the Şerīfī translation made by 
Hüseyin bin Hasan bin Muhammed el-Hüseynī el Hanefī in 1510 for the Memlük Sultan of Egypt Kansu 
Gavri. Şerîfî. Şehname Çevirisi. Cilt III. (metin) Hazırlayanlar: Dr. Zühal Kültüral and Dr. Latif Beyreli 
(Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları: 717, 1999).  
86 Firdevsī , Şerîfî translation, p. 1729, verse-beyt 48869.  
87 Firdevsī , Şerîfî translation, p. 1628, verse-beyt 45985.  Here, the term Tatar is added by the translator.  
88 Firdevsī , Şerîfî translation, p. 1665, verse-beyt 47046. 
89 Firdevsī , Şerîfî translation, p. 1745, verse-beyt 49320.  
90 Ebū Sa’id Abdülhayy b. Dahhāk el-Gerdīzī, Zeyn el-ahbār (1041) (Tahran: Abdülhayy Habībī, 1347 
H), pp. 255-256. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk 
Ülkeleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 71. “ ...because  it was far from being a 
wealthy country, Turkistan country was named after Turk..” and in p. 72. We can also see Turkistan being 
a safe heaven for the bandits, etc. Turkestan was a country, which was, united under one Khan. But 
interestingly at the same page it is said that Dokuzoğuz country was excluded from Turkistan. Whereas in 
many other sources, Turkistan was defined as the lands of Dokuzoğuz.  
91 Ebū’l Reyhān Muhammed b. Ahmed el-Bīrūnī, El-Tefhīm li evā’ili sinā’at el-tencīm (London: 1934), 
pp. 144-145. Parts published in Ramazan Şeşen, İslâm Coğrafyacılarına Göre Türkler ve Türk Ülkeleri 
(Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1998), p. 200. 
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Another example of native Turkestani literature of the time, Kutadgu Bilig,92 in 
1069, used the term Turān for the region.93 Just after a couple of years, another example 
of the native literature, Divān-ī Lūgat-et Turk of Mahmud al-Kashgārī,94 the first 
encyclopedical dictionary of the Turkish Language did not contain an entry under the 
term of Turkestan. The entry "Türkmen", however, has been associated with Alexander 
the Great's naming of the Oğuz  "similar to the Turk".95 Describing the Turkic world in 
the 11th century, al Kashgārī did not use the term Turkestan but preferred to use 
Turkified versions like "Turkish Lands" [Türk İlleri],96 or specific terms like "Uygur 
Lands" [Uygur İlleri].97 
It was in 1055, the Seljuks captured Baghdad from Buwayhids and established a 
sultanate protecting the Caliph. In 1073, the Seljuks defeated the Karahanids. Following 
the death of the Seljuk Sultan Melik Shah in 1092, the Seljuk Empire broke up into 
three successor states: in Anatolia, in Persia and in Transoxiana-Khurasan.  
 
3.2.6 Turkestan Before the Mongols in the 12th Century 
In 1124, the Mongolian Khitais were driven out of China by Tungustic Juchen; 
they then established a Kara Khitai state in what is now known as eastern Kazakstan. In 
1137, Kara Khitais defeated Seljuk-vassal Karahanids in Hocend. In 1140, Kara Khitais 
                                                
92 Knowledge of Happiness, written by Yusuf Has Hâcib in 1069/1070 and dedicated to Karahanid 
Khagan Ebu Ali Hasan bin Süleyman Arslan, one of the first examples of Muslim Turkic literature.  
93 Yusuf Has Hâcib, Kutadgu Bilig II: Tercüme (Trans. Into Turkish by Reşid Rahmeti Arat) (Ankara: 
Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından II. Seri, No. 20 TTK Basımevi, 1959). Although in p.1A there is a 
Turkestan word in the facsimile copy, this part is an anonymous introduction probably written in later 
periods in order to multiplying the copies of the text. Yusuf Has Hâcib rather used four terms for the 
world's regions, İran, Turan, Maçin and Çin. 
94 Written in 1071-1073 for teaching Arabs Turkish language and basically showing that Turkish is as 
rich as Arabic. Only complete copy is dated from 1266, copied  by Mehmed bin Ebu Bekr of Damascus. 
95 Mahmud Kaşgari, Divanğ Lûgat-it-Türk. C.I. Faksimile, C.II&III Trans (Ankara: TDK Yayınları, 
1941), p. v, iii, 415. This Türkmând or Türkmen version is also associated with Alexander the Great in 
many other sources of Islamic geography.   
96 Reşat Genç, Kaşgarlı Mahmud’a Göre XI. Yüzyılda Türk Dünyası (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma 
Enstitüsü, 1997), pp. 36-49.  
97 Reşat Genç, p. 48. For example, Ötüken was a place name in the deserts of Tataristan and very close to 
Uygur lands.  
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defeated Seljuk Sultan Sancar in Katwan and captured Transoxiana. In 1153, the 
Selçuks were overthrown by the Oğuz in Merw. Towards the end of the century, the 
Selçuks in Khurasan and Persia were dissolved and the Turkic Khorezmians became the 
new rulers of Transoxiana. A History of the Selçuks, written towards the end of this 
century, never used the term Turkestan but rather an interesting term as Harkavat 
Lands, which meant the land of tents.98 Khorezmian power started to shine in this 
century that was in the middle of western Turkestan and had a strategic location from 
the beginning.99 Under the Khorezmians, the difference between Khurasan and 
Turkestan became clearer.100 
 
3.3 Unification Under the Mongols 
Born in 1167 as Yesügei’s eldest son, Temujin, Chengiz Khan was first a vassal 
to Kereyits, then allied himself with Wang-Khan and conquered the lands of Kereyit.101 
He has achieved the unification of Mongols just after the conquest of Nayman 
country.102 In 1206, Chengiz Khan became the Khan of Mongols. In 1209, the Mongols 
defeated the Kirghiz and forced them to flee south of Tien Shan. Within the same year, 
Uygurs accepted Mongol rule. In 1210, Khorezm defeated Kara Khitais. The conquests 
of Northern China and then the Old Kara Khitai Empire made Chengiz Khan a neighbor 
of the Khorezmian Empire in 1218103. He destroyed this young empire in 1220. “His 
                                                
98 Şadruddîn Ebu’l-Hasan Ali İbn Nâşır İbn Ali El-Hüseyni, Ahbar üd-Devlet is-Selçukiye. Trans. By 
Necati Lugal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1943. Around 600 H.), p. 50. “When Melikshah 
attacked to Land of Tents (Harakavat) and captured the ruler of Taraz, Surhab... made his preparations 
in Rey, moved towards Mā warā' al-Nahr and arrived Samarkand...”. 
99 İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Harzemşahlar Devleti tarihi (1092-1229) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 
1956), p. 30. Kafesoğlu here argues that Khoream existed as a center of trade and culture from the very 
early ages on. See also Z.V. Togan, Harezm Kültürü Vesikaları I, Horezmce Tercümeli Mukaddimat al-
Adâb (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1961).  
100 Kafesoğlu, p. 143. He quotes from Kâmus-u Turkî here as calling Khurasan, Iraq and Turkestan were 
the names of different Islam lands. See also Fuad Köprülü. İslam Ansiklopedisi, Harizmşahlar article.  
101 René Grousset (trans. Naomi Walford), The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. P. 189-2 
09.  
102 Grousset, 213-6.  
103 Grousset, p. 236.  
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yasaq established throughout Mongolia and Turkestan a ‘pax Jenghiz-Khana’...”104 In 
1218, Mongols captured Jetisu and the Tarim Basin-Kashgar. In the same year, 
Khorezm Shah Muhammad executed the Mongol envoys; then Mongols started their 
westwards run. In 1219, Mongols crossed Syr Darya and invaded Transoxiana. In 1220, 
they captured Samarkand and Bukhara; and defeated Khorezmians. The height of 
Khorezm power was in 1215 when famous Celâleddîn was appointed as the governor of 
Gûr, Herât, Garcistân and Sicîstân by his father Sultan Alaâddîn. In 1221, he defeated 
the Mongols of Chengiz Khan twice. In the third battle, in the fall of 1221, he was 
defeated but managed to escape. The following years were spent with the re-
establishment of the Khorezm state in different places and Mongols kept an eye on him, 
attacked him at any time he surfaced himself. After 1228, his end is still a mystery and 
subject to many legends. Somehow, he had managed to disappear!105 
 
3.3.1 Geographers’ Turkestan concept During the Chengizid-Çağatay Rule  
Mongols conquered Khurasan and Afghanistan in 1221 and finished their 
conquest of Turkestan as a whole. After the death of Chengiz Khan in 1227, the empire 
was divided among his successors. The successor of Chengizid rule in Transoxiana, 
Tarim Basin and Jeti Su was the Çağatay Khanate. Under the strict Mongolian rule, in 
1270, the Uygur Kingdom was incorporated into the Çağatay Khanate. This was 
probably the first time in recorded history, when the Eastern, Western, Southern and 
Northern Turkestan were united under one central rule.  
The Secret History of the Mongols, which was written in 1240, does not use the 
term Turkestan for the region, and however used terms like the steppe of ten thousand 
                                                
104 Grousset, p. 252.  
105 Aydın Taneri. Harzemşahlar (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları/114, 1993). For Khorezm 
Shahs also see Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha by Melik Ata Juvainî.  
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Kirghiz or the Southern country.106 An Arab history-geography book of 1245 defined 
Turkestan as the north of Syr Darya, from Ferghana on.107 In many cases, the whole of 
smaller Khorezm country and all the lands north of Syr Darya was included into the 
term Turkestan108- while Transoxiana (Mawaraannahr)109 as a rule was always 
excluded.  
One of the best accounts of the Chengizid period has been the Tarikh-i Jahan 
Gusha of Juvainî. He defined Turkestan as the lands between Mawaraannahr and 
Machin.110 He limited the countries of Islam from the frontiers of Turkestan to the 
uttermost of Syria.111 He was always careful enough to use the terms Mawaraannahr 
and Turkestan separately.112 Explaining about the Mongolians' approach to Turkestan 
from Northeast, he claims that the city-region of Balasagun was also a realm of 
Turkestan.113 At the same time, he also pointed out similarities in the geography and 
culture of the two regions.114 Apart from these general usages, he also used the term in a 
limited way as a province too, an entity, probably around Sayram and Yassi.115 The 
undefined nature of the term made it difficult for the reader, but still, Turkestan was 
both a local unit (country and/or province) as well as a broader name of a region.116  
                                                
106 Manghol-un Niuça Tobça’an. Moğolların Gizli Tarihi. (Originally 1240) Trans by. Ahmet Temir 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1948), p. 160. But apparently for Mongols the region did not 
represent any special, limited meaning.  
107 İbn Abîl-Hadîd Al-Madâ’ınî, Sharh Nahj Al-Balâgha. Les Invasions Mongoles en Orient (Paris: 
Editions L’Harmattan, 1994 -completed in 1245), p. 18.  
108 İbn Abîl-Hadîd Al-Madâ’ınî, pp. 22-23  
109 İbn Abîl-Hadîd Al-Madâ’ınî, see pp. 23 and 25.  
110 Ala-ad-Dîn Ata Malik Juvainî, Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha. (1260s) (Translated from the text of Mirza 
Muhammad Qazvini by J.A. Boyle) (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 9-10.  
111 Juvainî, p. 25.  
112 Juvainî, p. 44.”... the qara-Khitai subjugated Mā warā' al-Nahr and Turkestan”.  
113 Juvainî, p. 58. “...when he had come to the boundary of Turkestan he beheld a pleasant plain with 
abundance of grass and water. He himself settled here and founded the town Balasaqun...” 
114 Juvainî, p. 109. “For in Mā warā' al-Nahr and Turkestan many persons, especially woman, claim to 
have magical powers”.  
115 Juvainî, p. 597. “..., there fell the whole of Transoxiana [Mā warā' al-Nahr], Turkestan, Otrar, the land 
of the Uighur, Khotan, Kashgar, Jand, Khorazm and Farghana.” 
116 Juvainî, p. 609. “And in all the countries from Turkestan to Khurasan, and uttermost Rum and 
Georgia...” also see p. 703 for the broader mean including Mogulstan. “They said that when the world-
emperor Chinghiz Khan set out fromTurkestan, before he came to the countries of Islam...”. 
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In 1271, an Armenian priest Grigor of Akner wrote “as we heard from some 
Mongols, their race went to East by leaving their motherland Turkestan, and spent a 
very poor life there, occupied in basically plundering by”.117 This is the only case in the 
text he used the word Turkestan. In a 1278 copy of Mesnevi of Rūmī,118 the term 
Turkestan was very rarely used and mostly in a less than sympathetic sense, as a source 
of traps and wrong doings.119 
In 1282, Ebūlferec-Ibnūlibrī described Turkestan as an administrative unit, like a 
principality around Otrar through the northern shores of Syr Darya.120 However, the 
term Turkestani was still used in a broader sense, including all the Turkics and even 
everyone south of Syr Darya.121 In this book, the adjacent territories in the region were 
named as  Turkestan, Mawaraannahr and Khurasan.122 
Marco Polo, after 26 years of his travels in Asia, writing his memoirs in 1298, 
called Turkestan Great Turquie.123 For him Great Turquie started from Kashgar and 
extended to the Aral Sea.124 This region is on the northwest of Hormuz(?), and was 
ruled by Kaidu.125 He called all the natives of Central Asia Tartars, and included 
Transoxiana into Great Turquie.126 
                                                
117 Aknerli Grigor, Moğol Tarihi (Trans. Into Turkish by Hrand D. Andreasyan) (İstanbul: İstanbul 
Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi yayınları/582, 1954. (Originally written in 1271, a collection of memoirs, 
other history books and interviews with other travelers) p. 3. 
118 This 1278 copy is copied by Mevlana's son Sultan Veled's student Dervish Abdullah bin Muhammed 
of Konya and still in the Mevlana Museum of Konya.  
119 Mevlana Celâleddin Rûmî, Mesnevi ve Şerhi. Vol. IV. Şerheden: Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı (İstanbul: 
Başbakanlık Kültür Müsteşarlığı Kültür Yayınları, 1974), p. 337. Verse-Beyit 2375. "Many folks arrived 
Türkistan from China and saw traps, false but nothing else..."  
120 Ebülferec-İbnülibrî, Tarihi Muhtasârüddüvel (Trans. Into Turkish by Şerafettin Yaltkaya) (İstanbul: 
Maarif Matbaası, 1941 - completed in 1282 by Assyrian Bishob Ebülferec, mostly in Assyrian and 
Arabic) p. 9.  
121 Ebülferec-İbnülibrî, p. 17. 
122 Ebülferec-İbnülibrî, p. 21.  
123 Marco Polo, The Travels. Trans. By Ronald Latham (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1987). In 
this version, Latham translated the term Turquie, the original term used by Polo, as Turkestan. See also 
Marco Polo, The Description of the World (London: George Routledge & Sons Limited, 1938). In the 
facsmile copy, Marco Polo called Anatolia as Turcomanie and Eastern Turkestan as Icogusritan 
(Uyguristan?).  
124 Marco Polo. The Travels., p. 83. Khotan and all Uyguristan are also included to Great Turquie.  
125 Marco Polo. The Travels., p. 313.  
126 Marco Polo. The Travels., p. 317.  
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A vizier of the Iranian-Mongol Court, Rashidūddin Fazlullah, in early 14th 
century (around 1304) used the term Turkestan extensively in his Jami’ut-Tawārikh.127 
He used the terms Turkestan and Uyguristan128 as adjacent territories. By this time, 
Turkestan was still a safe place for fugitives politically.129 The city of Otrar130 was 
basically the southern frontier of Turkestan131 to Mawaraannahr. This Turkestan region 
was neighboring Kirghiz in the Northeast. His usage of the term included the meanings 
of the word as a region,132 as a province,133 and as a country.134 As a realm, Turkestan 
was between the two Ulusses of Qubilai and Hulagü,135 and was devastated by Mongols 
several times.136 As a region, Turkestan was a region like Anatolia or Azerbaijan.137 In 
this text, for the first time the city of Yassi was called as Turkistan138  
                                                
127 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, Jami’ut-Tawārikh. (1304) Compendium of Chronicles. A  History of the 
Mongols. Trans. By W.M. Thackson (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998).  
128 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 22 of Part I “... the vicinity of the territories known as Turkistan and 
Uyguristan.” This is one of the first instances we find the word eastern neighbor of Turkestan as 
Uyguristan.  
129 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 155 of Part I. “... fled from there and emerged in Qirgiz and Uygur territory 
and Turkistan... seized the entire area of Turkistan... [Gürkan] was Genghis Khan’s contemporary in 
Turkistan...” This is also providing us the eastern and northern limits of Turkestan.  
130 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 145 of Part I. “... had fled to Turkistan..., taken over the whole province of 
Turkistan..., had taken Turkistan..., seized all of the realm of Turkistan along with Otrar, the frontier..., set 
out immediately for Turkistan and Iran.” This can be taken as a concrete evidence of the dual usage of the 
term both in regional and provincial meanings.  
131 Turkistan in this context should not be a bigger regional identity because, there are several descriptions 
with words like, approaching to Turkistan, passing through Turkistan etc. See Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 
430 of art II. “When he reached Turkistan nearly a hundred fifty thousand horsemen gathered around 
him”.  
132 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 229 of Part I. See Khorezmshah’s piece of territory in Turkestan. (A part of 
Turkestan). See also p. 235 of Part I. “... in the region of Turkistan...” 
133 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 374 of Part II, Chengiz Khan sending his commanders to seize and conquer 
Otrar and other cities of Turkistan. (surrounding Otrar.)  
134 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 410 of Part II. “The countries of Turkistan and Transoxiana, the lands of the 
Uygur, Ferghana and Khwarazm he gave to Amir Mas’ud Beg.” 
135 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 521 of Part III. “Between these two Ulusses [Ulus of Qubilai in Cathay and 
Machin and Ulus of Hülagü from Syria to Abaqa] lies the territory of Turkistan and Qipchakbashi, which 
is under your control.” 
136 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 455 of Part II. “It is well known that the realm of Turkistan was first 
devastated by Alghu, then by Qaban, Chübai,...” 
137 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 756 of Part III. “... Places that have been devastated in other territories by 
killing like follow lands of Baghdad, Azerbaijan, Turkistan, Iran, Anatolia...” 
138 Rashidūddin Fazlullah, p. 756 of art III. “[Massacres in cities] Balkh, Shebergan, Taliqa, Marv, 
Sarakh, Herat, Turkistan, Tay, Hamadan, Qum, Isfahan, Maragha, Ardebil, Barda, anja, Baghdad, Mosul, 
Arbala and most provinces attached to these places...” These are the names of well-known cities of 
history and also provinces. So we might conclude that there was a defined territory of a province around 
the city of Turkistan. 
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Ibn Batuta, while not having or giving a concrete idea where exactly Turkestan 
was,139 noted that, it was certainly neighboring China140 and Transoxiana.141  
Sir John Mandeville,142 an English Knight who claimed to have met the great 
Khan in the first half of the 14th century, wrote his controversial memoirs in 1356.143 
For him Anatolia was Turkye,144 realm of the Golden Horde was Tartary145 (or Lesser 
Tartary) and Central Asia was Greater Tartary. However only once in the text, the word 
Turquesten146 [Turkestan] was used, with a definition of its rough borders. It was 
basically a province from Khurasan to Ferghana-Eastern Turkestan.  
 
3.3.2 Unification Under Timur and the "Golden Days of Turkestan" 
In the early years of the 14th century, the Çağatay Khanate was split into two 
parts, one in the West (i.e. Transoxiana), and the other in the East (i.e. Moghulistan).147 
In 1326, the Çağatay Khan Tarmashirin was converted to Islam. The assassination of 
Emir Kazghan, in 1357, had brought anarchy to Transoxiana.148 Taking advantage of 
                                                
139 Ibn Batuta, Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-1354 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 148 
"... this Sultan Uzbeg, the Sultan of Turkistan and the lands beyond Oxus..." 
140 Ibn Batuta, p. 171, "...Almaliq, which is on the frontiers of Turkistan and China..." 
141 Ibn Batuta, p. 300 "...he choose to make his capital at the city of Qaraqorum, on the account of its 
proximity to the territories of his cousins, the kings of Turkistan and Transoxiana." 
142 It is still not known whether Mandeville really made all the travels he is writing about. However it is 
possible to see from the content of the book, he used mostly other travel accounts of the time and 
probably not made most of the travels in reality. It is still a valuable source for us in order to understand 
the basic terminology used in Europe about the region.  
143 Sir John Mandeville, The Travels of Sir John Mandeville. Trans. By C.W.R.D. Moseley 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987). Original French circulated through Europe between 1356-1366, 
written after more than thirty years of travels-however most of the book is quite full of controversies and 
its trustworthiness is open to debate. 
144 Sir John Mandeville, p. 53.  
145 Sir John Mandeville, p. 103. "...so to Tartary. This Tartary is under the suzerainty of the Great Khan of 
Cathay...The prince who governs that land is called Baco [Batu] and he dwells in a city called Orda." See 
also p. 44 of "the lesser and Greater tartary." And pages 112 and 144 for Tartary. (lesser)  
146 Sir John Mandeville, p. 160. "This land of Cathay is in deepest Asia, and in the west it borders the 
kingdom of Tarse...On this, the western, side of that kingdom, is the land of Turquesten [Turkestan], 
which reaches as far west as the Kingdom of Khorasan. In the country of Turquesten are only a few cities, 
the best of them being Eccozar [Farab]." Also see p. 161 for Turquesten.  
147 After years of succession struggles among the members of the house of Chengiz, the split was 
inescapable. See Grousset, p. 326-46. Especially p. 342. “The ruler of Transoxiana was Khan Kazan (ca. 
1343-46), Yassawur’s son, whose capital was Karshi.” However He could not guaranteed the support of 
Turkic nobility in Turkestan and soon assassinated.   
148 Grousset, p. 409.  
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this, the governor of Ili,149 Tuğlug Timur became last declared Çağatay Khan and ruled 
in Transoxiana. However, years of struggle between the Mongolian aristocracy and the 
Turkic nobility weakened both.150 It was only after Timurlane and his comrade Mir 
Husain found Kabil Shah,151 a great great grandson of Chengiz, and declared him the 
Khan, thus ending the anarchy.152 In 1363, Timur expelled Khan Tuğlug Timur 
replacing him with Kabil Shah, a puppet. By 1369, Timur became the sole ruler of the 
Transoxiana and between 1380-87 he conquered Iran. Towards the end of the century, 
the Turfan Uygurs also accepted Islam. In 1395, Timur defeated Khan Toktamış of the 
Golden Horde; and in 1398, crushed the Delhi sultanate; and in 1401, destroyed 
Baghdad. After defeating the Ottomans in 1402, Timur died in 1405.  
An Arab history-geography book of 1345 by Al-Umarī, differentiated Mā warā' 
al-Nahr and bilād al-Turk sharply; but used the term Turkestan only once in the text as 
to mean them both.153 He counted the provinces of Turkestan as Şaharkand, Gand, 
Bergand, Otrar, Sayram, Giçil, Gaşkin, Barsaka, Ardaba, Yanki, Kanyak, Taraz [Talas], 
Yangi Kent, Sikül, Almaka, Bişbalık, Hamül, Qarshi, Hutan, Kashgar, Badakshan, 
Gawran and Balasagun.154 In other places, he used the term bilād al-Turk 
simultaneously for a limited province in the north of Syr Darya as well as the Greater 
Turkestan as a whole.155 
                                                
149 Historical Ili was claimed by some contemporary Kyrgyz authors as exactly the territories of today’s 
Kyrgyzstan. See Ömürkul Karaev, “Bayırkı Turk Estelikteri jana Arab-Pers Avtorloru Kırgızdar jana 
Kırgızistan Jönündö,” In Keneş Yusupov (Ed.) Kırgızdar: Sanjıra, Tarıkh, Muras (Bişkek: Kırgızstan 
Baspası, 1993), p. 85. 
150 Grousset, p. 409-10.  
151 See Karl-Heinz Golzio, Regents in Central Asia Since the Mongol Empire (Köln: E.J. Brill, 1985), pp. 
21-23. For a detailed list of Chaghatayid rulers from 1227 to 1402. In fact after Kabul Shah Timur had 
two-orther puppet Khans, Suyurgatmış (1370-88) and Mahmud Khan (1388-1402).  
152 Grousset, p. 411.  
153 Al-Umarī, Masālik al-absār fī mamālik al-amşār.(trans. By Klaus Lech) Das Mongolische Weltreich 
(Weisbaden: Otto Harrowitz, 1968). Al-Umari born in Syria in 1301 and finished his work most probably 
around 1345. P. 116.  
154 Al-Umarī, p. 116. However still excludes Mā warā' al-Nahr and Ferghana.  
155 Al-Umarī, see pages 123, 132 and 164.  
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Just a century later than Marco Polo, a Spanish-Castellian ambassador traveled 
to Turkestan at the very height of Timur’s power in 1404.156 In his memoirs, de Clavijo, 
the Spanish envoy used the term Tatar for all the Turkic population of Turkestan, Ajem-
Farsi for the Persian speakers and kept Tajik as a separate term.157 In this text the term 
Tataristan was used both for the Turkestan region and for a much larger entity to 
include all northern lands neighboring Turkestan. Clavijo also used the term Turkestani 
for a group of people in the current day Armenia,158 most probably for the Turkic 
speaking Karapapaks. According to him the south of Oxus spoke Persian, and the North 
spoke Turkic.159 
A unique piece of native Turkestani chronicle, Nizamüddin Şami’s Zafernāme 
was completed in 1401-2. Again, here Turkestan was said to be a safe heaven for the 
political fugitives,160 with ghost towns.161 However, at the height of the golden days of 
Turkestan, the author uses Turan162 much more extensively than the term Turkestan.163 
He considers Turkestan as a part of the Turan provinces.164  
                                                
156 Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, Mememoirs: Anadolu, Orta Asya ve Timur. (Embajada a Tamor Lan) Timur 
Nezdine Gönderilen İspanyol Sefiri Clavijo’nun Seyahat ve Sefaret İzlenimleri (İstanbul: Ses Yayınları, 
1993).  (First Edition in Seville, by Andrea Piscioni, 1582) Trans. by Ömer Rıza Doğrul. See this book 
for the details of Timurid court in the height of its power. For Timur also see İsmail Aka, Timur ve 
Devleti (Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991).  
157 Clavijo, p. 124.  
158 Clavijo, p. 203.  
159 Clavijo, p. 127-8.  
160 Nizâmüddin Şâmi, Zafernâme (Trans. By Necati Lugal from Persian) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 
Yayınları-Basımevi, 1949). (original completed in 1401-2 with the orders of Timur, this can be 
considered as an official Timurid history book). P. 73. Although Turkestan was considered as a safe 
heaven for fugitives, it was simply because of Timurid tolerance to the people of the region, he kept 
appointing other people to Turkestan as governors as a promotion. See p. 107.  
161 Harold Lamb, The March of the Barbarians (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1941), p. 291. “It was out 
of such a Turkestan, with its ghost cities and memories, that Tamerlane emerged.”  
162 See also Şerafettin Ali, Timur ve Tüzükatı. By Mustafa rahmi and Kevser Kutay (İstanbul: 
Academyplus Yayınevi, 2000), p. 37 the lands conquered by Timur. “Iran and Turan, Rum Gilan, Şirvan, 
Azerbaycan, Fars, Horasan, Cidde, Büyük Tataristan, Harezm, Hutin, Rabelistan, bahtar zemin, Mağrib, 
Suriye, Mısır, Irak-ı Arab, Irak-ı Acem, Mazderan, Hindistan...” aslo see p. 94 "… Fergana’da Andican 
ve Türkistan vilayetleri...” and p. 96. “Turan’ı feth ile Semerkand tahtına oturduktan sonra...” 
163 Nizâmüddin Şâmi, see pages 9. (İran and Turan, p. 10, Iran and Turan, p. 11, Iran and Turan. However 
it is explained that these two terms meant the total realm of Timur in his life time.  
164 Nizâmüddin Şâmi, p. 343, 307, 347.  
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Beatrice Manz named the Timurid Empire the Ulus Çağatay.165 For Manz, 
Turkistan was farther north than the Ulus Çağatay, whose center was Samarkand. 166 
 
3.3.3 Timurid Heritage and the Arrival of Shaybanid Uzbeks to Turkestan 
From 1407 to mid-century, Timur`s son Shah Rukh167 in Herat and Shah Rukh’s 
son Uluğ Beg in Samarkand had ruled the Timurid Empire. As an excellent piece of 
Turkestani history of the century, Mirza Uluğbek completed his Tarikh-i Arba’ Ulus in 
1425. As the fashion of the time, he started his history of Turkestan with Noah and 
made the classical genealogical connection of Noah with the Turkic Khans of the 
region.168 He also used the term Turan169 extensively in the text for all Turkic-Oğuz 
lands.170 But still, the North and the East of Mawaraannahr was considered as Turkestan 
for sure.171 In order to explain the arrival of the Shaybanids, he claimed that the people 
of Turkestan had joined the Uzbegs172 easily and voluntarily.173 He also used western 
                                                
165 Beatrice Forbes Manz, The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991). See also the map in p. 8 for an example of broader-undefined borders of Turkestan where 
Turkestan was marked in the North of Aral Sea and Lake Balkash, somewhere exactly called as Kirghiz 
Steppe in the later centuries.  
166 Manz p. 80. Quoting Ibn Arabshah, she points out that: “To garrison the forts on the borders of 
Turkistan, he brought in soldiers from almost all the regions he had conquered...” and aslo see p. 87. 
“...and he installed Shahrukh’s other son, Ulugh Beg, on the Turkistan frontier, to guard the regions of 
Tashkent, Sayram and Ashbara.” 
167 See İsmail Aka, Mirza Şahruh ve zamanı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994). For more 
information about the life and environment of Shah Rukh (1405-47).  
168 Mirzo Uluğbek, Türt Ulus Tarikhi. Toshkent: Çolpan Nashriyeti, 1994. (Original: tarikh-i Arba’ Ulus. 
completed in 1425) It is also known as Şejeret-it Türk. P. 15-30. "Turkhan ibn Yafes ibn Nuh..." See also 
p. 36. “Turkiston zamin mamlakati” exists from the time of Noah on according to him. 
169 However Mirzo Uluğbek excludes Turkestan term from Turan at one instance in, p. 297. When he 
counts the names of “Turan-zamin mamlakatlar” as Kashgar, Balkh, Badakshan, Kabil, Gazna, and the 
lands down to the Sind Darya. (Indus)  
170 Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 51 and several other places. Also see p. 49, according to him Oğuzkhan conquered 
China, Kara-Khitai, Turkistan and Saklab (Slav-lands) where Turkestan was from Sayram to Samarkand 
and Bukhara. Here we see an open inclusion of Mā warā' al-Nahr into the concept of Turkestan. However 
in the following pages, p. 57, Mā warā' al-Nahr and Turkestan used separately. North of Turkestan was 
Dasht-i Kipchak.  
171 Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 115.  Also note that the extensive usage of Iran & Turan in the text. Also the words 
Tacik and Kazak appear all over the text.  
172 Arguably the name Uzbek(Özbek) was related to the Ozbek Khan, the Khan of the Golden Horde 
(1305-1337), a descendant of Chingiz Khan through Chaghatai. According to Caferoğlu the name Uzbek 
was an ethnonym given by the Golden Horde Khan Özbek to his own people until 1340. See Ahmet 
Caferoğlu, Türk Kavimleri (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1983).  
173 Mirzo Uluğbek , p. 226. He underlines the Turks of Turkestan tough. And calls it "Türkistan diyârı".  
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(Soldüz) Turkestan term for the shores of Murghab River.174 In his last page, he said 
that he tried to count all the names of Turkestan rulers.175  
In the meantime, from the early 15th century on, the Shaybanid Uzbeks moved 
southwards to Transoxiana under Abul Khayr Khan (1413-69).176 Abul Khayr’s power 
was at its height in the mid-century, but soon, in 1456-7, his lands started to be invaded 
by the Oirat-Kalmucks.177 Almost simultaneously, two of his vassal chieftains Karai and 
Canibeg, left him and found refuge in the domain of Esen-Bugha of Çağatay, whose 
tribes178, later on, were called as Kazaks or Kirghiz-Kazaks.179 Abul Khayr was killed in 
1468 in fighting against these "dissident Uzbeks." It was Abul Khayr's grandson 
Muhammad Shaybani, who succeeded him, as the vassal of Tashkent Khan Mahmud.  
Soon, his power in Turkestan was increased. However, the Shaybanids of Siberia 
continued to exist until the  1580s.180 
By the late 15th century, the Kazak Empire was established in Northern 
Turkestan steppes, whereas in the south, in 1497, the ruler of Ferghana, Babür, last of 
the Timurids, had captured Samarkand.  
At the end of the 15th century, the Ottoman historians were quite sure as to the 
geographical location of Turkestan. In Kitâb-ı Cihân-Nümâ, Neşrî explained that Turks 
                                                
174 Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 275.  
175 Mirzo Uluğbek, p. 326. “... Turkistan zamin hakanlarning namları şu risalada darj kilingandir.” 
176 Note that although Uzbeks were the Turkic stock of Northern Turkestan, Shaybanids were truely a 
Chingizite dynasty. They have descended from the grandson of Cenghiz Khan Shayban, who was the 
brother of both Batu and Berke. See Grousset, p. 478-9, “ At Jenghiz Khan’s death, Shayban was allotted 
the territories east and southeast of the southern Ural river, including a large part of the province of 
Aktyubinsk and Turgai.... About the middle of the fourteenth century, the hordes subject to the 
Shaybanids took the name of Özbeg....... although the origin of the name is still obscure.” See also 
Mehmet Alpargu, Onaltıncı Yüzyılda Özbek Hanlıkları (Ankara: 72 Ofset, 1995). For a detailed 
genealogical list of the Uzbeks. p. 8.  
177 Grousset, p. 479. 
178 See Abdülkadir İnan, “Türk Kabile İsimlerine Dair,” Türkiyat Mecmuası, Cilt I, p. 258-265, 1925 In 
Makaleler ve İncelemeler (Ankara: Türk tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1968), Cilt I. P. 1-7. For a good and 
detailed list and historical genealogy of Turkic tribal names.   
179 Grousset, p. 480. Kazak here means “adventurer” or “rebel”. Grousset basically calls them as 
"dissident Uzbeks."  
180 In fact it was somewhere near Tobol when in 1428 Abul Khayr, first Shaybanid Khan was proclaimed 
as Khan in Siberia. Russians in 16th century, from 1580s on conquered and re-conquered the Khanate and 
ended the Shaybanid rule in the North.  
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were descended from Yafeth son of Noah and lived in a country between Oxus and 
China, which was called bilâd-ı Turkistân (lands of Turkestan). The capital of 
Turkestan was Talas city; and Sayram, Karshi, Karakum and Bursun were included in 
the Lands of Turkestan.181 However, Neşrî also included all other Turkics of the region 
into this realm and called it a country like China, Sind-Hind or Rum.182 Completed his 
Muhākemetü'l Lugateyn in 1499, the renowned poet and scholar Alī Şīr Nevāyī, did not 
use the term Turkestan at all in his book.183 Instead, he used the terms like Sart,184 Türk 
İli,185 İrān and Tūrān,186 Türk Ulusu187 quite extensively in the text.  
Covering the events between 1494 and 1530, in the memoirs of Babur, one can 
find the usages of the term to mean both a city,188 i.e. Yassi/Türkistan, and the region.189 
When describing the borders of his first realm, Ferghana,190 he did not use the term 
Turkestan. He rather used phrases like a "Qipchak from Turkistan,"191 "Shaybani Khan 
                                                
181 Mehmed Neşrî, Kitâb-ı Cihân-Nümâ-Neşrî Tarihi. I. Cilt. Hazırlayanlar: F.R. Unat and M.A Köymen 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1949 - Neşrî Completed his book in 1492), p. 9 “... this group is 
very brave-heroic and comes from Bulcan Khan bin Yafes bin Noah and Bulcas Khan had two sons: Turk 
and Mongol. Their grandsons were very populous in number that can be only known by the God. Their 
place was between Ceyhun and China which was called bilâd-ı Türkistân...” 
182 Mehmed Neşrî, p. 13.  
183 Alī Şīr Nevāyī, Muhākemetü'l Lugateyn. İki Dilin Muhakemesi. Hazırlayan: F. Sema Barutçu Özönder 
(Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları: 656, 1996). Contains also a facsimile copy of the Topkapı Nüshası.  
184 Alī Şīr Nevāyī, p. 161. Here Sart is used basically for all Persian speakers.  
185 Alī Şīr Nevāyī, p. 169, (B7b in facsimile) Türk İli meaning the whole Turkestan. However almost 
around the same time, in the very early 1500s, (before 1512) an Ottoman historian Firdevsî-i Rumî in his 
Kutb-nâme was using the term Türk İli exactly for Anatolia, especially Western Anatolia while 
explaining about Ottoman attacks to capture Aegean Islands and Midlli. See Firdevsî-i Rumî, Kutb-nâme 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları XVIII Dizi-Sayı.5, 1980). Hazırlayanlar: İbrahim Olgun, İsmet 
Parmaksızoğlu. P. 29b-7, 31b-10, 39a-2.  
186 Alī Şīr Nevāyī, p. 168, (B5b in facsimile) Meaning the two main parts of the world in fact.  
187 Alī Şīr Nevāyī, p. 179, (B23a in facsimile) "Türk Ulusınıng..." Note the use of Turkish Nation as a 
single identity here, however in the meaning of the Mongolian Ulus, basically a federation of Clans.  
188 Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, Baburnama [Parts I, II and III. By W.M. Thackston, Jr.] 
(Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993), pp. 2-3 and p. 44 of Part I. “.. the direction of Turkistan” and “... 
governor of Turkistan city...”   
189 Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, p. 265. Turkistan is a region-province like Badakhshan, 
Ferghana, Samarkand, Bukhara, Balkh.  
190 Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, p. 1. “The province of Ferghana is in the fifth climate, situated 
on the edge of civilized world. To the east is Kashgar, to the west Samarkand, and to the south the 
mountains that border Badakhshan. To the north, although there were cities like Almalyk, Almatu and 
Yengi (Otrar)...” 
191 Zahiru ddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, p. 18 “ a qipchak beg of Turkistan”, p. 56 “One was 
Khusrawshah, a qipchak from Turkistan”, p. 170, “ ... a Turkistani tarkhan...”. 
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in Turkistan,"192 as the source of the enemy Uzbeks arriving somewhere from north - in 
fact not very far north. 
 
3.3.4 The Concept of Turkestan Under the Rule of Shaybanid Uzbeks 
In 1500 the Uzbeks captured Samarkand under Muhammad Shaybani Khan 
(1451-1510), destroying the Timurid house in Turkestan.193 For Shaybani, Turkestan 
was a vast area, covering all Central Asia with the City of Turkestan (Yassi), where 
Hoja Ahmed Yassavi was buried, being its center.194  
Muhammad Shaybani, attacked first Khorezm and then turned to conquer 
Khurasan.195 His next target was to destroy the remnants of the Çağatayite house in 
Turkestan, the Mahmud Khan of Tashkent. Mahmud inflicted on him a defeat, receiving 
aid from his relatives in İli.196 Shaybani was killed in a battle against Shah Ismail in 
Merv in 1510. “Muhammad Shaybani, master of Western Turkestan, Transoxiana, 
Ferghana, and Khurasan, had made the Uzbek Empire the chief power in Central 
Asia.”197 Again, after years of power struggle, Babur’s influence and Persian attacks on 
                                                
192 Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, p. 15, p. 90. “During this time Baysungur Mirza was constantly 
sending people to Shaybani Khan in Turkistan requesting assistance. Shaybani Khan hastened from 
Turkistan and reaching our camp” [near Samarkand]. p. 170.  and p. 173. “...and his Uzbeks’ kith and kin 
had come from Turkistan.” 
193 The most important impact of this conquest was the ethnic and social 'Uzbekification' of Central Asia 
after this point. See Vincent Fourniau, Özbek Fethi: Orta Asya'da Toplulukların ve Siyasal İktidarların 
Teması. X. Türk Tarih Kongresi'nden Ayrıbasım (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 808. 
All orther groups, Kirghiz, Turkmen, and Tadjik just scattered either on the mountainous or desert areas 
of the region, leaving the agricultural areas under Uzbek domination.  
194 Şiban Han Dîvânı: İnceleme-Metin-Dizin-Tıpkıbasım. Yakup Karasoy (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu 
Yayınları: 614, 1998 - From the 16th century Mā warā' al-Nahr copy in İstanbul Topkapı Museum, Ahmed 
III kitaplığı.) See p. 149-150 Beyt 70a 1-15. It seems that being a faithful follower of Yassawi faith, 
Shaybani praised his Sheikh being the light and guide of all Turkestan who established himself in the city 
of Turkestan.  
195 Grousset, p. 481.  
196 Grousset, p. 482.  
197 Grousset, p. 482. Note that Western Turkestan was somewhere north of Transoxiana.  
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Turkestan, the throne of the Uzbek Khanate of Transoxiana passed to another line, the 
Janids, or Astrahanids.198 
 Between 1501 and 1511, Babur fought against the Uzbeks for the control of 
Samarkand. In 1504, Babur established himself in Kabul. In 1506 the Uzbeks captured 
Bukhara, in 1507 Heart, thus bringing a real end to the Timurid dynasty in Turkestan. 
Between the years 1514-33, the Eastern Çağatay Khan Sayid, a claimant to the Eastern 
Çağatay throne, moved his capital from İli to Kashgar. In 1522, Babur captured 
Kandahar and moved southwards.  
In 1546, Kashmiri Mirza Haidar Dughlat finished his Tārikh-i Rashīdī, a detailed 
history of Çağatays and Timurids. He was very careful in distinguishing Mawaraannahr 
and Turkestan terms.199 Although, the town of Yassi was already Turkestan by this 
time,200 he used the term also as a local administration unit-vilayat in his text.201 But in 
some other places of the text, he tends to separate the town of Turkestan form the town 
of Sayram,202 the twin town of the former. Still, his Turkestan concept was inclusive of 
at least the territories between Syr Darya and the Mongolian motherland, Mongolia.203 
                                                
198 See Grousset, p. 486. “When in 1554 the Russians annexed the Khanate of Astrakhan, a prince of the 
Jenghiz Khanite dynasty of Astrakhan named Yar Muhammad, and his son Jan, took refuge in Bukhara, 
with the Shaybanid Khan Iskander(1560-83), who gave his daughter to Jan, in marriage. As the male 
Shaybanid line became extinct in 1599 with the death of  Abd-al Mumin, the throne of Bukhara passed in 
the regular manner to the ‘Astrakhanid’ Baqi Muhammad, son of Jan and of the heiress of the Shaybans”.  
199 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi (A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia) 
Trans. By E. Denison Ross (London: Curzon Press, 1972 - original completed in 1546), p. 29. “...when 
the countries of Mā warā' al-Nahr and Turkistan together with all their dependencies...” This is also a 
broader usage simply because of the consideration of the all the lands beyond Mā warā' al-Nahr as 
Turkestan.  
200 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 53. “...Amir Timur sets out from Samarkand and for that winter 
took up his quarters [kishlak] in Turkestan.” 
201 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 68. “... In those days the Moghuls were constantly attacking 
Turkistan, Shash and Andijan...”(speaking of 1440s) 
202 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 79. “Having done this, he went forth to lay waste Turkistan and 
Sairam.” If it was a local principality, Sairam should have been included to the term, no need of repeating 
it, then here he implies the town of Turkestan again.  
203 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 91-2. “... and the Moghul Ulus moved towards Turkistan, 
spending the winter at a place in Turkistan on the banks of the Sihun, called Kara Tukai..., when [the 
inhabitants] of Turkistan learned the news of the advance of the Moghuls on their territory...” However 
from this description one may also understand that other side of Syr Darya was also Turkestan.  
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In this text, the Turkistan was located at the North and outside the realm of Tashkent,204 
neighboring205 but not covering Farghana.206 This definition covered Mawaraunnahr 
too. It was also the name of the town Yassi.207 Turkestan was a land where political 
fugitives could find themselves safe heavens,208 a place to re-concentrate and unify 
before launching an attack,209 a location between Mawaraannahr and Moghulistan.210 
Additionally, he counted Sairam, Andijan and Akshi as the territories of Turkestan.211 
A regional history book by Mir Gıyaseddîn Muhammed Huseynî Khwandamir, 
dated 1524, used the term Turkistan, only twice in the whole text.212 Although he was a 
local historian, he used the terms Mawaraannahr and Khurasan very extensively.  
The British merchant, Anthony Jenkinson traveled through Turkestan in 1558.213 
He referred to all the natives as "Tartars,"214 and following the age-old European 
geographical conceptions, for him, Bukhara was still in the realm of Bactria.215 The 
whole region was called  "Tartary."216  
The last Shaybanid ruler of Bukhara, Abdullah Khan, died in 1598 and the 
power was transferred to the Astarhanid dynasty in Turkestan. In the North, Russians 
                                                
204 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 118. 
205 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 134. 
206 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 367. “... musulmans of Turkistan, Shash and Farghana...” 
207 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 349.  
208 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 245. “...when the Uzbeg Sultans who were assembled in 
Samarkand heard this news, they were suddenly filled with terror and fled, scattered and dismayed to 
different parts of Turkistan.”..”The pursuers drove the Uzbegs out of Bukhara into the deserts of 
Turkistan...” Here we see a broader, undefined Turkestan but surely covering north, east and west to the 
steppes, and deserts in both directions.  
209 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 250 “The Uzbeg all collected together in Turkistan”. 
210 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 293. In this page Dughlat explaining the realms of Chaghatai 
counts Moghulistan, Kara-Khitai, Turkestan and Mā warā' al-Nahr.  
211 Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, p. 358. Another example of the broader description but also the 
anarchy on the concept. 
212 Khwandamir, Habību’s-Siyār. (Tome Three Part I Ghenghiz Khan-Amir Temür) Trans. By W. M. 
Thackson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p.1 “On the Khans of Turkistan...” and p. 3 “... 
he conquered all the lands of Moghulistan and Turkistan as far as Samarkand and Bukhara.” It is 
interesting here the author includes Samarkand and Bukhara to the lands of Turkistan.  
213 Anthony Jenkinson, "The Voyage of Master Anthony Jenkinson, made from the city of Moscow in 
Russia to the city of Bokhara in Bactria, in the year 1558" In Richard Hakluyt, Voyages and Discoveries 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972). See pages pp. 77-90. (A travel report)  
214 Richard Hakluyt, p. 77 and in p. 78see "...land of Tartars called Turkmen..." 
215 Richard Hakluyt, p. 84 and also in the title of the report in p. 77.  
216 Richard Hakluyt, p. 87, 88 and 89. "...the kings of Tartary...", "...long time in Tartary..." 
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destroyed Sibir Khanate. Kuçum Khan (the last Shaybanid ruler of Sibir Khanate) died 
in 1598. In the late 16th century, the Kazak confederation in the steppes was also divided 
into three Hordes: Lesser Horde (Kiçi Cüz-West), Middle Horde (Orta Cüz-Center), and 
Greater Horde (Ulu Cüz-East). 
 
3.3.5 The Russian Advance and the Changing Dynasties in Turkestan 
In the mid-16th century, the Russians conquered all Siberia and reached the 
Pacific Ocean. After the death of Muhammad Shaybani near Merv in 1510, his 
Shaybanids in Khiva drove the Safavids out of Khorezm and continued to exist in Khiva 
until 1920. Their most famous Khan was Abul Ghazi Bahadur Khan217 (1643-65), the 
author of Şecere-i Terakkime.218 In this genealogical source, he used the terms "Turk" 
and "Turkmen" almost interchangeably. He started with the classical story about the 
origins of Turks, being the descendants of Noah’s son Yafeth's son Türk.219 He used the 
word "Tajik" for the Persian speakers of Mawaraannahr, in order to distinguish them 
from the other peoples of the Persian stock.220 He used the word "Turkestan" three times 
in the original text. The first usage was in reference to the city of Turkistan and the 
surrounding area.221 The second one was for a province on the same footing as the 
provinces such as Yangi Kent or Andijan.222 And finally he used the term "Turkestan" 
as a country but did not mention its borders.223 
                                                
217 For the life of Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan(1603-63), see EbulGazi Bahadır Khan, Şecere-i Terakkime. 
Hazırlayan: Zuhal Kargı Ölmez (Ankara: Simurg, 1996), pp. 21-7. This history of Turks book was 
finished by his son, soon after his death. 
218 Grousset, p. 487.  
219 Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p. 234-6. He also uses Turan, Iran and Hindistan quite often, however 
Turan meaning mostly Turkestan.  
220 Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p. 255.  
221 Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p. 138-Facsimile text. But still he does not limit the ‘surrounding area’. 
222 Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p.182-Facsimile text. Here too the borders left undefined but the city in the 
center probably.  
223 Ebul Ghazi Bahadır Khan, p. 201. Turkestan in here is a country like Iraq or Hindustan.  
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The Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi, curiously used the term "Türkistan" for the 
Turkish populated parts of Anatolia, especially of Central Anatolia.224 He also pointed 
out that he spoke the language of Türkistan, but there is another realm in Anatolia, 
which was called Yörükistan.225 He also separates Türkistan from the Eastern 
Anatolia,226 implying that his idea of Türkistan comprised mostly the Turkmen 
populated Central Anatolia. 
In the first half of the 17th century, Ottoman author Koçi Bey used the word 
Turkestan for Anatolia proper.227 An Ottoman history book of the second half of 17th 
century by Müneccimbaşı Ahmet Dede uses the term Mawaraannahr for the whole 
Central Asian region.228 
From 1680 up till 1718, Khan Teuke of Kazaks reunited the Kazak Hordes in the 
Steppes.  The Astrakhanid dynasty ruled Transoxiana (mainly Bukhara) from 1599 to 
1785.229 In the early 18th Century Oirat raids on Kazaks in the steppes. In 1710, a 
Shaybanid called Shah Rukh defeated the Khojas of Ferghana230 and established 
Khokand Khanate in the Ferghana Valley.231 In 1715, Peter the Great organized the first 
Russian campaign to the Steppes. In 1717, the Russian military expedition troops in 
Khiva were massacred. It was actually a Russian Embassy under Prince Alexander 
Bekevitch sent by Peter the Great with several thousands escort troops, ordered to seize 
                                                
224 Evliya Çelebi b. Derviş Mehemmed Zillî, Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi: Topkapı Sarayı Bağdat 305 
Yazmasının Transkripsiyonu (İstanbul: YKY, III. Kitap. 1058 H.), p. 13. "...[Akşehir] Because it is a 
Türkistan province, they have a special dialect..." 
225 Evliya Çelebi, p. 225. And at the same page he separates Tatar from Türkistan.  
226 Evliya Çelebi, p. 285.  
227A. K. Aksüt (ed.), Koçi Bey Risalesi (İstanbul: 1939), p. 28.   
228 Müneccimbaşı Ahmet Dede, Müneccimbaşı Tarihi I. Cilt. (Çev. İsmail Erünsal) (Sahâif-ül Ahbar fî 
vekâyî-ül-a’sâr, in arabic) (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1977 - completed originally in 1673). See especially  
pages 49-53. Although in p. 49 there is a title like " the migration of Kayı tribe from Turkestan to 
Khurasan and Iran", this might be used by the translator, because in no other place of the text Turkestan 
word is not used at all. This is not checked from the original or  facsimile copies. 
229 Grousset, p. 486.  
230 Basically a famous clan in Ferghana, Kashgar and all over Turkestan, claiming the heritage of Prophet 
and Arab conquerors of the region, also called as Sayyids.  
231 See Grousset p. 488-9. From 1800 on Khans of Khokand annexed Tashkent and Turkestan cities and 
then stepped up to the Balkash. However in 1876 Russians conquered Khokand and the Khanante was 
annexed same year.  
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the gold mines in Khiva. Khivans responded to this de-facto occupation by dividing 
these troops into several villages for the heavy winter conditions; and then slaughtering 
them all, except a few, who became slaves in the Khivan court.232 In 1718, Oirats 
defeated Kazak Middle Horde near Lake Balkash. In the years 1723-5, Kalmuks and 
Oyrats raid into northern Transoxiana. In 1731, Kazak Little Horde accepted Russian 
protection. In 1734, Russians established their first fort in Orenburg. In 1740, Kazak 
Middle Horde also accepted Russian protection.233 Nadir Shah of Persia conquered 
Transoxiana and stayed there between the years 1740-7.234 In 1742, a part of the Kazak 
Greater Horde also accepted Russian protection. In 1747 the Uzbek Mangit dynasty 
started to raise its power in Turkestan, especially in the Bukharan Khanate. 
The first signs of resistance to the Russian advance appeared in Turkestan during 
the years 1752-4 with the Bashkir uprisings when Kazak Abılay Khan promised refuge 
in the steppes to the fugitive Bahkirs.235 In 1757, Chinese defeated Oyrats in Jungaria.  
It was during the reign of the last Astrakhanid, Abu’l Ghazi (1758-85) when the 
chief of Mangits Mâsum Shah increased his power. He was married to the rulers' 
daughter and after Abu’l Ghazi he took the throne and his Mangits ruled over Bukharan 
lands until 1920 as the descendants of Chenghiz Khan.236 
In 1759, Chinese invaded Tarim Basin. In 1763, Uzbek Kungrat Dynasty 
captured power in Khivan [Khorezm] Khanate. In 1768, the Chinese officially named 
                                                
232 Progress and Present position of Russia in the East (London: John Murray, 1838), pp. 4-5  
233 For an extensive account of this debated issue see, Shahmatov, Kraev and Shoinbayev, Kazakhskoe-
russkie otnosheniya v XVI-XVIII vekakh (Alma-Ata: 1961), pp. 35-45. Kazak khan of Abulkhayr asked 
for Russian protection in 1730 but most of the Sultans did not obey his decision. Tsaritsa Anna Ivanovna 
sent a muslim representative, Mehmet Tevkelev who stayed among Kazaks between 1731-1733 and 
bribed Kazak elders and sultans. However, the mission failed and apart from Abulkhayr, Russian 
protection was not accepted by the Kurultay. For the memories of Tevkelev see M. Bijanov, "Drevnik M. 
Tevkelova kak istochnik po istorii Kazakhstana" (Alma-Ata: IAN AN, 1967), no. 4. pp. 83-87.  
234 According to Togan the most important event of 18th century Turkestan was this conquest by Nadir 
Shah, destroying the authority of the Chengizhid House in the region. Although Nadir Shah was a 
Turkmen (Azeri?) himself, his failure to control Yomut and Göklen Turkmens was notable. See Togan, p. 
198-9.  
235 Togan, p. 307.  
236 Grousset, p. 486-7.  
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the Eastern Turkestan as Xinjiang. In the years 1784-5, the Mangits succeed the 
Astarhanid dynasty in Bukhara and gained the title of Emir. From then on, he was called 
the Bukharan Emirate. In 1798, an Uzbek Khanate in Khokand was established.  
In 1707 Bukharan ruler Ubeydullah Khan, writing to the Sultan Ahmed III of the 
Ottomans, was calling his land the Turan Country.237 In another native source, in the 
Mukim Han’s History by Muhammed Yusuf Munşi in 1702, the northern limits of 
Turkestan were defined as Bulgar and Desht-i Kipchak, where Munşi also called this 
region as historical Turan.238 
It is interesting that a manual of Safavid Administration, dated 1725 did not use 
the term Turkestan even once, but preferred to use single city-state or province names 
like Bukhara, Goklen, Herat, Çiğ, etc., when explaining the region.239 
In the middle of this century, in fact, the word Turkistan entered into British 
political literature. This was basically because of the Persian officials in the Afghan 
Courts who were referring Balkh and the wilayat [province] surrounding it as 
Turkistan.240 It was after more than a century when Sir Henry Rawlinson, in his famous 
'Memorandum on the Frontier of Afghanistan,' opposed to the use of the term Turkistan 
and proposed the use of Afghan Turkestan instead.241 
Applying to Sultan Abdülhamid I, Bukharan ruler Seyid Ebülgazi Khan in 1783 
and in 1785, used the term Türkistân Country for his land and called the rest of the 
                                                
237 Mehmet Saray, Rus İşgali Devrinde Osmanlı Deveti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi 
Münasebetler (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1984), p. 14. Quoted from Name-i Hümayun Defteri, nr. 6, p. 
116-119. "...Turan ülkesi..." 
238 Muhammed Yusuf Munşi, Mukim Khanskaya Istoria. Trans by A.A. Semenov (Tashkent: Izdatel’stvo 
Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR, 1956), pp. 49-87.  
239 Tadhrikat Al-Mulūk, A Manual of Safavid Administration. (1725) Trans. By V. Minorsky (London: 
W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1943).  
240 J.L. Lee, The Ancient Supremacy: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731-1901 (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1996), p. xxxi. “When the British and European sources began to be interested in the region 
during the first half of the 19th century, they followed the Southern-Persian tradition and favored the term 
Turkistan.” 
241 Lee, p. xxxii. However, native representatives of British (in the Afghan court) continued to use 
Turkistan for Balkh or even in some cases Lesser Turkistan.  
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region  Türkistân Provinces.242 In his Answer, Abdülhamid I, called Seyid Ebülgazi 
Khan  the ruler of Turan Country but also used the terms Deşt-i Kıpçak and Türkistân 
among Ebülgazi's dominions.243 
 
3.4 Russian Empire in Turkestan and Kazak Resistance 
In 1804, Kungrats in Khiva adopted the title of “Khan”. In the late 18th and early 
19th Centuries, the basic local administration in all over Turkestan was realized in the 
hands of local Khalifas and Shaykhs in addition to local landlords and officials. 
However the practical power of a Khalifa was much more than any landlord or 
appointed tax collector.244 
By the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century Russian progress in the 
east was directed towards Turkestan, which at the same time included Eastern 
Turkestan, which in most of the official documents haven’t been separated from the 
Western Turkestan.245 Eastern Turkestan was as much a target as Western Turkestan.  
In the early 19th century, Russians started the conquest of the steppes. Abılay’s 
grandson Ubeydullah allied himself with China and launched attacks on the Russians. 
Slowed down in advance, Russians built their fort in Kokche Tau in 1824.246 Almost 
simultaneously Kaybalı Sultan revolted in Yayık and Bükey Orda from 1818 to 1829, 
aiming to enter into Khivan suzerainty. In 1829, he was arrested by Russians but 
escaped from Orenburg Fort in 1832 and joined the Adays of Khiva. In 1836 Bukey 
                                                
242 Mehmet Saray, Rus İşgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti ile Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi 
Münasebetler (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1984), p. 19. Quoted from Nâme-î Hümâyûn Defteri, Hatt-ı 
Hümâyûn, p. 72-73. "...Türkistân ülkesinin...Türkistân vilâyetlerini.."  
243 Mehmet Saray, p. 21. "Devlet-î aliyyemiz ile Turan ülkesi hâkimi arasında ... bir taraftan Deşt-i 
Kıpçak ve Türkistân bölgelerinde..." Quoted from Nâme-î Hümâyûn Defteri, nr. 9, p. 196.  
244 See Baxtiyar M Babadzhanov, “On the history of the Naqshbandiyya muğaddidiya in Mawara'annahr 
in the late 18th and early 19th centuries,” pp. 385-414 In Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from 
the 18th to the early 20th centuries. By Michael Kemper (Ed.) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1996).  
245 For details see, Dööletbek Saparaliyev, Vzaimootnoşeniya Kyrgyzskogo Naroda c Russkim I Sosednim 
Narodami v XVIII v. (Bishkek: Ilim, 1995), pp. 83-93 and 160.  
246 Togan, 308-11.  
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Orda leader İsetay Batır and Muhammed Batır rebelled; but soon, in 1838, they also 
ended up by joining the Adays of Khiva.247 
None of the Russian travelers and expeditioners of this century argued about an 
important regional unity-identity and/or Turkestan concept.248 Spending several months 
in Turkestan, Alexander Burnes249 in 1832, did not use the term Turkestan for the 
Bukharan, Khivan realms but used it rather for only the Afghan Turkestan.250 Burnes 
was accompanied by a Cashmere, Mohan Lal251, whose memoirs were much more 
informative about Turkestan.252 Although Lal uses Tartary253 for Turkestan a couple of 
times in the text in his memoirs, Turkistan as a term covers almost the whole of Central 
Asia254 with Bukhara being its center.255  
In 1822, the Khanate of Kazak Middle Horde and in 1824 the Khanate of Kazak 
Lesser Horde were abolished by Russians. From then on Kazaks started to revolt against 
                                                
247 Togan, p. 311-12 
248 F Nazarov (Kokand-1813), N.N. Murav’yev (Turkmen Steppes and Khiva-1819), A.F. Middendorf 
(west and south Siberia-1841-7), N.V. Khanykov (Bukhara-1841-1842), G.I. Danilevskiy (Khiva-1842), 
M.N. Galkin (East Caspian and Turkmen Steppes-1859), N.M. Prezheval’skiy (Central Asia, Tibet, 
Mongolia-1871-1872). See Mary Holdsworth, Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century: A Brief History of the 
Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva (Oxford: Central Asian Reserach Centre, 1959).  
249 Alexander Burnes, Travels into Bokhara (Baltimore: E.L. Cares & A. Hart. 1835. See v. II, p. 39 on. 
The 1834 London edition of the same book was rather more unique in its language and detailed 
descriptions of the region; See Alexander Burnes, Travels into Bukhara: the Account of a Journey from 
India to Cabool, Tartary and Persia (London: JM, 1834). Here Bukhara meant only the name of the 
Bukharan Emirate where Tartary was used for the whole Central Asia. The term Toorkistan was also used 
in a meaning within the concept of Tartary. See V. 1, p.  312 and V. 2, p. 153. Also all over the book 
Tartar and the term Toork (Turk) were used interchangeably. 
250 See also M. Anwar Khan, “Burnes’ Mission to Central Asia 1831-1832” Journal of the Asiatic Society 
of Pakistan,” Vol. XI, No: 1, April 1966. pp. 109-119. According to Khan, Kashmir is also included into 
Central Asia.  
251 Alias Hasan Jan, an active member of secret British military expeditions.  
252 Mohan Lal, Travel in Punjab, Afghanistan and Turkistan to Balkh, Bokhara and Herat and a Visit to 
Great Britain and Germany (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Company, 1977 – the first edition in London, 
1846). As it can be understood from the title he used the Turkistan spelling for the regions from Northern 
Afghan province of Balkh on. 
253 Mohan Lal, p. 80 “Bokhara... the whole region of Tartary..” But in page 81 he says for the Kushbeyi of 
Bokhara “... the most religious man in Turkistan.” 
254 Mohan Lal, for the whole historical Timurid region also. P. 74. “... the great king of Turkistan...” 
255 Mohan Lal, p. 84. See the whole of the book for the different usages of Turkistan also.  
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the  Russians (1820-40). Kenesary Kasımov256 resisted the Russians (1837-47).  In 
1838, in some English publications the region was still considered to be Tartary.257 
In 1838, Kenesary achieved local victories against the Russians in Siberia and 
Orenburg.258 By 1839, people were rebelling all over the Steppes. Countless chieftains 
declared themselves Khans or Sultans. Being the grandson of Abılay Khan too, 
Kenesary was the most popular among the natives of the steppes.259 However, a cousin 
of Kenesary Kasimov, Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov (1835-1865) was a prominent 
figure with Ibray Altynsarin (1841-89) and Abai Kunanbayev (1845-1904) who 
defended a Russian-Kazak rapprochement.260 
There were instances Russians called Turkestan as Middle Asia in the second 
half of 19th century.261 However, these instances remained as exceptions in the overall 
literature about the Turkestan region.  
During this period, Mustafa Reşit Paşa of the Ottomans was using the term 
Turkistan for the whole of Ottoman Empire.262 Soon after that, in 1856 the Paris Peace 
                                                
256 See Han Kene, Kazak Halkının Tevelsizdiği uşin Küresken Han-Batırlar Turalı Tarihi Tolğamdarmen, 
Dastandar (Almatı: Jalın, 1993). For the examples of post-soviet Kazak nationalist approach to this 
Kazak Hero and note the emphasis on the Kene Sary being a hero of Turkistan, Şıgıs (Eastern) Turkistan, 
etc. Kenesary was elected as the Khan of all Kazak in a kurultay convened in 1841.  
257 Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East (London: John Murray, 1838), p. 145.  
258 For a detailed skhetch of Russian colonial expansion and Kenesary revolt see M.K. Lyubavskiy. Obzor 
Istorii Russkoy Kolonizatsii s Drevneyshikh vremen do XX veka, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo 
Universiteta, 1996. pp. 521-530. See also A.M. Mokshev. Istoricheskoy Obzor Turkestana i 
nastupatelnogo Dvizheniya no nego Russkikh, St Petersbug, IzDr, 1890.  
259 Togan p. 313-25. See also E. Smirnov, Sultany Kinesary i Sadik (Tashkent: 1889), pp. 23-26. 
260 Kermit E. McKenzie, "Chokan valikhanov: Kazak Princeling and Scholar," Central Asian Survey. Vol. 
8. No. 3, 1989. P. 4-8. See in p. "Ablai had no fewer than 12 wives and 30 sons, and one of his grandsons, 
Kenesary Kasimov, was to lead a stubbornly fought ten-year revolt against Russian rule during 1837-
1847. These were precisely the years of Chokan's childhood and in the revolt Chokan's father, now an 
officer in the Siberan line Cossacks, was pitted against his cousin, Kenesary, and later awarded a medal in 
recognition of his loyalty." Chokan was a promising scholar of orientalism and served in Russian Imperial 
court for various times, including being a secret agent to Kashgar between 1958 and 59.  
261 See L. Kostenko, Srednyaya Aziya i Vodvorenie v Ney Russkoy Grazhdanstvennosti (S. Petersburg: 
Tipografii v bezovrazova i komi, 1981). However in this book Kostenko also used historical Turan name 
for the aral-capspian basin. He also differentiates between  Kaysak (kazak) and Kara-Kyrgyz (Kyrgyz) in 
p. 29-31. He calssifies the peoples of Middle Asia as Tajiks, Kyrgyz-Kazaks, Karakalpaks, Turkmens, 
Uzbeks, Araps and Sarts. At this point he underlines that Sarts are not Tajiks at all, Sart are the settled 
townspeople and mostly from Turkic stock. See pp. 30-71.  Kostenko also included Tarançı and Dungans 
into the population of Turkestan and defends a dynamic Russian foreign policy to include Eastern 
Turkestan and Southern Turkestan to the Empire’s realms. see pp. 342-354.   
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Conference's Turkish version, the word Türkistan is again used to imply the Ottoman 
State.263 From this time on, during the Tanzimat period, the term Turkistan, in the 
ottoman literature is mostly used for the Ottoman empire/state.264 The Ottoman 
intellectual Namık Kemal translated their western name of Jenues Turcs or Young 
Ottoman Party as "Türkistan erbab-ı şebabı".265 
In 1848, the Russians abolished the Khanate of Kazak Greater Horde. It was in 
1853 that the then Governor-General of Orenburg succeeded in establishing Russian 
military forts on the Syr-Darya, one of them later named after him.266 In 1855, the 
Russians completely reached the Syr Darya line.  By 1852, the Russians had an Aral 
fleet of five war ships. They navigated through Syr Darya quite effectively and were 
ready to contribute the conquest of Amu Darya too.267 
 
3.4.1 Turkestan as a Russian Colonial Province 
Although the Russian dominance in Central Asia had been considered as a very 
nominal one,268 they continued to strengthen their power in the north. The Russian 
                                                                                                                                            
262 R. Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat (Ankara: 1954), p. 610. Quoted in Hakan Erdem. 
"Türkistan: Nerede, Ne Zaman?" Toplumsal Tarih. Ekim 1998. No. 58. P. 40. Erdem argues that Reşit 
paşa simply translated French delegate's word of Le Turquie as Türkistan into Turkish.  
263 For the text of Paris Peace Conference see. M. Aktepe, Vak'a-nüvis Ahmet Lûtfi Efendi Tarihi (Ankara: 
TTK Basımevi, 1988), pp. 230-4, Its 1984 Istanbul edition is cited in Hakan Erdem, "Türkistan: Nerede, 
Ne Zaman?" Toplumsal Tarih. Ekim 1998. No. 58. P. 39.  
264 Hakan Erdem, "Türkistan: Nerede, Ne Zaman?" Toplumsal Tarih. Ekim 1998. No. 58. P. 40-41.  
265 Hakan Erdem, "Türkistan: Nerede, Ne Zaman?" Toplumsal Tarih. Ekim 1998. No. 58. P. 42. See same 
article for the  further usages of Türkistan term in the articles of Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi or in the other 
Ottoman printed Press for Ottoman State and Anatolia.  
266 Alexander Kornilor, Modern Russian History (London: Alfred A. Knoph, 1924), p. 227. Same 
Governor General Perovsky failed in his expedition against Khiva in 1839 mostly because the heavy 
winter and absence of proper roads.  
267 Ali Suâvî, Hive Hanlığı ve Türkistân’da Rus Yayılması. Hazırlayan: M. Abdülhâlik Çay (İstanbul: 
Orkun Yayınevi, 1977 - original published in Paris in 1873 as “Le Khiva en Mars”), pp. 27-37.  
268 Friedrich Engels, "Russia in Central Asia" The New York Times, 3.11.1858. "Russia's domination over 
three ordas, or Kirgiz is only nominal.” Cited in Baymirza Hayit "Türkistan'ın Kazakistan Bölgesinin 
Rusya'ya İlhakı Meselesi Üzerine Bazı Oylar" IV. Uluslararası Türkoloji Kongresi Tebliği. In this paper, 
Hayit argued that well until the mid-19th century, it was difficult to argue about a total Russian 
administrative rule over the Kazak steppes.  
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strategy in the 1860s269 was to save Bukhara’s territorial integrity strictly and the Tsar 
himself opposed the annexation of Bukhara, taking the height of the so-called Great 
Game with Britain into account.270 However St. Petersburg did not oppose the capture 
of Tashkent by Colonel Cherniaiev in 1864 and annexed the region-Khokand.271 Khiva, 
on the other hand, created much more trouble for the Russians. Khan Muhammed 
Rahim II (1864-1910) rejected all Russian demands. The Russians launched an attack in 
1873 and soon Khiva was conquered and became a formal Russian protectorate in 
humiliation. But for the Khivan Khan it was still difficult to control the freemen of the 
desert, the Turkmen.272 
Writing in 1873, Ali Suâvî separated Turkistan from the Khivan Khanate and 
pointed out that there were four ethnic groups in Turkistan: Sart, Uzbek, Turkmen and 
Karakalpak, considering Sarts as Tadjiks-Persian speakers.273 
The American consul in St. Petersburg Eugene Schuyler, traveled the region in 
1873 and wrote his detailed memoirs.274 He used the term Turkistan both for the 
Russian province and for the whole region from Khazar to Turfan.275 According to him 
the common language in Turkistan was Turkî, having the ethnic groups like Uzbek, 
                                                
269 It is also possible to claim that the nature of the Russian advance in Central Asia was not classically 
colonial or economic but rather it was strategically oriented. See S.A. Pokrovskiy, Vneshnyaya Torgovlya 
i Vneshnyaya Torgovaya Politika Rosii (Moskva: AN, 1947), pp. 242-251. In the mid- of 19th century, 
there were very little revenues and too much spending in Central Asia. And M.K. Rozhkova, 
Ekonomicheskaya Politika Tsarskogo Pravitelstva na Srednem Vostoke (Moskva: M-L, 1949), p. 314. 
The competition of Russian and British ‘tavari’ in Central Asia.  
270 Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 46.  
271 Alexander Kornilor, p. 228.  
272 Becker, p. 65-78.  
273 Ali Suâvî, p. 47.  
274 Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja. 
(Ed. With an introduction by Geoffrey Wheeler) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). 
275 Eugene Schuyler, see the map in p. xxxvii. Turkistan here is from Khazar to Turfan and from Merv-
Pamir line to Orenburg-Irtish line.  
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Tadjik, Liuli [lôlî-Gypsy], city dweller Sarts, Kafirs, Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, Turkomans, 
Tartars (and the Nogai) Persians, Arabs, Hindoos, Jews, etc.276 
For Russians, Turkestan had never meant a single ethnic identity,277 and they 
were in the process of understanding the nature of the conflicts between the armies of 
the Khanates and Turkmen of the desert.278 It was in fact before the creation of the 
Governor-Generalship that there were ideas of spreading Russian settlers among the 
circles in Petersburg.279 
Following the fashion of the time, in 1860s, Cevdet Paşa used the term Türkistan 
as rather implying the Ottoman Empire, simply all the lands of the Devlet-i Aliyye.280  
Traveling through Turkestan in 1863, the famous “Dervish” Arminius Vambéry 
provided important details about the political and daily life of Tartars of Central 
Asia.281 His usage of the term Turkestan was rather for a general far-off282 and big 
“country”.283 Also the Hadjis284 and Amir of Bokhara,285 while interviewed by 
Vambéry, were calling whole of Central Asia Turkestan including Bukharan and 
Khivan realms. Khokand and Kashgar together were called Chinese Tartary.286 Naming 
                                                
276 Eugene Schuyler, p. 51-54. Here he also underlines the importance of the city-identity among the 
Uzbeks like being a Tashkendi, Samarkandi, Khodzhendi, etc. As well as surviving clan identity.  
277 N. A. Khalfin, Politika Rossii v Sredney Azii(1857-1868) (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoy Literaturi, 
1960), p. 20.  
278 N. A. Khalfin, Politika Rossii v Sredney Azii(1857-1868), p. 92-93.  
279 N. A. Khalfin, Politika Rossii v Sredney Azii(1857-1868), p. 175. See also the map of Turkestan in p. 
18-19. Covering South of Kirghiz Steppe and Northern Afghanistan, From Caspian to Gobi desert in 
China made for the Russian Ministry of Roads and Communications.  
280 Cevdet Paşa, Tezâkir 1-12. (Yayınlayan Cavid Baysun) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991 -
Original is 1860s), p. 55 in a context of Ottoman ambassador in Paris having a conversation with 
Napoleon on the Ottoman Empire. See also Tezâkir 13-20 for this usage of Türkistan for Ottoman empire 
p. 23.  
281 Arminius Vambéry, The Life and Adventures of Arminius Vambéry (ninth edition. London: T. Fisher 
Unwin, 1914). See the book for the general usage of Tartar for the Turkics of Central Asia.  
282 Arminius Vambéry, p. 134. “...guests from far-off Turkestan..” 
283 Arminius Vambéry, p. See pages 134-140, his interviews with the Hadjis.  
284 Arminius Vambéry, p. 138. “...the roads of Turkestan are not so safe as those of Persia and Turkey.” 
285 Arminius Vambéry, p. 226. When the Amir asks him “Hadji, I hear thou hast come from Roum to visit 
the graves of Bahaddin and other holy men of Turkestan?” 
286 Arminius Vambéry, p. 136, but also see p. 134 where he calls “Chinese Tartary or Eastern Turkestan”. 
And also p. 214. 
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Karakum desert as being the heart of Tartary,287 which leads to the old usage of the 
Tartary for the whole of Turkestan. 
Although there were already regular diplomatic contacts between Russia and the 
Khanates,288 in 1852, Khivan Khanate, during the negotiations with the Governor 
General of Orenburg Perovsky, asked for permission for the establishment of a Turkish-
British base in the lower Syr Darya.289 It was first Kaufman who urged a common 
Turkestani identity-in the shape of a Central Asian coalition was a threat to the 
Empire.290 And the solution was to apply a more economic-oriented program in the 
region.291 From the very beginning, viceroy Kaufman and the Russian administration in 
Turkestan took the ethnographic classification in the region as a primary task.292 
Arriving at the region in significant numbers, Russian ethnographers, linguists and 
anthropologists, tried to find out what Sart, Uzbek, Kirghiz, etc were about.293 
In 1865, Russians created the Province of Turkestan. In the same year, they 
captured Tashkent. In 1867, Russians created the Governorate-General of Turkestan, 
with Tashkent as its capital and in 1868 the Governorate-General of the Kazak-Steppe, 
with Orenburg being its capital. In 1868, the Russians captured Samarkand and 
Bukhara, making the Bukharan Emirate a Russian protectorate.  
The Russian empires’ borders in Turkestan were set on the 20th of October 1869 
at the meeting of Milyutin and Forsight, during which the delimitation of Afghan 
                                                
287 Arminius Vambéry, p. 204. Note also the very common usages of the terms Uzbeg, Tadjik, Kirghiz 
and Turkoman (with several tribal names like Yomut, Tekke, Ersoy, Lebab, etc).  
288 N.A. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Sredney Azii k Rosii: 60-90-e gody XIX v (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 
1965), p. 59.  
289 N.A. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Sredney Azii k Rosii, p. 74. The Russian perception then was that, British 
Empire was using the Ottomans for infiltrating into the region.  
290 N.A. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Sredney Azii k Rosii, p. 289.  
291 N.A. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Sredney Azii k Rosii, p. 410.  
292 Daniel Brower, "Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan," p. 128. In Russia's 
Orient: Imperial Borderlands and peoples, 1700-1917. (Ed by) Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. 
Lazzerini. Pp. 115-137.  
293 Daniel Brower, p. 129.  
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borders, Russian-Bukharan suzerainty relations and Russian-Kashgar suzerainty 
relations were agreed between the Russian and British Empires. 
In 1868, an English publication about the region used the term Central Asia294 
only, however it called Eastern Turkestan, Chinese Tartary295, and using the term 
Turkistan and Khokand once296 in a long text as well as underlining Captain Burslem’s 
spelling of Toorkisthan.297 
Apart from the politics, this was also the time when the Russians started to apply 
Il'minskii method for the sake of separating Tatar from the Turkestani Kazak-Kirghiz 
languages by forcing a Cyrillic Alphabet for the latter.298 His colleague Ostromov, took 
one more step by applying the so-called Sart language-in fact a Tashkent dialect, into 
the literature of Turkestan by publishing the famous Turkistan Vilayetining Gazeti or 
Turkestanskaya Tuzemniya Gazeta from 1883 to 1917.299  
Although the Russian presence was increasing in Turkestan quite rapidly, the 
freemen of the dessert, Turkmen300 were independent in the deserts.301 
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Education Policy and the 1910 Conference on Islam,” p. 138-167. In Russia's Orient: Imperial 
Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917. Ed by Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1997).  
300 See also Ağacan Beyoğlu, Türkmen Boylarının Tarih ve Etnografyası (İstanbul: İstak, 2000). Beyoğlu 
in this book provides us a detailed history of the development of Turkmen ethno genesis, tribes, based on 
mostly popular historical legends in Turkestan. However it is worth to note that the author includes all 
Turkmens to a common Turkestan concept especially in 19th century.  
301 See Y. E. Bregel’, Horezmskie Turkmeny v XIX veke (Moskva: İzdatel’stvo Vostocnoy Literatury, AN 
SSSR, 1961), see pp. 21-45 for the role and place of Turkmens in Khivan Khanate.   
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3.4.2 Khanates Surrendering 
In 1873, the Khanate of Khiva became a Russian protectorate302 and in 1876 the 
Khanate of Khokand was annexed by Russia. One year later, the Ottoman 
Administration was involved in Central Asian politics by establishing diplomatic 
relations with Afghanistan.303 
However, the Russians were still unable to come to the terms with the Turkmen. 
Their ruling-elite (AkSakals or in Russian Starchina) and social organizations were 
always unreachable to the Russians.304 
A Turkish Traveler to Central Asia (Asya-yı Vüsta) began to call the region 
Turkestan after he landed at Krasnovodsk on the Caspian.305 He also made a distinction 
between Khorezm, Mawaraannahr,306 the Turkestan General Governorship, but still, 
used Turkestan307 as a greater geographical concept.  
Russian railway building in Turkestan began in 1880 from Krasnovodsk or 
Kızılsu and reached Tashkent in 1898. This changed the intellectual, commercial and 
political life of the region.308 In the mean time, though, in 1881, the Russians massacred 
Turkmen in Gök-Tepe and created the Transcaspian province.  
                                                
302 See the account of the correspondent of New York Herald, A. Mac gahan, Campaigning on the Oxus 
and the fall of Khiva (New York: 1874). For the details of this event. Mac Gahan traveled with the 
Russian armies conquering the Khanate. Its Turkish is first published in 1876 as Hive Seyahatnamesi ve 
Tarihi Musavver. Trans. by Kolağası Ahmed. Note the usage of the terms like Uzbeg, Kirghiz, Kazak 
(Cossack), Turkmen, Karakalpak in huge amounts. He does not use a united Turkestan concept at all.  
303 See Dwight E. Lee, “A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877," The Journal of Modern History. Vol. 
XIII, March-December 1941 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 335-356. See this 
piece for the pan-Islamist, then, intentions of the Ottoman administration in Central Asia’s Great Game.  
304See Bregel’, pp. 118-175 for the Turkmen ruling elite, starchina and their social-political structure in 
the desert.  
305 Mehmet Emin Efendi, İstanbul’dan Asya-yı Vüsta’ya Seyahat (İstanbul’dan Orta Asya’ya Seyahat) 
Hazırlayan: Rıza Akdemir (Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2000 – first edition in 1878), p. 12. 
East of Khazar is named as Turkistan.   
306 Mehmet Emin Efendi, p. 127 and p. 135.  
307 Mehmet Emin Efendi, p. 108, calls all of Khiva as Turkestan, p. 45, calls all of deserts as Turkestan 
and in p. 36, calls all Turkmen lands as Turkestan.  
308 See Togan p. 263. Also for Becker too, the arrival of the railroads was important in order to end the 
centuries old isolation of the region from outside world.  
 79
Traveling the region in 1881-2, Gabriel Bonvalot became a strong supporter of 
Russian terminology; and provided a detailed picture of the complex cosmopolitan 
ethnic structure of the region.309 It is interesting to see the complete separation of terms 
Turkestan and Kashgar310 and the use of the term Central Asia for the whole region.311 
In 1884, Russians started cotton agriculture in Turkestan. In the same year, they invaded 
Merv Oasis, completing the conquest of Turkestan; while having the Ferghana rebellion 
in 1885.  
For some western travelers to the region, natives were still all Tartars and it was 
thanks to Russians the region was united and the bloodshed among the native tribes was 
stopped.312 In 1887, the Russians and British set the Afghan border.  
George Curzon traveled through the new Transcaspian railway in 1888 and 
wrote his recollections in 1889. He clearly separated the Turkmen lands from 
Turkestan, in line with the Russian administrative divisions of the time.313 However his 
usage of the term Afghan Turkestan314 leads one to think that, the term still had 
geographical connotations.315 Curzon also provided very important and detailed 
information about the administrative and political situation in Turkestan.316 
                                                
309 Gabriel Bonvalot, Eski Yurt. Trans. By: M. Reşat Uzmen (İstanbul: Tercüman, 1979 - Original in 
1884), p. 35.  
310 See Sir Aurel Stein, On Ancient Central-Asian Tracks: Brief Narrative of Three Expeditions in 
Innermost Asia and Northwestern China (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964). For the usage of the words 
Kashgar and Eastern Turkestan interchangeably at the end of the 19th and at the begging of 20th centuries, 
pp. 33, 41-50. It is also interesting to note Sir Stein calls all the Turkic inhabitants as the Turkî people 
rather than calling them with different tribal names.  
311 Gabriel Bonvalot, p. 62-63.  
312 Henri Moser, A Travers L'Asie Centrale: La Steppe Kirghize, le Turkestan Russe, Boukhara, Khiva, le 
Pays Turcomans et la Perse (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1885). He traveled the region during 1883-4 with the 
Russian General Cherniaev, pp. 68-75.  
313 George Curzon, Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question (London: Frank Cass 
& Co. Ltd., 1967 - first ed. in 1889), p. 34 "...I must ask my readers, to bear very closely in mind the 
distinction between Turkestan or Central Asia proper, the capital of which is Tashkent, and Turkomania, 
or the country of Turkmens, which extends from the Caspian to Merv...", see also pp. 273-274 for this 
separation.  
314 George Curzon, p. 124-5.  
315 George Curzon, p. 273-274. See the part about cotton industry in Turkestan as a whole, not only 
Governorship.  
316 George Curzon, p. 257. Here he criticizes the military rule in the region, making t a real colony.  
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The use of Turkestan as a Russian administrative and a broader geographical 
term continued to exist for some time in the West.317 But, it should be noted that, the 
term was also used for the Turkmen lands as such.  
From 1890-2 on, the first Russian and Ukrainian mass settlers arrived at Kazak 
Steppe and Turkestan. This was followed by a number of uprisings against the Russians. 
The first one was by Andijans in 1878. Others were: Andijan and Margilan uprising in 
1882; Khokand Şakir Can uprisings, one of the greatest uprisings of the century, in 
1893; the Dukchi Ishan uprising in 1898.  They were all over the Ferghana valley. 
Dukchi Ishan, a 52 year old village khalifa Mehmed Ali, one of the last Yassawi 
Sheikhs of the region, had taken part in the rebellion for three years. He first attacked 
the Russian army barracks. After the usual slaughtering of Russian soldiers about, he 
wanted to turn to other cities. However, the city dwellers were not so enthusiastic. 
Being unsuccessful, soon, he was hanged by the Russians.318 
 In the Ottoman historiography of the late 19th century, the term Turkestan was 
widely used in its broader geographical meaning. Solak-zâde tarihi (1880), a History of 
the Ottomans until 1657, is a good example of this. However, Solakzâde used the term 
in both senses: the geographically greater Turkestan,319 containing many countries in it, 
and also the countries inside the greater area – i.e. the Central Asia.320  
                                                
317 Le Comte De Cholet, Excursions En Turkestan: La Frontiére Russo-Afghane (Paris: Librarie Pon, 
1889). See this book foe also for sketchs from the daily lives of Turkmens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Bukharans, 
etc. However the map in the last page of this book marks only the lands between Ashgabad and Merw 
(Turkmen Oasis) as Turkestan. Another example of conceptual misuse.  
318 Togan, p. 332-5.  
319 Solakzâde Tarihi (1880). Hazırlayan: Dr. Vahid Çubuk. Cilt 1 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı yayınları, 
1989), see pp. 109-110, Timur inviting an Anatolian Sheihk with him back to Turkestan. Or p. 120, 
Timur is retreating back to Turkestan.  
320 Solakzâde p. 100. “the shahs of Sistan and Mazderan, rulers of Bedakhshan, Geylan and Turkistan 
filled this valley with all their soldiers...” Here Turkestan means rather a local province probably based on 
Otrar region. Also see p. 343. Speaking of Azak, Solakzâde explains that it is a popular stop for the 
traders from Turkestan and Mā warā' al-Nahr, still excluding it from a greater Turkestan concept.  
 81
In Redhouse’s first Turkish-English Lexicon, published in 1890, one of the 
definitions of Turkestan was Turkey and the Turkish Empire.321 
The last census made in Turkestan prior to the revolution was the 1897 census, 
where Central Asians were categorized as Kirghiz, Turkmen, Sart, Uzbek and Tajiks.322 
According to the census which excluded Bukharan and Khivan territories, it was 
estimated that there were nearly four million Kirgiz (Kirgiz-Kaisaki and Kara-kirgiz) 
and almost one million Sarts and less than 750 thousand Uzbeks in the empire.323  
 
3.4.3 Jadidism and National Reform Among the Turkestanis 
According to Kafadar, it is known from the Latin sources of the 12th century to 
the 20th century that, many western accounts of Anatolia and/or the Ottoman Empire 
used different versions of the word Turchia or Turkiya. However, there were no 
widespread uses of these terms by the natives, neither as a political concept nor as a 
geographical description.324 A similar situation was also valid for Turkestan itself. The 
existence of a common and well-defined Turkestan identity is difficult to claim, 
especially prior to the 19th or early 20th century, when the Jadid education model 
introduced Western values to the natives.  
In 1900, Russia annexed Eastern Pamirs, thus ending the Russian advance in the 
region, reaching the English-Afghan realm. In 1905, the Russian revolution took place 
and ended with the declaration of constitutional Monarchy. Tribal and social structure 
                                                
321 J.W. Redhouse, A Turkish English Lexicon (İstanbul, 1890), p. 536.  
322 K. Fortunatov', Natsional'niya Oblasti Rossii. (Opyt' statsticheskogo izsledovaniya po dannym' 
vseobschey perepisi 1987 g.) (S.-Peterburg: Knigoizdatel'stvo Trud i bor'ba, 1906), p. 15. In p. 14 
Fortunatov put an information note that "apart from Tajiks, who is a Persian stock, all others were 
Tyurco-Tatars among which only Uzbek and Sart are settled.  
323 Curiously, in p. 19, Fortunatov made a table which shows the ethnic distribution in the oblasts, where 
Samarkand's population is %58,8 Uzbek and %26,9 Tajik, but Fergana's population is %50,0 Sarts and 
%9,7 Uzbeks and %12,8 Kara-kirgiz. The valley Uzbeks were almost totally considered as Sarts in this 
census, without pointing out any difference between the two.  
324 C. Kafadar, Between Two worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley: University Press, 
1995), p. 4.  
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of Turkestan was very complex at the beginning of the 20th Century and most of the 
energy of the newly emerging Jadid local intelligentsias was spent on the determination 
and elimination of the ethnical differences.325 Following the year 1905, a serious power 
vacuum occurred in Turkestan causing several peasant revolts against the Russian 
presence in the region as well as to local Russian settlers supported by the Governorship 
General. “One guerilla leader, Namaz Piri, soon became a legend in his life-time. Years 
later, Lenin himself praised Piri as a ‘Robin Hood of the desert’ and a veritable 
revolutionary leader of his people.”326 Although most of these rebellions were judged as 
the “nationalist” uprisings in the later Turkestani émigré literature and historiography, 
they were rather economic as well as religious in nature. 1905 reforms in Russia 
resulted with the liberalization of Tsarist censorship over the native education and 
publishing activities in Turkestan. The young Jadid intellectuals started to open one 
school after another, following the pattern of their mentor, İsmail Bey Gaspıralı, in 
Crimea.327  So, from 1905 on, an important influx of Jadid-Turkic periodicals started to 
appear in Turkestan after the first issue of Orta Asiya'nın Ömürgüzarlığı(1905).328 The 
terms Turkestan and Turan, in their historical, geographical and broader meanings 
survived during this period, irrespective of the existence of Tsarist Turkestan General 
                                                
325 See Togan p. 39-41 for a list of Kazak Tribes and social organization. P. 42-45 for a list of Uzbek 
tribes and social organization. P. 68-72 for a list of Kyrgyz tribes and social organization. p. 73-76 for a 
list of Turkmen tribes and their social structure. P. 76-81 for a good description of Taciks and their social 
structure. And p. 80-81 on the roots of the term Tacik explaining different approaches.  
326 Amir Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky: The future of Islam in the Soviet Union (London: Hutchinson, 
1989), p. 84.  
327 İsmail Bey Gaspıralı visited Turkestan and Bukharan Emirate in 1893. While he was in Samarkand, he 
opened a Jadid school in the city using the new method of teaching reading and writing in fourty days to 
the pupils. In Bukhara, he established very close and warm relations with the Bukharan Emir, but failed to 
open a new method school in this traditional city. However, this visit became a source of inspiration for 
the local notables and intelligentsia, who, soon, became close followers of Gaspıralı’s new method 
teaching system. See Hakan Kırımlı. Kırım Tatarlarında Millî Kimlik ve Millî Hareketler (1905-1916). 
Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996, p. 56.  
328 Çağatay Koçar, Türkistan ile ilgili Makaleler (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı yayınları/1272, 1991). 
Following, we see Tarakkiy (1906), Hurşîd (1906), Şûhrat (1907-1908), Asiya (1908), Buhâra-î Şarîf 
(1912-1913), Samarkand (1913), Ayna (1913-1915), Sadâ-yı Türkistân (1914), Sadâ-yı Fergana (1914), 
Al-Islâh (1915-1918), Tüccar (1907), Uluğ Türkistân (1917-1918), Al-İzâh (1917), Turan (1912), Buhâra 
(1913). All of them were closed either by the Russian censorship or by the Bukharan Emir's pressures.  
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Governorship as an administrative unit over these territories. At the beginning of the 
century, even for some Russian officials, north of Syr Darya was still 'Turanian 
Steppe'.329 Jadids, who were the part of the reformist intelligentsia of the natives, were 
soon to be confronted by the reactionary and traditionalist Kadimist intelligentsia.330 
The Jadidist-Kadimist struggle over the educational system and Muslim publications 
continued until the 1917 revolutions.  
In 1905, Ismail Bey Gaspıralı noted that Abdürreşid [İbrahim] was calling the 
natives of Turkestan Sarts, however Gaspıralı used the terms Turkestanis and Kyrgyz 
Kazakis for the natives of the region.331 The widespread usage of the term Sart by the 
Russians for the whole settled population of the region, apparently was accepted by the 
native intelligentsia up to a certain degree. However, Gaspıralı’s emphasis on the use of 
Turkestani, Kyrgyz-Kazak identities showed the authentic approach of him to the issue. 
However Abdürreşid İbrahim continued his stand on the ethno-politics of the region 
quite opposite from Gaspıralı’s stand. According to Abdürreşid İbrahim, in 1907, the 
residents of Bukhara were all Tajiks who also spoke some Uzbek too.332  However, 
Samarkand was completely a Turkic populated city whose residents could also speak 
some Persian.333 He separated the Kazaks and Kyrgyz of the Yedisu region from each 
other. That was probably one of the first categorical separation of Kazaks [Kirghiz-in 
Russian literature] from the Kyrgyz [Kara Kirghiz in Russian literature]. He cleared his 
                                                
329 A. Polovtsoff, The Land of Timur: Recollections of Russian Turkestan (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
1932). He was a white Russian émigré in Paris then.  
330 For the national composition of Turkestan before 1917 and the Jadidist-Qadimist struggle in the region 
See R.G. Landa, Islam v Istorii Rossii (Moscow: Izdatel’skaya Firma Vostochnaya Literature, 1995), pp. 
141-170, and 171-188.  
331 See İsmail [Gastrula], “Hurried ve Cabin-i Türkistan,” Tercüman, No: 91, 7 November 1905, p. 1.   
332 Abdürreşid İbrahim, 20. Asrın Başlarında İslam Dünyası ve Japonya’da İslamiyet, volume I (İstanbul: 
Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1987), p. 48.  
333 Abdürreşid İbrahim, p. 51.  
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stand on the Sart terminology in this book, by identifying them as the “townspeople” of 
Turkestan, irrespective of their ethnic origins.334 
An important part of Kazak intelligentsia was rather isolated in the North, 
concentrated in Orenburg, and were under direct Russian influence. Most of them 
attended Russian schools in the region. One of the early products of Russian schooling, 
the renowned Kazak scholar, Chokan Valikhanov claimed that the historical and blood 
relation with the Russians was enough for Kazaks who would voluntarily accept 
Russian suzerainty over the step.335 However, the Southern Kazaks in Jetisu and Syr-
Darya regions were completely a part of the rest of the Turkestani Jadid movement, 
along with the upcoming Turkestanist positions of the Turkestanis. After 1905 the 
Revolution Kazak intelligentsia was divided into two major groups. The first one was 
the Southern based, the pan-Turkist group which created a circle around the Ay-Qap 
Journal. The other group was rather concentrated around the Kazak newspaper, who 
were against any unification with the “Tatars” and were rather Kazak nationalists.336 
The nationalist-reformist intelligentsia, though, was isolated from the scattered Kazak 
masses of the vast Steppe region until the 1917 revolution. Even after the 1917 
Revolution it is seen that their quantity, quality, organizational capabilities and 
influences over their own masses were not enough to run an efficient governmental 
structure.337 
One of the causes of the 1905 reforms in Russia was the defeat at the hands of 
the Japanese Armies in the Far East. Accelerating the Russian efforts to connect all 
parts of their huge lands, this defeat also had its two-fold impact on Turkestan. In 1906, 
the Russians completed the Orenburg-Tashkent railroad, connecting Turkestan with 
                                                
334 Abdürreşid İbrahim, p. 60.  
335 Ch.Ch, Valikhanov, Stati (Alma-Sata: Perepiska, 1947), p. 5.  
336 S. Asfendiarov, İstoriya Kazakhstana s Drevneyshikh Vremen (Alma-Ata: Kazak Üniversiteti, 1993), 
pp. 273-5.  
337 S. Asfendiarov, p. 276.  
 85
European Russia. That was the first railroad line opening Turkestan to the outside 
world, especially more Tatar Jadids as well as traders. The second impact of the defeat 
was the fact that Jadids, first time started to think that this European giant, Russia, could 
be fragile to an Asian nation, Japanese, who shared the unfortunate destinies of the rest 
of Asians but overcame all difficulties through reforms and an excellent educational 
system. 
By 1907, the spelling Turkestan, instead of its original previous version 
Turkistan, as discussed above, was promoted in the English language sources. Even for 
the Northern Afghan provinces and the area north of the Afghan territories Turkestan 
term was widely employed.338 The use of Central Asia also increased in frequency, in 
most cases covering a vast area including Thibet, Eastern and Western Turkestan as 
well as Afghan (Southern) Turkestan.339  
Count Pahlen, who spent a year in 1908-9 in the region, said that Turkestanis 
should have appreciated Russian rule, which was too tolerant compared to the native 
rulers.340 He had a point of truth, while one takes the fugitive Turkestani intelligentsia 
living in the Russian quarters of the cities like Kagan, Samarkand or Tashkent, who 
found safety only in these places, all over Turkestan. Interestingly, for Pahlen, 
Turkestan meant a bit more than the classical Russian Governorship, an area which "is 
separated from the rest of the world by waterless deserts in the west, by uninhabited 
deserts [Steppe] in the north, and by the lofty ranges of the Tyan-Shan, Altay, Pamir 
and Hindu Kush in the East..."341 His approach to the Jadids organizing themselves and 
launching publication of journals, newspapers and books was rather skeptical. All the 
                                                
338 David Fraser, The Strategic Position of Russia in Central Asia, p. 11-12. Proceedings of the Central 
Asian Society. Annual Meeting of the Central Asian Society. Read in June 12, 1907. 
339 David Fraser, The Strategic Position of Russia in Central Asia. P. 9 and 10.  
340 Count K.K. Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). His memoirs of 
1908-9, when he was at an inspection duty in Turkestan, p. 16.  
341 Count K.K. Pahlen, p. 1.  
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Muslim organizations in Turkestan, were perceived by Pahlen, as having direct 
connection to the “center” in Istanbul - probably the Young Turks - standing for a 
Muslim unity all over Asia.342   
As it was well inserted by Ismail Bey Gaspıralı and his follower Jadids in 
several instances, the Russians also equated the terms Musulman (Muslim) with Turkic 
people, Tatar etc. A Belorussian newspaper, Nasha Niva, was informing its readers in 
1910 that Tyurk and Musulman meant the same nation and the Musulmans of the 
empire were either Tyurks or Tatars, Tyurkskih (Turkic) people. The same issue also 
included that the Chinese controlled territories in western China were in fact called 
Eastern Turkestan,343 thus a politico-geographical continuation of Russian Turkestan.  
The first known political activities of Turkestani intelligentsia was started in 
1910-12 in Istanbul by a group that arrived in the capital secretly from the Bukharan 
Emirate, which included notables like Abdurrauf Fıtrat, Osman Hoca, Sadık Aşuroğlu 
and others.344 Their secret society Terbiye-i Etfal  (education of children) sent fifteen 
students in 1911 and thirty more in 1912 to both Istanbul and Germany.345 The period 
they spent in Istanbul was the height of pan-Turkist propaganda of Union and the 
Progress Party and Enver Pasha’s power. They returned to Turkestan with a fresh 
exiting pan-Turkist idealism. The foundations of the Young Bukharans and Alaş Orta 
Parties in 1909 and 1912 were realized in such an atmosphere of the Young Turk 
reformation in the Ottoman Empire and the rise of pan-Turkism all over Turkic lands.  
 
                                                
342 Richard Pierce (ed), N.J. Couris (trans.), Mission to Turkestan: Being the Memoirs of Count K.K. 
Pahlen, 1908-9 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 51.  
343 G. Alisova, "Musul'mane v Rasey," Nasha Niva (18 November 1910). No. 47, pp. 708-9. But the 
Russian Turkestan was called as Middle Asia rather than geographically Turkestan.  
344 Timur Kocaoğlu, "Türkstanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," in Dr. Baymirza 
Hayit Armağanı. Ed by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed 
Yesevî Vakfı, 1999), p. 159.  
345 Kocaoğlu, p. 159.  
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3.4.4 World War I and Turkestan 
The Imperial Tsarist administration of Turkestan was a heavily military 
administration, with no access to the natives for any kind of local self-government. It 
was only within the realms of the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate, internal 
affairs of these states were left to the hands of autocratic rulers.346 
A western traveler who visited Turkestan in 1914 noted that “…Turkestan and 
Russian Central Asia are extremely loyal, peaceful and happy Russian colonies.”347 In 
these accounts of S. Graham, one can find a new Turkestan concept, which meant 
simply the lands of the Turkestan Governorship General, Bukharan and Khivan realms. 
The concept for the north of “Turkestan” was subsidized by the introduction of a rather 
inclusive concept, Central Asia, in fact Russian part of Central Asia. This was at the 
time the usages of the term Turkestan was quite popular to mean only the Russian 
Governorship.348 Ethnically, Turkestan was basically a cosmopolitan Russian colony in 
Asia.349 Quite similar to Hindustan (India), it was cosmopolitan, and it needed a super-
western power to be administered. Although the region was closed to general 
immigration prior to the War, there was still an influx of new settlers until the war,350 
thus contributing to the cosmopolitan nature of the area.  
Between the years 1914-1916, Russians doubled all the taxes they were 
collecting in Turkestan, creating a further pressure on the native dikhan class, given the 
                                                
346 For more on the Turkestan under late Tsarist administration see V. I. Masalskiy, Turkestanskiy Kray 
(St. Petersburg: İzd. F. Devriena, 1913).  
347 Stephen Graham, Through Russian Central Asia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 74. 
This author uses Chinese Tartary for Eastern Turkestan and uses Turkestan not only for the exact borders 
of the Russian governorate general but also for Bukhara and Khiva as well. See p. 52.  
348 Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923. Volume One (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1951), pp. 329-30.  
349 Stephen Graham, Through Russian Central Asia (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 24 
(Notes of a journey to the region in 1914) 
350 Stephen Graham, p. 154-156 and p. 166.  
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colonial Russian settlers kept themselves free from the center’s taxation.351  On the  25th 
June 1916, the Russian Emperor ordered the conscription of all males between the ages 
19-43 into the labor units of the Russian army.352 The 1916 uprising started just after 
these measures. Because, firstly it was humiliating for them to work for the labor units 
only and secondly the Caliph-Ottoman Sultan was fighting against Russians.353 The 
Russian army was ruthless in dealing with this uprising. As a result, probably several 
thousands of Turkestanis were killed.354 Most of the nomadic portion of the population 
subject to the Imperial conscription fled to Eastern Turkestan. The forced conscription 
continued until the 1917 Revolutions. However a very small number of the conscripted 
regiments arrived at the fronts.  
The 1916 rebellion, together with the growing concerns about the disintegration 
of the Ottoman Empire accelerated the growth of the Turkestani and Turkic 
consciousness among the members of the Turkestani Jadid intelligentsia.355 The very 
existence of the Turco-Russian rivalry in the War, together with the Tsar’s 1916 prikaz 
caused the 1916 July rebellion in Turkestan, resulted with great intellectual and 
psychological complexities among the Turkestanis.356 One of the best examples of these 
                                                
351 Çağatay Koçar, Türkistan'daki 1916 Yılı Milli Ayaklanmasının 70. Yıldönümü. X. Türk Tarih 
Kongresinden Ayrıbasım (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 773-774. Se also H. 
Tursunov, Özbekistan'da 1916 Yıl Halk Qozğalanı (Tashkent: ANUzSSR, 1966), pp. 33-41.  
352 For the full text of the “Ukaz of the Russian Emperor Nikolai II on the conscription of the male aliens 
to the labor units,” see, Vosstanie 1916 g. v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane; Sbornik Dokumentov (Moscow: 
İzd. AN SSSR, 1960), pp. 25.  
353 According to Koçar, Turkestanis did not have any intention to work and/or fight against their fellow 
Muslim brothers. P. 775.  
354 For an extensive account and Russian and Kazak archival documents concerning the 1916 rebellion 
see Kaharlı 1916 jıl: Kujattar men materialdar jinağı (Almaty: Kazakstan, 1998). See also Çağatay 
Koçar, p. 782. Koçar gives a deathtoll like 673,347, which is very doubtful taking into consideration, the 
Tsar's order only covering 485 thousand male population of Turkistan (Turkestan and Steppe 
Governorships in joint) that time.  
355 For a Turkish account of the 1616 rebellion and life in Turkestan in 1915-17 period see Fahrettin 
Erdoğan, Türk Ellerinde Hatıralarım (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1954). Erdoğan was an Ottoman soldier in 
the first year of the war and spent 1915-17 period in Turkestan as a POW. He was an Uzbek himself from 
Divriği’s Yağıbasan village. He counts the ethnic groups in Tukrestan as Uzbeks, Turkmens, Taciks, Sart-
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz-Kazaks, which supports the idea of clear-cut ethnic identities, existed prior to the 
revolution in Tukrestan.  
356 See Bagali Kasymov, Revolyutsiya I Literatura: zarozhdeniye I razvitiye uzbekskoy revolyutsionniy 
poezii 1905-1917 gody (Tashkent: Fan, 1991), pp. 17-29.  
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complexities could be observed in Cholpan’s (Abdülhamid Süleyman) poem at the end 
of the First World War, for the Turks of Turkey. It  was a good example of strong pan-
Turkist movement among the members of the Uzbek intelligentsia of the time:  
My brother, far away, so greatly suffering,  
My brother, alike a tulip broken,  
Is not Altai our common mother? 
Have we not played on her slopes, 
Did not the cool mountain springs 
Splash for us, run for us through the rocks, 
Were not our horses the wild steeds, 
Running like the whirlwind? 
In the golden days thou didst part from me 
And go to the Middle [Mediterranean] and Black Seas? 
But I remained like a bird,  
Opening not my wings,   
And none was left to show me the way. 
The enemy’s bullet struck my heart and I sank down: 
I was thrust into a dark prison and shut in. 
And than, O Master? 
Have we Turks lost the heart of the lion?  
Because cowards and weary of war?  
Is the fire in our hearts put out? 
And our fathers’ blood dried up? 
Oh brother, thou there and I here,  
Both in dire distress.  
Come, let us go again to the Altai, 
And mount the golden throne of our fathers.357 
 
Prior to the revolution, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Shibanid Uzbeks (or Taza 
[Fresh]-Uzbeks) had their strict tribal structures. “Sart” Uzbeks and Tajiks as a 
sedentary population lost their tribal affinities.358 The tribal groups of Mangyt, Kungrat, 
Kitay and Nayman were the major common groups among the Kazak, Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks. The Çağatays of Fergana consisted of Karluks, Kypchaks, Turks359 and 
Kuramans would claim a rather different “Turk” heritage different from other tribal 
                                                
357 Translation by Sir Olaf Caroe, in his volume; Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism 
(NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), p. 228.  
358 Alexandre Bennigsen, The Evolution of the Muslim Natiomnalities of the USSR and their Linguistic 
Problems (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1961), p. 5.  
359 Turks of Fergana Valley still exists as a completely separate tribal group, who both identify 
themselves as Turks, not Tyurks, and also their nationality on their passports were written as Turok or 
Turk.  
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groups.360 However, just prior to the 1917 revolution it was possible to speak about the 
existence of three main ethnic groups in Turkestan: the Kazak-Kyrgyz group, the 
Uzbek-Tajik group and the Turkmen group.361 All these groups, were claiming “Turk” 
or Turki identity as well as historical heritage.   
 
3.5 Summary 
The territories covered by the Turkestan concept have changed throughout 
history, mainly together with the movement of Turkish tribes from the northeast toward 
the southwest direction in Asia. To the native Persian stock of the region, anywhere 
populated by the Turks would naturally be called Turkestan, “the country of the 
Turk(s).” 
Probably one of the first usages of the term Turkestan was by the Armenian  
priest Sebēos in the 7th century AD, which coincided with the expansion of the Turkic 
Kaganate towards the west.  From that time on, “ancient Turan” was known as 
Turkestan. While several other names and terms had been introduced by the pieces of 
Persian, Arab, Russian, Assyrian, Mongol, English literatures on the region, only the 
term Turkestan has survived to the 20th century.  
The region became the possessions of several native and alien empires through 
out its history. Each and every one of them needed to call it by one single name. This 
name was mostly the “Turkestan” region, province, district, country, land, etc. It was 
lastly conquered by the Russian Empire and named the “Turkestan Governorship 
General” in the second half of the 19th century. The repeated uses of the term for 
different places in the world populated by Turks, like for the whole territories of the 
                                                
360 Alexandre Bennigsen, p. 15.  
361 Alexandre Bennigsen, p. 27.  
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Ottoman Empire, Central Anatolian plateau also reflects the fact that the term Turkestan 
has been used to designate almost anywhere populated by Turks. 
Throughout the centuries, several different definitions of the limits of the region 
were appeared. However by the end of 18th and beginning of 19th century, just prior to 
Russian conquest, its rough meaning covered the huge area from Siberia to Northern 
Afghanistan, and  from Caspian Sea to Lob Nor desert. It was in fact after the Russian 
advance in the region and the establishment of Step and Turkestan General 
Governorships, Turkestan concept was limited with a new political meaning, the 
territories of the Empire’s Turkestan Governorship, which were subject to constant 
changes as the Russian advance to South continued until the late 19th century. From then 
on, the usages like “Turkestan and Step,” “Turkestan and Bukhara,” “Turkestan and 
Khiva,” reflected rather political entities in the broader region of “Russian Turkestan.” 
For the natives residing in Step Governorship, Bukharan Emirate or Khivan Khanate, 
there was no such a problem either or not belonging to a common Turkestani identity. 
They were Turkestanis [Türkistanlıklar] in general, residing in different administrative 
units within the broader geographical region of Turkestan under the rule of White Tsar 
[Ak Padişah].     
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CHAPTER 4 
TURKESTAN UNITED AND DISUNITED  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, the unification and division processes of Turkestan are examined. 
Both the February and October revolutions of 1917 played very special roles in 20th 
century Turkestan. The liberal atmosphere of the first one resulted in the creation of 
national states in Turkestan, Turkestan Autonomy and Alaş Orda, whereas the latter 
destroyed these states. Probably as important as these, was the planning and 
implementation of the national-territorial delimitation of Soviet Central Asia which 
destroyed traditional states like Bukhara, Khiva (Khorezm) as well as Turkestan ASSR and 
produced new “national” national units in the region.  
 
4.2 Turkestan On the Eve of the 1917 Revolution 
Under the Tsarist Russian rule, two important administrative regulations were made 
in Turkestan. The first one was the establishment of the Step General Governorship, and 
the second one was the establishment of the Turkestan General Governorship combining 
the lands of Khokand, Khiva and Bukhara conquered by the Russians. Although populated 
by nomadic Kazaks, Jetisu (Semirechie) was included into Turkestan. So, when the 1917 
revolution took place, there were five administrative entities in Central Asia: The General 
Governorships of the Steppe and Turkestan, the Transcaspian Province, the Bukharan 
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Emirate and the Khivan Khanate. The Transcaspian Region was associated with Turkestan 
the General Governorship from 1905 on, but remained as an autonomous part of it in 
administrative matters.  
The political and geographical concept of Russian or Western Turkestan covered 
the lands of the Bukharan Emirate and Khivan Khanate, irrespective of both being 
politically separate entities. Published in 1917, an American intelligence report on 
Turkestan defined the limits of the region as:  
Western or Russian Turkestan is bounded on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the 
South by Persia and Afghanistan, on the east by China, and on the north by the 
Russian provinces of Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, Turgai and Uralsk. For 
administrative purposes this area is divided into five provinces, i.e. Transcaspia, 
Syr-Darya, Samarkand, Fergana and Semirechensk; there are in addition the two 
semi-independent Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara.1  
 
To them, there was no one single Turkestani nation with a standard European 
definition of the term “nation”. However, there were Turkestani “peoples” with minor 
differences in language and life styles. These “peoples” of Turkestan, as they were 
considered by the above-mentioned report, were: the Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Sarts, Turkomans, 
Karakalpaks, Taranchis, Kipchaks,2 Tajiks and Dungans. It is also underlined that Sart was 
completely an economic term, not a name for an ethnic group.3 These “little differences” 
among the “peoples” of Turkestan and their historical and cultural commonalities with the 
Turks of Turkey caused anxiety on the part of those concerned with American security. 
The importance of Turkestan in the development of the Pan-Turanian Movement, 
and its significance to the German plans for world dominion, are considerable… 
Pan Turanian emissaries from Constantinople have been active ever since the war 
began and the disturbances may be in part the result of their efforts.4 
                                                
1 Roland B. Dixon, “Western or Russian Turkestan, March 8, 1918,” MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 134. The 
National Archives (Washington D.C.: Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents “Special Reports 
and Studies” 1917-1919), p. 1.  
2 That should mean either Uzbek or Kazak Kipchak tribes in central Turkestan.  
3 Roland B. Dixon, part III, p. 9.  
4 Roland B. Dixon, part IV, p. 1-2.  
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Given the ever-increasing political instability in the Russian Empire and the ending 
of the First World War, the potential Pan-Turanian was one of Ottoman Turkey’s last cards 
in her war plans. Turkestan would be the first fragile piece of the Empire to break away. 
Arnold Toynbee prepared a Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement for the British 
Intelligence in October 1917, in which he argued that:  
The problem of Turkish Nationalism in Central Asia was infinitely remote before 
the Russian Revolution; the Revolution has made it imminent… If Russia falls to 
pieces, Central Asia will be the first fragment to break away…the pan-Turanian 
problem in Central Asia thus gives the British Empire a vital interest in the internal 
evolution of Russia-a permanent interest apart altogether from the war. Turkish 
speaking Central Asia may either remain part of Russia and gravitate towards Baku 
and Kazan, or break away from Russia and gravitate towards Constantinople, and 
the latter alternative would directly prejudice our security.5 
 
Current scholarly works established the idea that, prior to 1917 revolution, 
Turkestanis would not identify themselves only by their dialects (languages) as Uzbek, 
Kazak or Tajik;6 the primary and most important element of self-identification was religion. 
Muslim identity was effective together with all other types of identification elements. Prior 
to the Revolution, W. W. Barthold argued that the settled population of Central Asians had 
only a religious and territorial-local identity, and there was nothing like a national or 
common Turkestani solidarity.7 On the other hand, the nomadic portion of the population 
was rather identified by tribal federations and sub-clans. Zeki Velidî [Togan], in this 
respect, classified the natives of Turkestan as the “settled” and “nomadic”. The 
precondition for identification was one’s mode of life, and whether it was nomadic/semi-
                                                
5 A[rnold] J T[oynbee], “Report on the Pan-Turanian Movement” (London: Intelligence Bureau Department 
of Information, 1917); “Special Reports and Studies” 1917-1919, MC 1107, Inquiry Doc. 458, The National 
Archives (Washington D.C.: Records of Department of State, Inquiry Documents).  
6 Alexandre Bennigsen, "The Nature of Ethnic Consciousness in Soviet Cenrtral Asia" A paper prepared for 
delivery at conference on Soviet Central Asia: trends and changes (Washington D.C.: International 
communications agency, October 31, 1978), p. 12.  
7 See V.V. Bartol’d, “Sart,” Sochineniya, V. 2-2 part I (Moscow: 1964), p. 528-9.  
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nomadic (Kyrgyz-Uzbek) or settled Sart. Zeki Velidî considered all Sarts with Turkic roots. 
According to him, Sarts, in general, identified themselves with city-locality names such as 
Tashkentlik (Taşkendî), Kokandlık (Hokandî), etc. In this sense, the use of the name Uzbek 
had very limited meaning.8 There were also observable racial differences among the 
natives.9 Despite all these differences and classifications, there existed a common 
Turkestani identity among the natives, which appeared first during the 1905-1917 period, 
but much persistently and clearly in the 1917-1924 period.  
 
4.3 Turkestan Between February and October 1917 
One of the first steps taken by the Kerenskiy’s government about Turkestan was to 
issue an amnesty for the Kyrgyz-Kazak rebels in the 1916 events.10 This step 
simultaneously turned into a source of hope for the Turkestani Jadid intelligentsia on the 
matter of the democratization of Russia. Under the Tsarist rule, the Turkestani Muslims 
were considered as aliens (inorodtsy),11 Whereas, the February 1917 revolution and the 
provisional government of Kerenskiy provided certain rights – such as the rights to form 
organizations and publish newspapers free from censorship. 
                                                
8 A. Zeki Velidî [Togan], “Türkistan Matbuatı,” Türkiyat Mecmuası, volume 2, 1928, p. 606.  
9 Generally accepted racial features of the peoples of Turkestan in Modern times explained by Wheeler as: 
“The Uzbeks and Tadzhiks are members of the Caucasoid race. Their type is what we call as Central Asian 
riverain. Mongoloid characteristics can be observed among the Tadzhiks (mostly of plain areas), Karategin 
and Darvaz mountaineers and also among the Uzbeks of the Northern Khorezm and Kypchal Uzbeks in 
Fergana. Kazaks and Kirghiz are of the South Siberian type. They are formed in the process of the  
intercourse of Central Asian Mongoloids with the Kazaks of Caucasoid type. Turkmens have predominantly 
Caucasoid physical features, but unlike the Caucasoid Uzbeks and Tadzhiks, they are dolichocephalic and 
considerably taller” See Geoffrey Wheeler, pp. 9-10.  
10 “Amnistiya po vosstaniyu 1916 g.” Vestnik Vremennogo Pravitel’stva, 18 March 1917, cited in S.M. 
Dimanshteyn (ed.), Revolyutsiya i Natsional’nyi Vopros, Volume III (Moscow: Iz. Kom. Ak., 1930), pp. 70-
71.  
11 The empire regarded all non-slavic stock as the aliens legally, whose low level of civic culture necessitating 
that.  
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  The first Muslim revolutionary organization established in Turkestan was the 
Bureau of Turco-Tatar Organizations of the Turkestan Region, which had its first meeting 
on the 13-20th of April 1917 in Tashkent.12 However, this was an exclusively Tatar 
revolutionary organization and had no or little native elements within it. Meeting in 
Tashkent on the 4-8th of April 1917, the first congress of the Turkestani Muslims 
established the Turkestan Muslim Central Council (Türkistan Müslüman Merkezi Şurası),13 
electing Mustafa Çokay as its president. In their resolution, on the 8th of April 1917, they 
demanded autonomy for Turkestan and called themselves “the Muslims of Turkestan”. 
They also explained that the very aim of the organization was to unite “all the patriots of 
Turkestan”. The conservative wing of the organization, headed by Şir Ali Lapin, later 
separated and established: the Ulema Cemiyeti. The reformists under Münevver Kari 
continued with the Council of Islam (Şûrâ-yı İslâm). This first Congress of the Muslims of 
Turkestan in Tashkent dealt, mostly with the questions of native religion, education and 
political representation within the Russian Democratic Republic.14 With the efforts of Zeki 
Velidî, some Turkestanis decided to separate themselves from the Tatar unitarist wing in 
Petrograd and Moscow. It was also Zeki Velidî, who formulated and wrote the statute of 
Şura.15  
The debate among the Muslim intelligentsia was on the type of autonomy. There 
were two different views: demanding a non-territorial cultural autonomy for all  Muslims of 
                                                
12 Kaspiy, 7. May 1917, cited in Dimenstayn, p. 345. That was only a Tatar organization despite the name 
Turco-Tatar, aimed to organize Tatars in Turkestan.  
13 For the Bolshevik version of the story see, L. Z. Slivkin. Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskoy Partii 
Turkestana II. Tashkent: Gos. Iz. UzSSR, 1959, p. 71. According to Slivkin there was never a unity in the 
Şura and the representatives of the workers class within Şura and Ulema cooperated with the Bolsheviks in 
order to eliminate all nationalist elements in the near future.  
14 See the details of the congress in “S’ezd Turkestanskikh Musul’man,” Kaspiy, 30 April 1917, cited in 
Dimanstayn, pp. 345-46.  
15 Zeki Velidî Togan. Hatıralar, pp. 128-9.  
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the Russian Empire, or demanding a federal-territorial autonomy aimed at achieving full 
independence at the end. Along with the decisions of First all-Russian Congress, the 
Second all-Russian Muslim congress gathered on the 22nd of July 1917 in Kazan. There it 
was demanded a full spiritual, cultural and national autonomy for the Muslims of the 
former Empire.16 The Turkestan Committee of the provisional government at the capital 
(Petrograd) was far from having any control over the Bolsheviks of Tashkent; and 
complaints about the Tashkent commune rose from the very first days of revolution.17 The 
Kerenskiy government, unable to assert any political authority in Turkestan, kept its 
support for the Muslims to establish their own socio-cultural organizations.18    
Even before the organization of the Council of Islam (Şûrâ-yı İslâm), the 
newspapers Turan and Turan Society were established under the auspices of the nationalist 
Musavatist Azeris in Tashkent.19 The ideas of a pan-Turkic unity and a Turkestani union, 
for the sake of struggling against “the common enemy”, were propagandized in both Turan 
and then Türk Eli newspapers in Tashkent.20 Uluğ Türkistan (Greater Turkestan), which 
was the organ of the Council of Islam and Şûrâ-yı Ulemâ at the same time, remained on its 
pan-Turkestanist stand especially with the anti Bolshevik issues on the 11th, 15th and 18th of 
November 1917, which soon led to its closure by the Turkestan ASSR Sovnarkom.21 The 
very name Uluğ Türkistan, as the name of the official organs of Muslim intelligentsia in 
                                                
16 "organizatsiya musul'man" Novaya Zhizn. 30 October (12 November) 1917, no: 167 (161), p. 4.  
17 "sobytiya v Turkestan: soobshenie chlena Turkestanskago komiteta" Novaya Zhizn. 20 September 
(3october) 1917, no: 132(126), p. 4.  
18 See "Sobytiya v Turkestan" Rech'. 21 Sept 1917. No: 222, p. 4. For Kerenskiy's telegram dated 20th of 
September to the congress of Muslim civil organizations in Tashkent, celebrating them for their faith in 
greater democratic freedoms and autonomy, concerned about economy.  
19 “Turan”, Turan, 5 May 1917, Azeris in the organization included Abdullah Kasımzade, Muhammed Emin 
Efendizade.  
20 “Turk Ademi Merkeziyeti,” Turk Eli, 28 October 1917, p. 2.  
21 Editorial, “Uluğ Türkistan,” Uluğ Türkistan, 18 November 1917. But it continued its publication in 
Khokand afterwards.  
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Turkestan, was simply a sign of the unitarist stand of both the Council of Islam and Council 
of Ulema, concerning the political division of Turkestan general. Greater Turkestan (Uluğ 
Türkistan) also meant the unification of Eastern (Chinese), Northern (Steppe), Southern 
(Afghan) and Western (Russian) Turkestans.22 According to the editors of Uluğ Türkistan, 
“all Muslims of Russia are one single nation and not separate groups, like Kyrgyz, Uzbek, 
Sart or Tatar.”23 The early views of the Turkestani intelligentsia on the nationalities 
question can best be summarized with this approach of an Upper Muslim Identity.  
The Russian civil war was away from Turkestan. Turkestan was expected to fall 
into the hands of either Whites or Reds depending on the results of the battle between the 
two on the Orenburg and Siberian fronts. Only the Aral fleet, in the Aral Lake and on the 
rivers during 1917, were involved in the fighting against the revolutionaries on the side of 
Tsarist forces.24 
 While the Tsarist policy of nationalities concentrated mostly on the Polish and 
Finnish questions, the Bolsheviks tried to prepare a comprehensive program to deal with 
the problems of all the peoples within the borders of the former Tsarist Empire.25 That 
included Turkestan too. Even their earlier approach to the nationalities issue in Turkestan 
included a specialized division of ethnic groups. According to the earlier Bolshevik reading 
of the situation in Turkestan; “The former Tsarist colony of Turkestan had three distinct 
ethnic groups, that is, the Uzbek, Turkmen and Kyrgyz, and revolutionaries were ready to 
                                                
22 Ibid.  
23 See the issues of Uluğ Türkistan no. 1, 28, 29, 30 in 1917 for the details of the speeches of Ubeydulla Hoca, 
Münevver Karı and Şir Ali Lapin in the 14-22 April 1917 All Muslim Congress in Tashkent.  
24 Most probably on the side of whites. "Na Aralskom More" Novaya Zhizn 3 October (16 October) 1917, no: 
143(137), p. 4.  
25 N. Turyakulov (Dervish). "Kirgizskiy vopros v Turkestane" ZhN no: 42 (98) 31 December 1920, p. 1. 
Tsarist policy of nationalities was only concentrated on polish and finish problems. Kirghiz struggle against 
colonizer kulaks and national classes, especially in Semirechie oblast too many Russian settlers and double 
standards.  
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give all the nations of Turkestan their own identities”.26 In 1917, the Russian colonial 
Kulaks were the main targets of the revolutionary propaganda in Turkestan.27 The Kazak 
youth in the North, open to Russian influence much more than southern Turkestanis, was 
organized by the Bolsheviks as early as 1917 and by 1920 all these previous Jadid28 
associations were in the service of Revolution.29 
In the early 1917-8 revolutionary literature, the Turkestan term, in some instances 
reflected the lands of former Tsarist General Governorship and the two “Middle Asian 
Khanates” Bukhara and Khiva.  The widespread use of the term “Turkestan and Bukhara” 
should be read with political-administrative perspectives, as the two being separate 
administrative entities.30 
 
4.4 National(ist) Statehood in Turkestan, 1917-1924 
4.4.1 Turkestan [Khokand] Autonomy 
 Following the October Revolution, the leading native intellectuals met in Khokand 
and formed the first nationalist government in Turkestan. They established the “Turkestan 
Autonomous Government” on the 10th of December 1917. For the reasons of its limited de 
facto power on the field and influence all over Turkestan, this government was also referred 
to in the literature as the Khokand Autonomy.   
                                                
26 R. Dingel'shgodt "Turkestan i oktyabr'skaya revolyutsiya," ZhN, No. 24(122) 5 Nov 1921, p. 3-4.  
27 "Iz Turkestana" ZhN no: 38 (95) 2 December 1920, p. 2. 5th regional congress of Communist Party 
Turkestana on 12.10.1920 opened. Attacks on colonizer kulaks and nationalist bourgeois traditions of Russian 
settlers.  
28 A.N. "Uspekhi Kirgizii" ZhN no: 32 (89) 17 October 1920, p. 3. See for organization of Kirgiz youth etc.  
29 M Zorskiy (Munni) "Dvizhenie molodezhi v Sovetskoy Kirgizii" ZhN no: 36 (93) 17 November 1920, p. 1-
2. Talep (in omsk), İgillik (in Orenburg) Jas Kazak (in Uralsk) Umut (in Troitsk) Talep (in Atbasar), 
Ukagaydar (in Kokchetau), Ilm Yuli (in Pavlodar), Jas Azamat (in Omsk) they were very actşive and should 
be coordinated. Kazak youth activists.  
30 See Novaya Zhizn', “V Turkestane,” 17(4) May 1918, no. 92(307), p. 2.  
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After February 1917, the Tashkent Soviet refused the calls for native representation 
in Turkestan, which was totally composed of non-natives as the former Tsarist army 
officers. The Tashkent Soviet was an exclusive representation of the Russian and European 
minority in Turkestan. The Tashkent Soviet’s negative response to ideas of sharing any 
power forced Muslims to meet at the Fourth Congress of Muslims of Central Asia in 
Khokand in December 1917. There, the conservative Council of Ulema (Ulema Cemiyeti) 
and the reformist Council of Islam (Şûrâ-yı İslâm) allied with each other and also invited 
the anti-Bolshevik non-Turkestanis to the conference to achieve a full representation of the 
country. The result was the election of a Halk Şurası (Peoples’ Council) composed of 36 
Muslim and 18 non-Muslims, headed by Şir Ali Lapin.  On 11th of December they 
established a ten-member cabinet of this parliament, declaring Turkestan an autonomous 
territory within the Russian Federal Democratic Republic. The declaration of Turkestan 
Autonomy was the practical result of the Turkestani Jadids’ nationalist-democratic 
program.31 
The Turkestan Autonomous Governments pan-Turkestanist stand was its most 
prominent feature. Its founding fathers claimed not only the territories of the former Tsarist 
General Governorship of Turkestan but also the territories of the Steppe General 
Governorship and the territories of the Bukharan Emirate and Khivan Khanate. Three seats 
in the Khokand government were left empty in case unification with the Alaş Orda and 
Turkestan (Khokand) governments was realized.32 In fact, one of the first steps for the 
government was to organize a meeting with the leaders of Alaş Orda to discuss the details 
                                                
31 The best book ever written on Turkestan Autonomy describes comprehensively how Cedid reform program 
turned into a political Turkestanist independence program in the course of events in Turkestan Autonomy. See 
Saidakbar Azamhocayev. Türkistan Muhtariyati (Tashkent: Manaviyat, 2000), pp. 125-35.  
32 Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadeleleri Tarihi (Ankara, TTK, 1995), pp. 247-8.  
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of this unification. To this end, the representatives of Alaş Orda and the Turkestan 
governments met in Turkestan City (Yesi) in January 1918.33 Mustafa Çokay was the 
Foreign Minister of both the Alaş Orda and Turkestan governments; whereas the President 
of Turkestan Autonomy Tınışbay also acted as the Interior Minister of the Alaş Orda 
Government. Tınışbay resigned on the 15th of January 1918 due to financial difficulties; 
and Çokay became the president of the Turkestan Autonomy.34 However, Mustafa Çokay’s 
proposal to unite both governments and their claimed territories was not welcomed by the 
Kazak representatives. There were two different approaches among the Alaş Orda members 
on the issue. The president of the Alaş Orda, Alihan Bökeyhan, refused to unite with the 
Turkestan Autonomy in Khokand whereas Ahmet Baytursun’s group demanded unification 
with Turkestan.35 According to Olzsca-Cleinow, Bökeyhan was a radical reformist and 
didn’t want to unite with conservative-reactionary Turkestan.36 However, prior to the 
establishment of the Bolshevik power in the region, there seems to be no evidence to 
support this argument. It would be a rather hasty analysis to evaluate his manner in refusing 
unification with the Turkestan Autonomy with his later Kazak nationalist stand. Eventually, 
Bökeyhan’s power and authority in Alaş Orda overcame Baytursun’s demands for 
unification. After this important meeting, Bökeyhan increased the level of his Kazakism 
although Çokay’s and Tınışbay’s positions in the Alaş Orda government continued. 
The Khokand government, calling itself the government of Autonomous Turkestan, 
asked the Bolsheviks of Turkestan to stay away from Khokand and accused them of being 
the local-colonial bourgeois class of the former regime with the same imperialist 
                                                
33 Mambet Koygeldiyev, Tutas Türkistan Ideası Cane Mustafa Şokayoğlu (Almaty: 1997), pp. 33-38.  
34 Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan, p. 249.  
35 Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan, pp. 252-4.  
36 Olzscha-Cleninow, Turkestan, p. 385. See also Alihan Bökeyhanov, Şıgarmalar (Almaty: 1994), pp. 3345-
55.  
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ambitions.37 Çokay was quite successful in agitating Bolsheviks in Petrograd and Moscow 
against the continuation of the prestige and dominance of the former Tsarist officers in the 
Tashkent Soviet. In the lack of supplies and political power, Bolsheviks were unable to 
intervene in the situation in Turkestan. They were determined to negotiate with the winning 
side in Turkestan at the end of the civil war.38 Appealing to Stalin to resolve the Tashkent 
Soviet, the Khokand Government received a reply advising them to use force to dissolve 
the Tashkent Soviet, if such a force was available to them. The Bolshevik central 
government never believed that the circumstances in the reactionary and backward 
Turkestan would allow them to promote a native Bolshevik movement in the region. That 
was the reason why no Turkestani delegate was invited to the meeting where the Muslim 
Commissariat was established in Moscow.39  
Zhizn Natsional’nostei, the organ of the Peoples Commissariat for Nationalities, 
published articles highlighting the commonalities among the peoples of Turkestan. 
According to this Bolshevik propaganda, it was possible to speak about the existence of a 
single “Turkestani nation”.40 This Turkestani nation, suffered at the hands of colonial 
Tsarist officers, now found a democratic atmosphere to claim its own identity. However it 
                                                
37 See. "Illyuzii i fakty: k sobytiyam v Turkestane,” Novaya Zhizn, 2 January (3 February) 1918, no: 15(229), 
p. 15. See also in the same issue a telegram from Khokand, which was sent on 26th of December 1917 and 
signed by the first congress of Muslim workers and soldiers of Turkestan. The members of the congress 
declared that they were joining the forces of Russian Democratic Republic against “Tashkent anarchists” who 
will soon cause a catastrophe in Turkestan. The telegram was sent to Petrograd Soviet of Peoples Commissars 
from Khokand. In an article by Ahmed Salikhov "rezolutsiya kraevogo s'ezda voinov, rabochnikh musul'man 
po otnosheniyu k avtonomii Turkestana," Novaya Zhizn, 2 January (3 February) 1918 no. 15 (229), p. 15-16, 
Turkestani “workers” were asking: “…we would like to ask Peoples Commissars, don’t you against now your 
own principles when you support hegemonic policy of Russian colonists here?” [in Turkestan] And they have 
asked for immediate retreat of red guards and their replacement by their own Turkestan militia.  
38 For details of the short-lived Turkestan Autonomy and Çokay’s account of the events, see Mustafa Çokay. 
1917 Yılı Hatıra Parçaları (Ankara: Yaş Türkistan Neşriyatı, 1988).  
39 Only delegates from Murmansk, Petrograd, Caucasia, Crimea and Turkey were invited, including Sultan 
Galiyev and Mustafa Suphi, in 3 November 1918. See ZhN, no. 2, 17 November 1918, p. 6. Stalin's speech in 
this meeting, full of instructions published in the next issue "Rech' t. Stalina," ZhN, no. 3, 24 November 1918, 
p. 2.  
40 Editorial, "ocherk istorii razvitiya revolyutsii v turkestane I," ZhN, no. 3, 24 November 1918, p. 2.  
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was the Russian workers and soldiers who realized the revolution in Turkestan,41 and that 
was their right to claim domination over the party. The arrest of General Kuropatkin was a 
turning point,42 which helped Bolsheviks in Turkestan to persuade the native intelligentsia 
that they were not a continuation of imperialist Tsarist cadres.  
The Government in Khokand was also in contact with the only White armed forces 
in Turkestan, which was Ataman Dutov’s Cossack army, guaranteed the balance between 
the Bolshevik-led Tashkent Soviet and Khokand for a very short while. However, Dutov’s 
idea of forming a South-Eastern anti-Bolshevik alliance did not find enough support among 
the Turkestanis. 
By December 1917, all “bourgeois nationalist” periodicals in Tashkent, including 
Türkistan Mecmuası, Uluğ Türkistan, Türkistan Sözü, Türkistan Kurveri, Yeni Türkistan 
were closed in order to stop the Turkestanist propaganda.43 Of course, it was quite 
meaningful for the revolutionary periodicals of the time to use the name Turkestan and 
even Greater Turkestan. The next step for the Tashkent Soviet was to destroy the Turkestan 
(Khokand) Autonomy. It resolved to liquidate it on the 31st of January 1918 and attacked 
Khokand on the night of 7th of February. Until 22nd of February the battle continued and 
with the support of the Armenian Tashnaksutyun militia the city was captured by the 
Bolsheviks, leaving over ten thousand dead and a city leveled to the ground.44 The 
members of the government fled in different directions, while the remaining armed forces 
of the government started the Basmacı resistance in remote areas.  
                                                
41 Editorial, "ocherk istorii razvitiya revolyutsii v turkestane II," ZhN, no. 4, 1 December 1918, p. 8.  
42 Editorial, "ocherk istorii razvitiya revolyutsii v turkestane III," ZhN, no. 5, 8 December 1918, p. 8.   
43 Slivkin, p. 146.  
44 Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan, pp. 250-51.  
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Years later, the Bolsheviks accused those who were responsible for this massacre, 
namely the Tashnaksutyun militiamen, of causing the subsequent native’s strong support of 
the Basmacı.45 That massacre marked the beginning of the Turkestani armed struggle 
against the Soviets, and in many cases with the demands for the restoration of Turkestan 
Autonomy.46 Even during the later phases of the Basmacı movement, the main motto of the 
Korbaşıs (Basmacı commanders) remained the same: not recognizing the Bolshevik 
Turkespublika (Turkestan ASSR) and demanding the restoration of Turkestan Autonomy, 
as announced by Şirmet (Şirmuhammed) Korbaşı in 1921.47 
While the Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy more or less brought the representatives 
of all ethnic groups of the region within the Şura [Parliament] and in its government, it was 
only the Turkmens who preferred to stay away from all these developments. Turkmens 
stayed away from both the Turkestan Autonomy and then from the subsequent Turkestan 
ASSR; they even kept minimal attendance within the organs of the subsequent Khorezmian 
Peoples Soviet Republic. Their leaders, like Atabayev, were trying to establish their own 
statehood in the Zakaspi48 region as early as the 1917-1918 period.49 The Kyrgyz and 
Kazak representatives within the Parliament of the Turkestan Autonomy also fell into a 
serious tribal competition among themselves. Turkmens did not respond at all to the 
                                                
45 Dervish. "Basmachestvo i ferganskaya problema," ZhN, no: 18 (116), 16 September 1921, p. 2-3. 
Population density, feudal structure, commercial bourgeois of Bukhara, backwards social-economic situation, 
conservative national-religious structure, hunger were all results of this [Basmacı] movement. The author also 
accused Armenian Tashnaksutyun militiamen for massacre and plunder of the city, which made Bolsheviks 
unpopular in the eyes of the natives and caused their support to the Basmacıs.  
46 Yu. Ibragimov. "Krasniy Turkestan," ZhN, no: 12 (20), 6 April 1919, p. 1. Ergash Korbaşı, who was the 
police chief of the Khokand government was the first to organize these armed guerillas against the Soviets, 
who kept repeating his demands for the restoration of Turkestan Autonomy and claimed the heritage of this 
government.   
47 Şirmet Korbaşı was not recognizing Turkrespublika even for the peace negotiations, he was asking for the 
restoration of Turkestan Autonomy. See Editorial, "Borba s basmachestvom," ZhN, no. 21(119), 10 October 
1921, p. 3. 
48 Mavera-yi Bahri Hazer in Turkish.  
49 Sh. Tashliev, Ustanovlenie i uprochenie sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane, 1917- iyun 1918 gg. Ashkhabad: 
Turkmenskoe gosudarstvennoe izadatel’stvo, 1957, p. 92 and 143-4.  
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invitations of the Government for Turkmen representatives.50 In addition to its failure to 
achieve the representation by all peoples in Turkestan, the de facto influence of the 
Turkestan Autonomy remained confined to the city of Khokand or rather a quarter of the 
city of Khokand itself.  
The importance of this short-lived government, however, lies in its heritage. The 
fact that such an autonomous body was formed in one way or another first strengthened the 
positions of the natives within the Turkestan ASSR, and secondly showed the natural 
stands of the native intelligentsia to form a unified independent Turkestan in the region. 
Furthermore, the legacy of Khokand provided all Turkestani émigré politicians with the 
precedent of the existence, albeit a short-lived one, of a national autonomy. Mustafa Çokay 
himself became an émigré, who worked until his death in 1941 for the restoration of a free 
and independent Turkestan, as practiced in late 1917 and early 1918.     
 
4.4.2 Alaş Orda 
Alaş51 Party name was adopted during the 21-26 July 1917 Kazak Congress in 
Orenburg, replacing the name of the Kazak Kadet (Constitutional Democratic) Party, 
established in 1906. That was at exactly the same time as the July crisis of the Provisional 
government, which began to loose its control over the vast lands of the former Russian 
Empire. Bökeyhan left the Kadet Party in July because of the Kadet Party’s negative 
                                                
50 Mustafa Çokay, 1917 Yılı Hatıra Parçaları (Ankara: Yaş Türkistan Neşriyatı, 1988).  
51 Alaş is a common battle cry among the nomadic Kazak and Kyrgyz tribes of Turkestan. A Kazak Kadet 
(Constitutional Democratic) Party was established by a group of Kazak intellectuals, taking advantage of the 
Russo-Japanese war and the first constitutional reforms in Russia. Some of the founders of the party were: 
Alihan Bökeyhanulı, Muhammetcan Tınışbayulı, Ahmat Birimcanulı, Ahmet Baytursunulı, Mircakıp 
Dulatulı, Ömer Karaşulı, Mustafa Çokayulı, Halil Abbasulı. See Hasan Oraltay, Alaş: Türkistan Türklerinin 
Milli İstiklal Parolası (İstanbul: Büyük Türkeli Yayınları, 1973). Alaş Orda government officially established 
on 13th of December 1917 and declared its autonomy. Although Oraltay argues that Alaş Orda Government 
declared “National Turkestani Independence” on this date, Alaş leaders only declared their autonomy from 
the central former Tsarist and contemporary revolutionary governments.  
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attitude towards the autonomous government plans of the Kazaks within the party.52 The 
anarchy caused by this lack of control resulted in the October Bolshevik coup d’etat, which 
meant more anarchy and political chaos for the Kazaks. Almost simultaneously with the 
declaration of the Turkestan Autonomy in Khokand, in December 1917, the Alaş Party 
established the Alaş Orda Government, which claimed sovereignty over the former Tsarist 
Steppe General Governorship’s lands. Although, with almost no military and political 
control over the vast territory it claimed, it survived until March 1920. Following the Kazak 
Congress in Orenburg on the 18-26th of December 1917, the Alaş Orda Government was 
established theoretically as an autonomous body within Russia, under the Prime Ministry of 
Alihan Bökeyhan. Ataman Dutov was also there to support this government to secure his 
southeastern alliance plans. One of the first steps the Alaş Orda took, was to set up a 
military unit to be trained by the Cossack officers of Dutov,53 which temporarily fought on 
the side of White armies after the shock caused by the massacre in Khokand.  
Alaş Orda54 was the only political representation for the Kazaks of the Steppe.55  
However, local Alaş politics were far from having any control over the vast Steppe; and the 
Kazak population remained open to the influences from both Whites and Reds.56 The 
                                                
52 Gülnar Kendirbai, “The Alash Movement in Kazakhstan,” The Turks (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), Vol. 
VI, p. 857.  
53 N. Martynenko, Alash Orda: Sbornik Dokumentov (Alma-Ata: Kazakstan, 1992), p. 72.  
54 See the party program of Alaş Orda in Dimanstayn, pp. 363- 365. In the 10th article of the program, where 
Kazak-Kyrgyz lands were included into the concept of Turkestan.  
55 Baytursunov, "Revolyutsiya i Kirgizy," ZhN, no: 29 (37), 3 August 1919, p. 1. In this article Ahment 
Baytursun tried to justify Alaş Orda’s policy of playing between the Whites and Reds during the course of 
1917-1920 period while he explained the reasons of their entry into the Bolshevik service. Main reason was 
the disrespect to and humiliation of Alaş Orda Governments by the Whites in the region and their refusal to 
cooperate.  Bolshevik program for nationalities and respect is much appreciated by Baytursun in this article. 
However, here Baytursun fails to mention the existence of Uş Cüz Party established in November 1917 as a 
Socialist party. Its leader Kölbay Togıs had a reputation of being the member of Tsarist secret police in Omsk. 
This party, after the Soviet demonation in the Steppe joined the Bolsheviks.  
56 Editorial, "Tretiy oblastnoy s'ezd sovetov Bukeevskoy i Kirgizskoy stepi," ZhN, no: 26 (34), 13 July 1919, 
p. 2. See this article also for association of Kirgizia with Russia.  
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“bourgeois nationalist”57 nature of Alaş Orda was already declared by the Bolsheviks, and 
for the latter, its historical role in the revolution was over by 1920.58  
One of the main agenda of the arguments in the government was to decide whether 
to declare an independent statehood or to remain an autonomous part of  Federal Russia. 
Bökeyhan and Baytursun agreed on organizing negotiations with both the Russians of the 
Steppe region as well as the Kazaks of the Turkestan Autonomy to discuss this matter.59 
However, the long-awaited answer from the Syr Darya Kazak Congress on the 5th of 
January 1918 was rather a disappointing one, as they preferred to stay within the Turkestan 
Autonomy.60 The Kazak population of the lands claimed by Turkestan (Khokand) 
Autonomy was around three million residents in the Syr Darya and Jetisu districts.61 
Bökeyhan’s persistent Kazakism, apparently was not much appreciated by the Southern 
Kazaks.  
In the person of Muhammed Tungaçin, who was the former carter of the Tsarist 
Governor General in Orenburg, Stalin found the single member of the non-existent “Kazak 
proletariat,” and appointed him as the Commissar of Nationalities in the Kazak 
Department.62 Quite similar to the Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy, the Alaş Orda 
Government in Jetitam (Semipalatinsk) was a moderate local Government in a quarter of 
the city. The Kirrevkom (Kyrgyz Revolutionary Committee) demanded the abolishment of 
Alaş Orda on 3rd of June 1920. Lenin ordered the creation of the Kyrgyz (i.e. Kazak) 
Autonomous SSR on 26 August 1920, and it was officially established in October in 
                                                
57 In all  post-revolutionary Soviet literature both Turkestan (Khokand) and Alaş Orda governments were 
labeled as “bourgeois nationalist” governments, as a stage of the revolution in the east. 
58 A. Liyanov, "Avtonomnaya Kirgiziya," ZhN, no: 30 (87), 1 October 1920, p. 1. The role of bourgeois Alaş 
Orda is finished like all counter revolutionary elements.  
59 Kendirbai, p. 858.  
60 Kendirbai, p. 859.  
61 Kendirbai, p. 859.  
62 Togan, Bugünkü Türkili, p. 377.  
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Orenburg. However, none of the members of the Alaş Orda government submitted to this 
demand and continued their activities in Jetitam. The Alaş members surrendered when the 
Frunze’s Red army arrived in the region on 20th of December 1920.  
 The Alaş Orda Autonomy was much luckier than Turkestan Autonomy in terms of 
its choices and proximity to the theatre of war between the Whites and Reds. Most 
probably, this was the simple reason for its survival for three years in the middle of a 
bloody civil war. Although the three members of Alaş Orda and Turkestan Autonomous 
governments were the same persons, no strong evidence seems to exist to support the idea 
that the Alaş leaders had any consensus on their Turkestanist stand.  
Bökeyhan’s anti-unitary choice, although not supported by Baytursun and 
Devlethan, was a decisive point in the history of 20th century Turkestan. Apparently many 
in the contemporary Kazak intelligentsia were not much Turkestan-oriented.63 In any case, 
the unification of both Turkestan (Khokand) and Alaş (Jetitam) governments could hardly 
have any immediate practical consequences for both, which were suffering from political, 
military and financial weaknesses then. 
 
4.4.3 Bukhara 
 The chaos, which dominated the territories of the former Tsarist Empire after the 
1917 February revolution resulted in the de-facto independences of the two subordinate 
states in Turkestan: the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate. The Jadids of Bukhara 
were rather a secret society until the February revolution and voiced their demands for 
reform thereafter, taking advantage of the new circumstances. The Bukharan Emir Mir 
Alim Khan, under the pressure of both the Bukharan Jadids and the Tashkent Soviet, 
                                                
63 Editorial, "O Kirgizskoy intelligentsii," ZhN, no: 37 (94), 25 November 1920.  
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published a “Declaration on the Liberties” on 30th of March 1917.64 However, the Emir had 
no intention of letting these new liberties be used in real life. The Young Bukharans65 under 
the leadership of Osman Hoca and Abdurrauf Fıtrat organized a mass demonstration on the 
8th of April 1917 to force the Emir to realize their reform program, which came under fire 
from the Emir’s soldiers. Young Bukharans were reformist liberals, escaping from the 
Emirs prosecution, but by no means Communists or even revolutionaries.66 
After the events on the 8th of April 1917, all prominent Jadids fled to Kagan and re-
organized themselves to establish a cooperative relationship with the Tashkent Soviet. They 
presented a detailed project to the Tashkent Soviet in April 1917, enumerating the types of 
reforms and liberties they stood for.67 Until the destruction of the Turkestan (Khokand) 
Autonomy in late February 1918, the Tashkent Soviet did nothing but promised its support 
for the reformists, now in Kagan, against the regime of the Emir. Just after storming 
Khokand, the Red Army proceeded to Bukhara with euphoria on the 15th of March 1918 
where it faced defeat at the hands of the Bukharan Emir’s army. The Tashkent Soviet 
recognized the independence of the Bukharan State on 25th of March 1918.68 The Tashkent 
Soviet’s Red Army’s attack to Bukhara coincided with Ataman Dutov's Orenburg 
                                                
64 For the full text of this declaration see Hocayev, K Istorii, pp. 20-21.  
65 For more detailed information on Young Bukharans see Fayzulla Khodzhaev, “O Mladobukhartsakh,” 
Istorik-Marxist, no. 1, 1926, pp. 123-141. And also see S. Ainii, O Moei Zhizni, Sobranie Schinenii, volume I, 
1971, after page 81. Earlier, in 1911-12 both Fitrat and Aini were far from being “pan-Turkists”, they both 
called the language of Bukhara as Persian and the language of the first Bukharan newspaper Bukhara-i Şerif 
was Persian. This was strongly criticized in pan-Turkist Türk Yurdu of the time as Komatsu also pointed out. 
See “Buhara-yı Şerif Gazetesi,” Türk Yurdu, volume I, 1911-12, p. 376 and volume II, 1912-13,  p. 631.  
66 Yu. Ibragimov, "Krasniy Turkestan: Bukhara," ZhN, no: 13 (21), 13 April 1919, p. 1. Young Bukharans 
were simply liberals who wanted to reform Shariah rule with a parliament, to open modern schools and to 
have freedom of press. However these “liberal” demands were more than enough to make them the sworn 
enemies of the Emir.  
67 “Proekt reformy v Bukhare Komiteta mlado-bukhartsev,” Dimanstayn pp. 353-360.  
68 Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan, pp. 261-2.  
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Cossacks’ march against Tashkent.69 So the fragile position in the region stopped the 
Tashkent Soviet awaiting reinforcements.  
By the end of 1919, the Emir raised an army of fifty thousand men, the largest 
armed force in the region but an ill equipped one. This alarmed the Tashkent Soviet who 
immediately invited the Red Army to Turkestan to intervene. Most of the reports sent by 
the Tashkent Soviet to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party were 
exaggerations about the forces of the Emir. In the same reports, it was stated that there was 
only one group, Young Bukharans for the Soviets, which would cooperate in overthrowing 
the Emir.70 The impossibility to find Communist groups in both Bukhara and Khiva, the 
two feudal-reactionary countries, forced the Bolsheviks to search for channels with both 
“nationalist-bourgeois”, Young Bukharans and Khivans.71 
Unable to remove the Emir from Bukhara, the Tashkent Soviet increased the 
volume of aid to the Young Bukharans. A Bukharan Communist Party was created in 
Tashkent in June 1919. The non-communist Young Bukharans were also permitted to 
establish the Young Bukharan Party in Tashkent in January 1920.72 Getting prepared for a 
final offensive against the Soviets, the Bolshevik propaganda claimed that the Emir was 
receiving British aid and Bukharans were subject to the agitation of the British agents in the 
region.73 The Emir’s regime was already declared a feudal one, a “puppet at the hands of 
British-Tsarist imperialists”. The common goal in the programs of the Young Bukharans 
and the Bolsheviks in Turkestan was the abolishment of the regional commercial bourgeois 
                                                
69. "V Turkestane," Novaya Zhizn', 17(4) May 1918, no. 92(307), p. 2. 
70 “Report from Tashkent Soviet to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Part,” RTsKhIDNI, f. 
122, op. 1, d. 47, l. 266.  
71 “Anonymous Report to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party,” RTsKhIDNI, f. 122, op. 1, 
d. 47, l. 246.  
72 Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan, p. 263.  
73 “Field Report to the CC of the RCP,” UzRMDA, f.R-17, op. 1, d. 87, ll. 47-52.  
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in Bukhara. Accordingly, it would be only possible through the efforts of the Young 
Bukharans to destroy this ancient regime.74  
The second Red Army offensive against Bukhara was launched on the 28th of 
August 1920. The Bolsheviks, together with a group of Young Bukharans who 
accompanied them, attacked the city on the 2nd of September 1920. Upon seizing the city, 
they hastily created the Bukharan Peoples Congress; and declared the establishment of the 
Bukharan People’s Republic under the Presidency of Mirza Adülkadir Muhiddin together 
with the Prime Ministry of Feyzullah Hoca and Finance Ministry of Osman Hoca on 6th of 
October 1920.  
Most of the Jadids were satisfied with the creation of a relatively free atmosphere 
for realizing their educational projects. The Bukharan People’s Republic, from its first days 
on, was providing the best opportunities to the Jadids under the educational system 
designed by Fıtrat himself.75 On the political side, the Second Congress of Bukharan 
Soviets on 23rd of September 1921 elected Osman Hoca as the President of the Republic. 
He would, however, in December 1921, ally himself with Enver Pasha and the Basmacıs. 
Enver Pasha was especially active in Eastern Bukhara then.76 Osman Hoca’s decision to 
join Basmacıs left all power in Bukhara at the hands of Feyzullah Hocayev, who continued 
to act as the Prime Minister.77   
                                                
74 Editorial, "Bukhara," ZhN, No. 7 (14), 23 February 1919, p.1.  
75 Bukharan Peoples Soviet Republic being established under the progressive Cedids, including Fıtrat, who 
designed the education system there. "V bukhare," ZhN, no. 27(125), 26 November 1921, p. 2.  
76 Turkta "sredi natsional'nostey federatsii," ZhN, no. 16(151), 21-30 July 1922, p. 8.  
77 After the third All Bukharan Kurultay, Feyzullah Hocayev became the sole leader of the Republic, who was 
successful in engaging Enver Pasha's attacks on Bukhara. Editorial, "tretiy vsebukharskiy kurultay," ZhN, no. 
18(153), 11-20 September 1922, p. 16.  
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According to Feyzullah Hocayev, the Tyurkburo consisted mostly of the Young 
Bukharans under the banner of “unity against the oppressors”.78 For Hocayev, there was no 
question about Bukhara being part of a Greater Turkestan, in the politico-geographic 
sense.79 However, Bukhara was an ancient and traditional state in the region and the most 
prestigious politico-administrative unit.  By 1922, the number of Basmacı forces operating 
only around Bukhara exceeded 20 thousands regular troops.80 Especially after Osman 
Hoca’s decision to join the Basmacıs, the Bukharan government lost its legitimacy in the 
eyes of its citizens.  
From then on, Feyzullah Hocayev thought that the situation necessitated a re-
designing of the borders in the region - letting different socio-economic groups 
(represented by different ethnicities) live separately. The national-territorial delimitation 
(Razmezhevanie) was a very important task in order to re-arrange economic, cultural and 
political lives of the natives.81 He considered the current (1922-24) borders of the 
Turkestan states (Turkestan ASSR, Bukharan PSR and Khorezmian PSR) as an artificial 
one.82 He believed that they did not correspond to the socio-economic realities of the 
region. In his memoirs published in 1932, Hocayev stated that “although ‘pan-Turkists’ and 
‘pan-Islamists’ were opposing the delimitation, accusing me [Hocayev] by re-dividing the 
historical unity of Turks and Turkestan, for me the arrangements were heavily economic in 
nature”.83 As early as 1922, in order to guarantee political, cultural but more importantly 
economic rights of its members, Hocayev argued that the multi ethnic Bukhara (of Uzbeks, 
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80 Khodzhaev, pp. 35-6. 
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Tajiks, Turkmens and Kyrgyz) should be divided among the existing ethnic groups.84 
According to him, the imperialistic Russian Empire forced very different groups like settled 
Uzbeks and Tajiks to live together with the nomadic Kyrgyz and Turkmens thereby causing 
decades-long conflicts between them.85 The important task here was to unite 2,5 million 
Bukharan Uzbeks with the 5,5 million Turkestan (ASSR) Uzbeks by creating a single and 
powerful country, which would mean the correction of the former “sins” of the Tsarism.86  
  One of the first decisions of the government of the Bukharan PSR was to declare 
Turki (Turkish) as the official language of the state in March 1921. It was when Sadriddin 
Ayni87 wrote his poem the March of Turan. Established on 26th of June 1923, one of the 
first decisions of the Bukharan Communist Party was to establish a Turkmen Vilayat within 
the borders of the Bukharan PSR.88 On the 13th of January 1924, the Ferghana communist 
representatives to the Middle Asian Buro Central Committee Russian Communist Party 
proposed giving autonomy to their region.89 So razmezhevanie was under way in creating 
the national-economic autonomies in the region.  
By February 1924, the Bukharan PSR government declared her support for the 
national territorial delimitation (razmezhevanie) process.90 Feyzullah Hocayev’s plan for 
razmezhevanie was presented to the Bukharan Communist Party Central Committee 
plenum on 25th of February; and it was adopted as a resolution on 10th of March.91 The 
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91 UzRPDA f. 60, op. 1, d. 4269, l. 39-44. “Records of the Bukharan KP TsK Plenum, 25 february 1924” 
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Soviet forces established their full control over Bukhara only at the beginning of 1924. On 
the 19th of September 1924, Bukhara became a Socialist (Bukharan PSSR) Republic a day 
before its abolishment for razmezhevanie.92 On the 20th of September 1924, the 5th All-
Bukharan Congress of the Soviets adopted Feyzullah Hocayev’s following proposal: 
Aiming to rise the historical Great Uzbek civilization, Great Uzbek Republic should 
be formed among the Uzbek populations of the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm, 
and from the Tajiks living in these regions a Tajik autonomous region should be 
created.93  
 
This was the end of the ancient and traditional Bukharan statehood and the rise of a 
new, stronger but ethnically Uzbek state, the Uzbek SSR.   
 Despite the calls of the Turkestan ASSR to the Bukharan PSR to join forces and 
territories, the Bukharan leaders, as described by Hocayev, followed a completely different 
track. It was a policy aimed both at separating different socio-economic groups (mostly 
represented by different tribal groups) and to establish a rationally designated economically 
strong territorial unit, which later became Uzbekistan.  
Whether it was through Faizulla Khojaev’s skills, the weight of the Bukharan 
Uzbek lobby, the influence at the ‘Center’ of Khojaev’s patrons like Kuibyshev, or 
the correlation of his project with Stalin’s objectives, Uzbekistan emerged from the 
delimitation as the strongest unit…Apart from a huge population Uzbek SSR 
acquired the most fertile and biggest bit of the Ferghana Valley.94 
 
In order to maximize their territorial gains, Bukharan and other Uzbek Bolsheviks 
were enthusiastic about demarcation, which would finally create a Greater Uzbekistan.95 
According to a field report presented to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party, Hocayev was planning to establish a Greater Uzbekistan by dividing Kirghiz into 
                                                
92 Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan, pp. 265-6.  
93 UzRMDA, f. 47, op. 1, d. 563, l. 7. “Recods of the all-Bukharan Congress of Soviets, 20 September 1924” 
94 Donald S. Carlisle, “Soviet Uzbekistan: Satate and Nation in Historical Perspective,” in Beatrice F. Manz 
(ed.), Central Asia in Historical Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 119.  
95 “Field Report of German to Chicherin,” RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 24. 
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Kara Kyrgyz [Kyrgyz] and Kyrgyz [Kazak] in order to liquidate Khorezm's Kyrgyz 
populated region of Karakalpakistan into the Uzbek republic.96 Hocayev and other (mostly 
Uzbek) native Bolsheviks were categorically against the establishment of a Soviet Middle 
Asian Federation, whereas the Kyrgyz were in support of this idea.97 The leading 
Communist Uzbeks were against to any kinds of economic union proposed by the Central 
Committee of the Russian Communist Party and the Central Committee of the Turkestan 
Communist Party.98 Furthermore, the Uzbek Communists were planning to increase their 
advantages by taking the possession of irrigation networks, cotton growing valleys and 
heavily populated areas. "The Communist Uzbeks [The group of Rahimbayev, Hocayev 
and Muhiddinov] always played a leading role in the repartition."99 These were at least the 
perceptions of the non-native Bolsheviks in the region, reporting the developments in 
Turkestan to the center. It must be kept in mind that, almost all of the non-native 
Bolsheviks in Turkestan were the employees of the Turkestan ASSR and were under the 
influence of Turar Rıskulov, who stood for the survival and even expansion of the 
Turkestan ASSR in the region.  
 
4.4.4 Khorezmian PSR  
The Khivan Khanate was also a subordinate state of the Tsarist Empire in Turkestan 
since 1873. Compared to the Bukharan Emirs, Khivan Khans were much tolerant of the 
Russian professionals arriving in Khiva to reforming economic, agricultural and health 
infrastructures of this state. There was a historical ethnic tension between the Turkmens 
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and the Uzbeks of the Khanate over the sharing of water resources. Additionally, from 
1912 on, the local conflicts between the Yomud Turkmens and Khivan “Uzbeks” (or rather 
Khorezmian Turks as they have been called since then) were taking place, because of a 
famous blood feud, which continued until 1916.  
Living through a less conservative and reactionary regime, in comparison to the 
case in Bukhara, the Young Khivans were active throughout the 1910-1912 period in the 
Khanate. Their demands, which paralleled those of the Young Bukharans, were rather 
welcomed by the Khivan Khan on the 5th of April 1917, who allowed the opening of a 
parliament. By the end of April, the Khivan Parliament was already active. The president of 
the parliament, Pehlivan Niyaz Hoca, the Prime Minister Mat Murad and all other ministers 
were Young Khivans. However, from 1916 on, the claims of the Yomud tribal chief, Han 
Cüneyd, over the Khivan throne continued. Other tribal chiefs joined Han Cüneyd by mid-
1917 to force İsfendiyar Khan to expel Young Khivans from the parliament.  
Following the October revolution, in December 1917, the Tashkent Soviet 
recognized the independence of Khiva under İsfendiyar Khan. The Young Khivans then 
contacted the Tashkent Soviet and the Soldiers’ Soviet in Khiva for the continuation of 
their activities underground. Since the Yomud Turkmens of Han Cüneyd100 were the 
staunchest anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian elements in the Khivan Khanate, Bolsheviks 
had no other chance but to cooperate with the Uzbek intelligentsia of the Young 
Khivans.101 Ethnic tensions between the Turkmen and Uzbek residents of the Khanate 
                                                
100 Editorial, "Revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie v Khive," ZhN, no: 9 (66), 21 March 1920, p. 1. Han Cüneyd 
wanted to become a real khan but he could not, because of his non-royal tribal origins. However he was the 
sole ruler of Novyi Urgenç, the second biggest center of the country. See this article also for the preference of 
the Soviets to work with the Uzbeks in Khorezm against the Turkmens of Han Cüneyd.  
101 D.M., "K Khivinskoy revolyutsii" ZhN no: 24 (81) 25 July 1920, p. 3. Two nationalities: administrative 
Uzbeks and Yomud Turkmens of the desert. Han Cüneyd and his struggle against the soviets.  
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persuaded Moscow, from 1917 on, of the necessity for separating these two groups at least 
by means of different autonomous regions.102 
After the murder of İsfendiyar Khan by İşim, the son of Han Cüneyd, the latter 
became the de facto ruler in the country until the Tahta Agreement with the Turkestan 
ASSR on the 9th of April 1919. This agreement stipulated an amnesty for Han Cüneyd’s 
tribe and it constituted another recognition of the independence of Khiva by the Soviets. 
The Soviet forces occupied Khiva on 25th of January 1920 to end Han Cüneyds’ de facto 
Khanate. On the 1st of February 1920, the Khorezmian People’s Soviet Republic was 
declared. The Young Khivan Pehlivan Niyaz Hoca was elected President and Baba Ahun 
was appointed Prime Minister in April 1920.  
However, a communist coup brought the arrests of the president and other Young 
Khivan members of the cabinet in March 1921 in the city. Ata Mahdum, from Khorezmian 
Communist Party, was elected president in May 1921. The period until spring 1924 was 
practically a period of independence for the Khorezmian PSR (Khorezm is the ancient 
name of the Khivan region). However, the Khorezmian communists were still under the 
heavy influence of both the clergy and “bourgeois-nationalist” Young Khivans.103 In some 
reports from Khiva and Tashkent to Moscow, the suspicions of a conspiracy in which F. 
Hocayev, Z. Validov [i.e. Zeki Velidî Togan] and Han Cüneyd were involved against the 
Soviet power in Khorezm and Turkestan in general were voiced.104 Feyzullah Hocayev, in 
1922, was quite active in Khorezm too, dealing with the Uzbek population on the issues of 
                                                
102 See K, "V khive" ZhN no. 4(10)139 22-30 march 1922, p.11.  
103 See the speech of Broydo at the Khorezmian Communist Party, RTsKhIDNI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 83, l. 47-49.  
104 See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 86, d. 133, ll. 1-2. “Intelligence Report telegram from Khiva to TsK RKP, 
Molotov” 
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unification, which in Soviet intelligence records was considered “suspicious” as well.105 All 
these Soviet concerns, at the bottom line, pointed at the possibility of a sham fight between 
the intelligentsia of the natives in Turkestan to achieve an anti-Soviet alliance in the region.  
Along with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party, in March 1924, the Khorezmian Communist Party agreed on the division of 
Khorezm into separate national-autonomous regions, and started the national delimitation 
process. Simultaneously, during the 5th All-Khorezmian Congress of the Soviets, a 
resolution was adopted for the Turkmen, Uzbek and Karakalpak-Kazak people of the 
republic to unite with newly created republics and regions.106 After quite a stiff quarrel 
within the Khorezmian Communist Party Central Committee, on the 15th of March 1924, it 
was accepted that the “Khorezmian PSR would go along with the Russian Communist 
Party Central Committee’s decisions on delimitation of the national bases.”107 In mid-May 
1924, the Khorezmian Communist Party accepted a resolution establishing Turkmen and 
Karakalpak-Kazak Vilayats, as the last attempt to stop delimitation.108 Following this, on 
the 9th of June 1924 the Central Committee of the Khorezmian Communist Party agreed to 
abolish the republic and accepted the new regulations proposed by the Central Committee 
Russian Communist Party.109 However, the abolishment of the republic took some time and 
faced some opposition from the native communists. It was only after almost four months, 
on the 29th of September 1924, the Khorezmian PSR abolished itself; its territories were 
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divided between the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR, against the will of some of the 
prominent leaders of the republic.110  
The meaning of razmezhevanie was to put all the traditional states of Turkestan into 
a big cauldron and then to re-divide them in ethno-linguistic terms. According to Georgiy 
Chicherin, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR,  Feyzullah Hocayev’s 
ambitions for the “best and delicious” pieces of the Khorezmian PSR and Turkestan ASSR, 
aimed at establishing a Greater Uzbekistan, prosperous and wealthy, having gotten rid of all 
the impoverished parts111 The destruction of Khorezm, like Bukhara meant the destruction 
of one of the two oldest states in the region, which would inevitably influence the position 
of the Soviets in the eyes of rest of the Muslim world.112 The People’s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs argued that the preservation of the Turkestan ASSR and even, if 
razmezhevanie would certainly take place, the inclusion of Bukharan PSR and Khorezmian 
PSR into the Turkestan ASSR would be a much rational solution.113 
The Chicherin files in the Russian archives show that there was a concrete and 
strong opposition to delimitation within the Khorezmian Communist Party. Accordingly, 
the Khorezmian Bolsheviks were categorically against the partition of their state among the 
three new national units. This republic with three ethnic groups, according to an 
intelligence report, had one single and a very unique economic structure of its own.114  
Comrades from Khorezm ascertain in their "note" that "the main reason of national 
animosity in Khorezm was of economical in nature" while "there is not any national 
intolerance in the masses." Following these ideas, Khorezmian Comrades and 
Khorezmian Communist State are against the partition of Khorezm. Because, from a 
national point of view, Khorezm as a whole represents a colorful scene in the desert. 
                                                
110 See Hayit, Türkistan, pp. 273-4.  
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Uzbeks and Turkmens here admit the existence of economic concerns and demand 
national independence. Khorezmian comrades oppose such a partition. They desire 
to keep the historical-traditional economic structure which belongs to all of the three 
peoples of Khorezm. For them Khorezm is their a commonly owned republic.115  
 
Khorezm, while protesting this partition, was ready to accept the creation of three 
national autonomous oblasts, if only the economic and political unity is maintained.116 
Thus, Khorezm should be preserved as a unified whole albeit with inner autonomies. The 
questions concerning the issues of the establishment of Turkmenia and further delimitation 
should have been left to the development of a Middle Asian Federation.117 However, the 
project of the Middle Asian Federation remained on the paper for the rest of demarcation 
period.118 
 
4.4.5 Turkestan: As An Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic  
Turkestan ASSR-Turkrespublika was the most mixed politico-administrative unit in 
the region hosting all the groups in the region, Uzbek, Kyrgyz Kazak), Kara-Kyrgyz 
(Kyrgyz), Sart, Tajik, Turkmen, as well as all Slavic- European peoples who had been 
settled in the region due to the Tsarist colonial policy.  
By December 1917, there were two governments in the former Turkestan General 
Governorship claiming authority over the region, the purely Russian and European 
Tashkent Soviet and the Turkestan Autonomy in Khokand of the natives. The destruction 
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of Turkestan Autonomy in February 1918, left all authority in the hands of the Bolshevik-
led Tashkent Soviet. However, the rising volume of Basmacı attacks as well as Muslim 
communists lobbying in Moscow attracted attention toward Turkestan. “Moscow saw in the 
persistent refusal of the Tashkent Bolsheviks to grant the natives self-rule the principal 
reason for the dismal situation”.119  
  By March 1918, Soviet power was dominant all over Turkestan, except the 
Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate. Bolsheviks, however, were a minority even 
during the Fifth Congress of the Soviets of Turkestan in April 1918, constituting only one 
fourth of the delegates. (The rest were predominantly Socialist Revolutionaries and former 
Tsarist officers, Bezpartiynye - non-party- groups of the colonists). To balance their 
position, Bolsheviks started to recruit Muslims on their side in Turkestan. They were trying 
to include Muslims in the TsIK (Central Executive Committee) of the Turkestan ASSR and 
the Sovnarkom as their new allies. However, the natives were preoccupied with trying to 
get some help for their compatriots who were suffering from famine. The famine, which hit 
Turkestan and the Step during the winter of 1918-19, caused heavy casualties especially 
among the Kazaks.120 While large numbers of natives perished in Turkestan, new Russian 
settlers continued arriving, which angered the native Bolsheviks. The latter started to rally 
for the unification of all Turkestan. At the 5th regional congress of the Soviets in Tashkent 
on the 30th of April 1918, a resolution was passed to include Bukhara, Khiva in the 
Turkestan ASSR.121  
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The Turkestan ASSR was established on the 30 April 1918 as a result of the Fifth 
Congress of the Soviets of Turkestan. It was a territorial inheritor of the former Tsarist 
Turkestan General Governorship. It was a better-organized, more prosperous territory in 
comparison with the lands of the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate, where the 
reformist Jadids aspired to develop a similar socio-economic system.122 The association of 
the Turkestan ASSR with Russia changed the Bolsheviks’ weak position on the Turkestan 
front (Turkfront) against the White armies. This enabled the Reds to sandwich the White 
forces of Dutov and Kolchak in Northern Turkestan and, by sending the special Turkestan 
commission of Sh.Eliava, M.Frunze, V.Kuybishchev and Ya.Rudzutak, Moscow intervened 
in the work of the Tashkent Soviet and dominated the region.123 The main task of the 
commission was to end the ongoing anarchy in Turkestan.124 
In the spring of 1919, a Turkestan Commission (Turkkomissiya or Turkestanskaya 
Cherezvychaynaya Komissiya)125 was formed by the Central Committee of the Russian 
Communist Party and sent to Turkestan to inspect the situation there. The Turkestan 
Commission, in turn, established the Muslim Buro-Musburo (Musulmanskoe Byuro) which 
opened the ranks of the Communist Party to the Muslim cadres like Turar Rıskulov and 
Nizam Hocayev in April 1919. This drive for the nativization of the cadres, which was 
called korenizatsiya, caused the rise of a new problem for Moscow - the so-called “National 
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Communism”. Most of these native cadres of the Communist Party of Turkestan were 
Jadids with semi-clad nationalistic tendencies. During 1918-1919, Bolsheviks made a 
temporary peace with the Muslim elements within the party. In March 1919, Stalin declared 
that Turkestan would be the banner of revolution in the East,126 which would unite all the 
oppressed peoples of the colonies.127 That argument soon became popular among the 
Muslim Communists as well.128 
The Russians themselves appear to have been undecided at that time on one 
important point: whether Turkestan should become a politico-ethnic unit, or 
whether it should be divided up into smaller specific units. In fact, the question even 
transcended that of Turkestan in the administrative and political sense: many 
Muslim leaders viewed all of Central Asia in the broadest sense as Turkestan, 
including Kazakstan, Bashkurdistan and Tatarstan.129  
 
In the early July 1919, Lenin and Zeki Velidî worked together on the future of the 
Muslims in Soviet Russia in general, and Turkestan in specific. Lenin had already received 
a project written by Muhammed Barakatullah, the Indian pan-Islamist revolutionary, to 
establish a single Muslim region. Zeki Velidî submitted his own version of the project. Zeki 
Velidî’s proposals were welcomed by Lenin and cabled to Tashkent on the 12th of July 
1919.130 These increased the tensions in the Tashkent Soviet. Turar Rıskulov, on the other 
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hand, was introducing his own version of the project, proposing to strengthen the autonomy 
of Turkestan, with its own army, finances, and native cadres in the form of one indivisible 
Turkestan. Natives, increasing in numbers on the Central Executive Committee of the 
Turkestan ASSR, aimed first to diminish the power of Russian kulaks in the region. By 
September 1919, the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR ordered party 
workers to “take every measure possible” to eliminate the colonial Russian elements in 
Turkestan and to attract the natives into the ranks of the party.131 By mid-1919, there were 
Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz departments both in Sovnarkom and in the Commissariat for 
Nationalities’ Affairs of the Turkestan ASSR.132 
The highest platform for Bolshevik propaganda and policy making in the 
nationalities affairs was the official organ of the Commissariat for the Nationalities Affairs, 
the journal Zhizn Natsional’nostei.  For Zhizn Natsional’nostei, the concept of Turkestan 
had two different meanings: the territory exactly within the borders of the Tsarist Turkestan 
Governorship General and the broad region, including Northern Afghanistan as Southern 
Turkestan as well as Eastern Turkestan. According to this journal, by and large, there were 
three basic groups of natives in Turkestan: Sarts (Uzbeks) Tajiks and Kyrgyz.133 Turkestan 
was the historical “Turan” and was a steppingstone for the revolutionaries to extend the 
revolution to other nations of the East.134 The editors of the journal were quite well 
informed about the tribal problems in the region. Among the Kyrgyz, tribalism had been a 
determining factor in revolutionary politics. Especially the Noble Ak Süyek (White Bone) 
and the commons Kara Süyek (Black Bone) differentiation has been protested in the 
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revolutionary literature.135 The regional meaning of the concept in 1919, for instance, 
“Turkestan Republics” meant Turkestan ASSR, Bukhara and Khorezm. So, it is possible to 
argue the co-existence of broader regional and limited administrative meanings of the 
concept.136 In a long and anonymous article, in Zhizn Natsional’nostei, the historical 
Kyrgyz lands, together with the Steppe region in the North even Siberia, were considered to 
be the historical parts of  Turkestan.137 
Complaining about the increasing control held by Mir Said Sultangaliyev over the 
nationalities affairs among the Muslims and his unitarist stand, Stalin changed the name of 
the Muslim Buro in March 1919. The new organization was the Central Buro of the 
Communist Organizations of the East; and the Central Muslim Commissariat was divided 
into departments of the Tatar-Bashkir Commissariat, Turkestan Commissariat and 
Transcaucasian Commissariat.138 In early 1919, the Bolsheviks appreciated Kyrgyz (Kazak) 
and Kara Kyrgyz as well as Bashkir services to the revolution.139 However, Turkestan was 
still problematic, where native cadres were still not volunteering to cooperate with the 
Bolsheviks.  
At the fifth regional Congress of the Communist Party of Turkestan ASSR, which 
was held in January 1920 in Tashkent, national communists won their first victory against 
the Tashkent Soviet.   
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It was decided that, in the interests of international unity of the workers and 
oppressed peoples, they would oppose by means of communist agitation the strivings of 
Turkic nationals to divide themselves into various national groups such as Tatars, Kyrgyz, 
Kazaks, Bashkirs, Uzbeks and others and establishing small separate republics. Instead, 
with a view to forge the solidarity of all Turkic peoples, who so far had not been included 
within the RSFSR, it was proposed to unite them within a Turkic Soviet Republic; if this is 
not possible, it is then proposed that different Turkic nationalities be united according to 
their territorial proximities.140  
Rıskulov also demanded the renaming of Turkestan ASSR to the Turkic Republic. 
By then, the majority of the party membership was already in the hands of the natives. On 
March the 8th 1920, Moscow opposed this proposal. However, in the following 6th 
congress, the Rıskulov group kept its strength.141 At the 9th congress of Turkestan, the 
Soviets decided on the liquidation of colonization kulaks and confiscation of their lands, 
the end of land reform, and also decided to continue attacks on pan-Turanists and pan-
Turkists.142 
The organization of the Soviet power depended heavily on the cooperation of the 
native elements in the region.143 There was a strong sense of nationalism among the 
Muslims of Turkestan. It was not only tribalism or localism of the natives but an important 
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solidarity in being the same nation as the Muslims of Turkestan.144 The term Middle Asia, 
which was used in the revolutionary literature, represented the same Tsarist concept, 
considering the region as a part of Russian “Middle East”.145 Despite all these, probably 
under the influence of native Bolsheviks over the Stalin’s Nationalities Commissariat, the 
common usage of the term was in the broader meaning of Turkestan.146 
In the Turkestan ASSR, national communists had lost their power by March 1920. 
T. Rıskulov, N. Hocayev and Bek-Ivanov arrived in Moscow in May with many 
complaints. The Politburo examined the issues in the meetings held on the 25th of  May 
1920 and on the 13th of July, where Lenin instructed the Turkkomissiya (Turkestan 
Commission) to combat pan-Turkism and Islamism in the region and to study the ethnic 
structure of the region in order to decide whether a fusion (sliyanie) or delimitation 
(razmezhevanie) would be a better solution.  
These orders from Lenin, were the real beginning of the razmezhevanie. The 
reasons for its postponement until 1924 were the continuing Basmacı resistance, as well as 
other complexities that the Politburo had to deal with. Lenin took the issue to the Central 
Committee on the 20th of June 1920, where they decided to draw the national borders of 
Turkestan.147  
                                                
144 M. "K usloviyam raboty v kirgizskom krae," ZhN, no: 21 (78) 4 July 1920, p. 2.   
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147 RTsKhIDNI, f. 79, op. 1, d. 158, l. 4. “On the fundamental duties of  RKP in Turkestan, RKP TsK Political 
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Rıskulov, in Moscow, May 1920, was practically proposing the total separation of 
Turkestan from Russia as an independent Muslim entity.148 Lenin’s response to this was to 
order the preparation of a politico-ethnic map of Turkestan, divided into Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan and to prepare the details of this division. This was basically 
the first step for the upcoming razmezhevanie.149 When Rıskulov proposed his plan for a 
single Turk(ic) Republic, separate from the RSFSR, Turkkomissiya immediately declared 
its opposition. Kuybyshev was the first to react Rıskulov’s project “on the creation of a 
single Turkrepublic” describing it as a “nationalist ambition”.150 The creation of a Turkic 
Soviet Republic project was based on Rıskulov’s argument that:  
Turkestan consists of five regions [Syrdarya Region, Transcaspian Region, 
Semirech’e Region, Samarkand Region and Fergana Region]; of all populated with 
Turkic peoples; Kirghiz, Sarts, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Karakalpaks, Kipchaks and 
Tajiks in addition to foreign elements like Russians, Jews, Armenians and others…. 
The Turkestan Republics [Turkestan ASSR, Bukharan PSR and Khorezmian PSR] 
have already a core and dominant Turkic people.151  
 
In the broader meaning of the term152, the Sarts (Uzbeks), Kyrgyz, Tajiks, the 
Transcaspian Turkmens and Russians were considered the nations of Turkestan.  
The Tsarist administrative division of Turkestan served the interests of both 
imperialist Russia as well as the oppressor feudal Khans in the region, in accordance with 
the imperialist “divide and rule” principle. That was simply why the architects of 
                                                
148 Kh. T. Tursunov, Ocherki Istorii Kommunisticheskoy Partii Turkestana: Kommunisticheskaya Partiya 
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razmezhevanie decided to create ethnically pure republics.153 Established in March-April 
1919, the Musburo under the Turkestan Communist Party was trying to raise Muslim native 
Bolshevik cadres for the revolution. However, soon, it fell into the hands of “pan-Turkist” 
nationalists already practicing their ideals with the power of the bureau provided for them. 
They were even claiming to establish a separate Communist Party of Turkestan, free from 
the Russian one and intended to declare its independence. The Musburo was closed in June 
1920.154 The Musburo proposed the establishment of not only a Turk(ic) Communist Party 
but also the reorganization of the Turkestan ASSR as the Turk(ic) Soviet Republic in 
January 1920. The critical point in this proposal was the regulation that “each new Turk(ic) 
republic could join the Turk(ic) Republic.” That was overt pan-Turkism. The authors of the 
proposal were declaring that, Turk(ic) peoples should not be separated into pieces as Tatar, 
Kyrgyz, Bashkir, Uzbek and should not create their own national states.155 Frunze was first 
to oppose Rıskulov’s plan to create “an artificial Turk(ic) nation”.  The rest of the 
Turkkomissiya supported Frunze.156 In order to oppose Rıskulov’s plan, however, Frunze, 
Kuybyshev and Rudzutak argued that it was necessary to keep the historical unity of the 
Turkestan ASSR.157 The establishment of Soviet power in Bukhara and Khorezm was a de 
facto creation of a united Turkestan including Turkestan ASSR, Bukharan and Khorezmian 
PSRs and Kyrgyz ASSR. According to Stalin, national-territorial delimitation was basically 
a process for achieving the re-union of the divided states of Uzbeks and Turkmens by the 
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feudal and imperial lords.158 The new territorial proposals, along with the plans to unite all 
the Turkic nations of Russia were presented as the signs of Bolshevik good will to help 
these highly segregated nations to unite.159 
The USSR was formed in December 1922. A circular letter to Turkestan ASSR 
Central Executive Committee from the Russian Communist Party Central Committee, 
instructed that the Russian minority in Turkestan was not the elder brother, and the national 
solidarities and interests of Uzbek, Turkmen masses should not be the hostage of bourgeois 
slogans of the colonial period, it was the time to join forces in equal standing.160  
According to a leading party worker in Turkestan, Broydo said: 
The Soviet ethnography should work on the differences between the people rather 
than commonalities among them. There are ethnic groups of Karakirghiz, Kirgiz-
Kalpakov, Kaysaks, etc which are not nations yet. 161   
 
This was the panacea for the national communists.  
G. Skalov, who was another non-native Bolshevik, thought differently. For Skalov:  
The Middle Asian republics of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva were a whole as they 
shared the same ethnic groups (Uzbek, Turkmen, Kyrgyz) who were the parts of a one 
greater nation and economical space. Middle Asian Economic union was practically 
there. Concerns about ethnic problems should not overcome (override) the economic 
interests in order to keep them together.162 
  
Rıskulov, throughout 1923, used all his power to persuade Stalin that 
razmezhevanie would be a disaster for Turkestan and there was no pan-Turkist conspiracy 
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involving himself, Sultangaliyev and Zeki Velidov.163 Rıskulov also accused Soviet 
authorities in the region of ignorance and disrespect to the local notables, who, under the 
circumstances, supported the Basmacı “gangs”.164 Especially during the Central 
Committee’s June 1923 special meeting on the Turkestan questions, T. Rıskulov, F. 
Hocayev and A. Ikramov briefed the Bolshevik leaders on the situation in Turkestan. 
There, Rıskulov stood fast in his position to keep the Turkestan ASSR intact; Hocayev and 
Ikramov defended the necessities of making new territorial arrangements in the region. 
However, all three Turkestanis were united in their briefings that the Bolshevik atheist 
propaganda as well as struggle against Basmacıs were on the wrong track and they all 
demanded broader powers to develop a better Bolshevik policy in the region.165 
 
4.5 National Territorial Delimitation-Demarcation (Razmezhevanie) of Turkestan 
At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party in 
Moscow on the 31st of January 1924, it was decided to carry out the national-territorial 
demarcation of Central Asia. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan 
ASSR handled the issue of national-territorial delimitation of Turkestan on the 10th of 
March 1924 meeting. At the meeting, in his opening speech “On the National-Territorial 
delimitation of Turkestan”, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of Turkestan 
Communist Party A. Rahimbayev instructed them to support the idea.166 Some members 
like S. Hocanov opposed the idea of delimitation arguing that “there exists no Uzbek or 
                                                
163 Tainy natsional’noy politiki TsK RKP: Vosproizvedeno po tekstu 1-go izdaniya (Chetvertoe soveshanie 
TsK RKP s otvetstvennymi rabotnikami natsional’nykh respublik i oblastey v Moskve )9-12 iyunya 1923 g. 
Moskva: Byuro Sekretariata TsK RKP, 1923g  (Moscow: Insan, 1992), p. 296 and after.  
164 Tainy natsional’noy politiki TsK RKP, p. 14-25.  
165 For the full texts of their briefings see, Tainy natsional’noy politiki TsK RKP, p. 160-233.  
166 RTsKhIDNI,, f. 62, op. 1, d. 151, ll. 5-40. “Speech of the  secretary TsK Kompartii Turkestana A. 
Rakhimbaev-O natsional’no-territorial’nom razmezhevanii Turkestana.” 
 132
Turkmen nations, they are all from the same Turkic background, so why divide 
Turkestan?”167 On the same day, the 10th of March 1924, the Central Committee of the 
Russian Communist Party approved Rudzutak’s project and on the 11th of May the Central 
Committee’s Central Asian Buro decided to establish an Uzbek SSR and a Turkmen SSR 
as the members of USSR. The same resolution included the creation of a Tajik 
Autonomous Oblast within the Uzbek SSR and a Kara-Kyrgyz (i.e. Kyrgyz) Autonomous 
Oblast whose status to be decided later. 
The Kirghiz are drastically against the transfer of the Amu-Darya oblast and the 
Kirghiz-Karakalpak sector of the Khorezm Republic to Uzbekistan. Their consent is on the 
separation of the Kirghiz part of the Hungry Steppe. However, they do not seek the transfer 
of this part to Kirgizia, which could be seen in the text of the project "the question on the 
attachment to this or another republic is left open."168 
The Kyrgyz (i.e. Kazaks) of the Turkestan ASSR, with the same resolution, were to 
be included into the framework of the already existing Kyrgyz ASSR. However most of the 
reports arriving in from the region verified that the project was very ill- prepared and it had 
important drawbacks in the technicalities of the issue.169 Even in June 1924, there were 
serious concerns about the possibility of resistance by the Turkestan ASSR to the 
delimitation. Apparently F. Hocayev provided all the guarantees to the Central Committee 
about the safety of the project.170 On 12th of June 1924, the Central Committee approved 
the project. Two commissions were formed to carry out the fieldwork: The Central 
Territorial Commission and the Commission on National Delimitation. In this meeting the 
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Kyrgyz delegates protested the absence of a project to create a Kara-Kyrgyz region.171 
However, the Amu-Darya regional committee of the Turkestan Communist Party left the 
issue of the creation of a Karakalpak region to the decisions of the Middle Asian Buro of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In accordance with a proposal presented on 
5th of September 1924 as a last move, which was appreciated by the Central Committee of 
the Russian Communist Party, a decision to create a Karakalpak region was taken by the 
Middle Asian Buro on 6 September 1924.172 On 16th of September 1924, during the 
meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan ASSR, the use of the terms 
“Turkestan” and “Turkrespublika” were prohibited in the official documents. The name 
Turkestan was replaced by a Central (tsentralnaya) Asia concept, which, in the literary 
circles of the world then, meant rather Eastern Turkestan, Tibet and Mongolia.173 
The Uzbeks are trying to establish a Greater Uzbek Republic due to [the inclusion 
of] Khorezm and the oblasts inhabited by the Kirghiz, while simultaneously 
implementing a policy of splitting of the Kirghiz [among themselves] through the 
establishment of an autonomous Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] oblast. The Resolution of 
the Middle Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party 
on this matter, § 12, articles 2 and 3, proposes to transfer the Kirhgiz inhabiting the 
Turk[estan]respublic to the Kir[ghiz]respublic and at the same time "to establish..... 
a Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] Autonomous Oblast while leaving the question to which 
republic it will be attached unresolved." This reduction brings the Uzbek projects 
and even make the Kirghiz be left. The latter, became of the ongoing tribal [clanic] 
quarrels between Kaysak-Kirghiz [Kazak] and Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz], cannot come 
to a unanimous merge of that Kara-Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] oblast with the rest of 
Kirghizia.174 
 
On the 5th of April 1924, the Russian Communist Party ordered the Turkestan 
Communist Party, the Bukharan Communist Party and Khorezmian Communist Party to 
prepare their own versions of razmezhevanie maps and present them to the 13th congress of 
                                                
171 Kh. T. Tursunov, p. 38-39.  
172 RTsKhIDNI, f. 64, op. 1. d. 152, ll. 39-41.  
173 Zeki Velidî Togan, Türk-Türkistan (İstanbul: Toprak Dergisi Yayınları, Nu: 6, 1960), pp. 1-11.  
174 “Report from German to Chicherin,” RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, ll 23-24. 
 134
the Russian Communist Party. On the 10-11 May 1924, during the meeting of the Middle 
Asian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee, all the national-
territorial delimitation plans were combined and the following resolution was adopted:  
1. Turkestan [the exact borders of the Tsarist Turkestan Governorship General, 
H.A.K.], Bukhara and Khorezm are to be necessarily subject to delimitation without 
later federal unification among them, 2. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan republics are to 
be established and to be entered in to the USSR with their sovereign statuses. A 
Tajikistan autonomous region is to be created within the Uzbek SSR. A Kara-Kirghiz 
[i.e. Kyrgyz] autonomous region is to be created but the issue of which republic it is to 
be associated with would be left for further work. 3. The Kirghiz [i. e. Kazaks] of the 
Turkestan ASSR are to be included into the current Kirghiz [Kazak] ASSR. 175 
 
A territorial commission was set up with the members from these newly created 
national republics and regions. It worked out the details of the division of Turkestan 
according to the national and economic principles.176 However, in practice, it was too 
problematic to meet the requirements of the both principles at the same time to from new 
politico-administrative entities. The region was too much integrated both economically and 
ethnically. That was why S. Hucanov came up with the idea of the establishment of a 
Middle Asian Federation within the union.  
The attitude of the Muslim national circles to the repartition is very cautious. 
Chauvinistic and Pan Islamic groups keep silence, do not express their concern 
audibly, as if they try to preserve their ignorance. But according to some signs and 
information it is possible, nevertheless, to conclude that these groups closely follow 
the development of discussions and even inspire the local communist vanguard. Pan 
Islamists say "it would not be worse, " suggesting that the formation of national 
republics would provide them with more freedom of national-cultural activity and 
bourgeois-capitalist savings, than it is now available.177 
 
Given the poor state of the Middle Asian Economic Union, this was not taken too 
seriously; also by taking into consideration that all the new entities were in any case to be 
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members of the Union. The territorial commission completed its fieldwork by September 
and presented its plan on the 14th of September 1924 to the organs of Turkestan ASSR 
Central Committee.178 At the meeting of the Turkestan ASSR Central Committee on 15-16 
September 1924, Turkestan ASSR adopted its last resolution on razmezhevanie as follows:  
1. The Uzbek people are given the right to exit from the Turkestan ASSR and to 
establish an independent Uzbek SSR. 2. The Turkmen people is given the right to 
exit from the Turkestan ASSR and to establish an independent Turkmen SSR. 3. 
The Kirghiz people is given the right to exit from the Turkestan ASSR to unite with 
the Kirghiz [Kazak] ASSR under the RSFSR. 4. The Kara Kirghiz [Kyrgyz] people 
is given the right to exit from the Turkestan ASSR and to establish a Kara-
Kirghizstan autonomous region. 5. The Tajik people is given the right to exit from 
the Turkestan ASSR and to establish a Tajik autonomous region. 6. These decisions 
are to be presented to the RSFSR all-Russia Central Executive Committee’s next 
meeting.179  
 
Some reports also claimed that this project was basically establishing a cotton-rich 
Uzbekistan, in accordance with the interests of the Uzbek commercial bourgeois, 
represented by F. Hocayev.180 
The prevailing position, of course, is retained by the Uzbeks, who even now expect 
commercial advantages from developments including-the possession of the 
irrigation network, cotton areas and the most populated oblasts. As a result, the 
whole campaign is against economic unification and regulatory centers. The 
Communist Uzbeks always played a leading role in repartition. Among whom the 
most active group was that of comrades Rakhimbayev, Fayzulla Hocayev, 
Abdulzhapar Mukhiddinov and others.181 
 
By the 25th of September 1924, the chair of the Central Asian Buro, I. A. Zelenskiy 
finalized the project; and the latest version of the project was approved by the Central 
Committee on 14th of October, including the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast within the 
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RSFSR. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party approved the final 
resolution on 26 October 1924.  
  Although the razmezhevanie was already being carried out, the creation of a Soviet 
Middle Asian Federation and assigning Tashkent as its center was still strongly supported 
by the party workers in Tashkent and by the Kirghiz Communist Party, who opposed the 
transfer of Tashkent to the Uzbek republic.182 The idea of Federation was also “inevitable” 
simply because of the economic necessities.183 The demarcation of Middle Asia could be 
rationalized only with such an economic union.184 
The process of razmezhevanie could be divided into three phases. During the first 
phase, between January-June 1924, the decision to imply the policy of delimitation was 
taken. During the second phase, June-October 1924, the fieldwork of demarcation was 
completed. In the third phase, between October 1924 and May 1925 the national republics 
and regions were established and both the Uzbek and Turkmen SSRs became members of 
the USSR.185 Just prior to the application of delimitation, the Central Committee of the 
Turkestan ASSR Communist Party issued a declaration “to all peoples of Turkestan”,  
explaining its position on the issue of delimitation by saying that: “We are protecting all the 
rights of the peoples of the region, which were violated through the application of Tsarist 
imperial policies, and the new regulations will help solving these problems.”186 
Although Zakaspi oblast of the Turkestan ASSR was unofficially accepted as the 
Turkmen autonomy by 1921, it was still under the strict control of the Turkestan 
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Communist Party.187 There were even instances in the literature naming the oblast as 
Turkmenia and Turkmen land.188 On the 7th of July 1921, a Turkmen congress was held in 
Bukhara, with 70 Turkmen delegates from different parts of Turkestan. Complaints about 
Uzbek being the official language both in Bukhara and Khiva as well as complaints about 
the situations of Turkmens living in Iran and Afghanistan were voiced. That was how a 
Turkmen movement within the region for autonomy started.189As early as 1922, the borders 
of “Turkmeniya” was first described as "from Khorezm in the east the west, to the southern 
Üst-Yurt to Karabucak at the Eastern shores of Caspian Sea in the west; from Karasu river 
in Persia and Afghan borders in the south, to Bukharan territory on the north to Amu Darya 
River."  
However just after this definition, it is strongly pointed out that Turkic roots of the 
Middle Asians, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Karakalpak and Turkmen populations are from the same 
stock. The reason why Khorezmian Turkmens should be separated and associated with 
Turkmenia was basically Uzbeks of Khorezm were assimilating them.190 For Safarov, the 
ethnically heterogeneous structures of all states in Turkestan in 1922, Turkestan ASSR, 
Kirghiz ASSR, Bukharan PSR and Khorezmian PSR, was the proof of the artificiality of 
the borders in the region. He continued that agricultural, political and administrative 
reasons dictate two alternatives: a) Political and economical reorganization of all national 
groups under individual states like Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Turkmenistan and b) Unite 
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all Turkestan but divide it into federal oblasts (regions).191 By 1923, they had achieved a 
full autonomy just prior to razmezhevanie.192 The Turkmenification of Zakaspi and the 
town population was a natural result of the emigration of Turkmens to Turkmenistan after 
razmezhevanie from Bukhara, Khorezm and Turkestan ASSR’s other regions.193 By mid-
1924, the Turkmen party was active and influential over the Central Committee of Russian 
Communist Party in order to persuade Stalin the necessity to include Turkmen populated 
territories of Iran and Afghanistan with the newly created Turkmen SSR.194 However, the 
negative impacts of delimitation on the neighboring countries were another matter of 
concern, especially for the members of the Foreign Policy apparatus.  
From the point of views of international relations and their reflections in the Middle 
Asian circumstances, I ought to state that the demarcation would provide 
reactionary-bourgeois neighboring countries-China, India, Persia and Afghanistan-
with a new excuse to accuse the Soviet power of the liquidation of Muslim 
statehood and national rights. The elimination of Khorezm and Bukhara would be 
considered violence against Islam. At this moment, I suppose, we should especially 
avoid hastily and unscruntinized decisions which could weaken the international 
position of the USSR. In case of the implementation of the demarcation, we should 
create only the Uzbek and Turkmen republics and to retain Khorezm in its former 
boundaries and to establish inevitably, economic union of new republics through 
coordination of their economic plans in accordance with the resources and the actual 
needs.195 
 
4.6 Post-Razmezhevanie Turkestan-Conclusions 
Following the 1924 arrangements, the national territorial delimitation process was 
not over yet. In 1929, the Tajik ASSR was turned into a Tajik SSR and then joined the 
                                                
191 See G. Safarov. "k voprosy o prisoedinenii syr-dar'inskoy i semirechenskoy oblastey k kirrespublike," 
ZhN, no. 10(16)145, 19-20 May 1922, p. 4-5.  
192 Turkmen were semi-independent by 1923 even within the party organization of the Turkestan ASSR, with 
a greater territorial autonomy too. Editorial, "po avtonomnym respublikam i oblastyam RSFSR i po 
respublikam SSSR," ZhN, kniga vtoroya, 1923, p. 138-9.  
193 Sh. Kh. Kadyrov, Narodnoselenie Turkmenistana: Istoria i Sovremennost! (Ashkhabad: Ilym, 1986), p. 40.  
194 RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 20. “Letter from Chicherin to Stalin, Kamenev, Zinov’ev, Trotsky, 
Molotov and Rudzutak, 30 October 1924” 
195 “Report from  German to Chicherin,” RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 86, d. 24, l. 28. 
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USSR as a union republic. In 1932, Kara Kalpak region was re-structured as an ASSR 
under RSFSR and in 1936 it became the Karakalpak ASSR within the Uzbek SSR. From 
1926 to 1932 Kyrgyz (Kara Kirghiz first and then Kyrgyz) ASSR was also under RSFSR 
like the Kazak ASSR. In 1936, with the new Soviet constitution they were restructured as 
SSRs and became union republics too.  
The territorial exchanges and border delimitations continued throughout the Soviet 
period, leaving several enclaves of neighboring republics on the territories of the adjacent 
SSRs. The period between 1917 February and 1924 October was one of the breaking points 
of the history of Turkestan and the concept of Turkestan itself. This period witnessed the 
creation of a national and independent Turkestan State Khokand and also the Turkestan 
ASSR within the framework of the RSFSR. These were the only two short-lived states in 
history with the name Turkestan. The very process of Razmezhevanie had been another 
interesting episode of the history of the region. It resulted in the creation of two national 
republics, Uzbek and Turkmen, in addition to a number of Autonomous republics and 
regions, all designed with the ethnic criteria. The so-called economic criteria to fit into the 
different modes of lives of the natives have become a full propaganda but nothing else.  
 The idea of Turkestan, though, lived a long time after delimitation, among the 
national communists. Mağcan Cumabayulı wrote his famous Turkestan poem in 1929, the 
best piece of literature ever written explaining a native’s view of Turkestan.  
 
Turkestan is the portal of two worlds,  
It is the core of Turks,  
This country is god-given to the Turk  
And there happened great works of the Turk.  
They called Turkestan as Turan previously,  
Heroic Turk was born and grown here… 
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 With the purges of 1936-1937, very few national communists in Turkestan 
survived, and a new page in the history of Turkestanism is opened: the page of Émigré 
Turkestanism. Although during the purges both Feyzullah Hocayev and Ekmel Ikramov 
were accused with a conspiracy to re-establish Turkestan unity through their two 
underground organizations, there exists, still, no evidence to support this view.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ÉMIGRÉ POLITICS AND THE "TURKESTANIST" POSITION 
(1925-1945) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the development of the émigré life of Turkestanis out of their 
fatherland is examined. By 1925, numerous Turkestani political figures, escaping from 
Bolshevik oppression, ended up either in neighboring countries or in Turkey and Europe. 
However it should be noted that the largest part of the Turkestani intelligentsia remained in 
the region, many becoming native national communists in the service of Soviet State. 
 
5.2 Early Émigré Organizations 
The first signs of an organized émigré political struggle by the Turkestanis against 
the Bolshevik invasion of their country appeared in Istanbul in 1925. After a long and 
adventurous five years, Zeki Velidî, Mustafa Çokayoğlu, Osman Hoca (Kocaoğlu) and 
some other Turkestanis resolved to organize the political struggle for the independence of 
Turkestan during a meeting in Istanbul, in 1925.1 There, they decided to launch a 
comprehensive émigré program for informing the international public on the events going 
                                                
1 Timur Kocaoğlu, "Türkistanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," Dr. Baymirza Hayit 
Armağanı. Edited by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevî 
Vakfı, 1999), p. 160.  
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on in Turkestan. The result was the publication of Yeni Türkistan2 [New Turkestan] in 
Istanbul from 1927 on and then Yaş Türkistan [Young Turkestan] in Paris from 1929 
onward. Another component of their planned program was to organize Turkestanis who had 
emigrated to Turkey, Europe, Iran3, India4 and Arabia under émigré political associations. 
The first example of these associations was established in Turkey under the name Türkistan 
Türk Gençler Birliği (TTGB) [Union of the Turkestani Turkish5 Youth] in September 
1927.6  
The Émigré political organization in Istanbul was run by the efforts of both Osman 
Hoca and Zeki Velidî, until the problems between Zeki Velidî and Çokayoğlu surfaced in 
the first half of the 1930s. The very definition of the term Turkestan in TTGB and Yeni 
Türkistan had three components: Uzbek lands, Bashkir7 lands and Kazak-Kyrgyz lands.8 
Apparently in this initial period of émigré life there was a consensus on the leadership of 
                                                
2 Yeni Türkistan was published until11932.  
3 Quoting from The Times, 22.05.1934 issue, see "İran'da Türkistan Kaçkınları" YT. June 1934. no. 55. p. 41. 
Stories about folks escaping from disastrous famine in Turkestan to Iran. Exodus of Uzbek and Turkmen 
refugees to Iran continued until 1935. However, most of these refugees passed to Iran because of the 
disastrous famine going on in Turkestan in the first half of 1930s.  
4 For Turkestani immigrants in Iran and India see Editorial. "Türkistan Kaçkınları Faciası" Yaş Türkistan 
(YT). April 1932. no. 29. pp.1-4. And several other articles and news appeared in Yaş Türkistan pages. Initial 
years of émigré life in these countries were probably very painful. 
5 It should be noted here that the use of Türk in this literature covers both Turk(ish) and Turk(ic). The use of 
Türkî  (Turkic) was quite unusual in both émigré and pan-Turkist publications. So in most of the translations, 
the original form Türk is translated as Turkish rather than Turkic. That is simply because the authors never 
intended to make any differences between the two terms.  
6 Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği was established in the former Bukharan or Özbekler Tekkesi and continued 
its activities there until July 1940. In 1940, its name was changed into Türk Kültür Birliği [Turkish Cultural 
Union] and it became an important pan-Turkist association in Turkey. After 1950, its name has been changed 
again to Türkistanlılar Kültür ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Derneği [Association of Cultural and Social 
cooperation of Turkestanis]. It is still operational.  
7 Apparently, the inclusion of Başkurt lands to the concept of Turkestan was closely associated with the very 
existence of Zeki Velidî's among the Turkestani émigré circles. Otherwise there seems to be no serious 
evidence showing any attempt by Turkestanis, including Başkurtistan, into the concept of Turkestan. Most 
probably Zeki Velidî's anti Kazan Tatar stand made him to include his Başkurtistan into the Turkestani 
geography rather than Volga-Ural union.  
8 See the parts titled as "Türkistan Haberleri" in each issue.  
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Mustafa Çokayoğlu for the united émigré front.9 With the TTGB's10 efforts there was the 
beginning of a non-communist young national cadres for an independent Turkestan rose up 
in Turkey.11 This was the main service of TTGB to the political program of émigré. 
Çokayoğlu started the publication of Yaş Türkistan in Paris in 1929. His publication 
efforts were united with his (or common Turkestani) political platform called Türkistan 
Milli Birliği12 (TMB) [Turkestan National Union]. The new objective of the TMB in exile 
was declared to be "to free Turkestan from Russian Proletariat and/or Russian hegemony 
and the establishment of a free national Turkestan state."13 But there was still lack of unity 
among the Turkestanis. For the émigrés; thus, the formation of a unity remained the 
primary aim.14 His call to all Turkestanis in an emotional manner aimed at helping them to 
understand the importance of uniting under TMB. 
O Young Turkestani! Never forget the great weight of your sacred duty and the 
greatness of your responsibility. Get prepared, day and night, non-stop, for freeing 
your land from the Russian invasion and horror and for establishing a Free 
Turkestan! The needs of your land and nation demands you this before everything!15 
 
The highest number of Turkestani refugees would be found in Afghanistan during 
the course of the 1920s, and they soon became residents. However, Bukharan Amir's 
                                                
9 See Editorial. "Türkistan'da Mefkure Mücadeleleri," YeT, no. 2-3, July-August 1927, pp. 1-5. Editorial 
"Birleşen Uç," YeT, no. 4, September 1927, pp. 1-3. Suklu Kayoglu, "Rus Muhaceret Siyasetiniñ Yangi 
Devresi Muvacehesinde Türkistanlıların Vazifesi," YeT, no. 8, Mart 1928, pp. 1-7. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, 
"Rusların Muhaceret Siyaseti Hakida," YeT, no. 9, April 1928, pp. 6-10.   
10 The decisions and news of Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği appeared in Yaş Türkistan pages quite often and 
its enlargement by including more and more Turkestanis every year were praised. See Doktor İlter, "Türkistan 
Türk Gençler Birligi'niñ Onıncı Umumi Yıgılışı," YT. October 1933. no. 47. pp. 27-32.   
11 It was Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği, which facilitated significant numbers of Turkestani students to 
receive their higher education in Kemalist Turkey, and this was done for the sake of raising national cadres 
for the future independent Turkestan. See Yaş Türkistan, "Türkistan Türk Gençler Birligi," YT, August 1933. 
no. 45. pp. 7-8.  
12 Although TMB was originally established back in Turkestan several years ago, Çokay continued to use its 
legacy of being a common Turkestani platform. See A. Çokaybay, "Türkistan Milli Birligi'ni Ta'kib," YeT, no. 
7, December 1928, pp. 11-15.  
13 Editorial. "Kozgalıştan Kuruluşga," YT, August-September 1930. no. 9-10. p. 4.  
14 Editorial. "Kozgalıştan Kuruluşga," YT, August-September 1930. no. 9-10. p. 5.  
15 Editorial. "Kozgalıştan Kuruluşga," YT, August-September 1930. no. 9-10. p. 7.  
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continuing claims for his throne was a source of discomfort for the nationalists.16 Amir was 
a popular target of other émigré political leaders not only in terms of political matters but 
also in terms of financial ones.17 From the early days of émigré life, Turkestani leaders 
declared him the enemy of the Turkestan's Liberation Movement.18 
In Afghanistan, the Encümen-i Saadet-i Buhara ve Türkistan [Committee for the 
Salvation of Bukhara and Turkestan] was established for the sake of uniting Turkestanis in 
this country and organizing them to launch a final offensive against the Reds in 
Turkestan.19 However, Afghanistan itself was far from being a stable favorable émigré 
country.20 Turkestanis in Afghanistan continued their pre-soviet life-style freely and 
enjoyed the atmosphere of Jihad of Basmacıs, which was politically quite popular until the 
end of the 1930s.21 As expected, most of the Bukharan refugees in Afghanistan and some 
main Mujahedeen groups were still loyal to Emir, rather than the nationalist movement.  
By 1934, the Turkestani émigré flow to India was still continuing.22 Most probably 
Turkestanis who spent a couple of years in Afghanistan and could not find a better life left 
                                                
16 Praising Afghan hospitality for the Turkestani immigrants, Yaş Türkistan was also critical about Bukharan 
Amir's residence there and his continuing claims on the throne. Yaş Türkistan, "Afganistan ve Milli 
Türkistan," YT, October 1931. no. 23. pp. 21-23.  
17Quite similar to Whites running after their wealth in Europe, Turkestanis were after the wealth of their 
kinsmen in European banks. See Toktamışoglu, "Bir Türkistanlının servetige Hıyanet...," YT, April 1932. no. 
29. p. 31. Especially about this matter, Emir and his circle were the primary targets for criticism.  
18 S. Çokayoglu, "Türkistan İstiklâl Hareketine Karşı Buhara Emiri," YeT, no. 5-6, October-November, 1927, 
pp. 1-7.  
19 Motivated by the independence of Eastern Turkestan, émigrés in Afghanistan convened a series of meetings 
with the Afghan groups as well as all ulema and Amir's circles, where a series of agreements signed for the 
purpose of supporting the national cause in Turkestan. See Seyyid Abdullah Taşkendî, "Encümen-i Saadet-i 
Buhara ve Türkistan'ıñ Maksadları," YT, August 1933. no. 45. pp. 32-35. This organization had also an office 
in Peshawar.  
20 The news of the murder of Afghan King Nadir Khan in Kabul on 9th of November 1933, caused an alarm 
among the Turkestanis in Afghanistan about the threat of terror in the country. See "Afganistan'da" YT. 
November 1933. no. 48. pp. 37-38.  
21 See Kemimzâde, "Kabil'deki Muhacirlerin Turmuşundan," YT November 1934. no. 60. pp. 38-39 for some 
details about the lives of the refugees in Afghanistan and for an interesting marriage news where many 
Mujahedeen attended.  
22 As late as mid 1934 there was still a flow of refugees from Turkestan to Delhi-India, whose community 
leaders there were quite well organized themselves. See Hoca Mesud, "Hindistandagı Türkistan Muhacirleri 
Fa'aliyetinden," YT, August 1934. No 57. p. 33.  
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there and ended up in Indian cities. Émigré activities in India mainly concentrated in 
Peshawar and Delhi.23 The name of the Turkestani organization in India was Encümen-i 
İttihadı-ı Muhacirin Türkistan [Committee for the Unity of Turkestani Émigrés]. This 
organization had offices and representatives in both Peshawar and Delhi.24 In 1935, 
Turkestani émigrés in Bombay organized themselves under the name Türkistan Muhacirler 
Birliği [Union of Turkestani Émigrés], and started to publish their monthly Türkistan 
Kuyaşı [Sun of Turkestan].25 Both organizations continued their activities until the Second 
World War.  
 In Germany, the Turkestani community was limited to a few dozens of students or 
graduates from German Universities. Among them, were Tahir Çağatay and Ahmetcan 
Oktay, two of the students sent by the Bukharan Republic in 1921, who mainly worked 
with Çokayoğlu in publishing Yaş Türkistan.26 This small but very active community 
enjoyed the attention and help of researchers of Turkestan like Dr. Gerhard von Mende.27 
Unlike their other European counterparts, the German press was not totally ignorant about 
the causes of Turkestanis.28 Under the auspices of Gerhard von Mende, Nazi press started 
                                                
23 Even after the break-up of India Turkestani immigrants continued their activities both in Peshawar and in 
Delhi. See H.M. Ziyae'ddin, "Hindistandagı Türkistan Muhacirleri Arasıda," YT, March 1934. no. 52. pp. 34-
37.  
24 For the activities of émigrés in India and their organization Encümen-i İttihadı-ı Muhacirin Türkistan, see 
"Hindistandagı Türkistan Muhacirleri Arasıda," YT, October 1934. no. 59. pp. 36-37.  
25 By 1935 the Turkestani émigrés in India organized themselves quite well in Bombay too. They have 
established an association under Taceddin Kari, named Türkistan Muhacirler Birligi and published a monthly 
magazine called Türkistan Koyaşı. Their primary target was to inform Indian Muslims about Bolshevik 
atrocities in Turkestan. See "Hindistandagı Türkistan Muhacirleri turmuşundan," YT, April 1935. no. 65. p. 
32.  
26 Timur Kocaoğlu, p. 160.  
27 In 1935 there was a quite active Turkestani Diaspora in Berlin, organizing regular conferences and 
seminars. Some of them included names like Dr. İshak's son Oktay, law student Zahid Kasım and Doktor 
Tahir Şakir. See "Almanyadagı Türkistan Yaşları Faaliyetinden," YT, February 1935. no. 63. pp. 37-38.  
28 Also in 1930s, in German press articles and news about Turkestan started to appear as a preparation of Nazi 
plans about Turkestan. Under the auspices of Gerhard Von Mende, in fact, many Turkestanis found platforms 
to tell people the situation of their country. "Alman Matbuatında Türkistan," YT, February 1935. no. 63. pp. 
39.  
 146
to become interested in the Turkestan question, especially around the circles of Anti-
Comintern organization in Berlin.29 
 There was also a considerable Turkestani émigré community in Hijaz, Arabia. 
However, according to the Yaş Türkistan, the members of this community were deeply 
polarized among the town-based identities like Bukharan and Samarkandi. This lack of 
unity was criticized in Yaş Türkistan.30 
 
5.3 Relations with Russian and Other Émigré Organizations 
This was also the period, during which "White" Russian émigré organizations were 
very active in Europe as well as in Turkey. However, Turkestani leaders were cautious to 
keep their distance from those "still-imperialistic" circles.31 "White" Russians never 
recognized self-determination rights of Turkestanis. For them, Çokayoğlu and his comrades 
were no more than rebel colonial peoples. The "White" Russian émigré organizations, 
many of which enjoyed a significant prestige or influence in several European platforms 
actually weakened the possible performance of the Turkestani groups there.32 Russian and 
Turkestani émigrés in Paris and throughout the world stayed as enemies.33 
                                                
29 See "Almanca Neşriyatda: Türkistan Sovyet Cumhuriyetindeki Yirli Halk Vaziyeti," YT, April 1937. no. 
89. pp. 37-38.  
30 There was also a Turkestani colony in Hijaz, Mecca and Madina who kept struggling among them, divided 
with city-identities like Tashkendi, Bukharan or Samarkandi, which was criticized in the pages of YT. See 
Muhammed Cavid Bin Abidcan Oglı, "Türkistan Muhacirleri Arasında," YT, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 27-29.  
31 "Either White or Red Russian dictatorships..." From the very beginning there was an important antipathy 
between the Russian and Turkestani émigré groups. See Editorial, "Rusya'nın İstiklaline Nazarlar," YeT, 
September-October 1938, no. 14-15, p. 4.  
32 However there were also non-Russian publications attacking and even teasing Turkestani émigrés and 
refusing any Turkestani identity. One of them being New Japanese Immigrant  journal, in its 15th issue not 
only attacked Turkestanis but also praised "White" Russian remnants in Siberia and China as the heroic 
Siberian leaders, which caused anger in the pages of Yaş Türkistan. See Taşbalta, "Namussuzlar," YT, May 
1934. no. 54. pp. 24-27.  
33 It is understood that there were no good relations between white Russian émigrés and Turkestani émigrés in 
Paris or anywhere else in the world, simply because of the perceptions of both sides. For Russians, they were 
their former colonies; and for Turkestanis, they were their former colonistors. Turkistani émigrés perceived 
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However, Turkestanis were not alone. There was a natural alliance between 
Turkestani émigrés and Ukrainian, İdel-Ural, Caucasian, Crimean and Azerbaijani émigré 
leaders, to balance the Imperial Russian émigrés. Yaş Türkistan pages were also used as a 
forum for Azerbaijani, Crimean even Ukrainian nationalist émigrés.34 Turkestanis in Paris 
were the active participants of the famous Committee for the Friendship of Ukraine-
Caucasus and Turkestan.35 Both Yaş Türkistan and Yeni Türkistan36 strongly supported the 
Caucasian independence cause,37 as well as the Crimean, Ukrainian and İdel-Ural ones. 
Apparently, relations between the Turkestani and the Kazan Tatar émigré groups were very 
good all over the world.38 In their struggle against the "Great Russian Chauvinism" of the 
Soviet power, Ukrainian Diaspora was the most helpful one for Turkestani émigrés in Paris. 
During a conference by Ukrainian nationalist Maksim Antonovich Selavinskiy for the 
Committee for the Friendship of the Peoples of Ukraine-Turkestan and Caucasus, the issue 
of national state was separated form the issue of National Republics and Nationalities 
Policy just for the sake of Turkestanis.39 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
them as not very different than then-Bolshevik Moscow leaders in their desires to enslave their people and 
their country. See Yaş Türkistanlı, "Bulantırılgan Bir İrtek," Yaş Türkistan, June 1935. no. 67. pp. 17-20.  
34 As in the case of Ahmed Sadık (an ex-deputy), "Yaş Türkistan Mecmuası Muhterem Müdirine," YT, August 
1934. no. 57. pp. 38-39. Demanding clarification about the problems among the Azeri émigré conflicts.  
35 Another organization in which Turkestanis were represented was the famous Committee for the friendship 
of Ukraine-Caucasus and Turkestan" headed by former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Alexander Sholgin. Their 
activities in Paris continued during the 1930s and Turkestanis actively participated their meetings. "Ukrayna-
Kafkasya-Türkistan Dostlugu Komitesi Faaliyetinden," YT, March 1935. no. 64. pp. 28-29.  
36 See Kırımlı Cafer Seydahmet, "Ukrayna Millî Hareketi ve Kırım-Ukrayna Münasebâtı," YeT, no. 16, Kasım 
1928, pp. 8-12.  
37 Émigrés were also careful to support independence causes of other nations. See Kıvançlı, "1918-Mayıs-
1935" YT, June 1935. no. 67. pp. 36-37.  
38 There were close relationships between the İdel-Ural Diaspora and Turkestani émigrés. Tatar émigré 
publication Milli Bayrak and their activities in Japan were very much praised in the pages of Yaş Türkistan, 
"Milli Bayrak," YT, November 1935. pp. 33-35.  
39 See Mustafa, "Sovyetler İttifakında Milli Devlet Meselesi," YT, June 1937. no. 91. p. 14.  
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5.3 Propaganda Tactics of the Émigré Movement 
There was no doubt that some of the Turkestanis in the emigration harbored positive 
feelings about the Soviet "progressive policies" in Turkestan. So the main aim was to 
explain to Turkestanis that the entire Soviet moves which sounded quite promising and 
positive were everything but real.40 This Soviet propaganda for national self-determination 
rights was also propagandized by the western media too which was under the illusion of 
Soviet "progressive policy" in the East.41 So the most important duty for the émigré leaders 
was to keep Turkestanist idea alive and motivate their fellow émigré Turkestanis.42 
As the imperialists attacking Turkestan, Soviet or Tsarist Russians were of the same 
source for Çokayoğlu. Their approaches to Turkestanis were the same in terms of the 
motives of exploitation but the Soviets were much organized.43 This anti-imperialistic stand 
taken by Çokayoğlu forced him to develop also an overt anti-British policy, blaming the 
British for agitating Turkestanis for their own imperialistic interests.44 That was probably a 
                                                
40 Changes made by Moscow in 1931 in the Central Asian Bureau were taken as a positive sign by some 
Turkestanis. However, Yaş Türkistan responded this very harshly and repeated the policy that the only way 
was to obtain a complete independence. Hokandlı, "Orta Asya Bivrosu," YT, June 1931. no. 19. p. 15.  
41 Complaining about the tolerant approach of western media to the Bolshevik Dictatorship, Osman Kocaoğlu 
was explaining that all the slogans were empty not only about nationalities but also all other respects. Osman 
Kocaoğlu, "Aldamçı Moskova," YT, July 1931. no. 20. pp. 13-14.  
42 Keeping the hopes of émigrés alive was one of the main causes of Yaş Türkistan, where many articles 
appeared quite often to serve this objective. See Timuroglı, "Milli Tulkun," YT, October 1933. no. 47. pp. 6-
13.  
43 For the émigrés, there was not much difference between the Tzarist and Soviet Colonial policies in 
Turkestan. In fact, Soviets were much organized and exploitation-oriented. They have even not intervened 
into the Kazak-Kyrgyz famine simply thinking that these weak social stratas were destined to be extinct from 
the point of view of the Marxist dialectic. See Tobolin's comments on Kazak-Kyrgyz famine quoted in 
Timuroglu, "Imperialist Çar ve Milletler 'Halaskarı' Sovyet Hükümetinin Türkistan Siyaseti," Yaş Türkistan, 
December 1933. no. 49. pp. 10-11.  The second part of the article published in the next issue. Timuroglu, 
"İmperyalist Çar ve Milletler 'Halaskarı' Sovyet Hükümetleriniñ Türkistan Siyaseti II," YT, January 1934. no. 
50. pp. 42-46. This part is mostly about economic exploitation of the region both in Tsarist and Soviet times 
as a cotton plantation.  
44 Çokayoğlu was very much against any open foreign aid other than Turkish. Interestingly, he was quite 
harshly criticizing British attempts to agitate Turkestanis against the Russians. See Editorial, "Türkistan Milli 
Küreşinin Sebeb ve Maksadları," YT, August 1931. no. 21, pp. 1-7.  
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reaction to the Soviet propaganda that accused him of being a British agent.45 In response 
to the Soviet allegations about Çokayoğlu being a Japanese agent, he wrote "we have been 
far from British and French military in the past and as much as that we are far from the 
Japanese fascists now. And our view and sympathy about Trotskist-Zinovievists is not 
much different than our view and sympathy about Stalinists..."46 However, Turkestani 
sympathies for Japan from the 1905 on was still observable, and many leaders thought that 
Japan was the only power which could struggle against the Bolshevik Russia as well as 
imperialist China.47 Russia's retreat from Manchuria was interpreted as the beginning of 
Russia's retreat from the whole Asia.48 However Soviet accusations against Çokayoğlu and 
his supporters for being Japanese agents continued.49 Apparently, Soviet intelligence was 
reading Yaş Türkistan carefully. 
For the Turkestanists, the Soviet regime was a disease, which could not be cured but 
should be rooted out totally.50 The 1937 famine was an open failure of the Soviet Kolkhoz 
and Solhoz policy in Turkestan, which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands.51 This was 
nothing but an overt massacre. Yaş Türkistan also interpreted Stalin's rule over the rest of 
                                                
45 Soviet propaganda was telling people that émigrés and representatives of independence idea are in fact 
tools of British and other imperialist powers. See Editorial, "Türkistan Yaşları Arasıda," YT, August 1933. no. 
45. p. 5. Çokayoğlu harshly denied this and stood up for full and real independence.  
46 See "Bolşeviklerniñ İftiralı Hücumları," YT, June 1937. no. 91. pp. 24-25.  
47 Some had the tendency to see Turkey as the western Asiatic superpower where Japan would be the Eastern 
Asiatic superpower in order to struggle Russian and Chinese empires. See İlter, "Asya'da İki Dost Millet," YT, 
March 1931, no. 16. pp. 26-28.  
48 Russian retreat from Manchuria and leaving this territory was  interpreted as a great development for the 
future Russia-less Asia. See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Yırak Şarkda," YT, December 1934. no. 61. pp. 24-29.  
49 Soviets propagandized that Çokayoğlu and his friends were Japanese and other Imperialists' agents and 
were spreading fascism among the Turkestani youth outside. See "Türkistan Sovyet Gazıtalarında bizge ve 
Umumen Türkistan Milli Hareketige Karşı Yazılgan Makaleler Parçası," YT, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 20-23.   
50 Émigrés never thought that there would be any possibility to come to terms with the Soviet government. 
See Timuroglı, "Hastalık Nigizdedir" YT. April 1936. no. 77. p. 31.  
51 "Sovyet Rusyada Açlık," YT, May 1937. no. 90. pp. 37-39.  
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the Soviet Union as being equally disastrous for the Russian people and peasants, who lost 
their lives in millions.52 
 Émigré leaders were thinking that Turkestanis never accepted the rule of foreign 
imperialists and rebelled at every opportunity. Çokayoğlu was mourning on the 70th 
anniversary of the invasion of Turkestan (Tashkent) by the Russian armies.53 The year 1865 
was declared to be the black-year of Turkestan's history. Çokayoğlu was even declaring the 
Turkestanis that lost their lives during the 1916 uprising to be the martyrs of the Turkestani 
independence cause,54 though it was by then a well-known fact that it had not much to do 
with an overall Turkestani independence movement. Turkestanis in the 1916 uprising were 
even untrained about using weapons that they have captured from Russian barracks.55 The 
1916 uprising caused a massive exodus of Kazak ("Kyrgyz") tribes to Eastern Turkestan 
escaping from Tsarist punishment as well as conscription to the Russian army.56 Even the 
minor events, like the 1929 rebellion, in Turkestan were exaggerated in the pages of Yaş 
                                                
52 There was also emphasis on dictatorship of Stalin leading Russian workers to a disaster, not only other 
nations under Soviet domination. See Baltabay, "Sovyet Rusya'da vaziyet," YT, September 1935. no. 70. p. 
18.  
53 The 70th anniversary of the conquest of Tashkent by the Russian armies was declared as a mourning day for 
the émigrés, however although both the map and ethnic structure of the region has changed much, émigré 
leaders kept their faith for the unity of Turkestan as well as the desire of Turkestanis to fight back to Russians. 
Editorial, "15.6.1865-15.6.1935," YT, June 1935. no. 67. p. 9.  
54 According to Çokayoğlu, 1916 uprising in Turkestan was a very unexpected event both for Russians and 
for other Turkestanis. A preparation for that was out of question. It was of course nothing to do with the class 
struggle between the workers of Turkestan and Tsarist exploiters. It was completely against the Russian 
administration and the ones who lost their lives in that uprising were declared as the martyrs of Turkestani 
independence cause by Çokayoğlu. See Editorial, "1916 ıncı yıl," YT, August-September 1936. No 80-81. pp. 
2-11.  
55 It is known that although during the 1916 uprising some Turkestanis succeeded in the capture of some 
Russian weapons, none of these people knew how to use them. Especially in Cizzak and Namangan there had 
been incidents some Russian military barracks were completely destroyed. See "Bir Alman zabitiniñ 1916ıncı 
Yılgi Cezah Kozgalanına Aid Hatıraları," YT, August-September 1936. no. 80-81. pp. 23-24.  
56 After the 1916 uprising, more than 60 thousand Kyrgyz familys passed the border to Eastern Turkestan. 
The total Russian death toll was 2325 with a counted loss of 1384 persons. More than 9 thousand villages 
were destroyed completely and tens of thousands killed.  See "1916. Yılgi Kozgalışga Aid Bazı Bir 
Malumat," YT, August-September 1936. no. 80-81. pp. 12-15.  
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Türkistan.57 It should be noted that most of the "rebellion" news were received from pieces 
of Soviet press and interpreted with an important optimistic subjectivity by the émigré 
leaders as nationalist rebellions for a free and national Turkestan.  
 However, as all other émigré leaders, Çokayoğlu was receiving most of the 
information on Turkestan from European sources.58 Their direct connection with the 
motherland was very limited. The émigré activists were quite successful in interpreting this 
limited news from the Soviet sources in accordance with the nationalist causes. For 
example the non-existing "westernism" in Turkestan being popular among the masses was 
used as a propaganda issue in Yaş Türkistan.59 Like most of the other émigré leaders, when 
leaving his country, Çokayoğlu declared that his intention was to return to Turkestan in a 
matter of months’ time; at least just after the defeat of the Bolsheviks, which never 
happened.60 Of course, most of the emotional poems and calls to Turkestani Youth in the 
pages of Yaş Türkistan to rebel had no opportunity to reach the real Turkestani youth.61 For 
                                                
57 For a brief account of the 1929 uprising in Turkestan see the memoirs of Muhammed Ali Hasan Ali, 
"Türkistan Milli Kozgalış Tarihinden Bir Parça," YT, August 1934. no. 57. pp. 15-21.  
58 Apparently émigrés were learning about the height of Red Terror in Turkestan from some European 
sources. This shows us the limited nature of their contacts with the motherland. Apart from that some articles 
in émigré publications, it seems that they were quite unaware of the context and details of the red terror for 
sometime. See Editorial, "Türkistanda Kanlı Terror," YT, December 1934. no. 61. pp. 2-5.  
59 Very successful presentation of Hamlet in Turkish in Turkestan was perceived as the victory of so called 
“Westernists” (?) in Tashkent, where also many Russians appeared in the theatre to see Hamlet while not 
understanding any word of it. "Hamlet-Türkistan'da Garbçılık Akımınıñ Muvaffakiyyeti," YT, May 1935. no. 
66. p. 18.  
60 When Çokayoğlu was leaving Turkestan, his thought was to return back to his country after couple months, 
at least after the defeat of Reds. Mustafa Çokay Oglı, "1936," YT, January 1936. no. 74. p. 5.  
61  It is time to unite Oh Turkestan Youth, 
 It is time to work day and night without any rest 
 It is time to fight by taking the path of Chengiz 
 It is time to put our all efforts to send Russians out.  
T. Yolçı, "Türkistan Yaşlarına," YT, April 1936. no. 77. p. 36.  
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the editors of Yaş Türkistan, the victory of Soviets in Turkestan in terms of economic, 
social and cultural developments would directly mean the defeat of Turkestani patriots.62 
 The sharpest criticisms and attacks of the Soviet "progressive" policy and 
propaganda targeted the religious masses of Turkestan and all kinds of Islamic institutions. 
Émigrés, in fact, celebrated this deadly Soviets policy claiming that these policies would 
only arouse more reactionary feelings among the Turkestanis.63 Sometimes, even the 
straightforward Soviet attacks on traditional Muslim clergy and their students in Turkestan 
were presented by Yaş Türkistan as attacks against Muslim nationalist organizations.64 Yaş 
Türkistan had an open policy to show all anti-Soviet forces as parts of an organized Muslim 
nationalist movement. It was right that the most resistant group in Turkestan to Bolshevik 
atrocities as well as everything “Soviet” was the class of local Khalifa and especially 
Sheikhs-Khojas of Ferghana.65 Harsh criticism by the Soviet newspapers about the 
religious activities in Turkestan like the continuing prestige of Khalifas, un-attendance of 
pupils to schools and workers to their jobs during the religious holidays and rally-like visits 
to cemeteries and saints' tombs, led émigrés to propagandize that Soviet regime's policy 
towards Turkestan was a clear continuation of Ilminskiy-Ostromov line.66 
 
                                                
62 For the "Turkestan Nationalists" all kinds of developments in Turkestan (cultural, industrial, economic, etc) 
would have a negative meaning for the people of Turkestan. See Timuroglı, "Sovyet Hükümetiniñ Yutugu-
Türkistan Üçün Beladır," YT, September 1935. no. 70. p. 13.  
63 Conservative-religious nature of the population of Turkestan was seen as the main obstacle for the 
Bolshevik ideology in Turkestan. Émigrés, several times repeated that the Bolshevik attacks to religion and 
national values would not help Bolsheviks but rather cause more reactionary tendencies among the Muslims 
of Turkestan. Editorial, "Türkistan'da Dinge Karşı Muhakime," YT, January 1936. no. 74. pp. 2-5.  
64 Early in 1936, about 32 Turkestanis were arrested by the Soviet authorities and 7 of them were shot  to 
death immediately while the rest was sent to an unknown destination in Siberia. They were the "gang" of 
Abdülmuttalib Sheikh and his Khalifas who were continuing all their religious and nationalist activities in the 
countryside. See Oktay, "Türkistanda yaşırın Milli Uyuşmalar," YT, February 1936. no. 75. p. 19.  
65 Taşbalta, "Ruhanilerimiz Milli Küreş Cephesinde," YT, December 1937. no. 97. pp. 31-34.  
66 A, "Türkistan'da Dini Hareketler," YT, June 1937. no. 91. pp. 28-32.  
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5.4 The Emphasis on Soviet-Russian Colonialism and Diplomatic Efforts 
The most practiced tactic in Yaş Türkistan was to highlight colonial features of the 
Russian-Soviet rule over Turkestan. Quoting a French Newspaper Le Matin in Paris, dated 
the 17th of June 1930, "Soviet government executing a heavy colonial policy in 
Turkestan,"67 Çokayoğlu desired to convince his own Turkestanis as well as the 
international public that Turkestan should be counted among the colonial regions of the 
world. Apparently, some of the leading émigré leaders such as Tahir (Çağatay) initially 
wholeheartedly believed in the Soviet promises of national self-determination and as late as 
1936 they were complaining about how they were fooled.68 Prior to the Second World War, 
there were two centers in Europe, Berlin and Moscow, for Turkestanis.69 And Soviet 
patriotism was becoming a serious alternative to Turkestan nationalism.70 
The émigrés interpreted the Soviet propaganda on how sincerely “they were trying 
to destroy the remnants of imperial-colonial Russian chauvinism in Turkestan” as a proof 
of the surviving Russian chauvinism in the region. In fact, they never believed in the 
sincerity of the Soviets in solving this problem.71  For Çokayoğlu it was a matter of 
"colonization".72 The very failure of nativization was also a proof of existing foreign 
                                                
67 Yaş Türkistan, "Türkistanlılar Nazarı Dikkatine," YT, June-July 1930. no. 7-8. p. 1.  
68 Apparently some of the émigré leaders believed Bolshevik propaganda about the national self-
determination and their right to secede from the Soviets at the beginning of the revolution. As late as 1936 
they were still writing about how they were fooled by this. Tahir, "Bolşiviklernnin Milli Siyaset Oyını," YT, 
May 1936. no. 78. pp. 2-7.  
69 Turkestani émigrés were carefully observing European public opinion prior the WWII, some of which was 
Moscow and the rest was Berlin oriented in the growing power struggle within Europe. "Berlin mi, Moskova 
mı?" YT, March 1935. no. 64. pp. 29-32.  
70 The dilemma between Soviet patriotism and nationalism was one of the issues, which wondered émigré 
leaders. In fact, Soviets propaganda on patriotism was quite successful in absorbing nationalist tendencies 
some of Turkestani natives. Editorial, "Sovyet Vatanperverligi," YT, May 1935. no. 66. pp. 2-5.  
71 Quoting Kızıl Özbekistan newspaper no. 59, Russian chauvinism in Turkestan was still alive. See Kızıl 
Özbekistan'dan. "Rus Bolşiviklernin Türkistandagi Milli Siyaseti Küreşni Köçeytiremez," YT, June 1931. no. 
19. pp. 29-30.  
72 For Çokayoğlu there was little difference between Tzarist Russian colonialism and Soviet Russian 
colonialism. See Editorial, "Kızıl Müstemleke," Yaş Türkistan, June 1932. no. 31. pp. 1-6.  
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colonial rule in Turkestan.73 Çokayoğlu used to compare British and Russian style 
colonialism; he found the Russian one to be very brutal and military.74 The anti-colonial 
rhetoric of Bolshevism among the young Turkestanis during the revolution turned most of 
them into so-called "national communists." And it was a vain hope on the part of Soviets to 
expect from them to become directly the servants of "Muscovite Russians" like their feudal 
predecessors.75 Émigré leaders were quite sure that their compatriots back home would 
never surrender to the pressure of the center-Moscow as easily as the Khans and Emirs of 
Turkestan.  
 Another form of the same sort of propaganda was based on a new tactical campaign 
launched in émigré publications: Yaş Türkistan started to publish news of several rebellions 
in Turkestan against the Bolshevik atrocities. Apparently, the scale of such "rebellions" 
were quite exaggerated; if not, as was the case occasionally, manufactured product of 
wishful thinking.76 The basic aim in this sort of propaganda was, as always, to keep the 
Turkestanist nationalists’ motives warm and popular among the Turkestanis in emigration.  
 However, the Bolsheviks were winning victory after victory in the diplomatic field, 
including in the League of Nations.77 Certain Western intellectual circles reflected Soviet 
                                                
73 The failure of nativization of all cadres was a source of propaganda for the émigrés, publishing and 
reminding all foreign ruling elements in Turkestan for the sake of demonstrating their compatriots that 
foreigners were in power. Editorial, "Türkistan'da Bolşevik Fırkasınıñ İç Yüzi," YT, March 1935. no. 64. p. 8.   
74 For a comparison of British and Russian style colonialism, see Mustafa, "Rusya'da Milli devlet Mes'elesi 
Münasebetiyle," YT, August-September 1937. no. 92-93. pp. 10-14. Where the author finds Russian 
colonialism as a military and settlement-oriented farming-exploiting type.  
75 See Mustafa, "Bolşeviklerniñ 12 yıldan soñgına itiraf itdikleri bir hakikat," YT, December 1937. no. 97. pp. 
19-21. See also quotation of an open letter published in Enbekçi Kazak in 1925 by the Young Communists, 
who in 1930s become high-level party officials. The contend of the letter is highly Kazak-nationalist oriented. 
Enbekçi Kazak'dan "Açık Hat" YT. December 1937. no. 97. pp. 21-24.  
76 Émigré publications were quite filled up with the rebellion news against Russians and victory news of the 
Basmacıs. This was creating an important amount of optimism among the Turkestani leaders outside. See 
Editorial, "Milli Küreş Yolında," YT, February 1931, no. 15. pp. 1-3.  
77 Turkestani émigrés in Europe were following the activities and development of League of Nations from the 
beginning. However most of them were very much disappointed by the Bolshevik diplomatic victories in 
Europe and the ignorance of their cause. Editorial, "Dünya Sulh Buhranı," YT, June 1934, no. 55. pp. 2-4.  
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pretensions as liberators of Eastern peoples in the Western media. This had forced 
Çokayoğlu to clarify their progressive-nationalist position again.78 Yaş Türkistan was 
protesting the friendship between the democratic regimes of Europe and the totalitarian 
dictatorship of the Soviet Union. In fact, Turkestani émigrés were far from understanding 
the very basics of international politics of Europe.79 When Soviets became a member of the 
League of Nations, Turkestanis saw this as an opportunity to carry their cause to this 
international platform.80  
 
5.5 Geography and Ethnical Identity 
Another issue was to create a consensus on the geography and ethnicity of 
Turkestan. This was tried to be achieved mostly by Osman Hoca (Kocaoğlu). He defined 
Turkestan, to mean "the land of Turkic Peoples;"81 being located between Asia’s Northern 
and Southern parts and between China and Western Asia-Europe.82 
Osman Hoca defined the boundaries of Turkestan as: 
Suchu (Northwest of Kansu) and Kara Ula regions in the East. Altay-İrtiş line in the 
North. Ural river and Caspian Sea in the West. Atrek and Gurgan rivers, Khurassan 
Mountain range, Hindukush, Muztag, Künlün ranges in the South. Greater Türkistan 
is equal to 5,300,000 square kilometers.83 
 
                                                
78 Against the Soviet propaganda in the western press about the backwardness of the Bukharan Khanate and 
Turkestan before the Soviets, émigrés responded as their aim was not to return back the days before the Soviet 
invasion but to establish a modern Turkestan. See MÇ, "Türkistan hakkında Fransız Tilinde Bir Makale," YT, 
September 1935, no. 68. pp. 29-30.  
79 For a protest of Democratic European regimes friendship with the Soviet Dictatorship, see "1917-Aralık 
1936," Yaş Türkistan, November 1936. no. 84. pp. 6-9.  
80 Soviet membership to the League of Nations have been seen as an opportunity by the émigrés to take their 
issues to the International public and force Soviets to make changes in their policy on the Ukrainian, 
Caucasian and Turkestani populations. See Editorial, "Türkistan, Kafkasya ve Ukrayna Protestosu," YT, 
October 1935. no. 71. pp. 7-10.  
81 Osman Kocaoğlu, Türkistan. Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliğinde verilen konferanslar (İstanbul: Türkistan 
Türk Gençler Birliği Yayını no. 1 1936), p. 8.  
82 Kocaoğlu, p. 6. 
83 Kocaoğlu, p. 9 also sees the map of Greater Turkestan in p. 16.  
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Osman Hoca argued that since the ancient times, geographic divisions of Turkestan 
had remained quite similar.84 Tien-Shan range was the natural border between Eastern and 
Western parts of Turkestan.85 Turkestani émigré leaders apparently were well informed 
about the ancient history of the region.86 That was basically why they had put up a stiff 
resistance to the Soviet “manufactured” versions of the history of the region.   
The realistic use of the term Turkestan was meant to be "golden days" of Turkestan 
at the Height of Timurid Empire when the whole Turkestan was united under one political 
authority, as a rich and prosperous country.87  
In terms of ethnicity of Turkestan, Osman Hoca was keen to include Tajiks into the 
common Turkestani identity.88 Tajiks were openly considered as the natives of Turkestan 
and a part of Turkestani identity.89 It is difficult to find any example of exclusive émigré 
approach to the issue of Tajik and Sart identities within the context of Yaş Türkistan. 
                                                
84 Kocaoğlu also explains that, according to Greek philosopher Ptolemeos lived in 2nd century AD and Arab 
geographers of 9th century, Turkestan was divided into 11 main regions: 1. Hirkania: Southeastern Turkestan, 
Cürcan-Gürgân region. 2. Khorezm: Khiva and areas around Amudarya river. 3. Soghdiana: Upper Zarafshan. 
4. Transoxiana: Bukhara and lower Zarafshan. 5. Margiana: Marw and Ashgabat region. 6. Arriana: Herat and 
Herirud region. 7. Bactriana: Belh region. 8. Inner Scythia: The region between Aral Lake and Caspian Sea. 9. 
Outer Scythia: Yedi Su and Congaria regions. 10. Srika: Ferghana and Kashgar region. 11. İshrusene: Ora 
Tepe region. See Kocaoğlu p. 15.  
85 For the division of Eastern and Western Turkestan also see Kocaoğlu p. 15. “In the center of Turkestan, 
Tanrı (Tienshan) mountains range rise and separate the region into two parts. 19th Century European 
geographers called the eastern part as Eastern Turkestan or Kashgaria.” 
86 For the visions and perceptions of Turkestani immigrants about the term and its history see Muharrem 
Feyzi Togay, Türkistan'ın Dünya Politikasındaki Mevkii. Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliğinde verilen 
konferanslardan (İstanbul: Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği yayını no. 3, 1936), p. 4. “In the old times, real 
Turkestan was what is now called Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan. Travelers like Marco Polo called this 
region as Greater Turkey.” 
87 For a good example of the use of the term “Turkestan” implying the idealistic vision of the height of 
Central Asian civilization and history in Timurid period, see the pamphlet by Dr. Alimcan İbrahim Okay, 
Büyük Temir. Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği’nde verilen konferanslar (İstanbul: Türkistan Türk Gençler 
Birliği Yayını no. 2, 1936). 
88 In this conference Kocaoğlu explains that Turkestan term was first used by Arab geographers in the 8th 
century, then Turkestan was the area North of Transoxiana, the land between China and Islamic Iran. 
Kocaoğlu, p. 8. And in p. 9 he explained that Turkestan Turkish culture is a common product of nomadic 
tribes and city dwellers Turks and Tajiks.  
89 For Tajiks being a Turkestani tribe and their integrity with Turkestani national identity, Kocaoğlu, p. 7.  
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However, this issue remained a political as well as practical problem between the 
Turkestani émigrés and the rest of the Turkish pan-Turkish circles based in Turkey.  
 
5.6 Political Affiliations-Program 
The most favorite name used by the émigré leaders out of Turkestan was "vatancı" 
[patriot] and "Cedidçi".90 The pages of Yaş Türkistan was a platform: for both keeping 
Turkestanis out of Turkestan united (intact), and providing media support to the Turkestani 
political figures in exile to carry out their political activities.91 
Çokayoğlu was already in Europe and launched his renowned Yaş Türkistan 
publications from December 1929 on. In the first issue, he explained their identity and 
objectives as follows:  
We, the independence fighters of Turkestan, are fighting for the salvation of our 
race and our motherland Turkestan.92 Our aim is to establish a national state in 
Turkestan in spirit and in appearance.... Free and independent Turkestan.93 
 
Unification remained as the first and greatest problem among the émigré 
Turkestanis, while Çokayoğlu's line changed his stand swiftly. He began to criticize the 
political history of Turkestan, blaming Khans, as being responsible for the backwardness of 
their country by having stopped the people to unite and set up barriers among the natives.94 
                                                
90 Mustafa Çokay, "Türkistan'da Siyasi İntibalar", Yeni Türkistan (YeT), July-August 1927, no. 2-3, pp. 6-7.  
91 See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Türkistan'da Sovyet Hükümetinin Açlık Siyaseti,", YeT, September 1927, no. 4, 
p. 9. Çokayoğlu, in his first articles, was explaining why they have failed to secure Turkestani independence. 
He was still complaining about the famine of 1917-1921, which was used by the Bolsheviks as a source of 
their propaganda to win over what is left from Turkestani intelligentsia. In fact, this famine was one of the 
most important obstacle for the nationalists to activate population. Heavy employment of cotton-monoculture 
from early 1920s on in Turkestan made the famine continue in lesser extends and become a part of daily life 
in Turkestan. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Türkistan'ı Açlık Tehdit Ediyor," YeT, October-November 1927, no. 5-6, 
p. 10.  
92 Yaş Türkistan, "Bizniñ Yol," YT, December 1929. no. 1. p. 1.  
93 Yaş Türkistan, "Bizniñ Yol," YT, December 1929. no. 1. p. 3.  
94 Even in 1931 unification was one of the most repeated problems in Yaş Türkistan. Çokayoğlu was always 
quite suspicious that their movement was not receiving enough support from even the émigré Turkestanis. He 
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By 1931 both Çokayoğlu and Yaş Türkistan declared that their political affiliation concept 
was Turkism (Türkçülük).95 The 1920 revolution in Bukhara apparently was under the fire 
of Emir's circles, while Yaş Türkistan considered it to be neither socialist nor proletariat, 
but mainly a national revolution.96 This was surely a part of the heritage of Khans in 
Turkestan, which was seen as a barrier to nationalization of the tribes.  
Turkestan Khans, Kara Tigin and Shahrisabz Begs were behaving by themselves 
and tried to defend themselves against the foreign enemies in front of their capital 
cities by themselves. Our fathers did not have a feeling of being Turkestanis. The 
divided hatred of Khokand, Bukhara and Khiva, etc against Russia was just not 
enough to defend Turkestan against Russia. If there was a united Turkestan 
patriotism through the unification of Khokand, Bukhara, Khiva, Kara Tigin, 
Shahrisabz, Turkmen, Kazak, Kyrgyz tribes, Turkestan would be independent and 
destiny would free us from foreign domination. After Russia established herself in 
Turkestan, she started to agitate tribalism among the Turkestanis. We have seen that 
their success was not little during the 1917 revolution period. We have all started to 
defend our common goal Turkestan autonomy program, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, 
Turkmen, all of us, in different ways. When the Bolsheviks captured power, we 
Turkestanis couldn't have found a common ground among us and we have wasted 
the opportunity to fight back common enemy for the problems among us. Bukhara 
and Khiva could have stayed as Russian vassals. There might still be people who 
might recognize these two Khanates as national independent states. But this is 
certainly wrong. Their name was saved but they did not exist at all... This was a 
public-relations game for Russians for hiding Russian horrors in Turkestan from the 
eyes of the Foreigners. Even if Turkestan would have become an independent state 
through the Basmacı movement, the existence of the Russian vassal Bukharan and 
Khivan Khanates would make Turkestan a Russian colony again...Without 
territorial integrity, national unity in Turkestan cannot be achieved. Turkestan can 
only be saved by taking Bukharan and Khivan realms into it, and it will. Not only 
for the interests of our continuing struggle against Russia now, but also for the 
national independence too, we should never say Turkestan and Bukhara or 
Turkestan and Khiva. And we do not have the right to use these words. We do not 
refuse the existence of Khanates within the territories of Turkestan who were 
enemies of each other. We know very well the disastrous results of these historical 
mistakes. Now is another era, of the uniting the divided parts of the nation. Every 
                                                                                                                                                  
was covertly blaming late Khans, especially Khudayar Khan for the backwardness of Turkestanis as well as 
political and tribal polarization among the Turkestanis. See Editorial, "Milli Hareketimiznin Muvaffakiyyeti 
Üçün-Siyasi Hatt-ı Hareket Meselesi," YT, June 1931. no. 19. pp. 3, 6, and 10.  
95 It was clear that Yaş Türkistan accepted Turkism (Türkçülük) as a national idea (hars). Editorial, 
"Bolşivizm Türkçilik Düşmanidir," YT, July 1931. no. 20, pp. 1-6.  
96 In fact after the September 1920 revolution in Bukhara, the Bukharan peoples republic was not Bolshevik 
in nature at all. There were not any single emphasis on the terms like proletariat or bourgeois, it was a 
republican structure based on law. See Editorial, "Buhara Inkılabı," YT, September 1931. no. 22, pp. 1-8.  
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Turkestani patriot, every Turkestani understanding the seriousness of current 
national struggle and future establishment of national state, should regret the usages 
like "Turkestan and Bukhara" or "Turkestan and Khiva" or "Turkestan and 
Kazakstan." But they should declare the integrity of Turkestan from national, 
economic and all other aspects... Such usages would not only cause a spirit of 
differentiation among us but would also cause a false perception in the outside as if 
two different countries and peoples as Turkestani and Bukharan exist. ... Our 
national salvation and our peoples' future depend on our national unity alone. A 
national Turkestan, which has gotten rid of common enemy, can solve its 
organizational problems itself. It is an internal issue whether to call provinces as 
Bukhara, Khiva or Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakistan... So, it is not Turkestan 
and Bukhara or Turkestan and Something. It is only Turkestan.97 
 
This long quotation explains very well the main political issue among the 
Turkestanis in emigration. The basic issue was to create a united Turkestani front, ignoring 
the city and tribal identities, as well as the Bukharan Emir's authority over the émigrés. So 
Çokayoğlu's nationalist stand had two important facets: first, the Soviet-Russian 
propaganda, and second, the Emir and conservative Turkestani elements. Nationalism, for 
Turkestanis was Turkism; the idea of Turkic unity and it never meant tribalism.98 The stand 
by the nationalist Turkestanis was by all means Turkism (Türkçülük). That was probably 
why Çokayoğlu was proud of Bolsheviks naming reactionary elements in Turkestan as 
Çokay-Fascists.99 His pan-Turkist stand became quite clear and apparent in the pages of 
Yaş Türkistan, especially in the second half of the 1930s. In 1937, he announced his 
political position once more as being a Turkic (Turkish) nationalist and standing for a 
                                                
97 Editorial [Mustafa Çokay], "Türkistan ve Buhara mı Yoksa Togrıdan Togrı Türkistan?" YT, Mach 1932. no. 
28. pp. 1-4.   
98 On tribalism and nationalist idealism see Cafer Seydahmet Kırımer, Mefkûre ve Mefkûrenin Fert ve 
Cemiyet Hayatındaki Tesiri.Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliğinde verilen konferanslardan (İstanbul: Türkistan 
Türk gençler Birliği Yayını no. 4, 1936), p. 21. “If we say we are nationalists (milliyetçiyiz), it must mean we 
are Turkists (Türkçüyüz), not tribalists (kabileci).” 
99 Bolsheviks named counter-revolutionaries in Turkestan as Çokay-Fascists, which was taken as a pride by 
Çokayoğlu himself and a parameter showing their well-established network within the motherland. Editorial, 
"Düşmanlarımız Bizniñ Faaliyetimiz Hakkında Nime Dideler?" YT, February 1937. no. 87. pp. 2-6.  
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Turkic (Turkish) Union.100 Çokayoğlu's this late pan-Turkist stand was appreciated much 
by other Turkestani émigré groups and the émigré leaders.101  
However, the ideal-ideology of Yaş Türkistan was formulated as to pursue the 
"Turkic (Turkish) Union of Turkestan."102 So Çokayoğlu's primary objective remained to 
be limited with the creation of a united national independent Turkestan. The heritage of the 
Khokand Autonomy, Çokayoğlu hailed, was a gigantic step towards the unity of the whole 
of Turkestan. Its holy spirit was alive with Yaş Türkistan.103 And the upcoming Great War 
was a potential opportunity to free Turkestan.104 
Although the name of the basic nationalist political movement in Turkestan was 
“Turkism”,105 “Turanism” was another and still broader approach to the political program. 
Following the fashion of the 1930s, among the Turkestanis there was a tendency to 
consider themselves to be part of Greater Turan, where geographically Turkestan occupied 
the heartland and the core.106 Turan was a very loosely defined term with a strong 
emotional context,107 especially given the Persian (literary) influences on the Turkestani 
                                                
100 Aware of the difficulties of forming a Turkestani identity alone and separate from the rest of the Turkish 
groups, Çokayoğlu argued that they were standing for a Turkish Union "Türk Birligi" more than anything. 
And he was underlined the fact that the name of their nation was Turkish nation. Editorial "Düşmanlarımız 
Bizniñ Faaliyetimiz Hakkında Nime Dirler?" YT, March 1937. no. 88. pp. 4-5.  
101 Quoting Ayaz İshaki's words from Ana Milli Yol, "How would it be good if we had the opportunity to live 
together, Turkestan and İdel-Ural..." Oktay, "İki yapışık Kardaş Ülke," YT, M1937. no. 88, p. 18.  
102 See Tahir, "Türkistan'da Rusya İmperyalizmine Karşı," YT, May 1937. no. 90. p. 5.  
103 Khokand autonomy was a step towards the Unification of Greater Turkestan. Although it was a small step, 
its spirit and ideal was big and it was supposed to become the source of Turkestan National Unity movement. 
Editorial, "Hokand Muhtariyeti," YT, December 1937. no. 97. pp. 2-4.  
104 Expected new war in Europe was also a hope for the émigrés who thought that this would cause a great 
chaos within the Soviet Union and they might have an opportunity free their lands. See article titled "1935" 
YT, January 1935. no. 62. pp. 7-13.  
105 See Oktay, "Türkistan'da Türkçülük," YT, September 1938. no. 106. pp. 27-36.  
106 Muharrem Feyzi Togay, Turanî kavimler ve siyasî tarihlerinin esas hatları. Türkistan Türk Gençer 
Birliğinde verilen konferanslardan (İstanbul: Türkistan Türk Gençler Birliği Yayını, no. 6, 1938), p. 4 See 
also the map of Greater Turan in p. 2.  
107 For a definition of Turan popular in Turkey in 1930s see Togay, p. 6. “It is from Pacific to Northwestern 
Europe to Atlantic, from Northern Ocean (Arctic) to Yellow River, Himalayan ranges, deserts of Iran and 
Arabia, Mediterranean, up to the Alp range.” 
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intellectual circles. In short, as the heart and core of Turan,108 Turkestan was considered as 
the source of all the nations of Turan.109 
 
5.7 Çokayoğlu versus Zeki Velidî and Atsız110 
Although there were minor disputes over the independence issues between the Zeki 
Velidî and the Çokayoğlu camps, the real bone of contention apparently was over the use of 
terms the Turkestan, Türk İli (Turkic Land) and Türk Yurdu (Turkic Homeland). Zeki 
Velidî and his pan-Turkist comrades in Turkey started to use Zeki Velidî's concept of Türk 
İli for Turkestan, which was a Turkified form of the Persian word Turkestan.111 Almost 
simultaneously, Atsız Mecmua declared the language of Yaş Türkistan the "Sart 
language."112 It should be noted that the very word "Sart," among Kazaks, Kipchaks and 
pan-Turkists of the time had very offending connotations. Atsız accused Çokayoğlu of 
being assimilated by the Persian culture and language.113 The continuing attacks of Atsız 
Mecmua on Çokayoğlu and Yaş Türkistan forced Çokayoğlu to write an open letter to 
                                                
108 There were four main departments of Turan tribes according to Togay: Turco-Tatar, Tungus, Finno-Ugric 
and Mongolian. Togay, pp. 4-5-6.  
109 Togay, p. 7.  
110 Hüseyin Nihal Atsız (1905-1975), a well known Turkish nationalist and pan-Turkist, who heavily involved 
with the Turkestani, Azerbaijani and İdel-Ural émigré circles throughout 1930s.  
111 Zeki Velidî was explaining his stands as: “The Uluğ Türkistan newspaper published in Tashkent in 1917-
18 was using this concept for both Russian Turkestan and the eastern part of Turkestan under Chinese 
occupation. From then on, I used the same concept for Turkestan and Russian Turkestan as well, because 
Tsarist Turkestan General Governorship’s borders were subject to constant changes.” Zeki Velidî Togan, 
Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine (İstanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970).  
112 In a response to Atsız Mecmua's charges of Yaş Türkistan's language as a Sart-language, under Persian 
influence, Yaş Turkestan openly declared that it was the language of Turkestan. See İsen Tursun, 
"Mecmû'amıznıñ Tili Hakkıda," YT, February 1932. pp. 17-20.   
113 See H. Nihal Atsız, Sart Başı’na Cevap: Yerli Doktorlar Olmadığı İçin Ölen Merhum Atsız Mecmua 
Müdüründen Ecnebi Doktorlar Sayesinde Yaşıyan Yaş Türkistan Müdürüne  (İstanbul: Arkadaş Matbaası, 
1933), pp. 1-4. “What made Çokayoğlu mad and others who call themselves Turkestani rather than Turk was 
that I showed Sarts as primitive and unbrave, …, they are just the same as the Jewish converts in Turkey.” 
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Atsız.114 Most of the arguments were on the issue of Sartness of the Turkestani nationalists, 
among whom a considerable Tajik group always existed.115 Both sides were accusing each 
other by being tribalists. The "Kipchak-wing"116 led by Zeki Velidî and Atsız increased 
their accusations of Çokayoğlu being a Sart-Uzbek nationalist.117 The immediate reaction 
of Çokayoğlu was to declare all "tribalists," who were in fact represented by the "Kipchak 
wing" of Zeki Velidî, as the enemies of the nation and the national unification.118 
Probably after these first major problems with Zeki Velidî and Atsız Mecmua's 
attacks, in 1932, Çokayoğlu declared that pan-Turkism was an unrealistic cause.119 
However, in the late 1930s he turned to the pan-Turanian and pan-Turkist stands again. 
 The problems between Zeki Velidî and Çokayoğlu were not confined to the political 
stands of the two. Zeki Velidî's historical-ethnographic categorization of the Kazak sub-
tribes (Uruvlar) was protested and harshly criticized by Çokayoğlu.120 The latter claimed 
that, Zeki Velidî was in fact a foreigner to the region. While being very unkind to each 
                                                
114 See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Atsız Mecmuada KA harfleri astıga yaşırıngan efendige açık mektub," YT, May 
1932. no. 30. pp. 24-25. For the details of the problem between Atsız and Çokayoğlu and Zeki Velid's 
interference.  
115 It should also be noted here that among the Turkestanis such a clear distinction between Tajik and Turkic 
was never existed even under the circumstances a separate Tajik identity is accepted. The acceptance of Tajik-
Persian as the mother tongue would never mean the acceptance of a different identity other than Turkestani. 
Especially, among the city dwellers who were usually bi-lingual. Such distinguishing identities as of being 
Sart, Tajik or Turk were never attempted to be used but a common Turkestani identity was greatly respected.  
116 This represents the concept of the Atsız-Velidî camp, named by the author to underline their Kipchak-
oriented approach against the so-called "Sart" stand of Çokayoğlu.  
117 However, it should also be noted that no single notable "native" Turkestanis is known to support Atsız-
Velidî camp in this debate at the beginning! However this debate later became one of the sources of so called 
“Kipchak-Sart” separation in the ranks of émigré political organizations.   
118 All kinds of tribalism were among the main obstacles for the émigré leaders in achieving unification. In 
fact, many blamed Yaş Turkestan circles for being Sart or Uzbek oriented. For the Çokays answers to those 
see Editorial, "Türkistan Türklügü," YT, September 1932. no. 32. pp. 1-5. "During today's struggle for 
national salvation, we call all tribalists as the enemies of our Turkestan nationalism and our national 
salvation". p. 4.  
119 For Çokayoğlu there is an interesting difference between Turkism and political unification among all 
Turks. He finds Pan-Turkist or pan-Turanic approaches quite unrealistic. See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, YT. June 
1932. Number: 31. pp. 6-10.  
120 Çokayoğlu criticized Zeki Velidî's categorization and comments about Kazak tribes (uruglar). In fact he 
used very agitative sentences like Zeki Velidî's lack of information and use of Russian ethnographers methods 
leading him to make shameful mistakes, etc. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Kazak Urugları," YT, October 1932. no. 
35. pp. 18-23.  
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other, Çokayoğlu published one of the most unpleasant letters of Atsız in his Yaş Türkistan 
as a proof of Zeki Velidî's involvement.121 According to Çokayoğlu Atsız was an Anatolian 
chauvinist and Zeki Velidî was a falsifier of history.122  That was why Zeki Velidî was 
providing Atsız with the material to launch an agitative campaign against Çokayoğlu.  
 Most probably the origins of these problems between Çokayoğlu and Zeki Velidî 
went back to the times of revolution when Çokayoğlu had sided with the unitary Idel-Ural 
camp of Sadri Maksûdi. It was the exact time period when Zeki Velidî and "three Tatars" 
were in deep conflict over the issues of independence and unitary nature of the nation. Zeki 
Velidî had never forgotten "three Tatars" who worked for a non-territorial cultural 
autonomy within the Russian and then Soviet Empire. Çokayoğlu was in defense against 
Zeki Velidî's accusations of the unitarist group of Jadids who worked with Russian Kadets 
before and during the revolution and who were mostly against full independence of 
Turkestan or federalism.123 
Although Çokayoğlu was very careful in using the term Turkestan for Central Asia, 
there were instances in Yaş Türkistan when the terms Türk İli and Türk Yurdu also 
appeared, surely with an explanation that they both meant Turkestan.124 
                                                
121 Atsız replied to Çokayoğlu in Atsız Mecmua in 5 October 1932 but basically postponed the arguments 
between the two for a near future, after the victory against the common enemies. This was basically a problem 
between a Turkestani nationalist and a pan-Turanist who would not value Turkestan more than a part of 
greater Turkic homeland. H. Nihal. "Çokayoğlu Mustafa Bige Soñ Cevab" YT. November 1932. no. 36. pp. 6-
10.  
122 See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Merhum Atsız Mecmua Müdiri Nihal Big'niñ Uyatsız Çıkışıga Karşu 
Cevabum," YT, December 1932. no. 37. p.10. Çokayoğlu here harshly criticizes Atsız for being an Anatolian 
Chauvinist and in pages 14-15 attacks Zeki Velidî for being protected by Atsız but still the owner of 
"unashamed scientific lies".  
123 Çokayoğlu was again critical about Zeki Velidîs comments on the unitarists position before and during the 
revolution against the federalists. For Çokayoğlu, unitarist or federalist, opposition members should unite 
under one front, rather than continuing older enmities between them. See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "17 at Kum 
astıda kalgır yaramasız bir hareket," YT, February 1935. no. 63. pp. 20-21.  
124 "Türkistan-Türk İli yahud Türk Yurtu dimektir. Bu büyük ülke şarkî ve garbî Türkistan namıyla başlıca iki 
kısımga bölüngendir." Doktor İshakoglu, "Türkistan," YT. August-September 1936. No 80-81. p. 43. It is 
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5.8 Alaşism 
In Yaş Türkistan, Alaşçılık (Alaşism) was identified with Turkestan nationalism in 
all aspects.125 One of the most important problems before the Alaş leaders was to draw the 
limits of Kazak land. However, in a meeting with the members of the Bashkir government 
in Samara, the same leaders also showed their desire to unite with all other parts of 
Turkestan as early as August 1918. Çokayoğlu always included original Alaş Orda as an 
organ of Turkestan nationalism in the north.126 Simply because he was a member of the 
both Khokand and Alaş Orda governments, Çokayoğlu saw no single difference between 
the political stands of the two, in terms of their commitment to the Turkestani independence 
cause.  
 
5.9 Jadidism 
Jadidism, was a Muslim enlightenment movement, fueled by nationalist tendencies. 
Claiming the legacy of Gasprinskiy's Jadid movement in his paper Tercüman, Çokayoğlu 
was using every opportunity to underline Jadidism's great role on their enlightenment.127 
Early Russian propaganda in Turkestan, presented the Jadids as the reactionary rebels 
                                                                                                                                                  
interesting how Çokayoğlu accepted the usages of Türk İli and Turk Yurdu terms in his journal, which were 
quite identified with Zeki Velidî.  
125 Timuroğlu, "Alaş Orda," YT, September 1932. No. 32. pp. 18-21.  
126 Çokayoğlu always separated the first leaders of Alaş Orda from latecomers; most of them turned 
Bolshevik soon. His vision of Alaş Orda was basically an organizational tool of Turkestan nationalism among 
the Kazaks. Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Tübe Kılgan Alaş Ordacılar," YT, September 1932. no. 34. p. 13.  
127 In a congragulatory article for the 50th anniversary of İsmail Bey Gaspıralı's Tercüman, Münevver Kari's 
memoirs were quoted; "there were no signs of any Cedid schools in the year 1900 in Turkestan... Same year 
the program of a new Cedid school opened in Bahçesaray was published in tercüman. I read that. From that 
day on I had the idea of opening up such a school. ... In June 1901 I have gathered 30 pupils in the mahalla 
and get the necessary permission for the school. ... That was the first regular Cedid school opened under a 
program. 
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against Bukharan Amir and the reactionary religious circles.128 However soon they, Jadids 
of Turkestan and Alaş Orda, became the scapegoats of the Bolshevik press.129 The Soviets, 
however, had to wait until 1937 for the execution of famous Jadid-nationalist Turkestani 
figures like Çolpan, Fitrat, İlbeg, Nasir, Haşim etc.130  
 
5.10 Nativization 
Çokayoğlu's prior optimism about the national cadres holding high ranks in 
Turkestani republics soon turned out to be a source of apprehension among the émigré 
leaders. Nativization was perceived as a new success of the nationalities policy of the 
Soviet government.131 This also created a worry among the émigré leaders who needed to 
re-remind the people that, this was originally their idea to have the native cadres.132 The 
same Turkestanis who had revolted against the Tsar's 1916 prikaz for the conscription into 
the Russian army, applauded the conscription of Turkestanis into the ranks of Red Army, 
thinking that this was the only practical way to prepare the cadres of the future national 
army.133 By 1932, the emphasis on nativization was based on the argument that true 
                                                
128 Russian Bolsheviks used Jajdidsm and its reaction to traditional ways as a tool for its advance in 
Turkestan. In fact most of the Cedids refused to work with Bolsheviks. However leaders like Feyzullah Hoca 
joined Bolshevik ranks, which would later be blamed for using Bolshevism as a mask for achieving his 
Cedid-nationalist aims. See Editorial. "Cedidçilik Korkısı," YT, April 1935. no. 65. p. 7.  
129 Although Bolsheviks declared their victory over Cedids and Alaş Orda supporters many times after the 
revolution, as late as 1935 they were still complaining about the existence of the remnants of the both groups 
and were quite often referring to them for anything going wrong in Turkestan. Editorial, "Bolşevik Yalgan ve 
Bühtanları," YT, September 1935. no. 68. p. 2, 6.  
130 Famous Turkestani writers could not escape terror either. During the Uzbek Sovyet Writers Congress in 
Tashkent in early September 1937, Bolsheviks declared İlbeg, Çolpan, Abdullah Kadri, Fıtrat, Osman Nasir, 
Atacan Haşim and Rıza Ankabay as the bourgeois nationalists who succeeded to infiltrate to Bolshevik ranks 
during the chaos of Revolution in Turkestan and who also continued to defend their causes till 1937. See 
Oktay, "Neşriyatta Ziyancılık ve Ziyancı Muharrirleri," YT, November 1937. no. 96. p. 26.  
131 Canay. "Türkistan'da Yirlilendiriş Nimeden İbaret?" YT,  January 1930. no. 2. p. 5.  
132 Canay. "Türkistan'da Yirlilendiriş Nimeden İbaret?" YT,  January 1930. no. 2. p. 13.  
133 The conscription of Turkestanis to the Red Army ranks was interpreted as an important and positive 
development by many Turkestanis. In fact they had seen this as a preparation for the future national army. See 
Editorial. "Türkistanlılar Askerlikde" YT, October 1931. no. 23. pp. 1-5.  
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nativization was a complete nativization of all cadres.134 In the mean time, there was a fair 
appraisal of the achievements of the Soviet rule in Turkestan.135 
By 1933, the Turkestani émigrés realized that nativization was another Bolshevik 
failure.136 By mid-1930s, the native cadres of Turkestan were still largely stuffed by the 
Jadids.137 Great Russian chauvinistic imperialism was the main source of the failure of 
nativization.138 The first requirement for entering the Soviet Higher education machine was 
to be a Russian-speaker, which was somehow supported by Yaş Türkistan.139 The basic 
dilemma was the Russians’ ignorance of native languages of Turkestan while 
simultaneously campaigning for nativization!140 Soviets were mostly dealing with the 
problems of Russian settlers and leaving the native affairs to the natives.141 
The students sent to Germany by the Bukharan government were back in Turkestan 
in the 1930s. Only a small number of them remained in Germany to continue further 
                                                
134 Nativization was under heavy criticism among the émigrés. See Taşbalta. "Millileştiriş İşleri" YT. June 
1932. no. 31. pp. 27-30. Where the author argued that nativization would only be achieved through a 
complete nationalization of the cadres.  
135 See "Bugünki Türkistan Ahvalinden" YT. February 1933. no. 39, pp. 32-35. Here Yaş Türkistan praises the 
level of scientific advancement among the cadres as well as Turkestanis being in the command ranks of 
Turkestan based red-army, as much as %88.  
136 The failure of nativization projects in Central Asia were criticized harshly and found unrealistic and 
propaganda oriented by the émigré leaders. See Çağatay. "Yirlileştiriş Etrafıda" YT. November 1933. no. 48. 
pp. 36-37.  
137 As late as the mid 1930s there were still Cedids among the national communist ranks holding some power 
in Turkestan. One of them was Sadullah Hoca, one of the Cedid members who served quite effectively before 
the revolution. He was not a leader like Kari or others but respected by the Bolsheviks for a long time. 
Editorial, "İftira Okları," YT, February 1935. no. 63. p. 2.  
138 In order to use the failure of Korenizatsiya in Turkestan as a tool for more agitation, émigrés claimed that 
Russians would never give up their Russian-Imperialist-colonial assimilation project in Turkestan. They have 
used terms like "Moskova ve Neva Bataklıkları Sülüklerinden, Ruslardan Kurtuluşnu Talep İtedir." Oktay, 
"Her Yerde Rusçuluk," YT, April 1935. no. 65. p. 21.  
139 The most important barrier to Turkestanis for entering into higher education was the Russian language 
proficiency. However émigrés were quite sure that without those national cadres there would never be any 
hope for returning back to national sovereignty. So, they  supported the raising of national cadres even at the 
“cost” of having them as Russian-speakers. Canay, "Her Kanday Kadrlar Emes, Milli Kadrlargına," YT, June 
1935. no. 67. p. 13.  
140 Illiteracy of the Russian Bolsheviks about the native languages of Turkestan was also protested by 
Bolshevik leaders. Timuroğlu, "Yirlileştirüniñ 1935inçi Yılgı Hali," YT, June 1935. no. 67. pp. 13-17.  
141 It was also confessed by the leading Bolsheviks in Turkestan like Formanov and Viletskiy that they were 
always quite far away from the real proletariat of Turkestan, dealing with the problems of Russian settlers. 
See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Muştumuzırlar-Kolonizatörler Oyası," YT, August 1935. no. 68. pp. 12-13.  
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education.142 In fact, most of the émigré leaders kept their optimism about the raising of 
national cadres through Soviet higher education system.143 
 
5.11 Linguistic Policies 
Yaş Türkistan made it known that they were after a common Turkic language.144 
Quite similar to Republican Turkey in Soviet Turkestan, language policy was based on 
eliminating Persian and Arabic words from the Turkic language.145 This language policy 
caused many protests among the émigrés.146 The introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet came 
unexpectedly.147 Until then, even the Soviets were claiming that linguistic similarities 
among the peoples of Turkestan were by chance, as was the case in other nations.148 The 
                                                
142 All the students sent to Germany from Turkestan graduated by the end of 1922. Most of them stayed there 
for further academic education, while preferred to return back to their countries. Tahir, "Türkistan Yaşlıgı 
Uçün İslerlik Bir Kün," YT, January 1934. no. 74. p. 16.  
143 The importance of preparing national cadres within and outside Soviet Turkestan was one of the most 
popular issues dealt with in the pages of Yaş Türkistan as well as in the agendas of émigré leaders. Canay, 
"Milli Kadrlar Hazırlaş," YT, May 1936. no. 78. p. 8. They were interestingly optimistic about the education 
of Turkestani youth in the Russian higher education institutes and thought they would be the skeleton of the 
future independent Turkestan. See also Canay, "Milli Kadrlar Hazırlaş," YT June 1936. no. 79. p. 11.   
144 It was praised in Yaş Türkistan that the Turkish Minister of Education, in the Congress of Turkish 
Language in İstanbul, declared that their aim was to make Turkish such a language, a newspaper printed in 
İstanbul should be read and understood in Samarkand. See İsen Tursun, "Türk Dili Kurultayı Münasebetile," 
YT, November 1932. no. 36. p. 5.  
145 For the so-called Red Professor Atacan Haşim, the creation of the new Uzbek language should be made 
through the local dialects, rather than using old Chaghatay, or Cedid literature nor the language of Chagatai 
Goringi. The local dialects were the best ones in terms of cleanliness from Persian and Arabic words. See İsen 
Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," YT, September 1933. no. 46. pp. 15-19.  
146 Bolshevik language policy caused many protests among the émigrés and called as the destruction of the 
most important national pride and wealth. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti II," YT, October 1933 
no. 47. pp. 16-20.  
147 The change of alphabet from Latin to Cyrillic and the application of different Cyrillic alphabets to each 
tribal group, from the first days on, caused strong protests among the émigrés. See Va. Nu, "Türklük Sesi," 
YT, November 1933, no. 48. pp. 19-20.  
148 For the Soviet language policy, the people of Turkestan did not have any linguistic relations, commonalties 
or similarities with anyone else in the world. İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti IV," YT, February 1934. 
no. 51. p. 16.  
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language policy was considered to be one of the main tools of assimilation,149 as it was 
systematically destroying the means of communication among Turkic groups.150  
Turkestanis had showed similar reactions when Latin script was first introduced in 
Turkestan.151 Language policy was closely linked to the falsification of history and new 
attempts to create "national" and "soviet" cultures. This was the beginning of the Russian 
"doppa-Turkestani head cap" policy.152 Rightly so, the émigrés realized that the Soviet 
linguistic policies153 in Turkestan were directly linked to their "divide and rule" policies. To 
this end, the Russian linguistic policy was cleverly used in eastern classics.154 
Despite Russian attempts to popularize a Soviet literature in Turkestan, national 
local literature remained the most popular one.155 The attempts at elimination of Arabic and 
Persian words from the central Asian Turkic languages were supported as they lead to the 
entrance of Russian terminologies into these languages.156 Although there was a strong 
emphasis on the necessity of learning native languages for the European colonists in 
                                                
149 For the policy on language issue, see also İsen Tursun, "Türkistanda Til Siyaseti," YT, June 1934. pp. 5-11.  
150 The changes in alphabet and policy of languages, caused a natural feeling that Moscow not only stopping 
Turkestanis to get in contact with the western culture but also destroying all kinds of inter-Turkic relations 
which would bring a completely new picture. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," YT, July 1934. no. 
56. pp. 6-13.  
151 Linguistic policy was a part of a total cultural policy in Turkestan. During the introduction of Latin 
alphabet in Turkestan, Latin was seen as a tool of the Bolsheviks and many Turkestanis wanted their Arabic 
script back and they were called counter revolutionaries by the Soviets. İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til 
Siyaseti," YT, August 1934. no. 57. pp. 9-14.  
152 Falsification of language, history and their culture by the Soviets created lots of anger among the émigré 
leaders. İsen Tursun, "Tarihi Hakikat ve Soviet Siyaseti," YT, October 1934. no. 59. pp. 20-26. Doppa policy 
means emptying national values and reduction of national identity to very simple costumes.  
153 In many instances, the linguistic policies of the Soviets were identified as to be assimilationist in nature. 
İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," YT, November 1934, no. 60.  pp. 27-32.  
154 The response of the Soviets about the charges on the linguistic policy in Turkestan was simple. They were 
not against Eastern classics like Firdevsi or Hoca Nasreddin, etc. They even wanted Turkestani workers to 
sign their own songs rather then trying to learn classical Russian literature. İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til 
Siyaseti," YT, February 1935. no. 63. pp. 13-15.  
155 The failure of the popularization of the Soviet Literature in Turkestan was not questioned much in the 
politburo. Because it would directly mean the questioning of the Soviet colonial policy in Turkestan. See 
Tahir, "Türkistan'da Milli Edebiyat ve Edibler Faciası," YT, June 1935. no. 67. pp. 28-29.  
156 During the Alphabet Congress convened in Moscow in 1936, Soviet linguists pointed out their success in 
clearing Central Asian Turkic languages from Persian and Arabic influence and they were proud of the import 
of International-Russian terminology into those languages as well as better grammatical and punctuation 
(Russian) rules. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," YT, June 1936. no. 79. p. 21.  
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Turkestan, Moscow kept appointing Russian-Ukrainian Party apparatchiks to even to the 
Kolhoz-Sovkhoz level, who had never bothered to learn local languages.157 Russian 
language classes only became compulsory after the start of dismissal of national 
communists, from the 1st of September 1937 on in Uzbekistan.158 
 
5.12 Russification 
Another kind of response to nativization was a rather negative one, claiming that it 
would speed-up the assimilation process.159 Bolsheviks were promising everything possible 
to the farmer-dikhans during 1920s to keep them on their side.160 Increasing Soviet 
criticisms about the Jadids were another cause of anger.161 Influx of Slavs in Turkestan was 
a sign of irrecoverable assimilation.162 Defending a Turkestani amalgam, émigré leaders 
were strongly opposing the Soviet amalgam of nations, which would directly mean 
assimilation.163 Soviet education was seen as the strongest means of assimilation.164 
                                                
157 See "İdarelerni Yirlileştirü Mes'elesi Etrafıda," YT, June 1938. no. 103. pp. 49-50.  
158 Taşbalta, "Kırgından Soñraki Körünüşler," YT, August-September 1938. no. 104-105. p. 38.  
159 The first responses of the émigrés to nativization, interestingly, were quite negative, arguing that it was one 
more step to help assimilation Russian hegemony. See İlter, "Türkistan'da Millileştiriş Meselesi," YT, October 
1931, no. 23, pp. 27-30.  
160 Especially during their fight against the Basmacıs, Bolsheviks promised Turkestanis land, free markets, 
etc, especially to the dikhans; but by 1930s it became clear that they used all these promises to stop layman 
joining enemy ranks. See Çağatay, "Saglam Fikirge Karşu Bolşevik Hücûmu," YT, March 1932. no. 28. p. 19.  
161 Bolshevik applications of modern educational methods for the sake of propaganda and assimilation of 
Turkestanis were quite often protested among the émigré intelligentsia. However, the criticisms of the older 
Cedid systems by the Bolsheviks were found to be quite unnecessary. See Çağatay, "Tenkid mi Ahmaklık 
mı?" YT, December 1932. no. 37. p. 22.  
162 Actually waves of Russian-Ukrainian colonists to Turkestan in 1920s and early 30s consisted mostly of 
peasants, kulaks and mostly "dangerous aspects" of central Russia, who suddenly became the best bases for 
the Soviet power in the region. See Yaş Türkistanlı, "Rus Muhaceret Siyaseti Tehlikesi," YT, June 1933 no. 
43. p. 11.  
163 The attempts to create Soviet People through amalgam of nations also caused fear among Turkestanis, who 
defended the rights of smaller nations rather than creating an amalgam with the "Great Russians", which 
would directly mean assimilation. Tahir, "Milliyet ve Amalgam Meselesi," YT, July 1934. no. 56. pp. 20-23.  
164 Soviet type of enternasyonel education has been perceived as the strongest tool for assimilation. See Yaş 
Türkistanlı, "Türkistan Mektebleride," YT, January 1935. no. 62. pp. 17-21.  
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The famous "wall of interpreters" between the natives of Turkestan and foreign 
Russian rulers in Turkestan was to the advantage of Turkestanis.165 Çokan Valihanov was 
always suspected to be a cultural-missionary agent of the Russians. Soviet appraisal of 
Valihanov was deliberately a disadvantageous choice for them.166 Soviet schooling until the 
Second World War in Turkestan was nothing but a carbon copy of the Tsarist-Russian 
native schooling.167 Soviet change of toponyms in Turkestan was also a part of 
Russification-Sovietization of the region.168 Thinking that it would lead to the mass 
conversion of Turkestani youth into Orthodox Christianity, the émigré leaders were very 
much concerned about the anti-religious campaigns of the Soviet regime.169 
According to Çokayoğlu, given the low level of education and culture in Turkestan, 
introduction of Russian civilization into Turkestan was more than enough for a speedy 
assimilation.170 Soviets wrote the constitutions of each Turkestan republic, which were 
seemingly increasing their sovereignties.171 The Soviet colonization drive into Turkestan 
                                                
165 Safarov's lines about Bolshevism having a wall of translators in Turkestan were very much appreciated in 
the pages of Yaş Turkestan. Because émigrés, just like Bolsheviks in the region were very well aware of the 
negative attitude of these "interpreters" to Bolsheviks and they were basically a social class standing between 
the native Turkestani population and the Bolshevik Russians in the region. See 7Canay, "Bolşevik 
Tilmaçları," YT, May 1935. no. 66. pp. 10-14.  
166 Although his talents were very much admired by other Kazak leaders, most of the chiefs of Kazak society 
during the Tsarist times put important barriers between themselves and Çokhan Valihanov, who was 
perceived as a missionary-cultural agent of Russian imperialism. See Editorial, "Rus Misyonerligi," YT, 
September 1935. no. 70. pp. 6-8.  
167 Actually Soviet schools in Turkestan were, in a sense the carbon copies of Tsarist missionary Russkiy-
tuzeminiy schools. Taşbalta, "Ruslaştırma Siyaseti Küçeymekte," YT, January 1936. no. 74. p. 12.  
168 Renaming of Hojend as Leninabad and Evliyaata Mirzoyan in 1936 were both interpreted as the 
continuation of Tsarist colonial, re-naming policy of the geography of Turkestan for the sake of assimilation. 
See Baltabay, "Ruslaştıma Siyaseti Devam İtedir," YT, February 1936. no. 75. pp. 20-22.  
169 In most cases, Soviet anti-religious propaganda has been taken as a preparation for the future or even 
current propaganda for Orthodox Christianity. Émigrés were all alarmed about some Turkestani youth would 
convert. However, most of this was for propaganda purposes. Abdulvahab, "Türkistan'da Hristiyanlık 
Propagandası," YT, February 1936. no. 76. p. 21.  
170 Even the translation of Pushkin into Turkic dialects was interpreted as another step of Russian attempt to 
assimilate under Soviets. See M.Ç., "Medeni Esaret Silahı," YT, March 1937. no. 88. pp. 5-7.  
171 Çokayoğlu had interpreted Soviet efforts for the declaration of different constitutions for each Turkestan 
republic as nonsense and considered it as a very inefficient way to keep these republics within the union. 
Editorial, "Türkistan Cumhuriyetleri Kanun Esasisi Etrafıda," YT, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 2-5.  
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was accelerated during the second half of 1930s and this also created a protest among the 
émigrés.172 
At the beginning of the war, the Russian transfer of some of the industry to 
Turkestan was perceived very negatively by Zeki Velidî. Russians, while claiming to 
industrialize the Northern Turkestan and Western Siberia, were actually carrying their 
strategic industries to this region for safety reasons – keeping them far from German and 
Japanese fronts. This had also generated a huge Slavic migration into the region. Ural, 
Northern and Western Kazakstan were no more Russian borderlands but had become the 
heartland and Central Russia in the eyes of Zeki Velidî.173 
 
5.12 Historiography 
Another pressing concern for Çokayoğlu was the Bolsheviks’ re-writing of the 
history of Turkestan, not the least, that of the recent events, including those that related to 
the Khokand Autonomy. The article by Soviet Historian Alekseenkov on the Khokand 
Autonomy caused indignity on the part of Mustafa Çokayoğlu. Alekseenkov just invented 
new names and history, which motivated Mustafa Çokayoğlu to start writing a series of 
articles about Khokand Autonomy.174 For Çokayoğlu, the 10th of December, the day they 
had declared Turkestan’s Autonomy was certainly a step towards full independence.175 
Bolshevik falsification of their history greatly offended the Turkestani émigrés.176 
 
                                                
172 Timuroğlu, "Sovyet Rusya Muhaceret Siyaseti," YT, June 1938. no. 103. p. 39.  
173 Zeki Velidî Togan, 1940, p. 36.  
174 Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Bolşevikler Tarihni Kanday Yazadılar?" YT, February-March 1930. no. 3-4. pp. 31-
33.  
175 Editorial. "Muhtariyetden İstiklalga," YT, December 1930. no. 13. pp. 1-3.  
176 For the reactions of émigrés for the falsification of their history by the Bolsheviks see Yaş Türkistanlı, 
"Bolşevikler tarihi hakikatnı Sevmeydirler," YT, September 1935. no. 68. pp. 18-20.   
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5.13 The Great Russian Chauvinism 
Çokayoğlu saw the Great Russian chauvinism in and out of the Soviet Union as the 
most serious threat against the independence of all non-Russian nationalities.177 Çokayoğlu, 
in fact, admitted that this Great Russian chauvinism of the Soviets in Turkestan, would 
facilitate the spread of the Turkestani cause.178 Çokayoğlu always thought that the Soviet 
patriotism was another form, or even a step towards the Great Russian nationalism.179 
 
5.14 The Geography of Eastern Turkestan 
The main geographical demarcation between Eastern and Western Turkestan was 
drawn with the Tien-Shan Mountains. The North of Eastern Turkestan was called Jungaria 
while the South was historical Kashgaria.180 Çokayoğlu complained about Uygur merchants 
using the name of Eastern Turkestan for their own profits all over the world.181 One of the 
most important events in the period of 1929-1940 was the de-facto, and for a while de jure, 
Turkestani independence as well as increasing Soviet influence in Eastern Turkestan182 and 
                                                
177 See Editorial, "Buhran," YT, April 1933. no. 41. pp. 5-6. "As long as the Russian threat which takes all the 
national movements in the world under fear and we Caucasus, Ukrainian, Turkestani, İdel-Ural and Crimean 
people under its direct influence, continues, there would not be peace on earth and cannot be." pp. 5-6.  
178 For Turkestanis, it was also good that Soviets were following a Russian nationalist policy in Turkestan 
simply because of the reason that it would be easier to be observed by the natives. In fact, even some Soviet 
authors like Vitechenko agreed that Soviet policy in the matter of nationalities was disastrous in terms of 
national security. See Editorial, "Sovyetlet İttifakıda Milli Mesele," YT, August 1935. p. 7.  
179 According to Çokayoğlu, Soviet Patriotism was completely a step towards great Russian nationalism, 
which became a reality by the mid 1930s, especially concerning the former-colonial lands. See Editorial, 
"Sovyet Patriotizminden Rus Milletçiliğine," YT, February 1936. no. 76. p. 7.  
180 Tañrıbirdi, "Şarki Türkistan," YT, June 1933. no. 43. p. 17. "Tien Shan mountains divide Eastern Turkestan 
in two parts, in the North Zhungaria and in the south Kashgariya."  
181 "Şarkî Türkistan ismi bilen dünyanıñ her bürçeginde ticarat kılıb yurüci mesuliyetsiz kişilerniñ yüzindeki 
maskalarnı yırtıb taşlav... zamanı kildi." Editorial, "Şarki Türkistan Meselesi Münasebetiyle," YT, September 
1938. no. 106. p. 9.  
182 See Velidî-1940, pp. 16-31 for the details of events in Eastern Turkestan between 1929 and 1940.  
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its possible future integration with the Western Turkestan under one administration 
(Soviet).183  
 
5.15 Independence of Eastern Turkestan 
Independence of Eastern Turkestan was a great motivation for the émigré leaders.184 
Independent Eastern Turkestan was the best example to justify the continuation of the 
Turkestanis’ struggle for freedom.185 In 1934, there was a massive disappointment among 
the Turkistanis, as Eastern Turkestan was loosing her independence. However, 
Çokayoğlu’s continued optimism helped them to overcome and instead use it as a case in 
assessing their own struggle.186 
 
5.16 National Communists and Red Terror 
Although it was accepted that national communists were running a passive 
resistance campaigning against the center, they were harshly criticized by Çokayoğlu for 
their considering national republics as being inseparable parts of the Soviet Union.187This 
was also the time when some of the Turkestanis in exile had started to give credit to the 
                                                
183 Velidî-1940, p. 16. 
184 A letter sent to ash Türkistan started with the cry "Long live new Islamic Government in Eastern 
Turkestan!" "We wholeheartedly desire the creation of Uluğ Türkistan in Central Asia with the independence 
of Western Turkestan and its unification with free Eastern Turkestan. Long Live Uluğ Türkistan!" See Mirza 
Azmi, "Yaş Türkistan'ga Mektub," YT, August 1933. no. 45. p. 20.  
185 The independence of Eastern Turkestan from China was the cause of all hopes for western Turkestanis. Its 
survival was a great boost for all Turkestanis to continue their struggle for independence. Türkistanlı Yılmaz, 
"Yılmayacağiz, Yıkacağiz," YT, April 1934. no. 53. pp. 38-40.  
186 The destruction of Eastern Turkestan in 1934, caused a great disappointment among the western 
Turkestani émigrés too.  Editorial, "Şarkî Türkistan Feciası ve Onun Bizge Birdigi Ders," YT, September 
1934. no. 58. pp. 2-7. Here quite an emotional article, Çokayoğlu argued that the lessons learned from the 
Eastern Turkestani experience would help them in the future.  
187 MÇ, "Türkistan Fırka Kurultaylarında," YT, November 1930. No. 12. pp. 7-11.  
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Bolshevik promises for so-called national self-determination policies.188 Just before the 16th 
Soviet CPSU Congress there were party congresses of all Central Asian republics, in late 
1930.  
Although the issue of Central Asian Federation had lost its popularity for Moscow 
after 1924-5, it was still a popular argument for the National Communists of Turkestan. 
Çokayoğlu, while preserving all possible accusations he made against National 
Communists, argued that this would be another gigantic step towards the establishment of 
one single independent Turkestan.189  
In this respect, it was noteworthy to underline the fact that he was calling for the 
"amalgamation" of all the tribes of Turkestan for the establishment of a nation state. 
According to Çokayoğlu, there was no chance to compromise with the Soviets.190 Yaş 
Türkistan, continuously followed-up and observed Red Terror in Turkestan.191 Çokayoğlu's 
hope for a national communist take-over or a coup in Turkestan continued.192 Red terror in 
the party ranks started to become known in Turkestan by 1934 when more than three 
                                                
188 The Bolshevik promises for national self determination has been taken seriously by many Turkestanis. See 
M.Ç., "Milli Mesele Tivere Gide," YT, August-September 1930. no. 9-10. pp. 7-15.  
189 Mustafa Çokayoğlu was one of the leaders who opposed Bolshevik project for a Central Asian Federation. 
However, his interpretation of this project was that Turkestani national communists would be able to use this 
unification as a step towards united national Turkestan. See MÇ, "Sovyet Orta Asya Federasyonudan Milli 
Mütehhid Türkistan Devletine," YT, March, 1930. p. 9 "we do not thing the idea of federation would be better 
than the current idea of national republics. Our aim is indivisible Turkestan. We are thinking about our future 
national free Turkestan state as an indivisible nation state. One of the most important task of the future 
national independent Turkestan government would be the creation of the single nation of the single state after 
the amalgamation of all tribes of Turkestan...We also believe that national communists would use the idea of 
federation for our final aim of united national independent Turkestan." 
190 Çokayoğlu did not think that there would be any chance to agree with the soviets on a common principle. 
Editorial, "Kızıl Şovinizm," YT, May 1932. no. 30. pp. 1-4.  
191 Red terror in Turkestan had been closely observed by the émigrés and the news about constant protests had 
been published in different publications. Editorial, "Türkistanda Milli terror," YT, September 1932. no. 34. pp. 
1-6.  
192 But there were always hope that national communist Turkestanis would capture the power and see the 
Bolshevik atrocities soon. "Bolşevikler Yaş Türkistan'ga Karşı," YT, March 1934. no. 52. pp. 37-38.  
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quarters of the native party workers were replaced by the "trusted" elements.193 National 
communists were the only remaining national elite left in Turkestan. Consequently they 
were the only targets of Moscow's policy on the region.194 Feyzullah Hoca and Ekmel 
İkram were the sole responsible figures for the Red Terror killing thousands for failing to 
fulfill cotton quotas.195 One of the leading national communists, Turar Rıskulov, was 
blaming Alaş leaders for opposing Russian settlement in Turkestan in 1935.196 By 1936 
Çokayoğlu was blaming national communists who were under the attacks of Red Terror as 
the loyal Bolsheviks.197 An increasing volume of Red Terror meant basically clearance of 
the remnants of national cadres in Turkestan and their replacement by Russians.198 The 
clearance of Party from the national communists caused protests among the émigré leaders, 
however the existence of fresh young cadres was taken as a positive development.199 
                                                
193 The renewal of KP members in Turkestan in 1934 was made for the sake of cleaning chauvinist and 
nationalist elements from the rank of the party. In some local cases up to %60 to %90 of the party members 
were driven out of the party. See Editorial, "Türkistan'a ırka Tazeleşi Neticelerinden," YT, October 1934. no. 
59. pp. 2-7.  
194 Existence of active opposition against Moscow's Russian-centered policies on Turkestan among the 
intellectuals and national communists of Turkestan was the source of hope for the émigré Turkestanis. They 
even exaggerated the westernist and easternist tendencies among the national communists in Turkestan and 
interpreted the existence of both as a unified front against assimilitionist policies of Moscow. Yaş Türkistanlı, 
"Türkistan'da Gerbçılık ve Şarkçılık Akımları," YT, November 1934. no. 60. pp. 24-27.  
195 According to Çokayoğlu most of the victims of Red Terror in Turkestan were killed simply because of 
their inability to fulfill the cotton quotas provided by Moscow and he blamed Feyzullah Hoca and Ekmel 
İkram for this bloodshed, for their inability to stop that. Mustafa, "Türkistandagı Soñ Terrör Mes'ulları," YT, 
March 1935. no. 64. p. 11.  
196 In 1935 Turar Ryskul blamed Alaş Orda leaders and especially Alihan Bukeyhan for the Turkestani 
opposition in the party for the new Russian immigrants to Turkestan. In fact, that kind of a decision was taken 
in 1926 in Kızıl Orda during the 5th party Congress as stopping Russian immigration to Kazak lands until the 
settlement of all nomad and semi nomad Kazak-Kyrgyzes. See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Bilçirak Bihtan ve 
Yalganlarga Karşı," YT, September 1935. no. 68. pp. 13-14.  
197 Soviets promoted a number of Turkestani party workers Lenin Orders at the end of 1935. Among them 
there were: Mirzoyan and Uraz İsaulı from Kazakstan, şaduris and Abdullah Rahimbayof from Tajikistan, 
Popon and Kaygısız Atabayev from Turkmenistan, Ekmel İkram and Feyzullah Hocayev from Uzbekistan. 
İsaulı, Rahimbayov, Atabayev and Hocayev were all the heads of Peoples Commissars in their country, all 
national communists but also quite loyal Bolsheviks too. They were immediately declared as the greatest 
enemies of Turkestan nationalists. See Tahir, "Nefret Tamgası," YT, February 1936. no. 76. pp. 8-12.  
198 The year 1937 was the height of cleaning up Party and Comsomol cadres from the alleged "nationalists 
and saboteurs" especially in Kazakstan. "Komsomol Katarında," YT, March 1937. no. 88. pp. 23-25.  
199 See for the reactions of the émigrés to Cleaning and refreshing Party Cadres in Turkestan. Taşbalta, 
"Türkistan'da Komminst Fırkası Saflarında," YT, April 1937. no. 89. pp. 16-20.  
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The fate of Feyzullah Hoca, his execution in 1937, had not been applauded by the 
émigrés. He was the only representative of the Young Bukharans and National 
revolutionaries among the Bolshevik ranks. Çokayoğlu thought that Russians kept him until 
they had prepared their own local loyal cadres and than they got rid of this “half-
Bolshevik” – as they had considered him to be. Çokayoğlu said "although we hated former 
the Bukharan emir and his regime, we have never allied with any foreign power, and with 
Bolsheviks against him."200 
Ekmel İkram was seen as a tool for the Russian policy of dividing Turkestan Turks 
into tribal groups. His continuous emphasis on the Uzbek identity and their superiority in 
Central Asia had been widely protested by the émigrés who has declared themselves 
Turkish nationalists.201 Yaş Türkistan had called the purges political programs. While being 
very concerned about the future of the Turkestani elite in the country, especially Çokayoğlu 
found them as the justice of history.202 Feyzullah's group was the second generation of 
national communists who replaced the Turar Rıskul group in early 1920s while the latter 
was rather called the Turkist group.203 Çokayoğlu made it very clear that they would have 
no sorrow for those who served Bolshevik murderers, at all.204 
Although having no sorrow for the Feyzullah group, Çokayoğlu said that Soviet 
accusations of them being enemies of people should be read to mean the enemies of Great 
                                                
200 See Editorial, "Feyzullah Hocanıñ Akıbeti," YT, August-September 1937. no. 92-93. pp. 2-5.  
201 Timuroğlu, "Rus İmperyalizmine Karşı Türk Birligi," YT , August-September 1937. no. 92-93. pp. 10.  
202 For the dismissal of Feyzullah Hoca and other peoples Commissar in Turkestan republics see Editorial, 
"Türkistan'da Siyasi Pogrum, Onuñ Mana ve Ehemniyeti," YT, October 1937. no. 95. pp. 2-7.  
203 In fact the first group of National Communists who were pacified in 1920s were called groups of Turar 
Ryskul, Sultan Beg Hocaoglı, Said Vakkasoglı. They were simply replaced by Feyzullah Hoca, Şirinşah 
Şahtimur, Abdullah rahimbay, İsa Kayoglı, etc. And this second group, less Turkist, more national 
communists were dismissed in 1937. "Türkistan'da Milletçi Gruplar," YT, October 1937. no. 95. pp. 7-12.  
204 We do not have a bit of sorrow for the ones who served .... (Bolshevik murderers)... in order to massacre 
our people.." Çokayoğlu never felt sorry about the executions of the second-generation national communists 
who were declared as either fascists or as the agents of fascists. See Editorial, "Türkistan'da Siyasi Pogrum," 
YT, November 1937, no. 96. p. 7.  
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Russian Chauvinism.205 The execution of Ekmel İkram with Feyzullah Hoca was a surprise 
simply because everyone thought that he would stay in his post while Feyzullah Hoca 
would be shot by the Soviets.206 
During his questioning by Vyshinskiy in the Show trials of 21s, Feyzulla Hoca 
repeatedly "confessed" that he was first a member of the bourgeois organization 
"Millî İttihad" from 1920 on, then from 1927 on became affiliated with the former 
Turkestan nationalist circles and finally from 1930s on became a part of the rightist 
conspiracy of Rykov's and get the promise of an independent Uzbekistan from 
them.207 In the same trial, Ekmel İkram "confessed" that he became one of the 
leaders of the national organization called "Millî İstiklal", for gathering force and 
preparing national cadres, and continued to support Turkestani students entering 
into higher education institutions, etc.208  
 
Yaş Türkistan had interpreted Feyzullah and Ekmel's confessions of fighting for the 
"bourgeois" independence of Uzbekistan, as the existence of a high national consciousness 
among the Uzbek party elite by.209 Kazaks never appeared in show trials in large numbers. 
Due to the continuing terror there, the accused ones were not brought to trials at all.210 
Replacement of executed native national communists by the "foreign" Bolsheviks 
from Russia was supporting the émigré’s arguments about the assimilationist-colonial 
                                                
205 Declaring the old servants of Soviet Bolshevism in Turkestan as the enemies of people, interpreted by 
Çokayoğlu as declaring them as the enemies of Russian nationalism. The basic reason for Moscow for getting 
rid of these cadres was their opposition of the domination of Great Russian chauvinism among the party 
cadres. "Siyasi Pogrum Devam İtedir," YT, December 1937. no. 97.p p. 15 and 18.  
206 See Editorial, "Feyzullah Hoca ve Ekmel İkram'nıñ Akıbeti," YT, April 1938. No 101. pp. 2-3.  
207 Quoted from Izvestiya of 5.3.1938. "21 ler makhemesi," YT. April 1938. no. 101. pp. 3-4-. See pages 3-43 
for full manuscripts.  
208 Quoted from Pavda of 7.3.1938, "21 ler mahkemesi," YT, April 1938. no.101. pp. 23-24. See pages 3-43 
for full manuscripts. 
209 For the last words and full "confessions" of both Ekmel İkram and Fayzullah Hoca see "21 ler makhemesi" 
YT. April 1938. no. 101. pp.40-43. Where they openly confess that they were the members of right Trotskist 
conspiracy and were fighting for the nationalist independence cause for Uzbekistan in "bourgeois" terms.  
210 Terror and trials in Kazakstan was much more behind the closed doors but it was possibly worse than 
anywhere in Turkestan. By early 1938, Chairman of Central Executive Committee Kolumbetulı Uzakvay, 
Head of Peoples Commissars Uransary İskaraulı and Alma-ata Party Committee Head Said Vakkasulı 
Canaydar were already shot.  
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policies of Moscow.211 In the mean time, Çokayoğlu, while trying to be just, was trying 
hard to remind people that the Feyzullah group were “murderer servants” of Moscow.212 
 
5.17 Turkey 
Çokayoğlu identified himself with Turkey and defended Turkey against Soviet 
propaganda.213 Ignorance of the Muslim World even of the terrible famine in Turkestan was 
a source of another great disappointment for him.214 Turkey's cautious reaction toward the 
independence of Eastern Turkestan was also not encouraging for the Turkestani émigrés.215 
Turkestanis could not find any nation, even Turks, to take their cause to the League of 
Nations.216 The ban on the distribution of Yaş Türkistan in Turkey was interpreted as 
"punching the one on the floor".217 Turkish ignorance about the Bolshevik atrocities in 
Turkestan created an important disappointment among the émigré leaders.218 In the 
                                                
211 See Taşbalta. "Türkistan'da Sovyet Kadro Siyaseti" YT. May 1938. no. 102. p. 21.  
212 Çokay urged Turkestanis repeatedly, observing the sympathy for Hocayev and İkramov after their murder 
by the Stalinist terror. “not to forget they being the agents of Moscow and their attacks on the Turkestan 
independence.” See Editorial, "Feyzullah Hoca ve Ekmel İkram Hakikaten de Kızıl Moskovanıñ Düşmanı mı 
idiler?" YT, June 1938. no. 103. p. 5.  
213 Émigré publications tried to answer negative propaganda campaign of some Russian media about Turkey 
being at the hands of barbaric, backward conservative Muslims. See Mustafa, "Bir Tarihi İftiraga Karşı," YT, 
February 1933. no. 39. pp. 18-22.  
214 The worst scenes of the Famine in the USSR had been amongst the nomad Kazak and Kyrgyz hordes in 
the step. Comparing western churches campaigns to aid the Christian folks of Soviets, émigrés were very 
much disappointed by their fellow Muslims’ silence for the sufferings of Turkestan. See Tahir Şakir, "Aç ve 
Kimsesiz Bir Halk," YT, November 1933. No 48.ç pp. 2-5.  
215 Apparently, Turkish government did not have any information about the independence of Eastern 
Turkestan; however, its officials kept saying that this would make Turkey happy but nothing else. Anadolu 
Ajansı Muhabirinden, "Tevfik Rüşdi Biğ'iñ Şarkî Türkistan'a Da'ir Beyanatı," YT. February 1934. no. 51. pp. 
10-11.  
216 There were of course efforts of Turkestanis to influence Turkey for taking Turkestan matter to the League 
of Nations. Doktor Mustafa Ali "Türk Mes'elesi" YT. May 1934. no. 54. pp. 5-7.  
217 The prohibition of Yaş Türkistan in Turkey on 6th of October 1934 with the pressure of the Soviet 
government caused great disappointment among the authors of Yaş Türkistan. It was in fact found unfriendly 
to the relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia. See Mustafa. "Yaş Türkistan Türkiyege Giritilmeyeturgan 
Buldı...(yıkılganga yumırık)" YT. November 1934. no. 60. pp. 6-11. 
218 The ignorance of public opinion of Turkey to the atrocities in Turkestan created an important amount of 
disappointment among the émigrés; and Turkish intelligentsia was blamed for it’s undesire to understand the 
conditions in Turkestan. See Oktay. "Türkiyelilerniñ Sezmedikleri ve Bilmedikleri" YT. January 1936. no. 74. 
p. 30.  
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emigration, white Russians in Europe were calling Mustafa Çokay a “Kemalist” because of 
his pro-Turkey positions.219  
Çokayoğlu noted this ban on Yaş Türkistan in Turkey as the worst disastrous thing 
in his émigré life.220 In 1939, the İnönü government in Turkey, with the diplomatic 
pressures of the Soviet government deported some of the Turkestani leaders from Turkey, 
including Osman Hoca, who first went to Poland and ended up in Iran at a time when the 
Second World War was just starting.221 
 
5.18 Tribalism 
Yaş Türkistan criticized tribalism. There was a point of truth in this criticism.222 
Tribalism in Yaş Türkistan also appeared in its underestimation and humiliation of the 
development of the Turkmen national language.223 Tribal union was very important.224 
Soviet nationalities policy of supporting local-tribal nationalism in Turkestan with the 
                                                
219 Mariya Çokay, Yash Turkestan: Pamyati Mustafa Chokay-Beya (Paris: 1950), p. 25.  
220 For Çokayoğlu, prohibition of YT in Turkey was one of the worst disappointment during the whole history 
of his émigré life. See Yaş Türkistan, "Yaş Türkistannıñ sekiz yaşga Kirişi Münasebetile," YT, December 
1936, no. 85. pp. 2-3.  
221 Timur Kocaoğlu. "Türkistanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine Bir Bakış," in Dr. Baymirza Hayit 
Armağanı. Ed by Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevî 
Vakfı, 1999), p. 162.  
222 Despite every attempt to unite the tribes, there was open Uzbek favoritism in some articles of Yaş 
Türkistan. See yaş Türkistanlı, "Ruslukka Karşı Türkistan Yaşları," YT, July 1933, no. 44. p. 20-25. Our 
leader (başbug) should "prove that he is really from Timuroğulları with his powerful race faith." p. 25.  
223 One of the first pioneers of the creation of a completely separate tribal language and literature was realized 
under the Turkmen Börioğlu Kömüş Ali and his comrades, which was declared to be an enemy by Yaş 
Türkistan authors. In fact Türmne's such a movement from Turkestan was unacceptable for the Uzbeks at the 
center. See İsen Tursun, "Türkistan'da Til Siyaseti," YT, November 1933, no. 48. pp. 24-26.  
224 Yaş Türkistan, "1929-Aralık 1934," YT, December 1934, no. 61. pp. 5-9. "YT defends the unity of Turkish 
tribes, thinks about the future of Turkish people, and wants to help political, ideal and cooperative unity 
among the Turkish tribes." p. 8.  
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objective of weakening Turkestani unity and identity was one of the most destructive acts 
realized in Turkestan.225 
By 1936, the Soviets had imposed "passport nationalism" and tribalism among the 
émigrés in Afghanistan. As a result, the tensions were raised and the unity was broken 
up.226 
During the revolutionary period in Turkestan, the Kazaks of Alaş Orda and all other 
Kazak intelligentsia were strongly affected by their tribal ties and established their political 
positions accordingly.227 Émigrés were in chaos and lack of unity stemmed from tribal 
differences as well as political polarization between the Islamists and Turkists.228 
 
5.19 Demarcation 
Although there was a considerable discomfort among the Turkestani leaders about 
the on-going national-territorial demarcation of Turkestan, they were following the 
developments with great interest. 
                                                
225 The signs of Russian-Soviet patriotism, according to émigrés, was creating a local-national patriotism, 
even in some cases supporting nationalist tendencies. Editorial, "Milli Vatanperverlige taman bir Adım," YT, 
February 1936, no. 75. p. 6.  
226 Apparently both émigré leaders and the Turkestanis in Afghanistan were quite happy with the hospitality 
shown to them by the Afghan authorities. However, there was no "national" unity among the émigrés and 
tribal differentiation was still active among them. Azmi Haşimi, "Millet Yolbaşçılarıga Bir Müracaat," YT, 
October 1936, no. 83. p. 38. In an answer to this application Çokayoğlu wrote that national unity among the 
Turkestanis was one of the main causes of their struggle and he opposed the Soviet imposed "passport 
nationalism" meaning the tribal affiliations. See Editorial (Azmi Haşimi), "Muhacerattaki Milli Vazifemiz," 
YT, November 1936, no. 84. pp. 2-6.  
227 Tribalism among the Alaş Orda Kazaks was very widespread. In fact, it caused many troubles among 
themselves. "At the end, ... İvan İstepnov=Ali Cangeldin, who fakely called himself as Alaş Orda member and 
'Kıpchak'... he was also with Russian Red Guards. After a while 'Kıpchak' İstepnof-Cangeldin, 'töre' millikhan 
and 'argın' Ahmed united against Mir Yakıb and raised 'kıpchak' Amangeldi as their candidate. Both kıpchaks 
united and gathered Red guard and Russian mujiks around themselves. Hot fight started. Amangeldi, who said 
'Bolshevik' is the Russian form of 'kıpchak' was killed in a fight against Alaş Orda. .. Today Bolsheviks are 
claiming that 'bolshevik hero Amangeldi' is killed by nationalist, counter-revolutionary Mir Yakıb Dulat..." 
See Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Batır Bolşevik Amangeldi Hakkında Hakikat," YT, December 1936, no. 85. p. 33.  
228 Even in 1937 there was no sign of unity among the émigrés, who kept falling into conflicts especially on 
political matters like being a Turkist or Islamist etc. See "Milli Birlik Teşkilatımız Üçün," YT, September 
1937, no. 94. pp. 5-9. 
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Russians, especially under the Bolshevik regime, are sensitive about the term 
Turkestan, which might become a slogan and has the potential to unite native Turks 
of Central Asia. Turkestan is now only a name for a locality in the Syr Darya basin 
of Kazakstan where the tomb of Hoca Ahmed Yassawi is...229 
 
Apparently there was a silent discussion going on among the Turkestani political 
leaders in exile about the confusion created by the Russian policies in Turkestan. In these 
discussions, the issue of the very meaning of the term Turkestan was also included. By 
1927, according to Zeki Velidî, they had come to a conclusion on how they call the region 
and its parts.  
We have decided with the comrades that... the use of Turkestan only would mean 
Western Turkestan and Kazakstan. For the both Eastern and Western Turkestan we 
would employ the term Two Turkestans. Separately for the Chinese Turkestan, the 
use of Eastern Turkestan, and for the Western Turkestan and Kazakstan in joint the 
use of Western Turkestan would be employed. For Maveraünnehr, according to 
current limitations, Uzbekistan, for the Step Governorship, Kazakistan, for Zakaspi 
(Mavera-yı Bahri Hazer) Governorship, Turkmenistan, for Çungarya, as the older 
version, Çungarya, for the Koca, Kumul, Urumchi, Köçen and Yargöl regions 
would be named as older version Uyguristan. It is thought that the employment of 
the extension of -ili instead of -istan for the meaning of country would be more 
convenient.230  
 
Zeki Velidî made these remarks in the Yeni Türkistan.  These were about to become 
the most important issues of his future conflicts with Mustafa Çokayoğlu, who was 
naturally standing for a unified Turkestan and its historical name. Soviet national-territorial 
demarcation policy was completed by the creation of a Tajik SSR on a great scale. Quoting 
a German author, Kelaynov, Yaş Türkistan protested the creation of Tajik SSR231 and 
                                                
229 Ahmed Zeki Velidî, "Türkistan İsmi, Hudûdu ve Müsâhası Hakkında," YeT, October- November 1927, no. 
5-6, pp. 30-31. In this article Zeki Velidî argued that the term Türkistan was first used during the Sasanid 
period and also by the 8th century Armenian author Musa Harinaki's book, which called this geography as 
Turkastanok for the Schytia of Ancient Greeks. See p. 31. However he does not show any footnotes in this 
journal article.   
230 Ahmed Zeki Velidî, "Türkistan İsmi, Hudûdu ve Müsâhası Hakkında," YeT, October- November 1927, no. 
5-6, pp. 35-36.  
231 N.M., "Bolşeviklerin Türkistan Siyasetine Bir Alaman Nazarı," YT, April-May 1930, No 5-6. p. 19.  
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interpreted this as a new Soviet attempt to fortify the southern borders of Central Asia as 
well as attracting Tajiks of Afghanistan to the Union.232 
Soviet deportation of Ukrainian and Russian peasants to Northern Kazakstan 
resulted in disaster not only for the natives but for themselves too.233 
...National delimitation [millî cigereleş] is the second disaster after falling into 
hands of Soviet power... We have entered into the revolution of 1917 with different 
tribal names like Kazak, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Turkmen. Outside, we have been 
identified as Turks of Turkestan. However we stayed separately with those tribal 
names at the motherland and this was the worst point of our national disaster... we 
know that both Islamic Union and Turkic Union are only words-promises but 
nothing else. Our primary task should first unite among ourselves and get rid of this 
foreign Russian prisonership.234 
 
Çokay was thinking that the imminent result of the razmezhevanie would be an 
unfortunate situation, which would make Turkestanis “national minorities” in the “national 
republics” of each other.235 
Zeki Velidî one of the scholars who was aware of the simple but critical 
terminological changes in accordance with the Russian policy, also realized of the fact that 
the nationalities policy of the Bolsheviks was irreversible.236 The poets what he called the 
“poets of Stalinist appraisal” (or in Zeki Velidî’s words Stalin meddahları) have been found 
in each tribe and are named  “popular poets”: Jambul from Kazaks, Ata Salih from 
Turkmens, Farrah Devletşan from Başkurts and so on. Russians, through the legends 
                                                
232 N.M., "Bolşeviklerin Türkistan Siyasetine Bir Alaman Nazarı," YT, April-May 1930, No 5-6. p. 20. 
233 Russian policy of placing Russian and Ukrainian peasants to the northern steppe of Turkestan was not out 
of necessity but out of nationalities policy. However from the early days of the revolution on, those peasants 
were not as eager to come as the previous ones during the Tsarist times. In fact in most cases their 
immigration resulted quite disastrously for themselves too. Yaş Türkistanlı. "Rusya Muhaceret Siyasetine Bir 
Kuş Bakışı" YT. April 1934. no. 53. pp. 12-18.  
234 Editorial, "1917-1924-1934," YT, November 1934. no. 60. pp. 2-6.  
235 Mariya Çokay, p. 20-22.  
236 See A. Zeki Validî [Togan], 1929-1940 Seneleri arasında Türkistanın Vaziyeti. Türkistan-Bilik no. 4 
(İstanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1940), See p. 3 footnote 1: “I have used the term “Kazaçi” to separate Russian 
Kazaks from Türk Kazaks in my book “Bugünkü Türkistan.” Now Russians, for the sake of separating the 
two, introduced “Kazah” (Kazakh) and “Kazahıstan” (Kazakhstan) concepts for Türk Kazaks and we can also 
accept this made-up form.” 
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produced by these creatures, were succeeding in portraying Stalin as a fatherly figure in the 
hearts of Turkish tribes.237 
According to Zeki Velidî, on the 10-22nd of September 1922 in Tashkent, Kazak and 
Uzbek pan-Turkists met with the attendance of Tınışbayoğlu, Dostmuhammedoğlu of 
Kazaks and Münevver Karı and Talibcan of Uzbeks for the Seventh Secret All Turkestan 
Congress. They decided that the word Turkestan should mean all Turkestan ASSR, Alaş 
Orda, Bukhara, Khiva and Zakaspi and should be replaced with the term Greater Turkestan, 
and for the future, its territorial integrity should be kept at any cost.238 
In 1943, Zeki Velidî published his The Map of Turkili and Its Explanations. He said 
“we use Türkili instead of Türkistan”. The use of Persian – stan as if there was no Turkish 
word for that - is inconvenient especially at a time when the Turkish nationalism was on the 
rise. The Turkestan concept was also used to imply the Syrdarya basin for a long while and 
did not seem to be convenient to use the term to imply the whole Türkili from Volga-
Caspian line to the western end of Chinese wall… For the first time, a pan-Turkist Uzbek 
intellectual Aşurali Zahiri used the word Türkili for Turkestan in 1917; in the same year, 
the Azeri Emin Efendizade and his friends started to publish the Türkili newspaper in 
Tashkent. They said: “We are following their path, which we find right. However, we also 
use Maveraünnehr [for Zakaspi], Türkistan or Western Türkistan for the Tsarist general 
governorship and Kaşgarya for Eastern Turkestan.”239 
                                                
237 Validî [Togan], 1940, p. 15. 
238 Zeki Velidî Togan, Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine (İstanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970), p. 148-9.  
239 Zeki Velidî Togan, Türkili Haritası ve ona ait İzahlar (İstanbul: Türkili-Bilik, no 6., 1943), p. 1. See the 
1:4,200,000 map of Turkestan at the end of the pamphlet, prepared by Zeki Velidî and drawn by cartographer 
Behçet Begit.  
 184
Collectivization in Turkestan caused another wave of emigrants from Turkestan to 
Afghanistan.240 The settlement of Turkestani nomads, Kazak and Kyrgyz, ended up in 
another disaster.241 These administrative adjustments to Turkestan were carefully 
monitored by the Turkestani émigrés.242  
 
5.20 Basmacıs 
Although many émigré leaders hold the view that the Basmacı resistance was over 
by 1926,243 Çokayoğlu's optimism about the former comrades in arms, national communists 
in the high party ranks in Turkestan was a source of hope.244 The Russian paranoia about 
the fate of Basmacıs and Enver Pasha's movement was welcomed by the émigré and even 
taken as evidence to the existing resistance against the Soviets. In 1930 there were still 
articles appeared in the Russian press, creating conspiracy theories about the heirs of Enver 
                                                
240 One of the main reasons for the continuing Turkestani refuge flux to Afghanistan in the early 1930s was 
basically Bolshevik policy of land and production quotas for each farmer, which also helped many young 
people joining the remnants of Basmacı groups in the mountains. See "Türkistan'da Kozgalış harekâtı" 
(excerpts  from Russian Newspaper Dni, YT, February 1932, no. 27. pp. 26-30.  
241 The replacement of nomad Kazak and Kyrgyzes in Turkestan started from 1929, but continued quite 
slowly until 1933. For the émigrés no one was against this replacement but everyone was against its 
Bolshevik version. For them the interests of Russian mujik were observed more by the Soviets. The 
settlement policy was a disaster for the Turkestani nomad and semi-nomads. See Editorial, "Sovyet 
Hükimetinn Türkistan Göçebelerni Urnaştıru yani Dühkan halıga gitüri Siyaseti," YT, July 1934, no. 56. pp. 
2-6.  
242 Turkestani émigrés were following the progress of Razhmezhavanie quite carefully. They updated their 
leaders about the changes in the administrative structure of the Union. See "Sovetler İttifakınıñ İdari 
Bölünüşü," YT, June 1936, no. 79. pp. 7-40.  
243 Even the strongest nationalist Turkestanis, believed that Basmacı resistance was over by 1926. Quite 
without any real information about the organization and nature of Basmacıs, most of the émigré were praising 
the heroic struggle of Turkestani peasants against Bolsheviks but thinking that they were so much 
unorganized and weak for a guerrilla warfare. See Abdullahzade Tevekkül, "Basmacılık," YeT, March 1928, 
no. 8, p. 11.  
244 Çokayoğlu was very optimistic about the national Turkestani communists for the struggle against 
Bolsheviks inside the country and even declared them as the future cadres of independence struggle. Mustafa 
Çokayoğlu, "Rusların Muhaceret Siyaseti Hakkında," YeT, April 1928, no. 9, p. 10. Interestingly, in the same 
article Çokayoğlu used terms like Özbekistan and Kazakistan more extensively than the term Turkestan.  
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Pasha in Afghanistan organizing new Basmacı movements in cooperation with the Afghan 
state.245 
Most of the Basmacı prisoners and Turkestani Kulaks ended up in Siberian Gulag 
Solovsky from the beginning of the 1920s. Solovky became a very well organized forced 
labor camp sometime around 1927-29 when thousands of Turkestani prisoners lost their 
lives because of illnesses and hard conditions.246 
Most of the Basmacıs left their arms against Bolsheviks after the local treaties in the 
early 1920s were subject to political repression and eventually arrested by the authorities in 
the early 1930s.247 Yaş Türkistan was trying to explain that Basmacıs were not bandits at all 
but they have declared their aim as the establishment of a free-independent Turkestan and 
establishment of a Turk-Islam republic.248 Çokayoğlu was also declaring Enver Pasha as 
the Martyr of Turkestan and promised to re-bury him in the capital of a future independent 
Turkestan.249 Çokayoğlu viewed Basmacıs as being the fighters for Turkestani 
independence.250 
Small skirmishes between Red Army troops and remnants of some Basmacı groups 
on the Afghan border were interpreted as the active resistance continuing against the 
                                                
245 One of them quoted in Yaş Türkistan from Russian Posledniye Novosti of 3rd of October 1930; PN., 
"Türkistan ve Afganistan'daki İş," YT, October 1930, no. 11. pp. 21-23.  
246 Azarbaycanlı Ağaoğlu, "Sürgün Yiri Solofkiy'de Türkistan Mücahidleri," YT, January 1931, no. 14. pp. 18-
22 (taken from Yeni Türkistan, year 4, no. 30).  
247 Even in 1931 there were Basmacıs in Tashkent teahouses and in villages running propaganda against 
Russians and communists. Their arrests were quite often appeared in émigré publications. Mektûb, 
"Türkistannin bugünki feci ahvali," YT, July 1931, no. 20. pp. 34-36. 
248 In fact 8th article of the declaration of the 2nd Congress of Muslims of Turkestan, convened in 1922, 
openly declared that the fight was for the independence of all Turkestan. Its 12th article said an independent 
Turk-Islam Republic was the main goal. (Basmacıs) See "Bir Tarihi Vesika," YT, April 1932, no. 29. p. 6.  
249Mustafa Çokayoğlu, "Merhum Enver Paşa Hakkında Hatıra Parçaları," YT, August 1932, no. 33. p. 12.  
250 Although Çokayoğlu was sure that Basmacı was a popular-national uprising against the Soviet colonial 
policy in Turkestan, he was also in agreement with Safarov about Basmachestvo having connection with the 
Ferghana Valley dikhans' unhappiness with the Soviet land policy, which drastically diminished their profits. 
Editorial, "Basmacılık...," YT, February 1933, no. 39. pp. 4-5.  
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Bolshevik invasion.251 Out of the tens of thousands of Basmacıs that ended up in the Gulag 
Solovskiy, very few survived.252 As late as 1935, the Red army was continuing its "hot 
pursuit" of the remnants of Basmacı groups in southern Turkestan, Northern 
Afghanistan.253 
Basmacı leaders like Lakaylı never became subjects of show trials; they were 
mostly shot in jails without any trial.254 Turkmens of Cüneyd Khan and his former Basmacı 
comrades were in Herat until he died in 1937.255 For the émigrés, anything going wrong in 
Turkestan was a resistance movement against Soviet power.256 There was still a 
considerable effort to keep Basmacı legends alive.257 
Çokay’s sympathy for the Nazis was no different than other members of promethee 
and he was very suspicious about cooperation with the Nazis. However, his death in 1941, 
                                                
251 Émigré propaganda about the responses of the natives to Red terror were full of rebellion stories, most of 
which were not true at all, and some of them relied on the news in western sources which were quite 
conscious about the dicta regime in the Soviet Union. See Mustafa, "Yurt Vaziyati," YT, January 1935 no. 62. 
pp. 4-6. However there were real clashes between the soviet troops and some remnants of the Basmacı groups 
in the Afghan-Tajik border area, in which, Mujahedeen really received some support from the Dikhans of 
Turkestan. See quotation from Daily Express (19.12.1934), YT, January 1935. no. 62. p. 7.  
252 Most of the arrested Basmacıs shipped to Solovskiy, Ural and Novosibirsk gulags. Only in Solovskiy 
Gulag in total 30 thousand Turkestanis lost their lives. And many got lost in different exile destinations. See 
Biş Arıklık, "Esaret Hatıratımdan," YT, February 1935, no. 63. pp. 26-27.  
253 In a letter to YT from Afghanistan, it is understood that in 1935 Red army troops were continuing their 
pursuit of Basmacıs in Southern Turkestan. According to that letter, many Turkestanis were waiting for the 
war to break up, for a general rebellion. See "Afganistan'a sığınan bir yurtdaşın mektubu: Türkistan'da 
vaziyet," YT, October 1935, no. 71. pp. 42-45.  
254 İbrahim Beg Lakaylı has been captured by the Red soldiers in the middle of 1931. Everybody waited for 
another open trial to show all the enemies of the people and saboteurs, however this did not take pace at all. 
He was taken to a Tashkent Jail and probably shot without any show trial. Canay, "İbrahim Bey Lakaylı 
Kalay tutulgan idi?" YT, January 1936, no. 74. pp. 22.  
255 Cüneyd Khan dominated most of the territories of Khivan Khanate from 1916 until 1928 and fought 
against both Khivan Khan Esfendiyar, Tsarist Russians and Bolshevik red Army. The only reason he could 
not establish a government in Khiva in 1918 was the basic reason of Turkmen-Uzbek tribal competition, when 
Uzbeks allied with Red troops in 1919 and forced Turkmen Cüneyd Khan to retreat desert. Canay, "Herat'dan 
bizge Cüneyd hanıñ vefâtı haberini bildirdiler," YT, August-September 1937, no. 92-93. pp. 18-20.  
256 Passive resistance of the farmer-peasant population of Turkestan to Industrialization and all kinds of Soviet 
Great projects in the region has been taken as a resistance to Soviet Colonialism in the pages of YT. See 
Timuroğlı, "Kızıl Rusya İstismarcı Müstemleke Siyasetine Karşı Türkistan Dühkan Halkı Milli İradesi," YT, 
September 1937, no. 94. p. 19.  
257 "In a letter written in mid February from Turkestan to our journal it is said that; 'We have learned that a 
one-thousand strong Basmacı movement launched in the Karadağ region of our motherland. Among them, 
some 300 hundred are the former Red Army soldiers and the rest are the fugitive Turkestanis from the 
Dushanbe prison..." See "Türkistanda Basmacılık," Yaş Türkistan, April 1938, no. 101. p. 58.  
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because of a plague he caught during a visit to a German prison camp filled by the 
Turkestani soldiers of the Soviet Army, left the leadership position for the Turkestani 
émigrés empty for a long while.  
 
5.21 Turkestanis between Nazis and Soviets: Turkestan Legions 
During the First World War, German efforts to mobilize Turkestan against Britain 
was concentrated in the efforts of a diplomat, Otto von Hentig, who traveled across Turkey, 
Iran and Afghanistan, and planned to send German representatives to Tashkent, which was 
never realized.258 However, the pan-Turkist stand of the Union and Progress Party and 
especially the martyrdom of a respected ally, Enver Pasha in Turkestan during his fight to 
liberate Turkestan from the Bolshevik Russians, caused the concentration of academic 
attention to this region.  
In the 1930s the Nazi Party was not completely ignorant about Turkestan. There 
was at least one Turkestani working for the Foreign Relations Department of the Party’s 
APA (Aussenpolitisches Amt), Veli Kayyum. He was sent by the Bukharan Peoples 
Republic to Germany as a student in 1921-2,259 when he was only seventeen years old. He 
first studied agriculture and then studied political science in Hochschule für Politik. From 
the mid 1930s on he was preparing reports, mainly on agriculture, for the Party’s APA. He 
usually didn’t have much contacts with Prométhée Turkestan émigrés simply because he 
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was much younger and they were not many in Germany.260 Most of the Prométhée 
supporters were on the side of Poland and the Western Allies before the War. There were 
even German reports blaming the former President of Bukharan People’s Republic, Osman 
Hoca, fleeing from Warsaw by a British Plane in 1939 and serving Britain as an orientalist 
in Iran.261 
One dilemma that the Nazis faced in integrating Turkestanis into their war machine 
was that, Turkestanis were members of Untermensch (Lower race-men) Asiatic stock were 
the enemies of the Arian race according to the dominant ideological propaganda.  In the 
first phases of the war against the Soviet Union, many of the Turkestani and Tatar POWs 
couldn’t escape death simply because Nazi commanders thought they were Jews by just 
looking at their circumstation.262 This, of course, decreased the rate of Turkestanis being 
volunteers for the legions dramatically. Although some precautions were taken by the 
Nazis, the racist attacks against Turkestanis continued till the end of the War, because of 
their Asiatic appearance. A letter of Kayyum asking the release of one of his friend, Mansur 
Atabekov, from Auschwitz is an evidence of this situation. Atabekov was probably one of 
the victims killed in 1943 by an order of Himmler for the creation of a skeleton 
collection.263 Racist German hatred against Turkestanis was so evident in many cases, even 
the former President of the Turkestan Autonomy, Mustafa Çokayoğlu was beaten badly 
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once in a Berlin street, by an SS member agitated by a propaganda film about thee Asiatic 
lower race.264 
Between 1941-1945 Turkestanis in the legions published many pamphlets and 
periodicals like Yengi Türkistan, Milli Türkistan and Milli Edebiyat.265 Both Yengi 
Türkistan and Milli Türkistan were using the common Turkestani (Turkestanish) dialect, 
which was a heritage of Çokay from 1929 on.266  
The Nazis considered “Soviet Eastern Nationalities” as one single concept; while 
they were eager to separate Slavic and Baltic Soviet nationalities by their own terms. In the 
Ostministerium and SS Centers, they had a Turan-Caucasus department (Lietselle Turan-
Kaukasus) to deal with all these “nationalities”. However there existed separate 
departments for Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians.267 
By November 1941, there were at least more than two million Soviet POWs in 
German hands. One of the first two battalions created was the 450th Turkish battalion, 
probably and practically at the beginning of 1942. It had a special statute until the end of 
1943. When the resistance of the German Army to legions was broken in November 1941, 
Rosenberg advised Hitler the creation of “Turkish” legions and after Hitler’s acceptance in 
22 December 1941 OKW ordered officially the creation of Turkestani, Armenian, Georgian 
and Muslim Caucasian legions.268 
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It was Von Papen who organized the visits of two Turkish Generals Hüsnü Emir 
Erkilet and Ali Fuat Erden269 to the war fronts (in Crimea) and Nuri Pasha (Enver Pasha’s 
brother) to Berlin at the beginning of war.270 That was when they met with Gerhard Von 
Mende and first talked about the establishment of Turkestan legions. Most of the 
independent departments as well as ministry tables created for dealing with Soviet eastern 
nationalities, but mainly Turkestanis were under the supervision of Professor Gerhard Von 
Mende. Actually the first of such departments was established for Turkestanis, much earlier 
before for Volga Tatars and Caucasians. Mende’s departments operated in an increasing 
rate till the April of 1945, even after the bombing of Ostministrium and many other official 
buildings in Berlin.271 
  Germans were quite comfortable with the activities of Turkestanis because of the 
this region had the least importance in the after-war plans of the German expansion. 
However places like Crimea and Caucasus were within the German post-war colonial plans 
and their representatives were facing important limitations in their activities.272 Millî 
Türkistan Birlik Komitesi (National Turkestanian Unity Committee) was active since the 
spring of 1942.273 Bukharan President Osman Hoca was an anti-Nazi. So, German Eastern 
Ministry got into contact with Mustafa Çokayoğlu, despite the efforts of an employee of the 
German Foreign ministry Tatar Alimcan İdrisoğlu to stop that. According to him 
Çokayoğlu was half Russian by blood and cooperated with the Jewish Marxist democrats 
during the revolutionary era.274 But through the invitations sent by Veli Kayyum and then 
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quite unpleasantly Çokayoğlu came to Germany in the fall of 1941 and chose Veli Kayyum 
as his translator. However, he died in the Christmas of 1941 and Kayyum became the only 
person to organize Turkestanis in the concentration camps for the Germans.275 
The first thing Kayyum did was to take the “Han” (Khan) title and renamed himself 
Veli Kayyum Han. He was given an official residence, a car and German diplomatic 
passport then. In August 1942 he published the first issue of Millî Türkistan. The 
Committee was in the structure of an exiled government of Turkestan with 21 members in 
its cabinet. In addition to a budget received from the Germans, the Committee collected a 
sum of money from the Turkestani members of the legions, which made it quite free from 
German financial aid. Millî Türkistan was printed initially at 15,000 and then its tirage 
became 80,000. Its last issue under the Nazi banner was published in April 1945.276 
However, in a short while serious ethnic discrimination and problems appeared 
within the committee. Kyrgyz and Kazaks protested Kayyum Han’s policy of making the 
committee an Uzbek dominated organization. Finally, they applied Rosenberg for the 
creation of their own committee; but Germans refused this. Support of Kazaks and Kyrgyz 
came from a Tatar leader Dr. Ahmet Temir, who planned a common Tatar-Kirgiz and 
Kazak committee and refused Kayyum’s leadership. However, they lost again; and Dr. 
Temir went back to Turkey in deep disappointment.277 
In October 1943, Baymirza Hayıt officially became the deputy of Kayyum Han, but 
there was still an opposition. The decision by the SS, to create its own Turkestani legions 
and choosing Capitan Andreas Mayer-Mader as the commander of this legion, was 
protested by Kayyum. Mayer-Mader was a pan-Turkist and was planning to organize 
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guerilla warfare in Turkestan just as was done by Lawrance in Arabia. Kayyum thought 
that he would be able to steal the loyalty of legionnaires from him. In the winter of 1944 an 
Azeri Aslan Abdullayev and a Kyrgyz Sülaymanov were organizing the opposition against 
Kayyum among the legions and distributed brochures signed by Turkestan National 
Government. Planning a coup, they sent a legionnaire to kill Kayyum in March 1944, but 
Kayyum was in Paris then. Kayyum’s aide Gulam Alimov suppressed the rebel and six 
Turkestanis including Abdullayev and Sülaymanov were hanged. Mayer-Mader was also 
executed.278  
By the summer of 1944, Kayyum’s prestige was seriously damaged among the 
Turkestanis. He organized a congress to rehabilitate the committee’s prestige but didn’t 
accept opposition to take part in this congress. He even stopped Gulam Alimov speaking to 
the Congress, who suppressed the rebels. The First Turkestan National Congress met in 
Vienna between the 8 and 10th of July 1944. The height of the organization was the arrival 
of the Führer’s telegram announcing the promotion of a medal to Kayyum. However the 
competition between Turkestanis was going on, especially the Leitstelle in SS central 
administration becoming more and more concentrated with the Kazak and Kyrgyz 
opposition to Kayyum. SS starting to promote Pan-Turkism openly towards the end of 1944 
alarmed the anti-Pan-Turkist Kayyum. He appointed one of the harsh opponents to himself, 
Haris Kanatbay to the General Secretary post of the Committee. But from the other side, 
Kayyum continued to attack the opposition even in February 1945. Kayyum blamed a 
Turkmen, Kurban, who was openly criticizing Uzbek tribalism in the committee, by trying 
to establish contacts with western allies. SS did not take it seriously. Finally, SS’s president 
for the “Turan-Caucasia” Leitstelle Reiner Olzscha planned the firing of Kayyum. Being 
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good at intrigues and having an oriental ability to be seen as sympathetic, Kayyum stayed 
at his position. Towards the end of the war, in 24 March 1945, Kayyum achieved the thing 
he was trying to for the last five years. Rosenberg, while considering all other committees 
as national representations, recognized National Turkestan Unity Committee as the 
Temporary Turkestan National Government and the legion as the National Turkestan 
Army.279 
Kayyum always thought that he was continuing the legacy of the former nationalists 
of Turkestan, and their struggle was mainly against the colonialists of the West.280 SS 
established a “Turkestan Study Group” in January 1944. Most of the opposition against 
Kayyum was in this group. They were working under the Berger’s SS Central 
Administration with the leadership of SS Obersturmführer (SS rank for Captain) Dr. Reiner 
Olzscha. In November 1944, this group established a Molla Mekteb (Religious School) in 
Dresden, just like the one of the Wehrmacht in Göttingen. The main objective of the school 
was to eliminate Sunni-Shia problems among the Muslims.281 Most of the German 
officialdom was against the idea of pan-Turkism, but the development of the war 
eliminated this. Although the interpretations of professors Spuler and Jäschke pointed out 
that Pan-Turkism was only alive in Azerbaycan with little power, this had not stopped 
Olzscha in continuing on with the Pan-Turkist project.282 
The SS began to publish a journal called “Türk Birliği” (Turkish Unity) from the 
end of 1944 on, for the “Eastern Turkish Armed Force” (Doğu Türk Silahlı Gücü). Despite 
all the opposition of the Kayyum, it was in Latin and just like İsmail Bey Gaspıralı’s 
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Tercüman, in a common Turkish dialect.283 This wing inserted a common Turk identity 
among the legions, overriding Kayyum’s prestige by putting him as the representative of a 
limited part of the Turkish world.284 The primary aim of the journal was to eliminate 
“Tatar, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazak” identities, and unite all Turks under the banner of 
Turkness.285 Türk Birliği represented the ideological breaking point among the members of 
the legions, by leaving Uzbek dominated Turkestanism to Kayyum group and moving 
further to Turkism and pan-Turkism.286 However, Türk Birliği had also claimed the 
heritage of Mustafa Çokayoğlu.287 
Wehrmacht was uncomfortable with the legions, finding them unreliable elements. 
After some negotiations with Wehrmacht in November 1943, 450, Türk battalion of 
Andreas Mayer-Mader was transferred to Waffen-SS. Mayer-Mader, unable to persuade 
Wehrmacht to his plans for para-droping to Turkestan and launching a guerilla warfare, 
volunteered to transfer his troops under the command of the SS. He was a general of 
Chiang Kay Shek in China before the war; but after the Japanese attack, he found himself 
fighting on the side of aggressors. He used to speak all Turkic dialects and had a desire to 
convert into Islam. This made him a good candidate for the SS to command the Turkish 
legion.288 
In January 1944, he was in the Waffen-SS and his battalion was raised to a 
regiment. Many Kazak and Kyrgyz opposition to Kayyum concentrated in this regiment. 
His demise is still unclear. There are some documents about his being killed in combat; but 
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in the opinion of the people of his time, he was most probably executed by the SS. 289 After 
him, a comrade-in-arms of late Enver Pasha, Kernel (SS-Standartenführer) Harun el Reşid 
Bey became the commander of the Waffen-SS legion. His real name was Wilhelm 
Hintersatz and he was a prominent German Pan-Turkist figure of the time.290  
The pan-Turkist Eastern Türk Armed Force had four regiments of Turkestani, 
Azeri, Crimean and Volga Tatars.291 Gulam Alimov being the commander of the Turkestan 
regiment, Kayyum finally was forced to accept this situation.292 With its nationalist, anti-
Russian and Islamic motives, the Waffen-SS became very attractive for the members of 
Wehrmacht legions. Also the opportunity to serve as an officer in the SS caused many 
Turkestanis escape from Wehrmacht and join into the ranks of the Waffen-SS.293 
Gulam Alimov joined Slovak resistance on 25th of December 1944 after executing 
some of the German officers, together with nearly 300 of his men. Alimov was a religious 
man; Germans gave him many medals; but, because they were cross shape, he always 
refused to wear them.294 Uzbek circles around Kayyum and Alimov were uncomfortable 
with the supports of SS Central Administration and Olzscha for Kyrgyz and Kazaks who 
were isolated by the committee. That caused a new alliance between Kayyum and von 
Mende, alienating Olzscha.295 The creation of “Kommitet Osvobozhdeniya Narodov Rosii” 
(KNOR-The Liberation Committee for the peoples of Russia) in November 1944 and 
“Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Armiya” (ROA-Russian Liberation Army) in January 1945 
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caused a significant unrest among Turkestanis. Kayyum resisted sending any 
representatives to this committee. He even said that this was the main for Gulam Alimov’s 
joining the Slovak’s resistance. Only five Turkestanis under Haris Kanatbay joined KONR 
and Kayyum succeeded in keeping Turkestanis concrete and united against Russians. 296 
Although the SS propaganda, with Kayyum’s efforts directed towards the 
elimination of all kinds of tribal differences among the Turkestanis, the secret and closed-
circle Nazi documentation was classifying the Turkestanis, just like the Soviets, as Uzbeks, 
Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Turkmen and Tajiks.297 Kayyum was aware of this and became more 
careful in the equal representation of each tribal group, especially in the propaganda 
machine of the Turkestan legion, without sacrificing leadership role for the Uzbeks.298   
In the beginning of the war, according to the decisions of Ostministrium, pan-
Turkism propaganda was not allowed; but they desired to create a unified feeling among 
the members of the five “tribes” of Turkestan.299 Turkestan was not a direct target for 
German sabotage and underground activities because of geographical distance. However, 
we know that there was at least one paratroop operation300 realized (like Karl in Kazan or 
Tamara operations).301 
A group of twelve Turkestanis, trained by German counter-intelligence,  infiltrated 
into Turkestan in May 1943 with fake documents. Until December 1944, they were the 
main source of German intelligence from the region. They were divided into five 
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underground operational groups in: Tashkent, Stalinabad, Alma-Ata, Calalabad and 
Guryev. Their operations were covered by Mir Kasım, who was a Turkestani General in 
Belo-Russia. In December 1944, they ended their operation and went underground, or 
became integrated within the ranks of Red Army.302 In the aftermath of the war, Turkestani 
soldiers escaped from being sent to Soviet authorities and mostly concentrated in KZAB 
(Koordinationszentrum des antibolschewistischen Kampfes) and Paris Block. Veli Kayyum 
was found innocent in the Nurenberg trials and released. Re-organizing Turkestanis left in 
Europe, he started to publish Milli Türkistan again in 1950, which continued till 1975. 
However in 1951, first separation was lead by Haris (Keres) Kanatbay, a non-Uzbek who 
started to publish the journal Türkeli until 1955.303 From 1951 to 1953, the Voice of 
America and from March 1953 on Radio “Liberation” (then became Liberty) had become 
their “émigré” centers. This radio had initially a Turkestani department with two sections, 
reflecting the continuation of all the problems experienced in the Committee during the 
war.304  
 
5.22 Summary 
The nationalist-Turkestanist intelligentsia and political leaders of Turkestan 
evacuated their country between 1918-1923, while national statehood achieved by 
Turkestan Autonomy, Alaş Orda, Bukharan People’s Republic and Khorezmian People’s 
Republic, one after another fell into the Bolshevik control. Evacuation was in all directions 
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- to Europe, to Turkey, to Afghanistan, to India and to Arab countries. In fact to anywhere 
they could reach and find safety from the Bolsheviks. In these locations, they were 
organized under associations and began to publish journals, first to keep émigrés intact and 
close to each other, in order to keep Turkestanist ideals alive; but more importantly to 
explain to  the international public that their countries had been invaded by the Bolsheviks.  
Yeni Türkistan until 1932 and Yaş Türkistan until the Second World War were both 
the major Turkistani émigré journals. Mustafa Çokayoğlu emerged as the only and 
recognized leader of Turkistani émigré in exile. He was also accepted as the leader of a 
government in exile, Turkestan Autonomy.   
Their information channels to the motherland were almost non-existent by the 
1930s, and they were able to follow developments within the Soviet Central Asia only 
through Soviet sources. Every bit of news was subject to interpretations and a special 
treatment of infiltration to clean it from the Bolshevik propaganda but to find out what was 
really going on in the motherland. It was also in the 1930s Çokay and other émigré leaders 
launched their policy of presenting Turkestan as one of the world’s oppressed colonies. 
This policy was followed by the émigrés of the post-war period. 
Among the “real” Turkestani émigrés, the term Turkestan was not to be challenged 
at all. However “outsiders,” like Zeki Velidî, broke the consensus by proposing a new term 
Türkili for Turkestan. From the early 1930s on, an important disintegration among the 
émigrés emerged. Zeki Velidî lead a rather pan-Turkist “Kipchak wing” whereas 
Çokayoğlu, Osman Hoca and other prominent leaders kept their Turkestanist positions 
intact. This secession from the mainstream Turkestanist position became clearer during the 
War, especially within the Turkestan legions, when the accused “Sart”-Uzbek clique 
became dominant over the émigrés after the death of Mustafa Çokayoğlu.  
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The story of Turkestan Legions is rather the story of the rise of Veli Kayyum “Han” 
as the strongest leader that the Turkestani émigré had ever seen. Numbers of the armed 
legion members, once reached two hundred thousands, based in Slovakia, Poland, 
Belorussia and some in Ukraine. However, they never played an important role in any 
decisive battle. They were established late and were dissolved in accordance with the Yalta 
decisions. Most of them were forcefully sent back to the Soviet Union and were executed 
there after “the trials”. However, several thousands had succeeded in fleeing and continued 
the Çokayoğlu’s heritage of émigré Turkestanism in the post-war period.  
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CHAPTER 6 
NATIONALISM, TRIBALISM AND TURKESTANISM: 
A STORY OF POST-WAR TURKESTAN 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The ending of the Second World War had influenced two groups of Turkestanis; 
those who were living in Turkestan and those who were already in exile. The post-war 
history of Turkestan is marked by the nativization of cadres within the national republics of 
the Soviet Central Asia. This trend followed a rather clanic-tribalist pattern in each Central 
Asian republic, causing the development of a number of “ruler” clans and a new “ruling 
elite”. On the émigré front, Uzbek-Kazak controversies surfaced in the 1950s, when a 
Turkestanist and a pan-Turkist polarization accrued among the émigré.  
 
6.2 Global Picture: “Razmezhevanie” 
 The natives of Turkestan have gained their “nationhood” through razmezhevanie (as 
called) or national territorial demarcation. This was started in 1924. It was a process not 
only planned and directed by the center but with a rather active participation of the national 
communist elite of Turkestan itself.  
However, the appearance of the “Islamist” and “Turkestanist” Basmacı movement 
until the mid 1930s was certainly a sign of resistance to the new order in Turkestan.  In any 
case, Turkestanis, were for the most part proud and quite loyal subjects of the USSR just 
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after the Second World War.  The Second World War was an important turning point in the 
history of region, during which millions of Turkestanis lost their lives on both sides of the 
front. In every village of Turkestan, one can still see the memorial stones erected to the 
memories of the so-called Great Patriotic War (i.e. the Second World War) upon which 
several dozens of names of the martyrs of the villages are carved. Probably, since the 
“Golden Ages” of Turkestan, that was the reign of Timur, it was the first time that 
Turkestanis were somehow united against a common enemy and lost too many lives in 
order to protect their “common home,” the Soviet Union. 
 One of the most frequent claims of the post-war Sovietology was the artificiality of 
the borders drawn by the razmezhevanie. The Turkestani émigré literature of the Cold War 
period simply supported the idea of “one and indivisible Turkestan”. Many Western 
analysts also pointed out the artificiality of the borders as well as the potential of inter 
ethnic conflicts in the region; not only conflicts between natives and Slavs but also among 
the natives as such.  
The “politically correct” approaches in the Western academia were changed towards 
the new Soviet classifications of the peoples of Turkestan. Soon after, the re-naming of the 
regional politico-geographic terms in accordance with the new Soviet versions was begun.   
 
6.3 Tribal or Regional Groups and Political Fractionalism 
As Olivier Roy pointed out, the post-war political history of Turkestan was much 
identified with the struggle of regionalist/tribal fractions within the state apparatus of the 
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Central Asian republics.305 Following the deaths of Bukharan Feyzullah Hocayev, 
Tashkendi Akmal Ikramov and Margilani Yoldaş Ahunbabayev, at the end of 1930s, a 
Fergana fraction with non-Cedid roots took over the power in Uzbekistan. This fraction of 
Osman Yusupov (1937-50) and Amin Niyazov (1950-55), which ruled Uzbekistan for more 
than fifteen years, carried out an important task for Uzbekization306 as compared to the 
preceding Bukhara and Samarkand groups, which were rather Tajik oriented. The reign of 
N.A. Muhiddinov (1955-57), a Tashkendi, was considered to be a continuation of this 
“Uzbek” fraction. His successor Sabir Kamalov (1957-59) was also a Tashkendi. He 
followed strictly the traditional Ferghana-Tashkent alliance. In 1959, when Şeref Reşidov 
became the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR, a Jizak (Samarkand) 
clan started its long-lasting reign in the country. For a decade, Reşidov was unable to 
replace the members of the Fergana-Tashkent clan in the high bureaucratic and political 
structure. From the very beginning, Russian masters kept themselves outside the political 
and bureaucratic struggle in Uzbekistan.307 The transfer of the three major border districts 
to Uzbekistan as a “gift” on the part of Kazakstan was the source of important propaganda 
for the Reşidov group in Tashkent.308 
However, Reşidov’s internal popularity within his republic could not stop the heavy 
attacks in the Soviet press for the slow progress in learning the Russian-language in 
Uzbekistan.309 The insistence of the Uzbek party bureaucrat R. Nişanov that Russian was 
                                                
305 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (London: I.B. Turis, 2000), pp. 109-124. See 
this part for further details on the political struggles between regional and tribal struggles between the 
fractions in Central Asian republics.  
306 Ibid, p. 110.  
307 C. Royster, "From Tashkent," Wall Street Journal (6 August 1962), p. 4.  
308 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (15 January 1963). These regions included the famous cotton-growing regions of 
Kirov and Pakhta-Aral. This fact was criticized in the Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (16 January 1963).  
309 See RL Research note No. 1527 (June 6, 1963). These criticisms on Reşidov appeared in especially 1962 
issues of Uchitelskaya Gazeta of 17, 20 and 22 November and DIB (19 December 1962).  
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the second native language of Uzbeks was also questioned.310 The alleged ghost of a 
Cedidist and nationalist fractions operating in the ranks of Uzbek Communist Party was 
also a popular story brought in by the press both in the West and in the Soviet Union.311 
There were even some Western authors like Kolarz, who  imagined the existence of a 
united Kazak and Uzbek nationalist front which tried to overthrow their Russian oppressors 
for the sake of establishing a free independent Turkestan modeling, free Persia, Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.312  
Prominent Uzbek authors of the time wrote that, although the Tsarist government 
had ignored the national and religious rights of the natives of Turkestan, it was significantly 
“progressive in nature”.313 However, there must had been something within the Uzbek 
society that prevented Russification. The Uzbek traditional neighborhood, mahalla, for 
sure, was a great obstacle to the communal way of life as well as Russification.314 In public 
speeches, Reşidov complained about the ongoing traditionalism in Uzbek society during 
the first years of his rule, which he saw as a kind of nationalism separating the brotherly 
nations of the union.315 Indeed, Uzbek nationalism manifested itself in its discrimination 
                                                
310 RLR Notes, No. 1625 (October 28 1963). "The Russian Language in Uzbekistan" Quoted Nişanov’s speech 
published in Pravda of October 22 of same year.  
311 RL Research note, no. 1556 (July 22 1963). "The lost of shortcomings in the uzbek ideological front" see 
also Pravda of 17 July 1963 on Uzbek TsK on nationalism.  
312 Walter Kolarz, Communism and Colonialism (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 12-20.  
313 D. Adildiyev, "150 god put," Komsomolets Uzbekistana (26 March 1964), p. 6. Quoting Fitrat,was very 
popular that time who accordingly wrote that "If the Russian people suggest that we learn their language and 
literature, they mean us no harm. On the contrary, they wish our country to thrive, and our people to prosper." 
314 Reşidov in 1964 was attacking the Uzbek mahalla, old housing with big backyards and high walls keeping 
privacy, as being feudal and reactionary to the communist styles. See London Times (25 September 1964) for 
"Passive Acquiescene in Russianization". 
315 See James Critchlow, "More on Central Asian Nationalsm," Radio Liberty Research paper No. 2169 
(January 25 1966). See especially large quotations from Reşidov’s writings and speeches published in 
Kommunist.  
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towards Crimean Tatars and Ahıska Turks [Meskhetians], latecomers after Stalin’s 
deportation of them to Central Asia, from the 1960s on.316 
Only after the 1969 Pahtakar events, Reşidov found the solution to eliminate the 
Fergana-Tashkent clan, accusing this “Uzbek” clan of showing tolerance towards 
nationalists. These disturbances at the same time provided him the bases for the dismissal 
of the head of state Yadgar Nasruddinova and the Premier, Bukharan, Rahmankul 
Kurbanov, who was sentenced to six years in prison.  
 
6.3.1 The Pahtakar Events: Nationalism or Hooliganism? 
The Pahtakar events were one of the darkest and unexplored parts of Soviet 
Turkestan’s history. Apart from the bits and pieces of information in the Soviet and 
Western media about these events, the most detailed and probably the accurate information 
about them has been acquired from the notes of the Uzbek republican deputy Prosecutor, 
Boris Kamenetsky, who fled to Israel after his dismissal in the mid-1970s.317 On 2 June 
1969, in the Pahtakar Stadium (Tashkent), the popular local soccer team Pahtakar was 
playing against Dynamo Moscow. There were over a hundred thousand Uzbek football 
spectators in the stadium which was designed for sixty thousand. In the middle of the game, 
posters appeared with slogans "samarskie, ubirayets von!" (Samarskiye [Russians] go 
home!). Russian spectators tore down the posters and a huge fight broke out causing the 
game to be stopped. The entire Tashkent militia of fifteen thousand strong men and the 
MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], who were mostly Slavs, forces were deployed. The 
order was restored within two hours and the game resumed. However, the disorder was not 
                                                
316 James Critchow, "Nationalism in Uzbekstan in the Brezhnev era," pp. 306-15.  
317 Boris Kamenetskiy (b. In 1922, was the Uzbek Republican deputy prosecutor from 1966 to 1973), "Crime 
and Corruption in Uzbekistan," RFE-RL Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research (26 October, 1979).  
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over. As the game ended, the Uzbeks attacked the Russians. The Uzbek crowd went into 
Navai Street; stopped the traffic; took Slavs out of the busses and tramway cars; and killed 
at least ten of them.  People shouted slogans: “Go back to your Russia, we did not ask you 
to come here!” ("My vas ne zvali syuda!"). Following the events, more than one thousand 
“hooligans” [Bazarilar in Uzbek] were arrested. Reşidov called it petty hooliganism and 
group hooliganism. The events very caused great fear among the Tashkent Russians who 
wrote several thousands of letters to Moscow, complaining about the tolerance of the 
Uzbek authorities toward this fascistic event that took place. This time the Uzbek 
authorities were quite successful in closing the case by giving half a dozen prison terms to 
the “hooligans”.  
As the complaints from the Tashkent Russians continued, cases were re-opened 
after a year. Now, some of the cases were politically upgraded to “malicious hooliganism 
inciting national antipathy and hatred”. According to Kamenetsky who worked with 
Nasruddinova for several years, she hated everybody other than Uzbeks. She was a member 
of the bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR. She was 
also the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a ceremonial presidential post. 
Kamenetsky reported that she fired all Jews from the high offices and replaced them with 
Uzbeks. As the head of state of Uzbekistan she had the power to pardon, and she exploited 
this power by accepting huge amounts in bribes and pardoning Uzbek criminals.318  
Only a few days after the Pahtakar events, a huge public trial for ten Crimean Tatar 
political activists was scheduled in Tashkent. Kurban Ruzetov was a judge famous for his 
                                                
318 Ibid., the same report.  
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show trials of Crimean Tatars. He was quick to accuse the Crimean Tatars of being behind 
the events, whom he alleged agitated the crowds to postpone their own political trials.319 
The whole Pahtakar events need much further investigation to find out exactly what 
had happened and also what the exact motives of the Uzbeks were in attacking Russians in 
the streets of Tashkent. While, the “hunt for samaritsy” lasted for two days, on the 2nd and 
3rd of June 1969, and left more than ten Russian civilians dead, surely, Pahtakar was not 
considered a national uprising. It had strong nationalistic and anti-Russian motives. The 
“tolerance” of the republican authorities would rather be interpreted as their hurried attempt 
to close the cases without causing much trouble for themselves at the center.      
In his remark on Uzbek nationalism and Turkestan, Kamenetsky, a contemporary 
observer, said::  
Every Uzbek dreams of independence and ask when is Russian going back to his 
Samara?.. The focus of Uzbek nationalism is Uzbekistan, and not any supranational 
entity such as Turkestan or Central Asia, nor yet any sub national tribal or local 
affinity.320 
 
Although Kamenetsky was not aware of the inter-Uzbek clan relations in depth, his 
evaluations as a close witness to the events are valuable. The political power in Uzbekistan 
remained in the hands of this “nationalistic” Samarkand clan until the death of Brezhnev 
and the establishment of Andoropov’s power. 
                                                
319 See David Nissman, "Hooliganism in Uzbekistan," RL Research CRD 270/69 (6 August, 1969). For 
Pahtakar events of 2-3 June 1969, see also Peking Review (4 July 1969), Report by Hung Chuan-yu, "The 
new Tsars," Hanry S. Bradsher, "Violent clashes in Tashkent reported troubling Russians," Washington 
Evening Star (24 July 1969). "Bezorilar jazolandi," Sovet Ozbekistoni (10 June 1969).  
320 Boris Kamenetskiy, "Notes on life in Uzbekistan," (RFE-RL Soviet area audience and opinion reserach, 26 
October 1979).  
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6.3.2 Tolerance in Nationalist Literature 
In the 1970s, there appeared a group of Uzbek authors, who used extensive 
Chaghatayisms in their literary works.321 From early the 1960s on, historical films about 
Timur, Navai, Mahdumquli, Manas, Babur, and other Turkestani historical heroes were 
financed by the republican Communist Parties. Equally important, the translation of 
historical texts and the idealization of some selected figures of the Turkestani history were 
carried out despite harsh criticism by the Moscow press.  
Mirasism [“Heritagism”] was rather an elite Soviet-Turkestani movement aimed at 
rehabilitating the native historical heroes in the post-Stalin era.322 In some cases, the 
representatives of this movement, although being part of the Soviet establishment and 
living within the Soviet Union, were quite successful in providing important pieces that 
somehow demonstrated their sympathies towards Turkestanism and the Turkestani identity. 
The first open idealization of the term "Turkestan" in the post-war Soviet literature was 
seen in an article written by a renowned Kazak poet and novelist, Dukanbay Doscanov, in 
1963. 
History's family tree, Turkistan, with your whirlwind, you sign in distance, with 
your whirlwind, emerge our ancestors, who fought their enemies in the agony of 
death.323 
 
  A similar example was Çingiz Aytmatov's article in Izvestiia, in 1974, in which he 
defined the Soviet Central Asia as Turkestan, his native-homeland.324 The appearance of 
                                                
321 For examples and the arguments in the Uzbek press of the time see John Soper, "Uzbek Writers look to the 
past for inspiration," RFE/RL reserach RL 129/79 (April 24 1979).  
322 See the issue of Dergi in 1965, No. 41,  on the details of literary reflections of Uzbek, Kazak, Kyrgyz, 
Tajik and Turkmen nationalisms.  
323 See Dukanbay Doscanov, "Turkistan Elesteri," Juldız, no. 11 (1963), p. 38 Although this could be 
considered as a rare and exceptional example of Turkestanist approach and heritage in Soviet-Turkestani 
literature in 1960s,  its concrete and clear statement that it has been the fatherland of (at least Kazaks) is worth 
to note.  
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the article coincided with a period when almost in every Central Asian state, historical 
heroes, such as Timur (Tamerlane) and Uluğ Beg in Uzbekistan, were rehabilitated in 
official documents too.325 In the meantime, the idea of the historical and traditional 
distinctiveness of Turkestan was being recognized in the Western press.326 However the 
Cold War period Soviet historiography launched its own propaganda campaign for 
historical and modern separation of Central Asia and Kazakstan, in which the original 
population of the former was an Iranian-Persian stock and the latter was of a highlander 
nomadic stock.327 Some of this propaganda was digested by some Turkestani intellectuals 
and brought new phenomena - the fusion of local identities with an Islamic consciousness.  
Soviet national policies in Central Asia implanted the idea of separate national 
cultures and identities. This in turn led to the fusion of Islamic sentiment with 
national consciousness.328 
 
At the height of Reşidov’s power in 1978, the renowned Uzbek author, Pirimqul 
Kadirov published his Turkestanist and nationalist novel, Yulduzlu Tunlar [Stary Nights].  
... the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazak, Kyrgyz don’t you know that all these are Turkic 
people? Like the children of one father, our land is one, our religion is one, our 
history is one... now our hearts must also be one...my dear sir Qopaqbiy, just 
understand the meaning of the word Turkistan. Turkistan means the country of 
Turks.329 
 
 The theme of common Turkic and Muslim roots of the peoples of Turkestan was 
brought up openly by Kadirov, whereas he also highlighted the meaning of the concept as 
                                                                                                                                                  
324 Chingiz Aytmatov, "Turkestan," Izvestiia (October 31, 1974). "Turkestan... Oh! My native land, part of my 
great-Soviet country!" This piece is more important than the previous one simply because this was published 
in one of the primary Russian language daily, Izvestiia, not like Juldız, a rather local literary journal.  
325 See Hedrick Smith, "Temarlane Still Haunts Moscow's Rulers," IHT (3 June 1974), for the details of 
Soviet and Western reactions to the rehabilitation of historical heroes in Turkestan.  
326 David Satter, "The Sickle and the Crescent," The Financial Times (December 1, 1976). Many in the 
Western public was for a long time ignorant to the distinct identity of Turkestan and considered the region as 
a former Tsarist and then Soviet region with predominant Russian existence.  
327 Davendra Kaushik, Central Asia in Modern Times (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970).  
328 Diloram Ibrahim, The Islamization of Central Asia: A Case Study of Uzbekistan (NY: The Islamic 
Foundation, 1993), pp. 21-22.  
329 Pirimqul Qadirov. (b. In 1928 a well known Uzbek author), "Yulduzli Tunlar," Sharq Yulduzi, no. 5 
(1978), p. 34.   
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being the “country of Turks”. That was very important simply because, that showed the 
continuing Turkestanism, although in some rare instances, among the Central Asian 
intelligentsia. This novel was written more than half a century after the razmezhevanie and 
could be seen as a good piece of Turkestan consciousness of an Uzbek intellectual with 
unusually strong emphasis on the unity of the peoples of Turkestan.   
 
6.3.3 Political Tribalism Revisited 
Only after the death of Brezhnev in 1983 was Reşidov replaced by an Andropov 
figure, Inamcan Osmanhocayev, a representative of the Fergana-Tashkent faction.330 Refik 
Nişanov replaced Osmanhocayev in 1988, again a fierce supporter of the Tashkent-Fergana 
faction. Soon, in mid-1989 though, Islam Kerimov, who was from the rival Samarkand 
faction, replaced him.  
 In Kazakstan, the last remnants of the Alaş Orda’s Cedid cadres - including non-
Cedids like Turar Rıskulov -  were eliminated by the end of 1930s. During the course of the 
war, the first secretary of the Kazak Communist Party was a Russian, N. Skortsev (1939-
46). Following the War, a member of the Kazak Southern Greater Horde331 (Ulu Cüz) 
became the First Secretary for eight years. The next first secretary of the Kazak party, 
Cumabay Şayakmedov (1946-1954) was the representative of probably the first non-Cedid 
and non Alaş-Orda raised political cadres in the Soviet Kazakstan. He was also the one 
who not only established but also formalized the traditional Greater Horde domination in 
the political cadres of the Kazak Communist Party. His two successors, Brezhnev (1954-
                                                
330 For a detailed sketch of Rashidovchina, see Demian Vaisman, “Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the 
Political Life of Uzbekistané,” in Yaacov Ro’I, (ed.) Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (London: Frank 
Cass, 1995), pp. 105-121. See also Kamil Ikramov, “I probil chas”, in Rashidov i rashidovshchina, Sbornik 
statei (Perm: 1992), pp. 18-25. See also T. Pulatov, “Pod sen’iu ottsa natsii,” in Rashidov i rashidovshchina, 
pp, 38-55.  
331 For a comprehensive history of tribalism and tribes among the Kazaks see Sh. Kudayberdi-Uly, 
Rodoslovnaya Tyurkov, Kirgizov, Kazakov i Khanskikh Dinasty (Alma-Ata: Jazushy, 1990), pp. 67-112.  
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56) and Yakovlev (1956-59) served at the post of first secretary for rather short terms 
before leaving the post to a classical Brezhnevite figure Dinmuhammed Kunayev who was 
the first secretary of the Kazak Communist Party between 1959-1986. The liquidation of 
the Tselnyi Krai on the 26 of December 1960 was the first victory of the Kazak Party 
apparatus in stopping “Russian federal expansion”.332 During this period, Kazak 
intellectuals were quite openly demanding more nativization of cadres and native language 
instruction for the youth.333 Kunayev also supported Kazak writers, advocating the 
employment of native cadres into the managerial positions within the republic.334 Kunayev 
was always very careful to define his policies in terms of the Lenin’s nationalities policy.335 
He was also a member of the Greater Horde, whose thirty-seven year rule over the country 
was almost identified with the total domination of Greater Horde over the whole 
administrative and bureaucratic apparatus. That was probably why the December 
(Jeltoksan) Events took place when he was replaced by a non-Kazak, Gennadi Kolbin 
(1986-89). The last first secretary of the Kazak SSR and then the first president of 
Kazakistan, Nursultan Nazarbayev (1989 to present), was again a member of Greater 
Horde. So, in the Kazak case, the political struggle was rather between the representatives 
of the huge Slavic population of the republic and the representatives of the Kazak Greater 
Horde.336 
                                                
332 See Christian Duevel, “Liquidation of Tselnny Krai-A Fillip for Kazakh Nationalists,” RFE-RL Research 
Report, no. 2110 (25 October 1965).  
333 N.D. Dzhandiddin, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (September 8 1964). Dzandiddin also published a book titled 
"kommunizn i natsionalniy vopros" same year by Almaata-mysl.  
334 For details of this argument and Kunayev’s policy see, S. Tolıbekov, L. Slavin, N. Kiybayev and N.D. 
Candildin, Kommunizmi razvitie natsional’nykh otnosheniy (Moscow: Mysl’, 1964). See also this book for the 
Kazak perception of the Virgin Lands project.  
335 D. Kunayev, “Torzhestvo Leninskoy natsional’noy politiki,” Pravda (1 April 1970), p. 2.  
336 Tribalism remained one of the most important obstacles of the creation of a Kazak ethnic and or national 
consciousness too, see Anwar Galiyev, “Zhuzy Kazakov: Proshloye, Nastoyasheye, budusheye,” in N. Zh. 
Shahanov, Kul’tura Kochevnikov na Rubezhah Vekov. Almaty: TDMK, 1995, pp. 34-6.  
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 In Kyrgyzstan the fractions were on the north-south axis, where in Turkmenistan 
Teke-dominated tribal political structure was effective. The tribal/clan structure of the 
political/administrative apparatus in Tajikistan was more complex, rather resembling the 
situation in Uzbekistan. The more “Uzbek” Leninabad-Hocend clan started its reign by 
Babacan Gafurov’s (1946-56) appointment to the post of the first secretariat of the 
republican Communist Party. This process was continued with Tursunbey Ulcabayev 
(1956-61), Cabbar Resulov (1961-1982), Nabiyev (1982-85), and Kahhar Mahkamov 
(1985-1991). All being representatives of the Hocend clan. The pre-independence Tajik 
nationalism was based on the reactions of the Garm and Kulyab clans to this Hocend clan’s 
domination over the political and administrative cadres. 
 The extensive appearance of political tribalism among the party elites in post-war 
Turkestan shows the existence of “sub-national” identities, which are strong enough to 
challenge the “national” identities as well as a common Turkestani identity. Indeed, it was 
quite on the same parallel with Stalin’s “amalgamation through particularization” theory. 
However, the “secret of the success” of the Soviet Nationalities policy rested in the Leninist 
principle of rapprochement and then total fusion of the Soviet peoples, which could only be 
achieved with the development of material wealth equally among all these peoples.337 
 
6.4 Eastern Turkestan: Where is Western Turkestan? 
According to the Chinese press in 1962 and 1963, Soviet agents organized the mass 
exodus of Uygurs to Soviet Central Asia, as a hostile act.338 In fact, these Uygurs were 
                                                
337 Tashkentskaya Vysshya Partiynaya Shkola. Respubliki Sredney Azii v Period razvitogo sotsializma 
(Moscow: Mysl, 1980), p. 218.  
338For further details of Uygur exodus to Kazak SSR in 1962 see A. Kaşın. “Doğu Türkistanda Sovyet 
Yayılması,” Dergi, No. 35/36 (1964), p. 39.  
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fleeing from the systematic massacres of the Chinese government, and Soviets took the 
advantage of the situation to accuse China of violations of basic human rights. So, starting 
from 1962 on, an increasing number of Uygurs found refuge in eastern parts of the Kazak 
SSR. Uygurs, active in Kazakstan, enjoyed the freedom of using the term Eastern 
Turkestan for their country, throughout this period.339  
  Beginning in the early 1970s, articles in the Soviet-sponsored Uygur newspapers in 
Alma-Ata began the extensive use of Şarkiy Turkistan [Eastern Turkestan] (Şığıs Turkistan 
in Kazak and Vostochniy Turkestan in Russian issues) instead of the Chinese name for the 
region Sinkiang. One can observe the persistent and repeated usage of the term and the 
concept of Eastern Turkestan in the pages of the Uygur periodical Kommunizm Tughi: 
“How can the Chinese invaders call Eastern Turkestan Sinkiang-the New Land, the New 
Territory?”.340 Alma-Ata of the 1970s was the center of the Soviet sponsored Uygur anti-
Chinese publishing, broadcasting and organization activities under the banner of a “free 
Eastern Turkestan”. Kazak tolerance of the issue has been seen in several Kazak 
publications as well as Kazak interest in their kin in Eastern Turkestan.341 Some even 
                                                
339 See. A. Vakhidov, "Sharqiy Türkistan," Kommunizm Tughi (February 21-22 1979). An Uygur Newspaper 
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341 See Ötegen Kumişbayev, “Qazaq Folklorı Türkiyada,” Qazaq Adebiyati (16 August 1974). In this article 
the author also used the concept of Eastern Turkestan extensively.  
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argued that during the Brezhnev era, Soviet-Chinese tensions necessitated the loyalty of 
Turkestanis, which resulted in the appointment of Kunayev a politburo member, who 
decreased the influx of Slav migrants and tolerated Turkestan solidarity.342  
 Apart from all that, if there was an Eastern Turkestan, suffering at the hands of 
Chinese oppressors, then, where was Western Turkestan? The widespread employment of 
the term Eastern Turkestan, then, was an another aspect, which helped the survival of the 
concept of Turkestan during the post-war period.  
 
6.5 Émigré Turkestanism 
 The post Second World War years witnessed an influx of Turkestani émigrés in 
Europe. The Turkestani émigrés in Europe no longer consisted of a few dozen of 
intellectuals, as it had been the case before the war. But there were at least a couple of 
thousand Turkestanis in Europe, mostly remnants of the Turkestan legions. The first thing 
they did after the Nuremberg trials was to launch publication activities to create public 
support for themselves  in Europe.  
 The most important and influential Turkestani émigré journal was Milliy (then 
Millî) Türkistan, which was published between 1952-1975 in Berlin and then in Düsseldorf 
(a total of 134 issues). Its language was “Turkestanish”343 in Latin script. For more than 
thirty years, this journal remained the official organ of the “National Turkistanian Unity 
Committee for the Struggle of National Liberation of Turkistan”.344 Its chief publisher and 
editor was Veli Kayyum Han for most of its life. In 1951, a group of Turkestani émigrés in 
                                                
342 Allen Hetmanek. "National Renascence in Soviet Kazakhstan: The Brezhnev era" pp. 295-305. In George 
W. Simmonds (ed.), Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin 
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Europe under the leadership of Haris Kanatbay, an ethnic Kazak, who also had been at 
strife with the “Kayyum wing” during the war, separated themselves from the Committee 
and started to publish their own Journal, Türkeli in Munich between 1951-53. Its name was 
important because they preferred to use the name Türkeli, instead of Turkestan,345 
according to them, it was the Turkified form of the Persian term Turkestan. The Kanatbay 
wing was more pan-Turkist and less Turkestanist in this respect. Another important 
difference was the use of every different Turkestani dialect in the journal rather than 
sticking to one “Sart” version or a united “Turkestanish” language. This line was continued 
by the publication of Büyük Türkeli by Hasan Oraltay in İzmir in 1962 for only ten issues 
and then in 1974 in İstanbul for only two issues.346 There were also several single issues of 
this journal published in different years during the 1980s.  
 
6.5.1 Türkeli, Türkili, Türkistan and Uluğ Türkistan 
Zeki Velidî published a pamphlet in 1960 about the history of the Turkestan concept 
and the Soviet-Russian affect on it. He was questioning the idea of using Türkili for the 
region, simply because of the misuse of the concept in different publications, such as 
Türkeli. For him, the conventional term Turkestan was much better to stick with, only if the 
form Greater Turkestan is also kept. He informed that:  
Under the circumstances we have concluded that the sole use of Turkestan would 
mean Western Turkestan and Kazakstan, Eastern (Chinese) and Western Turkestans 
                                                
345 However, the use of the concept of Turkestan continued extensively in Türkeli. The editors were not 
persistent on using the concept of Türkeli instead of Turkestan in the literary language at all. The use of 
Türkeli in the name of the journal was rather a demonstration of the political preference. See Uluktuk, “Yeni 
Sovet Takdirine Göre Türkistanda Miili-Kurtuluş Hareketleri,” Türkeli, No.1 (1951), p. 27.  
346 For a detailed list and additional information on the Turkestani émigré literature, see Timur Kocaoğlu, 
“Türkistanlı Göçmenlerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri Tarihine bir Bakış,” in Rasim Ekşi and Erol Cihangir (eds.) Dr. 
Baymirza Hayit Armağanı (İstanbul: Turan Kültür Vakfı and Hoca Ahmed Yesevi Vakfı, 1998), pp. 159-170. 
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would be called  Uluğ (Greater) Turkestan; For the separate use, Chinese Turkestan 
would be called Eastern Turkestan…347 
 
By 1970, Zeki Velidî was also critical about the misuse of the term Türkeli by the 
Kanatbay group. According to him, Türkeli meant “Turkish Nation” whereas Türkili meant 
Turkestan, such as the newspapers used it in 1917 Khokand. Zeki Velidî from 1917 on, 
defended the use of Türkili for Turkestan. However, the Kanatbay group publishing Turkeli 
in Munich was using Turkeli for Western Turkestan and Türkili for Greater (Uluğ) 
Turkestan.348 Zeki Velidî protested the conceptual misuses of these terms.  
 
6.5.2 Decolonization of Turkestan  
 Following the Second World War and throughout the Cold War period, the 
Turkestani émigrés were trying to argue the problem of Turkestan to be the colonial 
question (starting from 1949 and onward).349 The colonies of Great Britain and France in 
Africa and Asia were granted their freedom one after another in the period of 1945-1950. 
Turkestani émigrés believed that their diplomatic efforts could persuade the international 
public to include Turkestan into the decolonization drive. The anti-colonial move in the 
1950s and 1960s provided an important hope on the side of émigrés who celebrated the 
independence of former western colonies and carried the hope that the UN would facilitate 
a similar drive for the Soviet colonies too.350 However, these hopes, soon, proved to be 
shallow and wishful thinking. One can easily follow the difficult balance of peaceful 
diplomatic methods to explain the Turkestanist stand and the repeated battle-cries for the 
                                                
347 Zeki Velidî Togan, Türk-Türkistan (İstanbul: Toprak dergisi Yayınları Nu: 6, 1960), pp. 38-9.   
348 Zeki Velidî Togan, Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine (İstanbul: Kayı Yanınlarıı, 1970), p. 144.  
349 See Jurtci. “Mustamlakalar Mas’alasi,” Milliy Türkistan (15 September 1949), no. 63, pp. 7-10.  
350 See Taşkentli, “Sovet-Rus Mustamlakaçiliği Keskin Qaralanmaqda,” and “Nigeriya va Türkistan,” MT 
(November-December 1962), no. 93A, pp. 31-35.  
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liberation of Turkestan in Millî Türkistan. On the academic front, Baymirza Hayit was 
producing voluminous academic literature on their version of  “colonial thesis”351 
Most probably as a result of their efforts, the decolonization of Turkestan issue was 
even voiced once in the UN General Assembly.  Sir Patrick Dean, British spokesman at the 
UN, was arguing in the General Assembly that de-colonization of the Soviet Empire was 
necessary. He argued that, Britain and the Russian empires colonized the world at the same 
times, but Russia was refusing to grant their independencies.352 
 
6.5.3 The Languages of Turkestan 
 The language of the Milliy (Millî) Türkistan was officially called “Turkestanish” 
(Türkistanca).353 It was basically a Kipchak dialect of Uzbek. This was a direct 
continuation of Çokay’s language policy in Yaş Türkistan. And policy to handle different 
tribes of a single Turkestani nation was also the same as Çokay’s policy. In the issues of 
Milliy Türkistan, all individual peoples of Turkestan, that is, the Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazak, 
Kyrgyz and Tajik were referred to as urugs (tribes).354 These “tribes” were the equal 
partners of Turkestani nationhood. However, it is interesting to see the inclusion of the 
Persian speaking Tajiks into the tribes of the Turkestani nation. This must have much to do 
with the existence of a considerable number of Tajik soldiers in the Turkestan legions and 
their survivors in Europe. 
 
                                                
351 See Baymirza Hayit, Soviet Russian Colonialism and Imperialism in Turkistan as an Example of the Soviet 
Type of Colonialism of an Islamic People in Asia (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965).  
352 Lawrance O'Kane, "Colonies of Sovet Derided by Britain," NYT (27 November 1962), pp.1-2. The author 
in this artcle uses the term as followingly; "...the conquest of the three Uzbek states of Turkestan was 
completed by 1876..." he did not include Kazak and Turkmen lands to tyh concept at all.  
353 See “Muraçaatnama (Türkistanca ve Inglizce),” MT (July-August 1950), no. 68, p. 3.  
354 See above issue, pp. 14-15. “Taçik urugimiznin musiqası…Türkmen urugimiznin halq calgu, Qazaq ve 
Qirgiz uruglarimiznin….”.  
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6.5.4 Millî Türkistan and Veli Kayyum’s Turkestanism 
Turkestani émigrés and their leader Veli Kayyum Han argued in the pages of Milliy 
Türkistan that their struggle continued on both sides of the front, before and during the war. 
According to Veli Kayyum Han, Turkestan was a well-defined and united country. Veli 
Kayyum Han delivered a speech at the Congress of Anti-Bolshevik Peoples on 12th of June 
1950. In this speech, he explained that:  
Turkestan, the country of Turks, is located between the Caspian Sea, Idel-Ural line 
and the northern Asian Kararakurum Desert and the Tarim Valley. In the south it 
neighbors Iran and Afghanistan, in the east it neighbors Tibet and Mongolia and in 
the north Siberia… Turkestani national movement at the homeland ended with the 
executions of Akmal İkram, the leader of the National Independence (Milliy Istiqlal) 
fraction and Feyzullah Hocayev, the leader of the National Unity (Milliy İttihad) 
fractions… Our struggle for independence is not only for ourselves but it is a 
struggle for the whole Islamic world too…355  
 
The basic political line of Milliy Türkistan was Turkestanism, and it carried out this 
task from the early times of the Second World War, through a huge campaign to train 
Turkestani POWs of the Red Army who would instantly became the soldiers of the 
Turkestan Legions of the Waffen-SS. According to the memoirs of a soldier of these 
legions, the journal played an important role in their indoctrination during the war,  
The journal Milliy Türkistan was an important weapon in our hands [during the war] 
strengthening the ideas of Turkestan, the independence of Turkestan and the unity 
of Turkestan. The journal was our coursebook, sourcebook, our national feeling, 
and our national ideal.356 
  
Kayyum Han’s National Turkistanian Unity Committee was organized all over the 
world quite well - among the Turkestani émigrés, all over Europe, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
                                                
355 Veli Kajum-Han, “Türkistan,” MT (October-November 1950), no. 69A, pp. 9-17.  
356 [Kamil Haşimoğlu], Türkistan Millî ordusunun askeri, “Millî Türkistan 10 Yaşga Toldı,” MT (June-July 
1952), no. 79A, pp. 6-9.  
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Pakistan, Afghanistan,357 as well as in Turkey.358 He monitored not only a wide range of 
political issues in these countries, but also most of the Soviet literature and the 
developments within Turkestan herself. For example, he was closely monitoring the 
Reşidov’s remarks in the Soviet press; his attacks on Islam, on pan-Turkism and on 
Turkestanism were severely criticized by Veli Kayyum Han, in the pages of Millî 
Türkistan.359 In most issues of the journal, Kayyum Han published long articles analyzing 
the anti-Turkestanist drive of the native apparatus in Turkestan.  
As in all other émigré journals, the Turkestani émigré publications used every news 
item about local corruption, sabotages and the inadequate use of Russian language which 
appeared in the Soviet press as the evidences of the resistance of the Turkestanis to the 
Soviet-Russian rule.360 According to Kayyum Han, there were two major movements in 
Turkestan during 1960s. The first one was the Russification drive by Moscow. This was 
also united with the Soviet efforts to separate Kazakstan from the rest of Turkestan, which 
was called “Middle Asia” in the Soviet press of the time.361 The second one was the 
resistance of the native Turkestanis to this trend within the limits of the regime.362 He 
                                                
357 In fact these Turkestani refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan were the ones best preserved their identities 
throughout the cold war era, for details see Audrey C. Shalinsky, Long Years of Exile Central Asian refugees 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan (NY: University Press of America, 1994).  
358 For the Turkestani émigré organizations all over the world and the activities of Türkistan Millî Birlik 
Komitesi among them see the special issue of Millî Türkistan (October-December 1953), no. 87A.  
359 For a detailed analysis of the Reşidov’s new nationalities policy see V. Kajum-Han, “45 Yıl İçinda 
Türkistan,” MT (September-October 1962), no. 92A, pp. 5-13.  
360 V. Kajum-Han, “45 Yıl İçinda Türkistan III,” MT (January-February 1963), no. 94A, p. 3.  
361 To this separation émigrés never replied with an alternative approach. However the Institute for the Study 
of the Soviet Union and its journal Dergi developed an alternative approach by calling Soviet Middle Asia ans 
Southern Turkestan and Kazakstan as Northern Turkestan. See Y. Mironenko, “Sovyet Türkistanının 
Demografik Yapısı,” Dergi, No. 39/40 (1965), pp. 8-25.  
362 See the No. 41, 1965 issue of the Dergi for a comprehensive study of native’s nationalisms in Soviet 
Turkestan in the post-war period. Edige Kırımal in this issue argues the unnecessity of employing any other 
terms than Turkestan to the region, and objects the use of Northern Southern terminology by Mironenko in 
the pervious issue. He also interprets the existence of the whole “otvet k falsifikatoram” literature in the 
Soviet press as a sign of existing Turkestani nationalism and the need to provide replies by the official 
authorities. See Edige Mustafa Kırımal, “Sovyet Türkistanında Milliyetçilik,” Dergi, No. 41 (1965), pp. 3-21.  
By then the name Turkestan was employed, administratively, only for the Turkestan (Yesi) town in Southern 
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mentioned the Kyrgyz Çıngıs Aytmatov, the Kazak Olcas Süleymanov and the Turkmen 
Inayet Kılıçev as the representatives of the Turkestanist movement in the homeland.363 
Apparently, the quasi-nationalistic, Mirasist literature of the time was enough to provide 
some extra hope to the émigrés, who had lost almost all contacts with their homeland and 
were only able to follow the developments through the Soviet press reaching the West. 
In order to clarify his and the Committee’s Turkestanist position in comparison to 
the Reşidov regime in Uzbekistan, Veli Kayyum Han published an open letter addressed to 
Reşidov in 1963. There, Veli Kayyum Han wrote: 
The difference between you and us is basically that we are in defense of our people 
and working to liberate an indivisible Turkestan from Russian and Chinese 
oppressors, to give our people fortune and happiness and free them from the chains 
of prisonership. You? You are helping the ones who are oppressing our people. Our 
army [legion] came as close as Astrakhan to free our homeland during the war, 
following the path of our great ruler, Timur.364 
  
Meanwhile, the Soviet press organized campaigns against the Turkestanists and 
Kayyum Han underlying their loyalty to the German fascism and accusing them being the 
spies and servants of the US intelligence.365 Even during the wartime, there was hearsay 
about the involvement of Kayyum Han in the alleged poisoning of Çokay in 1941. At that 
time no one dared to question authority of Kayyum Han. Probably with some Soviet help, 
                                                                                                                                                  
Kazastan and for the Turkestan Military Okrug, centered in Tashkent. Soviet retention of the name Turkestan 
for the military district in central Asia might be for the reason for the its tsarist military past rather than a 
concession to local nationalism. It was first created in 1867 by the Tsarist conquering campaign and then it 
carried out all the conquest and the rule of the region until 1917 revolution. However it did not cover steppes. 
It was in 1918 Soviet power collapsed in Turklestan and until 1926 Soviet army was connected with the 
Turkestanfront or Turkfront. In June 1926 Turkfront is renamed as Central Asian Military district. At the end 
of WWII, it was re-named as the Turkestan Military Dstrict, given the Russian-nationalist storm of the time, it 
was rather a concession to Russians in the army. In fact in 1946 steppe military district too was absorbed into 
Turkestan military district. However in 1969, Kazakstan was removed from it and established an independent 
Central Asian military district. Geographicaly, its use for the Turkestan ranges in Kyrgyz SSR continued.  
363 V. Kajum-Han, “45 Yil İçinda Türkistan IV,” MT (March-April 1963), no. 95A, pp. 3-15.  
364 V. Kajum-Han, “Şaraf Raşidoviç Raşidovga Açıq Mektüb,” MT (November-December 1963), no. 99A, 
p.4.  
365 See pp. 21-22 for a detailed list of Soviet Publications on Veli Kajum-Han and the Committee in the above 
issue of MT.  
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these allegations became one of the main tools of anti-Kayyum Han propaganda among the 
émigrés throughout the post-War period.366 In 1964, Uzbek artists performed a play called 
“Qanlı Serab” in several places in Uzbekistan as well as in Moscow. The play depicted the 
alleged bloody plans of Veli Kayyum Han and pan-Turkist fascists who tried to overtake 
Central Asia and massacre of all progressive cadres there. 
 Although most of the issues of the émigré journals as well as Millî Türkistan were 
filled with unproven information about insurrections, there were also long theoretical 
articles about the status of Turkestan as a Russian colony, including the different 
definitions of the concept colony.367 The employment of concepts like Central Asia, Middle 
Asia and Kazakstan were the tools of Russian-Soviet colonial policy, which aimed to 
destroy, not only the nation or the country, but also the very name of the country.  
Türkistan means Turk[ic] country or Turk[ic] homeland. This is not a newly 
invented name. It has thousands of years history. In the last decades, it is not used 
properly in the literary and political works and a new tradition of using the word 
Central Asia took place... It is wrong to employ the geographical concept of Central 
Asia to the place of the national and historical concept of Turkestan. It is equally 
wrong to name only a part of Turkestan as Turkestan itself... Since the Chinese has 
changed the name of Eastern Turkestan to Sinkiang, only Western Turkestan has 
been known as Turkestan... It is necessary to employ the concepts of Eastern and 
Western Turkestan properly. Just like how we call Eastern and Western Germany, 
North and South Korea, etc.368 
 
 As the leading representative of Turkestanism in Turkey, Zeki Velidî protested 
dispersed nature of the émigré organizations in Europe and the tensions between Kayyum 
and Kanatbay wings.  
                                                
366 See Ali Kantemir, “Mustafa Bey Çokay Hakkındaki Hatıratım,” MT (November-December 1963), no. 
99A,  pp. 23-26. Here Kantemir published the original death certificate of Çokayissued by Auguste-Viktoria 
City Hospital. Apparently Kajum-Han was trying to persuade Turkestanis accusing him with the murder of 
Çokay. In this article Kantemir wrote unusually positive sentences abouy Kajum-Han too.  
367 V. Kajum-Han, “Müstemlekeçilikni Yanglış Tüşüngenler ve Türkistan Meselesi,” MT (January-February 
1965), no. 106A, pp. 3- 11.  
368 Çobankır, “Türkistan İsmi,” MT  (April-July 1968), no. 124A, pp. 29-31.  
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Turkestanis in Europe are publishing two journals now. One is Millî Türkistan in 
Uzbek language, the other is Türkeli in Kazak, Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen 
languages. Both groups established Committees to Liberate Turkestan and working 
separately. These unpleasant struggles between them, especially throughout their 
publications in English and Russian are causing a perception in the eyes of the 
peoples reading these publications as Turkestanis are a simple people in lack of 
unity.369  
 
6.5.5 Fall of a Movement: Turkestanism Monopolized 
According to Zeki Velidî, some Uzbeks tried to monopolize the use of the term 
Turkestan and that was why Abdullah Recep Baysun, in his book Türkistan Millî 
Hareketleri, published a map excluding northern and western Kazakstan from the 
Turkestan region. On the other hand, some Kazan Tatars also tried to expand the borders of 
Idel-Ural concept such as Ayaz İshaki, who in his book Idel-Ural, published in Berlin in 
Russian and French languages, included Bashkiria and Western Kazakstan to this 
concept.370 
There was also another debate happening on the Voice of America radio during the 
1960s. Some were arguing the use of Uzbek language and calling it Turkestanish 
(Türkistanca); the others were arguing to classify all Turkic languages in two groups as 
Tatar and Turkestanish. Türkeli group, on the other hand, was arguing that each and every 
separate dialect of Turkestan be used, but called “Turkestan languages” as a whole.371 That 
was probably the most favored solution for Zeki Velidî, whose personal sympathy to 
Kanatbay was much higher than his sympathy for Kayyum, whom, he declared to be an 
Uzbek nationalist earlier. 
                                                
369 Zeki Velidî Togan, Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine (İstanbul: Kayı Yanınlarıı, 1970), p. 142.  
370 Zeki Velidî Togan, Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine (İstanbul: Kayı Yanınlarıı, 1970), p. 143.  
371 Zeki Velidî Togan, Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine (İstanbul: Kayı Yanınlarıı, 1970), p. 147.  
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 By the end of 1970s, the former Waffen-SS-Millî Türkistan cadres, as well as 
Kanatbay’s Türkeli wing disappeared from the scene. Even the US sponsored “Dergi” and 
the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union was no more active. Most of the émigré 
leaders, tired of decades of struggle, were scattered all over the world waiting for the 
unforeseeable collapse of the mighty Soviet Empire. However the 1970s witnessed another 
important development for the émigrés, the rise and popularity of the Azatlık Radyosu 
(Radio Libery). It was not an émigré organization and the relatively “politically correct” 
stand of the Radio was followed by a rather Soviet pattern in classifying the peoples of the 
Soviet Turkestan. The establishment of separate departments for each “people” of 
Turkestan was an important blow to the unitarist stand of the previous Turkestanist 
émigrés. Additionally, most of the people employed in these departments were not émigré 
leaders and/or politically active cadres organized under any leading organization. 
Employees were young career oriented professionals, and in the most favorable cases the 
descendants of the émigrés. In any case, from the mid-1970s on, a united Turkestanist stand 
started to disappear in the émigré circles. There was basically a lack of the young cadres to 
continue the Cedid - Alaş Orda - Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy - Yeni Türkistan - Yaş 
Türkistan - Waffen SS - Millî Türkistan - Dergi line.  
Only thanks to the persistent efforts of Baymirza Hayit, the great scholar of the 
history of Turkestan, and probably the last great activist of Turkestanism and the only 
political successor of Kayyum Han, the idea of Turkestanism and the concept of Turkestan 
survived the heavy Soviet anti-propaganda of the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1980s, the 
words Turkestanism and Turkestan, by no means acceptable to the “politically correct” 
terminology, started to be identified with only a part of the Uzbek emigration in Europe and 
Turkey.   
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6.6 The Road to Independence: Turkestan in the 1980s 
 By the beginning of the 1980s, Turkestan was one of the most stable regions in the 
Soviet Union. Except for the public disorders in 1969 and 1979 in Tashkent and Alma-Ata, 
the whole region was under the strict rule of the “Brezhznev” gang.372 At the beginning of 
the decade, the first shock in Turkestan was the assassination of the Kyrgyz Premier Sultan 
Ibragimov by an unidentified person in a sanatorium.373 The rumor had it that certain 
“Muslim nationalists” or “fundamentalists” were responsible for the murder.374 By then, the 
first impacts of the Afghan War on the region began to be observed. Especially in both 
sides of the Valley region, in Ferghana and Osh, where mullahs were attending public 
religious ceremonies with the official figures openly. Civil servants would complain to the 
Western observers about the working hours which were not designed to fit the prayer times; 
and explain Ibragimov’s assassination as a result of a “private feud”, closely related with 
the corruption within the state.375 However, it was soon discovered that the Premier was 
killed by an ethnic German, who attempted to leave the country, but stopped by the Kyrgyz 
authorities.376 
 
                                                
372 L. Alexeeva and V. Chalidze, Mass rioting in the USSR. (Silver Spiring: Foundation for Soviet Studies, 
1985). There were Kazak demonstrations in June 1979 against the idea of granting Soviet Germans an 
autonomous territory, Kazaks gathered in Tselinograd (Akmola, contemporary Astana) to protest the project 
and shouted slogans of  "Kazakstan is one and indivisible" (Vesti iz SSSR, 1979, 18/19 no. 4 cited). 
373 Sultanov was killed in 4 December 1980 while sleeping in a sanatorium. “Probably murdered by Muslim 
nationalists; Down in Kirgizia Something Stirs," The Economist (17 January 1981).  
374 David Satter, "Moscow Shows Concern Over Order in Kirgizia," The Financial Times (8 January 1981), p. 
3.  
375 Mark Wood, "Soviet Muslims Puzzled by Events in Afghanistan," Reuters (13 July 1983). People 
attending mosques in launch hours and complaining that they cannot (civil servants) come for the ikindi 
(afternoon). Kyrgyz premier Sultan Ibragimov in 1980 was assassinated "as a result of a private feud" but it 
was corruption.  
376 David Martin, "Riddle of a Primiers's Death," The Far Eastern Economic Review (13 February 1981). 
Kyrgyz Premier Sultan Ibrahimov killed by an ethnic German who had been frustrated in his attempt to leave 
the country.  
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6.6.1 The Politics of Literary “Turkestanism” 
The famous novel by Uzbek author Mamadali Mahmudov, Olmes Kayalar was 
published in Şarq Yulduzi in 1981. The novel had a strong nationalist and anti-Russian 
tone. The Russian “conquest” of Turkestan was no more than a colonial empire’s invasion 
and exploitation of the region, Mahmudov publicly announced, as early as 1981. During the 
same year, alarm bells were ringing in both the Soviet and Western press about the 
unusually high birth rates of Turkestan Muslims. Western predictions that by the beginning 
of the 21st century, the Soviet Union would have a Muslim majority were answered by the 
Soviet press with the usual “otvet k  falsifikatoram” literature.377 But this term was not a 
new invention of the 1980s Soviet authors, short in imaginative power. It was inserted into 
the literature in the 1950s. From 1956 on, a new phrase “falsifiers of the history of the 
Soviet Middle Asia and Kazakstan” entered into the Soviet academic literature and press.378 
Western scholarship was arguing that Soviet homo Islamicus was not basically an 
adversary to the regime, not even a critique of the regime but a silent but sure existence of a 
separate part of the Soviet society or even some part other than all other Soviets.379 
                                                
377 Anastasia Gelischanova, "Demographic Policy, a Touchy Subject in the USSR," RFE-RL Research RL 
316/81 (August 13 1981). See also V. Kiyuıtin "Fal'sifikatory ot Demografii," Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (July 9, 
1981). Answers the anti-soviet conclusions of the western publications on the issue of population growth 
among the Muslims of Turkestan.  
378 For a comprehensive analysis of this literature see Baymirza Hayit, Some Problems of Modern Turkistan 
History: An Analysis of Soviet attacks on the alleged Falsifiers of the History of Turkistan. Düsseldorf: East 
European Research Institute, 1963. Some of the famous pieces of this literature were: Protiv Falsifikatorov 
istorii Sovetskogo Kazakstana, Alma-Ata, 1961, Falsifikatory istorii narodov Sredney Azii, Tashknet, 1960, 
Falsifikatory pobedy sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane, Tashkent, 1962, Protiv burzhuaznykh falsifikatorov istorii 
sredney azii i Kazakstana, Ashkabad, 1962, Khamid Inoyatov, Otvet falsifikatoram istorii sovetskoy Sredney 
Azii i Kazakstana, Taşkent, 1967, etc.  
379 Héléne Carrére s'Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt. Trans. By 
Martin Sokolinsky and Hary A. La Farge (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), p. 263. Although many 
"otvet"s were published in the Soviet press to this book. One was claiming that all the freedoms and self-
imposing national rights of the people of the soviet central asia was because of the existence of true 
democracy in the Soviet Union and claiming that this was far from crating a danger to the Soviet system, on 
the contrary it was its strength. See Albert Pin, "Otvet," Novoe Vremya (22.2.1980). p. 31. "razgovor s 
chitatelem".  
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Çingis Aytmatov’s numerous short stories and articles about the history and then 
the current state of Issyk Kul was putting the lake in the very center of Kyrgyz nationalism. 
Aytmatov, along with Olcas Süleymanov, pioneered environmental nationalism in 
Turkestan.380 Glorification of the non-Russian past of Turkestan started with the Tolegen 
Kasımbekov’s famous historical novel, Sıngan Kılıç in 1966, glorifying the free and happy 
life of the Kyrgyz under the Khokand Khanate.381 This trend grew faster in the first half of 
1980s, with the encouragement of Çingis Aytmatov and some other Kyrgyz literary figures. 
However, it was clear that the Kyrgyz Communist Party was not happy about that and kept 
its critical position about the glorification of the past and nationalistic tendencies.  
 Brezhnev paid one of his last visits in his life to Tashkent in March 1982, when he 
awarded the Uzbek SSR with the Order of Lenin.382 Reşidov’s Uzbekistan was one of his 
closest allies within the Soviet system and his personal links with Central Asia, and 
especially his affinity with the leaderships of the Kazak and Uzbek CPs, who were actually 
his appointees, were well known.383  He was quite well informed and aware of the rise of 
nationalist tendencies through the glorification of the Turkestani past. He warned his Uzbek 
comrades by saying that “there are not a few glorious pages in the many-centuries history 
of the Uzbek people but the golden time of their development is not in the past, comrades, 
but in the present and future”. Another issue that he touched during his speeches and visit 
                                                
380 Anastasia Gelischanova "Is Issyk-Kul any Nearer Salvation?" RFE-RL Research RL 215/83 (31 May 
1983). Chingiz Aytmatov’s complains about (for) Issyk Kul was the center of Kyrgyz nationalism.  
381 Ann Sheehy, "Usubaliev Scores Kirghiz Historians and Cultural Figures for Nationalistic Errors" RFE-RL 
Research, RL 216/83, 1 June 1983. Criticized local historians and cultural figures for continuing to hold 
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1983) Criticized the Novel Sıngan Kılıç (broken sword) of the author Tolegen Kasımbekov, published in 
1966, v. 1. and 1971 v. 2. in Kyrgyz.   
382 Bess Brown, "Brezhnev Mixes Praise and Criticism of Uzbekistan in Tashkent Speech," RFE-RL Research 
RL 140/82 (March 25, 1982). He was a bit critical, he presented to Uzbekistan the order of Lenin on March 
24. Urged then to send labor surplus to the other areas of the Soviet Union. 
383 TASS, "Beseda Tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva v TsK Kompartii Uzbekistana," Izvestia, 26 March 1982, p. 
3. Very few criticisms but much appraisal to Uzbek SSR 
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to Uzbekistan was the transfer of the excessive labor surplus of the Republic, especially in 
the Valley region, to the other regions of the USSR. That might be taken as a sign of 
Moscow’s seriousness in handling the Turkestani population growth rates.  During the 
Brezhnev era, the psychology of the natives were: Islamic, traditionalist, conformist, anti-
Russian nationalist, pan-Islamic and with a desire for fair treatment.384 
 
6.6.2 Corruption and Native Cadres 
Western observers noticed the fact that Turkestani officials and politicians now 
constituted a clear majority in the power structures of the Central Asian Soviet Republics. 
Their shares in the council of ministers and bureaucracy were exceeding their shares in the 
populations of the republics. This was true even in the Kazak SSR, where Kazaks did not 
have an ethnic majority at all.385 The present author has personally observed several former 
employees of the Central Asian Communist Parties, who stated that the only positive 
product of the long-lasting Brezhnev period was a real nativization (korenizatsiya) which 
was achieved through the employment of local-native cadres in the party structures.  
The corruption charges against the CP officials in Turkestan were quite common 
from the second half of the 1970s on.  Brezhnev’s death in 1982 marked a new era in 
Turkestan. The “Brezhnev Gang” was no longer feeling secure, and Moscow-based CP 
investigators started to appear in the capitals of Soviet Central Asia one after another. This 
was the beginning of the famous “Cotton Affair” which continued until the very end of the 
1980s. The scandal was publicized at the highest level at the CPSU congress in Moscow in 
                                                
384 M. Vol'Per. "Nekotorye Aspekty Psikhologii narodov Turkestana" Aprel, 1973 (A machine copy of 9 
pages long report in RL Research papers Middle Asia archive. P. 2-7.  
385 Bess Brown, "The National Composition of the Governments of the Central Asian Republics" (August 4, 
1982), RLR-RL 313/22. From 1980 on, shares of Muslims in the council of ministers were advantageous and 
clearly much more than their shares in the republic's population in CA states. See the tables in 2 and 3 except 
Tajikistan.  
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February 1986, where Gorbachev singled out Uzbekistan for sharp criticism on the 
corruption issue. He announced that, between 1978-83, the Soviet state had paid more than 
one billion rubles for cotton that had never been produced. Immediately a purge in the 
Uzbek Communist Party started and tens of thousands of party members were expelled, 
including three thousand police officers being fired from their jobs. Uzbeks, on the other 
hand, accused the “ethnic-Russian troika” in Tashkent for all the purges and corruptions.386  
The early 1980s also marked an interesting circulation of a unique piece of 
underground samizdat literature in Turkestan. It started first in Uzbekistan, in the form of 
the multiplication of magnetic tapes of Holy Kur’an, stories of prophets and the saints, 
legends (dastans), and even voice-recordings (“letters”) from the relatives abroad.387 
Similar materials seen in Turkmenistan and Kazakstan in the mid-1970s; however, the 
Uzbek experience, apparently, was much organized and well done.  
Reşidov, just before his death, continued his so-called “Russian for everyone” 
campaign, urging Uzbek youth to learn Russian at least before they serve in the military.388 
Following his death, in 1983, Usmanhocayev succeeded Reşidov. Usmanhocayev was a 
representative of Andropov’s cadres who were determined to end the “Brezhnevite Gang”s 
domination over the cadres in Central Asia. He put his main stance on the issue of Central 
Asian unity, Turkism and Turkestanism in one of his early speeches follows;   
Towards the end of his long speech, however Usmankhojaev, blamed the bourgeois 
falsifiers who show that the national delimitation of Central Asia was actually the 
                                                
386For a comprehensive account of the corruption and the “Cotton Affair” see, James Critchlow, "Further 
Repercussions of the Uzbek Affair", RFE-RL Report on the USSR (May 4 1990), pp. 20-22. (See also, RL 
202/90, April 1990)  
387 Bess Brown, "Profitable Unofficial Religious Publishing Operation uncovered in Tashkent," RFE-RL 
Reserach RL 420/82 (20 October 1982). Such materials were usually in the form of multiplication of Islamic 
texts as well as magnetic tapes.  
388 Bess Brown, "Measures to Integrate Central Asians into the Soviet Armed Forces Discussed in 
Uzbekistan," RFE-RL Research RL 93/83 23 February 1983. Russian language skills prior to introduction 
takes on an ever greater urgency, said Reşidov, urged youth to attend officer training institutes.  
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destruction of Turkestan and the united fatherland of the Turkic peoples. 
Usmankhojaev claimed that new socialist nations of Central Asia were formed by 
rejecting the lies such as a single Turkestan and a single Turkic nation as advocated 
by bourgeois ideologists.389  
 
Usmanhocayev’s strong emphasis on the “bourgeois falsifiers” claims of one united 
Turkic homeland, Turkestan, came during an interesting time when the Premiers and First 
Secretaries of other Central Asian Soviet Republics, at the very same meeting, made strong 
references to the common history and brotherhood among the peoples of the region. One of 
them was the young Kazak Premier Nazarbayev, who declared Uzbeks the blood brothers 
of the Kazaks.390  
 
6.6.3 Gorbachev in Power 
The first official full-text publication of the Kyrgyz epic Manas in 1984 was 
considered as the victory of nationalist literary figures over the party bureaucracy.391 The 
Kyrgyz party chief T. Usubaliyev was by no means an associate of Gorbachev and was 
highly critical of the local KGB, which he thought was too harsh on the party workers in 
                                                
389 T. Kocaoğlu, "The Ethnic Ties of Central Asians Brought Out at a Soviet Anniversary: Both Anniversary 
of Uzbek SSR and the Communist Party," 27 December 1987, RLS-PS Research, F 586-591. At the 
anniversary of the both Uzbek SSR and CP of UzSSR. "Usmankhojaev, the first secretary of the Uzbekistan 
CP CC, focused on the question of the national delimitation of Central Asia among other topics in his speech. 
Mentioning establishment of Turkestan ASSR within RSFSR in 1918, as a step, and Bukharan and Khivan 
Soviet Peoples’ Republics, another step. And October 27 1924 historical resolution on national delimitation 
for the establishment of republics, failed to mention national governments of Alaş Orda and Khokand in 
1917.” (Quoted from  Sovet Ozbekistani (9 December 1984), p. 5. And Pravda Vostoka ( 9 December 1984), 
p. 4.  
390 Sovet Ozbekistani (9 December 1984), p. 5. And Pravda Vostoka (9 December 1984), p. 4. Kazak Premier 
Nazarbayev said: “we know well that Kazak and Uzbek peoples are blood brothers with each others from 
ancient times.” (Kocaoğlu) in Uzbek version, in Russian version: “it is root of the brotherhood of our peoples 
go back to distant centuries.” Tajik and Turkmen leaders draw attention to the historical/cultural and ethnic 
ties between Central Asians.  
391 E. Tenişev, "Iz reki po imeni Manas," Sovetskaya Kirgizia (28 June 1985), p. 9. Heroic epic was published 
first as a great national victory, first volume, was celebrated by Nauka in 1984.  
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the charges of corruption.392 Usubaliyev was a minor member of the “Brezhnev Gang” in 
Turkestan, being the party boss in the Kyrgyz SSR from 1961 on, was relieved from his 
post in November 1985 and replaced by Absamat Masaliyev, in accordance with the 
Gorbachev’s plan to dismiss all remnants of Breznevite cadres in Turkestan.393 Gorbachev 
simply tried to reverse the Brezhnevite policy of nativization of Central Asian cadres, “the 
expansion of local autonomy for native elites in the national territories” as well as growing 
non-Russian participation to the center’s politics.394 
The problems concerning the Central Asians serving in the Soviet army continued 
in the course of the 1980s. Apart from the language problems, they were increasingly 
becoming the targets of Russian chauvinism in the army, were humiliated and mostly 
employed in the construction battalions.395  
However, the knowledge and instruction of the Russian language was indeed very 
poor in Central Asia, especially in the Valley region.396 Gorbachev openly accused local 
authorities in Turkestan of being tools of localism, which stopped the integration process of 
the Union.397  
                                                
392 Bess Brown, "Party Chief of Kirgizia Acknowledges Problems in the Republic," RFE-RL Research RL 
238/85 (2 July 1985). Usubaliev criticized local KGB being harsh on KP members. Critical of general 
glasnost - perestroika but sympathized to Gorbachev.  
393 Turdakun Usubaliev, in 2 November 1985 announced that he had been relieved of his post of the first 
secretary of the TsK of KP Kirgizia, replaced by Absamat Masaliyev. Usubaliev was a Brezhnevite figure 
from May 1961 on. .  
394 Steven L. Burg, “Nationality Elites and Political Change in the Soviet Union,” in Lubomyr Hajda and 
Mark Baissinger, pp. 24-42.  
395 Albert Weeks, "Russian Officers, Ethnic Soldiers Sharply Split in Soviet Military," FPI News Service (25 
February 1985). Lack of language skills of non-Russians went along with, racism in the Russian army ranks 
and a certain distrust towards  Central Asians.  
396 G. Ivanov, "Primen' synok, shinel,” Krasnaya Zvezda (13 February 1986), p. 4. And 14 February 1986, p. 
4. Youth in Namangan oblast do not speak Russian well as a source of problem in soviet army. Detailed 
report about the preparation of the youth in Namangan for the military service.  
397 An Sheehy, "Gorbachev's Speech to the 27th Party Congress: Nationality Relations," RFE-RL Reserach, RL 
99/86 (26 February 1986). In the 27th party congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev criticized mestnichestvo 
(localism) underlined the importance of nationalities relations as a sign of rising nationalism. 
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Whereas nationalism is an ideological movement, localism refers to administrative 
action aimed at promoting the interests of one’s own administrative unit, regardless 
of its composition. Localism is an inherent feature of any bureaucracy, since all 
bureaucrats prefer more resources to carry out their programs. But nationalism 
intersects with localism when the interests of an administrative unit come to be 
identified with the interests of a particular national group resides in it.398 
 
Usmanhocayev adapted himself to Gorbachev’s ideas quickly, especially on the 
issue of the nationalities policy of the union. He became the strongest critic of the period of 
1960-1980 during which the so-called Rashidovshchina was alleged to have been quite 
tolerant on local nationalism movements. Suddenly, Timur, Babur, Navai, and the Soviet-
imposed historical heroes of the Uzbek history became the “cults of nationalists”. The 
Uzbek Party, according to him, had worked to polarize and disintegrate the Soviet society 
for the last two decades, rather than working to integrate and amalgamate.399 It was also the 
peak of the Afghan War and the Mujahedeen were progressing, causing very heavy 
casualties on the Soviet forces. One of the main impacts of the Afghan war on Turkestan 
was the resurrection of religious and nationalist tendencies among the natives, which were 
criticized by the center.400 The on-going war on the south of the border was undermined by 
                                                
398 Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Baissinger (eds), The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 310.  
399 Ann Sheehy, "Nationalistic Tendencies in Recent Uzbek Historiography and Historical Fiction Under 
Attack," RFE-RL Reserach RL 11/87 (December 23, 1986). Reşidov rule was criticized, being tolerant on 
nationalism. Usmanhojayev criticized for the idealization of past during the past two decades. National pride 
etc. Pravda Vostoka (5 October 1986)) idealization of Timur, Babur. See also Mavlan Vakhabov in Pravda 
Vostoka (December 4 1986,) criticized 1960s literature Declaring all the poets of the feudal period as the 
classics of Uzbek literature "Golden age" of Timur is a pan-Turkist label of 1920s, he says. Olmas Qayalar 
(Eternal Rocks)of Mamadali Mahmudov was about Uzbekistan at the time of Russian conquest, strong 
nationalistic and anti-Russian overtone. (published by Sharq Yulduzi, 1981) urges that Uzbeks are becoming 
too nationalist.  
400 "Internatsionalizm-nashe znamya: vsesoyuznaya nauchnaya konferentsiya v Tashkente" Pravda Vostoka, 4 
April 1986, p. 1 and 3. Unity of the soviet peoples stands on Russian language. Bourgeois propaganda 
speculating on Islamic factor, tried to resurrect nationalist tendencies.  
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the center and Gorbachev’s campaign to replace Brezhnevite cadres faced with the first 
important blow in Kazakstan in December 1986.401  
 
6.6.4 December (Jeltoksan) 1986 
Dinmuhammed Kunayev, “a patriot of Kazakstan,”402 was the last but the strongest 
Brezhnevite leader remained in power by the end of 1986 in Turkestan. When Moscow 
replaced him with the ethnic Chuvash Gennady Kolbin,403 in December (Jeltoksan) 1986, 
streets of Alma-Ata were taken by students and workers protesting their leader’s dismissal. 
In the literature of the independent Kazakstan, this “protests were to be written as the first 
“independence-oriented popular uprising” in Central Asia. One of the main reasons of his 
replacement was his nationalistic tendency, which was creating circles of Kazak 
nationalists, protected by the Party.404 Later, he was also accused of tribalism and 
                                                
401 See The NYT, December 20 1986, The Sunday Times, December 21 1986 and Le Monde & The Guardian, 
December 22 1986 said that: demonstrations in Alma-Ata were more than 10 thousand broke into the local CP 
headquarters, two prisons and inmates were freed. 
402 The best reports explaining his Kazak patriot stand are written by a former employee of the Kazak radio, 
Pyotr Perejinsky, born in 1918 in Kiev and fled the USSR in 1982. He worked in the Kazak radio from 1959 
until 1982. See Pyotr Perejinsky. “Observations on Affirmative Action in Kazakhstan,” RFE-RL archive BGR 
#4-82, August 1982. “Kunayev favored Kazaks in cadre policy, entrance into educational institutions, in 
graduation, science, arts, industry, media, trade, housing, travel, etc. Kazaks were all favored during 1970s 
and early 1980s.” He quotes an anonymous “famous” Kazak comrade as telling him as such; “Many Kazaks 
still feel that Russian domination is a temporary thing, and that the time will come when we will chase them 
back over Volga.” In another quotation from a “famous” Kazak film producer an interesting explanation of 
the Soviet Kazaks appear; “There are two layers of a Kazak, the top layer represents the opportunity to make 
a good career which is there for taking, provided you are a Kazak and party member. The second layer is 
hatred for the Russians who have seized and defiled our territory. I think that this layer is the one closest to 
the Kazak’s true feelings. On one day, he thinks, we will get it all back…”  
403 In most sources he was labeled as ethnic-Russian. However for the Kazak protesters his ethnic affiliation 
did not matter at all. He was firstly a non-Kazak and secondly non-Turkestani. Moreover, Kunayev succeeded 
in establishing a quite effective clan network around himself, which would even rebel in the case of a 
challenge to the Kunayev clan by even another Kazak clan.  
404 G. Kolbin, “Bol’she printsipial’nosti,” Pravda (9 March 1987), p. 1 and 3. Kolbin, in this article attacks 
Dusetay Bekecanov who was Kunayev’s personal aide for cadres’ policy. According to Kolbin, Bekecanov 
established a broad nationalistic circle consisted of writers, artists, intellectuals not only to share the corrupt 
money of the regime but also destroying Soviet power in Kazakstan. 
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establishing traditional clan networks among the Kazaks.405 After all, Kunayev was the one 
who achieved the “Kazakization of Kazakstan at the cost of the declining economy of the 
republic”.406  
 Jeltoksan was a serious blow to Gorbachev’s Central Asian policy and in two years 
ended up with the replacement of Kolbin by another member of the Kazak Ulu Cüz, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev. It was interesting to observe that, Kunayev’s premier and then the 
first aide, Nazarbayev was the only party apparatchik who did not surrender to Kolbin’s 
anti-nationalism campaign.407 The Soviet Kazak and Russian press were alarmed over the 
rise of nationalism in Turkestan after the Jeltoksan events. The tone even turned at some 
points to heavy criticism of the Russification and Sovietization of Turkestan, which was not 
in line with Lenin’s nationalities policy.408 Southern Kazakstan Oblast and Chimkent were 
the center of Kazak nationalism and had relatively free press and nationalist 
organizations.409 The Soviet press took the issue to the agenda and accused the party 
workers in this region of corruption and mismanagement as well as being too ignorant 
about the flow of nationalist literature in the region. In 1987, the newly published History 
of the Kazak SSR in Kazak idealized the traditional Kazak Cüzs. Moscow feared that this 
might lead to patriotism and nationalism. One of the main figures of this increasing Kazak 
nationalism was the Chimkent party boss, A. Askarov. It was alleged that under the 
                                                
405 This accusation was directly made by G.Kolbin in a later interview, see A.Ladin,“Ot razobshechennosti-k 
ob’edineniyu usiliy,”  Pravda (1 April 1989), p. 1 and 2.  
406 Bess Brown, “The Fall of Kunayev,” RFE-RL, RL 7/87 (2 January 1987).  
407 However he defended himself after Kunayev with such words; “Kunayev questioned my Kazak 
nationalism when I presented evidences of corruption in the party ranks…” “Soviet Kazakh Prime Minister 
Says He Received Death Threats,” Reuters (29 August 1987).  
408 "Druzhba narodov SSSR-sila i krepost' nashego sotsialisticheshogo gosudarstva" Pravda Vostoka, 10 
February 1987, p. 2. Russification and Sovietization of Middle Asian republics was under heavy fire. Soviet 
nationalities policy was a chance after colonial imperialistic policy.  
409 "Ne suzhat' ramki temy" Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (2 September 1987), p. 3. On the nationalism in the 
newspapers of Chimkent oblast, Chimkent being the center of Kazak  nationalism.  
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leadership of Askarov, this “bourgeois nationalism” was spreading all over Kazakstan. 
Askarov and his circle was best organized in a small town called Turkestan in Chimkent 
Oblast, which was the historical-spiritual center of Turkestan, where the highly revered 
medieval religious mentor Hoca Ahmed Yesevi’s mausoleum was located.410 
In 1987, the Kyrgyz press also started arguing whether or not internationalism 
meant anti-nationalism. There were serious arguments to support and respect national rights 
of the native peoples of the Kyrgyz SSR.411 During the party congress at the end of the 
year, Aytmatov raised the question of more Kyrgyz language schooling in the republic, 
even for the Russians. Aytmatov suddenly became a political activist supporting the idea of 
sovereignty, fulfilling the rights given to the republic by the Soviet and republics own 
constitutions.412 Also following the Jeltoksan events in the neighboring Kazakstan, it was 
reported that students established nationalist organizations. In January and February many 
foreign (especially Russian) students at the universities were attacked in Frunze (Bishkek) 
and Osh.413 Aytmatov gave an interview to the popular Russian journal Ogonek in 1987, 
openly declaring his stand on the national issues. It was only after this that the Kyrgyz press 
found enough courage to publish readers’ letters, demanding more national rights and 
                                                
410 A. Tursunbaev, "Sledovat' istoricheskoy pravde" Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (10 September 1987), p. 3. In 
1987 by Mektep Izdatelstvo, new Istorii Kazakskoy SSR is published and it was idealizing Cüzs. Idealization 
of Cüz would lead to patriotism, one of these patriots was Chimkent obkom party first secretary A. Askarov, 
bourgeois nationalism in Kazakstan  was spreading everywhere.  
411 K. Bokonbaev, "Mosty vzaimoponimaniya," Sovetskaya Kirgiziya (24 October 1987), p. 3. Bokonbayev 
here argued that internationalism should not mean anti-nationalism and national rights should be respected.  
412 John Soper, "Nationality Issues under review in Kirgizia," RFE-RL research, RL 49/88 (January 29, 1988). 
More schools in Kirghiz demanded ("the latest plenum of the Kirghiz party central committee held in 
December 5, 1987 dealt with nationality presentation in the party ranks-quoted from Sovettik Kyrgyzstan, 
December 5, 1987) participation in industry, workforce etc. Aytmatov was demanding more Kirghiz 
schooling for the republic and also more national rights.  
413 "Nationalist Incidents Reported in Soviet Kirgizia," Reuters (3 March 1987). “In Frunze last autumn 
Kirghiz leader Absamat Masaliyev said: nationalist outbreaks on the part of the young people and an incorrect 
attitude to foreign students (after Jeltoksan) against Russians too.”  
 234
native education.414 Interestingly, not only the Kyrgyz readers but even some Russian army 
officers who were then serving in the republic sent letters to the Soviet press, explaining the 
miserable state of Kyrgyz in their own countries.415 Kyrgyz party officials started to appear 
at religious funerals and ceremonies officially in the Osh region the same year.416 
Simultaneously, the Turkmen press started to publish similar themes, accusing local 
Russians of ignorance towards the languages and cultures of the region and even of 
humiliating the natives. The Turkmen intelligentsia proposed a compulsory instruction of 
the Turkmen language to Russian students in the schools in Turkmenistan. Moreover, there 
were cases when local Russians were accused of being imperialists.417  
 
6.6.5 Turkestanism Resurrected in Turkestan 
In Uzbekistan, of course, the movement towards sovereignty was very strong. 
“Lenin’s Nationality Policy” was also under heavy criticism from Uzbek literary figures. 
By 1987, literary figures like Muhammed Salih and Rauf Parfe were well respected and 
quite active in organizing the Uzbek intelligentsia under a Turkestanist opposition. 
Although most of the 1980s, for Parfe, were spent in a constant struggle for cultural and 
national rights, Turkestanism was always at the top of their agenda. According to Parfe, 
“Many in Uzbekistan were united and working together to achieve more rights and unite 
                                                
414 Aytmayov was a pioneer. Only after the journal Ogonek published an interview with Aytmatov, did the 
Kirghiz press began to publish articles in the form of readers letters in Kirghiz language instruction matter, 
see Ogonek 28/87.  
415 I. Esyutin, "Prityazhenie Stroya" Krasnaya Zvezda (29 March 1987), p. 2.  
416 V. Stavitskiy and V. Khrustalev, "Double dealing," Sovetskaya Kirgizia, 15 August 1987. SWB 
SU/8677/B/5, 19 September 1987, on "Participation by party officials in religious funerals in Kirgizia". 
417 O. Musaev, "Torzhestvo Leninskoy natsional'noy politiki KPSS," Turkmenskaya Iskra (24 November 
1987), p. 2. “Russians being too ignorant to the language of the people among whom they live. This causes 
protests among Turkmen intelligentsia. This is called ideology of imperialism, rather than friendship of Soviet 
peoples. Turkmen language should be thought in Russian schools too.”  
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Turkestan under one flag with enthusiasm at the time”.418 Official attempts to introduce a 
Soviet-type brotherhood and friendship between the Soviet nations were met with anger 
and protests.419 “Moscow’s mouthpieces in the region, usually local Koreans, Russians or 
other Slavs, were blamed by the native journalists as the enemies of Uzbekistan, who tried 
to re-assert imperialist and chauvinistic Russian claims.420 The Uzbek “motherland” and 
Turkestanism topics have been openly discussed in the literary organs of the republic quite 
continuously.  
The out-migration of Slavs, in the Kyrgyz SSR was observed as a misfortune, but 
according to the Kyrgyz it was also an opportunity to raise new Kyrgyz cadres to run their 
own country by themselves.421 The Stalinist Kyrgyz poet Tokombayev, the strongest 
critique of Aytmatov died in 1988. Although he was the founder of the modern Kyrgyz 
literature and the author of the first “nationalistic” Kyrgyz novels about the Kyrgyz struggle 
for independence in early 20th century and the Kyrgyz migration to China, became an anti-
nationalist figure in the 1980s.422 In Turkmenistan, demands for more national and religious 
rights continued in 1988.423 The Kazak poet and novelist S. Ademov, issued a long 
statement in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, demanding more razmezhevanie for creating 
nationally homogeneous regions in Turkestan in 1988. According to him, the Kazak 
                                                
418 Interview with Rauf Parfe (August 1999).  
419 G. Rashidov, "Natsional'nye protsessy v SSSR" Pravda Vostoka (7 February 1988), p. 4. A critiqutical 
review of the book : R.A. Salihov, İ. Ya Halilov and E. Yu. Yunusov, Natsional'nye protsessy v SSSR  
(Moscow: Nauka, 1987). This book supports old "falsificators" and enemies of Soviet unity.  
420 N. Ganyukhina, "Soyuz Bratsva," Pravda Vostoka (1 May 87), p. 2. Uzbeks were accusing Korean-Soviet 
journalists of being internationalist because of having no motherland. “Russia is yours and Uzbekistan is 
ours”. See this piece for organized Uzbek nationalism quite openly Declared by several citizens.  
421 N. Kumskova, "Pereezzhaet sem'ya, chto za faktom?" Sovetskaya Kirgizia, no: 4 (6 January 1988). 
Outmigration of Slavs gave an upper hand to Kirghiz to form a national working class-proletariat.  
422 John Soper, "Controversial Kirghiz Poet Tokombaev Dies," RFE-RL Research RL 284/88 (June 22 1988). 
Tokombaev (born in 1904) was the founder of Soviet Kirghiz literature, his novel Before the Dawn (1962) 
concerning the national liberation of the Kirghiz in the early 20th century, 1916 rebellion and exodus to China 
was greatly appraised.  
423 "Vospityvat patriotov-internatsionalistov," Turkmenskaya Iskra (13 January 1988), p. 1. For nationalist 
rights and argument going on all over the USSR, standing for moderate rights to nations and religions.  
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nationalism, which he claimed to represent, was an outcome of the Great Russian 
Chauvinism.424 1988 was also the year when the first signs of ethnic disorders began to be 
seen in Turkestan. By then, Uzbek-Tajik tensions surfaced in Northern Tajik regions of 
Hocend, Karategin and Kurgantübe.425 Moscow was on the side of Tajiks, at least 
according to Uzbeks, demanding the protection of the rights of the Tajiks and Turkmens in 
Uzbekistan.426 Another expedient of the center were the charges of corruption against the 
local part elites.427 The democratic opposition group Birlik (Unity) was established in 
Tashkent this year, in November 1988. The first criticisms of the group were directed 
against the cotton-monoculture in the republic, corruption over the cotton production and 
the unusual deaths of the Uzbek Red-Army conscripts.428 
In August 1989, a large-scale massacre of the Ahıska (Meskhetian) Turks by Uzbek 
gangs took place in the Ferghana Valley region ended up with the mass out-migration of 
over seventy thousand Ahiska Turks to Kazakstan and other Soviet republics. Although the 
Uzbek press claimed that the events were a result of the center’s provocations,429 Moscow 
accused Birlik and Uzbek nationalists.430 Many in the Soviet press blamed Birlik, 
                                                
424 S. Adenov, "Natsionalniy vopros i sistema upravleniya obshcestvom," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (4 
February 1988), p. 2. He was producing brochures-Kazak nationalist-only Kazak samizdat that we see. He 
argued to stop population movements in Russian immigration, but to re-draw boundaries to create ethnically 
homogenous republics (more Razmezhevanie) he says Kazak nationalism is a product of Great power (i.e. 
Russia) chauvinism. His critiques published in the same issue of Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (February 4, 1988), 
p. 3. By N. Zhandil'din "po povodu boleznennogo natsional'nogo chustva" S. Adenov was critized whose 
article was published in the same issue together with this critique.  
425 "S positsiy otkrovennosti" Kommunist Tadzhikistana (15 March 1988), p. 3. Tajik-Uzbek ethnic tensions 
exist both in Uzbekistan and Tajiksitan.  
426 Timur Pulatov, "Begushcie Vpered: Arby," Moskovskie Novosti, no: 14 (3 April 1988), p. 10.  
427 Arkadiy Sakhnin, "Korruptsiya," Izvestiya (2 November 1988), p. 3. Corruption in Uzbekistan being so 
serious and almost able to stop the operation of the state.  
428 Gregory Gleason, "Birlik and the Cotton Question," RFE-RL 264/90 (8 June 1990). RL Report of June 15 
1990. 
429 Lev Levin, "Pylayushcee leto Fergany," Zvezda Vostoka, no: 10 (October 1989) p. 1-7. See this article for 
a long and good account of provocations and failure of the Uzbek militiamen to stop the atrocities.  
430 D. Usatov, V. Kamalov, "Komu eto na ruku?" Pravda Vostoka (4 November 1989). Birlik was accused for 
most of the Fergana and Khokand events and labeled as a provacative and nationalist extremist group.  
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nationalists, as the agitators of Ferghana attacks on Ahıskas.431 Taking the news mostly 
from the Soviet press, some western media also even blamed population-demographic 
pressures in Fergana-Uzbekistan for this latest ethnic violence.432 However, Birlik was the 
only organization in Uzbekistan which tried to stop events, with an overwhelming emphasis 
on the Turkic and Muslim brotherhood. To many Uzbeks it mattered not that he deportee 
Ahıska Turks also happened to be coreligionists and ethnic Turkic kinsmen, they were still 
outsiders and New Comers. 
It was as early as 1990 July that Türkistan Khalq Kharakati (Turkestan Peoples 
Movement) was established in Uzbekistan, with the slogan of "Bütündir Türkistan 
Bütündir!" (Turkestan is a united whole!).433 The supporters of this Turkestan-i movement, 
declared that due to the territorial division of the region all the disasters-ethnic- that the 
region face are.434 The leader of the movement Bahrom Goyib was stressing "who can deny 
that we are Turks?... It is out of suspicion that we are the children of one people... we will 
surely unite. Turkistan is already united in our hearts."435 
 
                                                
431 TASS, General V.K. Pankin, "K sobytiyam v Fergane: Nakazanie-Neotvratimo," Sovetskaya Rossiya (15 
June 1989), No 138, p. 4.  
432 Scott Share, "Population explosion sparked Uzbek riots, demographer says," Baltimore Sun (19 June 
1989). Evets break up over the price of some strawberries.  
433 Türkistan, Türkiston Khalq Kharakati Nashri, No. 1-August 1990 Tashkent, p.1. Muharrir Rauf Parfi. The 
deputies from all Turkestan republics hold a congress in July. Tajiks refused to join the movement. Kazak and 
Uzbek deputies agreed on establishing the movement. President elected as Bahram Goyib, deputy Seyitbay 
Baydullaev, Izzetullah Nuriddinov and Rauf Parfi. Olzhas Suleimanov was the hakem-... By then there were 
deputies from Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Karakalpakistan.  
434 Türkistan., p. 1. "Petition of Turkestan Popular Movement to the Turkestans." It was stressed that the 
region is an ethnically, religiously and historically unified one and attempts to divide it causes all the troubles. 
In p. 2 it was also pointed out that "all the Turkestanis are brothers and sisters." See pages 2-4 for the ustav of 
the movement, very pan-Turkist and unionist in nature.  
435 Türkistan., p. 4, message from the president.  
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6.6.6 The Case for Turkmenistan: A Separate History and Identity 
The ghosts of Cüneyd Han and of Basmacıs were still alive in Turkmenistan in the 
mid-1970s.436 Although there was no hint of any existing “pan-Turkist” or “pan-Turanist” 
movement in the Turkmen SSR, Western observers interpreted that soviet propagandists 
constant attacks on “pan-Turkism” and “pan-Turanism” in the soviet press as a clear sign of 
the existence of movements in the region.437 However, Turkmen tribal structure was the 
only resistance to the proposed Soviet way of life. Traditionalism, sourced from this tribal 
structure, among the layman as well as the intelligentsia was rather the determining factor 
in Turkmenistan.438 At the end of 1969, on December the 24th, the Turkmen party Chief 
Balysh Ovezov was dismissed from his post with nationalist charges and Gapurov replaced 
him. The arrest of a leading Turkmen poet and writer in a mental hospital in 1971, was 
understood to be because of her independency-oriented thoughts by the West. However as 
early as 1963, the Turkmen language literary newspaper Edebiyat ve Sungat was launching 
discussions about honoring of native language and pride.439 
A well-known nomenclature to the Turkmen SSR, Pereudin, in duty since 1947, 
was released from his post of second secretary of Turkmen Communist Party central 
Committee in 1980.440 That could be a sign of an important change in the Turkmen 
                                                
436 In 1976, Turkmenskaya Iskra published a whole book on the end of Basmacıs, an importnat anti-Basmacı 
book in Russian by Yu.A. Polyakov, A.I. Chugunov. Konets Basmachestva. Moskva: Nauka, 1976.  
437 Teresa Rakowstra-Harmstone, "Nationalism in Soviet Asia since 1964," pp. 272-3. In.... George W. 
Simmonds (ed.), Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin (Detroit: 
The University of Detroit Press, 1977). Papers and proceedings of the symposia held at university of Detroit 
on October 3-4 1975.  
438 Tirksh Dzhumagel'diev, "Obnovlenie Traditsiy," Literaturnaya Gazeta No: 15 (8 April 1981), p. 4.  
439 Amanberdi Murat and George W. Simmonds, "Nationalism in Turkmenistan since 1964," pp. 316-321. In 
George W. Simmonds (ed.), Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the era of Brezhnev and Kosygin 
(Detroit: The University of Detroit Press, 1977). Papers and proceedings of the sympozia held at university of 
Detroit on October 3-4 1975, p. 318-20. It was underlined that Ethnic self-assertion was never separatist in 
Turkmenistan tough.  
440 Bess Brown, "Changes in Party Leadership in Turkmenistan," Radio Liberty Reserach paper RL/20/81, 
January 13, 1981.  
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leadership. Under Gapurov, tribalism reached its height in Turkmenistan where clan and 
personal loyalties were the only necessary qualifications for the cadres.441 Gapurov was 
retired on December 21, 1985 and Saparmyrat Niyazov took over as an anti-corruption 
figure who was already the chairman of the council of ministers. However, Gapurov's clan 
was fighting back by appointing Stalinist cadres to the leading positions as in the case of 
Gurbansakhadov’s appointment to the chairmanship of the writers’ union.442 By then, 
especially the countryside Turkmenistan was taken over by local lukmans (traditional 
healers), mollas (mullahs), Ishans (religious guides) and ocaks (holy families) who were 
practicing miracles and medicine together with the people's tomb worshipping tradition. 443  
In Gorbachev's speech to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union on January 27 1987, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and southern 
Kazak oblasts were mentioned as the core of corruption in the USSR.444 A known Turkmen 
tribalist and nationalist Khudayberdi Durdyev was appointed as the propaganda and 
ideology chief of the Turkmen party in 1988 who was an expert on Mahdumkuli and Sufi 
brotherhoods.445 It was still possible to speak about the open reaction of the Turkmen 
intelligentsia to the falsified version of their history for the sake of soviet propaganda.446 
In September 1989 a group of Turkmen intellectuals in Ashgabad established 
association of "Agzybirlik"-Unity for continuing their activities on the promotion of 
                                                
441 Patrick Cockburn, "Patrick Cockburn visits Soviet Turmenistan," The Finacial Times (February 25, 1986), 
p. 6.  
442 John Soper, "Older generation leader choosen as head of Turkmen writer's union," Radio Liberty reserach 
paper. RL 416/85 (December 11, 1985),  Krasnyi Arkhiv.  
443 See T. Atayev, "Din ve Mucize," Sovet Turkmenistany in Turkmen. (4 January 1986). SWB SU/8196/B/1 
(1 March 1986).  
444 See for the full text of this report and speech Pravda (January 28, 1987). Which leaded an ati-corruption 
campaign in Turkmenistan, see Bess Brown. "The Anti corruption campaign in Turkmenistan" Radio Liberty 
Research paper. RL 49/87. Krasnyi Arkhiv (January 30, 1987).  
445 Bess Brown, "A new kind of Ideological secretary in Turkmenistan?" Radio Liberty reserach paper, RL 
29/88 (January 21, 1988), Krasnyi Arkhiv.  
446 See Sh. Annaklychev, "Istoriya i My," Turkmenskaya Iskra (19 June 1988), p. 2.  
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Turkmen language, national customs and environmental rights. Although it was popular 
among the masse, in November 1989, Niyazov attacked the organization heavily and in the 
January of 1990 the organization was banned. It had a very similar program to Birlik of 
Uzbekistan.447 The absence of a democratic nationalist movement was strongly associated 
with the strong-continuing influence of the Teke tribe in central Turkmenistan, Ersary 
alongside the Turkmen-Afghan border and Yomud in western Turkmenistan. The low level 
of economic and social development, the absence of a sizeable intelligentsia and the 
Turkmen officials’ fear of perestroika made it almost impossible for the Turkmen 
intellectuals to continue this nationalist movement.448 
There was, like all other Muslim union republics, state controlled, Vatan association 
in Turkmenistan whose deputy president V. Gafurov attacked Agzybirlik, blaming it for 
promoting divisiveness, not unity.449 Agzybirlik organized a huge meeting in Ashgabad in 
January 1990, the anniversary of the Tsarist invasion of the country.450 Agzybirlik leaders 
Nurberdy Nurmamedov, Shirali Nurmuradov and Mehmet Sakhatov faced with harsh fines 
and harassment when they tried to collect signatures for the official registration of the 
organization.451 After mid-1990 the leaders of this movement were forced to flee the 
country, continuing their struggle in Moscow.  
 
                                                
447 Charles Arlson, "Inching towards Democratization," RL-RFE Research report (January 4, 1991). No 15, p. 
35-36.  
448 Annette Bohr, "Turkmenstan under Perestroika: An overview," RFE-RL report on the USSR (March 23, 
1990), pp. 20-30.  
449 V. Gafurov, "Kago azobshcaet Edinenie," Turkmenskaya Iskra (21 January 1990).  
450 "Probuzhdenie,"Atmoda, 26 February 1990. No. 9(66) p. 21.  
451 "Delo chlenov neformalniy organizatsii agzybirlik" (their letter to) Ogonek, No. 30, 1990. July. P. 3.  
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6.7 Summary 
 After the Second World War, which united the “Soviet People” against the common 
enemy, we observe a gradual increase in the tribal and local self-identification in Turkestan. 
In most cases throughout the post-war period the power remained in the hands of one tribe 
or local clan in every Soviet Central Asian republic. These sub-“national” identities, 
especially in politics, challenged the new “national” identities. However “amalgamation 
through particularization” was not so successful as seen in the native’s hatred against the 
Central Asian Russians in the Pahtakar events. The post-war and especially the Brezhnevite 
period also witnessed an important development; the tolerance of nationalist literature and 
the rehabilitation of the Turkestani past in several instances referred to as Mirasism.  
The émigré  literature out of the Soviet Union continued hardliner Turkestanist 
stance until the mid-1970s. However the weakening of this movement, caused by the lack 
of  cadres to continue Cedid-Alaş Orda-Turkestan (Khokand) Autonomy-Yeni Türkistan-
Yaş Türkistan-Waffen SS-Millî Türkistan-Dergi line. By the 1980s, remaining Turkestani 
associations and publications were monopolized in the hands of a few Uzbek idealist 
émigrés in the West.  
The post-Brezhnev anti-corruption drives, during both Andropov and then 
Gorbachev periods resulted with gradual dismissal of long lasted Brezhnevite cadres in 
Central Asian republics. Both Kunayev and Reşidov were charged of nationalism. Kunayev 
lived long enough to see the uprising of Kazak crowds when he was replaced with an 
outsider and the glorification of this event in the history of independent Kazakstan. On the 
other hand, Reşidov died before the Soviet authorities crushed his cult which would be 
partially reinstated in the independent Uzbekistan.  
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 The whole history of post-War Turkestan inside and outside the Soviet Union, was 
a story of an ongoing war between the two ideologies. Turkestanist and pan-Turkestan 
stands of the émigrés and the amalgamation of people’s policy of the Soviet authorities, 
which achieved far less than the Western predictions about the assimilation of Soviet 
Muslims. Although the concept of Turkestan was glorified and praised in some literary 
instances, on the level of the politics, tribal and local identities played an important role. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND UNIFICATION EFFORTS 
IN THE POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, significant initiatives in regional integration during the post-Soviet 
era (the 1990s) in Central Asia are presented. The basic emphasis is on the “summit 
diplomacy” trying to create a united Central Asia out of the post-Soviet chaos. The 
“unusually close” relations among the leaders of Central Asian states might provide a good 
picture of “unification for necessities” approach to the students of the region.  
 
 
7.2 The First Phase: Official Initiatives - Summit Diplomacy 1990-1991 
Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was a common practice of the 
Republican leaders in Central Asia to hold summit meetings to discuss regional problems 
and the problems emanating from Moscow.1 First Secretaries Niyazov of Turkmenistan, 
Makhamov of Tajikistan, Kerimov of Uzbekistan, Masaliyev of Kyrgyzstan and the host 
Nazarbayev of Kazakstan attended the noteworthy June 23, 1990 summit meeting in Alma-
Ata. It was noteworthy, because, during the Soviet Period, Kazakstan used to be included in 
a separate geographical and economic category by Moscow. Even for the practical 
                                                
1 Jon Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia (Manchester: Manchester University Press,1997), 
p. 198.  
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necessities, when they wanted to emphasize Kazakstan's commonalties with the rest of 
Turkestan, the terms “Sredniaia Azia (Middle Asia) and Kazakstan” were used. In June 
1990, the Kazak leadership joined the Middle (and later Central) Asian group, with an 
important emphasis on regional integration and the need for further cooperation. The 
mandates of the summit were the establishment of regional joint councils and committees 
in almost every field to tackle the common regional problems.2  
The second summit was only a few weeks before the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
in Tashkent on 14th of August 1991. The resolutions of this meeting were more concerned 
about the activation of regional councils and committees and the inclusion of Azerbaijan 
into this regional gathering.3 At this meeting, Askar Akayev, who replaced former Party 
Secretary Masaliyev in October 1990 just after the Osh events, represented Kyrgyzstan. 
While many of the leaders were uncomfortable with the fact that speedy transition in 
Moscow would cause greater dangers for themselves, these two summits, held before  
independence, were rather efforts to create a Muslim-Southern bloc within the Soviet 
Union. Especially after August 1991, "Central Asia's leaders were now orphans; their 
common 'fatherland' had died in the hands of Slavic brothers".4   
 
7.3 The Second Phase: Post Soviet Chaos 1991-1993 
It was only after three Slavic Republics decided to form a Commonwealth on the 8th 
of December 1991 that Central Asian leaders met in Ashkhabad on the 12th of December 
and decided to apply for membership to this Commonwealth. On the 21st of December 
                                                
2 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 52-53. 
3 There were controversial reports in the Western press whether if this meeting was a pan-Turkestan one. 
"...They should unite into a single Central Asian State, to be known as Turkestan." "Central Asian Republics 
Aim to Keep Moscow at a Distance," Financial Times (14.8.1991), p. 2  
4 Olcott, p. 54.  
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1991, eleven former Soviet States met in Alma-Ata and formed the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.5 The speedy collapse of the Soviet Union seemed for a long time 
unbelievable to the Central Asian leaders - in 1991 and even in 1992 - after they all had 
declared their independence! Since the collapse of the Union and the creation of the CIS 
took place almost simultaneously, many leaders and many observers believed that CIS 
would be the new name of the Union.  
The Ashkhabad summit was the third Central Asian regional summit. Nursultan 
Nazarbayev was the first one in Ashkhabad meeting on 12 December 1991 to propose a 
Turkic or Central Asian Union.6 According to some observers, the resolutions of this 
meeting and Nazarbayev's hard stand for a separate “Central Asian Union” were rather a 
part of political tactics to balance Slavic Union already established by Russia, the Ukraine 
and Belarus, and persuade them to establish a greater commonwealth including the rest of 
the former Soviet States. How sincere Nazarbayev was in this stand is not known. 
However, one can conclude that the Alma-Ata meeting on the 21st of December 
establishing CIS was an outcome of Nazarbayev's initiative on the issue keeping the unity 
of the former Soviet space. 
By then, none of the Central Asian Presidents had established their strict rules over 
their countries. Nazarbayev was under heavy pressure by the Kazak nationalists who were 
demanding a new status for the Kazak language and new regulations concerning the inter-
ethnic balances in the country.7 In Uzbekistan Kerimov was rather paralyzed with the 
growing support of the masses to the democratic opposition Erk and Birlik, both 
championing Pan-Turkist and Turkestanist political programs. In Turkmenistan, Niyazov 
                                                
5 Anderson, p. 198.  
6 Anderson, p. 138.  
7 Kamal Smailov, "Radi Spravedlivosti ...," Kazakhstankaya Pravda (8 February 1992), p. 2.  
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had his own version of secular culture but insisted that Turkmens do have unique ways in 
every aspect of life.8 He was at the very beginning of building his own personality cult and 
strict authoritarian regime, while acting very quickly to crash newly developing democratic 
and pan-Turkist opposition, Agzybirlik.. Akayev of Kyrgyzstan was rather a new-comer to 
the political arena, and had little to tell his people. Erkin and Egemen groups were the 
democratic pan-Turkist groups already offering Kyrgyz a pan-Turkestan program. 
Under these circumstances, a fourth summit was held in Bishkek on the 23rd of 
April 1992. The agenda was again “how to achieve greater regional cooperation and 
integration?” However, fears of emerging Uzbek hegemony in the region prevented the 
leaders from discussing further integration.9 The Bishkek meeting also marked the first 
signs of Tajikistan's reservations about such a union in Central Asia, as Tajikistan was the 
only absentee in Bishkek. Another important feature of this meeting was the attendance of 
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozyrev as an observer. This was clearly a 
sign of Russia's interest in what was happening in the region. However, Niyazov was still 
there and hadn’t made up his mind yet about the integration issue. Grown up in an 
orphanage, called himself Turkmenbashi and Serdar (not only vozhd like Stalin), in 1989, 
he tried to promote a plan for bilingualism but soon, retreated as he feared the reactions of 
Turkmen intellectuals and elders.10 By the beginning of 1992, Niyazov’s cult had been 
recognized11 as a product of Turkmen culture. It was best formulated in the words of the 
Turkmen ambassador to Moscow: “How we pray to one God we are loyal to one 
                                                
8 Saparmurat Niyazov, "Turkmenistan ne budet nikommunisticheskim ni islamskim," an interview by Andrey 
Mesherin, Turkmenskaya Iskra ( 24 February 1992), p. 1-2.  
9 "Integratsiya..," Izvestiya (23 April 1992),  see also B. Brown, "Regional Coopeeration in Central Asia?" 
RFE/RL, Reserach Report, 2:5 (29 January 1993), p. 32.  
10 Christopher J. Panico, "Turkmenistan Unaffacted by winds of democratic change," RFE/RL reserach report 
(January 22 1993), Vo. 2. No. 4. pp. 6-10.  
11 See especially several letters published, which praise, thank and even pray for the health of the President 
Niyazov, "Desyat' let blagopoluchiya," Komsomolskaya Pravda (23.1.1993), p. 2.  
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president”.12 Niyazov, declaring Islam and national culture as the spirit of Turkmen people, 
was promising land reform “as soon as possible”.13 The Russian press was alarmed over the 
Turkmen’s desire to share their wealth with Iran and Turkey. The term “second Kuwait” 
began to be used then.14 However, he was the one who first resisted the “colonial demands” 
of the Kozyrev diplomacy, which was insisting on the right of dual citizenship for the Slavs 
in Turkestan.15 
The fifth summit was opened on the 4th of January 1993 in Tashkent. This time the 
Uzbek leadership invited Tajik16 counterpart on purpose to strengthen the Tajik 
commitment to regional integration. The adoption of the term “Tsentralnaya Azia” (Central 
Asia) for the whole region replacing the Russian term “Srednyaya Azia (Middle Asia) and 
Kazakstan” was one of the main achievements of this summit. 
Leaders of Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
attending a summit in Tashkent, have declared their intention to use Central Asia as 
the collective term for their five republics... they had taken appropriate steps to 
create a common market of Central Asian states... an inter-republican coordinating 
council would be established to coordinate actions... The creation of a regional 
information network, including a regional newspaper and a television service, were 
also envisaged under the agreements.17 
 
 At this Tashkent summit, Central Asian leaders developed a plan for the regional 
integration - an imitation of the European Union system: foreseeing a common currency, 
free movement of goods, labor and capital as well as the elimination of all trade barriers all 
                                                
12 Interview with Pasol Turkmenistana Niyaz Nurkylychev in Moscow. "Odin narod-odin prezident," 
Vechernaya Moskva (29.01.1993), p. 2.  
13 Saparmurat Niyazov, " Interview: Vremya Pokazhaet kto prav," Vechernaya Moskva (15.03.1993), p. 2.  
14 Yuriy Vasilyev, "Karakumskie Sheykhi," Rossiya, No 15. 7-13 (04.1993), p. 4.  
15  "Dual citizenship the main subject at Kozyrev-Tereschenko talks,"Interfax (17 nov 1993).  
16 We can divide Tajik people into seven different regional-clan groups: the northern (Leninabad Region), the 
people of Kulob (in the western part of the Khatlon Region), the people of Kurgantepe (the western part of the 
Khatlon region), the people of Garm (east of Dushanbe several districts at the center), the people of Hisor 
(Centre, west of Dushanbe), the people of Dushanbe (capital), the people of Badakshan (in the Badakshan A. 
Region). Apart from these differences, one third of the population in Tajikistan is consisted of Ethnic Uzbeks, 
left on the other side of the border during the national-territorial demarcation of Turkestan.  
17 SWB (6 January 1993), SU/1579, ITAR-TASS (4 January 1993). For further on this see also "V Tashkente," 
Izvestiya (6 January 1993), p. 3.  
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over the region.18 Some leaders, like Kerimov, even made it clear that he CIS was not a tool 
for further integration, but a tool for stable disintegration (a soft divorce) of the Soviet 
Union.19  
In an appeal to the heads of states of Central Asia, the representatives of Uzbek 
institutions said: " We believe that Central Asia will always be a welcoming common home 
for all peoples inhabiting it, an example of peace and progress, inter-ethnic accord and 
political stability."20 For leaders like Akayev, an integration of the "core" CIS states, 
Russia, Kazakstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was necessary,21 and this summit 
was a step towards this integration. These "gigantic" steps created excitement in the Tajik 
leadership too – in fact, Tajiks were welcoming this development more than anyone:  
Clearly, the implementation of this project is a task for the future but it is 
completely realistic. This confidence is based on the aspiration of fraternal peoples 
for unity and on their aspiration to live in their large country in peace and 
prosperity.22 
 
 However, the same Central Asian leaders, after weeks, met in Minsk for the CIS 
summit and signed the contradictory documents: strengthening CIS structures but 
weakening regional attempts to unite. It was in fact after this Minsk summit, Rakhmanov of 
Tajikistan and Niyazov of Turkmenistan both distanced themselves from each other and 
with the rest of the Central Asian leaders. It was here, Nazarbayev declared his Eurasian 
                                                
18 See Serik Primbetov, “Regionalnaya Integratsiya Tsentral’noaziatskikh Gosudarstv: Itogi, Opyt, Problemy, 
perspektivy,” Gribert Diter (izd.) Regionalya Integratsiya v Tsentralnoy Azii (Berlin: Germanskiy Fond 
Mezhdunardonogo Razvitiya, 1995), pp. 113-131. See also for a common perception of regional cooperation 
teories by the Central Asians, El’mar Al’tfater, “Regionalizatsiya Mirovogo Rynka,” Ibid, pp. 59-112.  
19 "President Criticizes CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly but Says CIS Necessary", SWB (5 January 1993), 
SU/1578 B/4, Interfax, Moscow in English 1639 gmt (31 Dec 1992).  
20 "Uzbek Representatives Welcome Central Asian Unity", SWB (21 January 1993), SU/1592 B/9, Tajik 
Radio, Dushanbe in Russian 0400 gmt 19 January 93.  
21 "Akayev Urges Integration of Core CIS States," SWB (9 January 1993), SU/1582 B/5, Izvestiya (Moscow: 7 
January 93).  
22 SWB (9 January 1993), SU/1582 B/4, Tajik Radio, Dushanbe in Russian 0400 gmt (7 January 93).  
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Economic Union idea to the public for the first time.23 Championing economic integration, 
Nazarbayev claimed "Alma Ata could become a Mecca for the developers and planners of 
the integration of the Eurasian Economic Zone."24 On the other hand, Niyazov was not that 
optimistic, he declared that Turkmenistan "rejects the creation, in the CIS, of strict 
centralized structures whose activities will have a super-state character".25  
As 1993 wore on, meetings of the Central Asian 'five' increasingly became 
gatherings of a regional 'troika'. Subsequent regional meetings took the form of 
consultations among Nazarbayev, Akayev and Karimov; meeting jointly and 
separately, while the idea of a full-fledged Central Asian regional organization 
disappeared from most people's minds.26 
 
 The most important feature of this second phase of official attempts for integration 
was the fact that each Central Asian leadership had different ideas in mind concerning the 
issue. Niyazov was the first leader to refuse any further integration and super-state 
structures, which would eventually limit state sovereignty.27 Kerimov was trying to change 
Niyazov’s stand on this by asserting his political weight and assuring him that "the possible 
unification of the Central Asian states on a regional basis would not damage their 
independence."28 Interestingly, although Nazarbayev was the first to announce his desire to 
create a Central Asian Union in 1991, he was again the first who publicly denounced the 
                                                
23 Eurasianism or Eurasian Union ideas have a long history in the Soviet literarute. It is best described as a 
quasi-political intellectual movement of Soviet intelligentsiya. “Its representatives state that Russia is a 
unique blend of Slavic and non-Slavic cultures and ethnic groups. Eurasianists also emphasize the corporate 
nature of the Russian state which makes it quite different from the West. Eurasianism emerged in the 1920s as 
an anti-Bolshevik movement. Yet, through its evolution, Eurasianism has become closer and closer to the 
Soviet brand of Marxism. In its blending of Marxism with nationalism, Eurasianism was one of the precurors 
to the present-day ideology of post-Soviet Russia”. See the best piece on this idea by Dmitry V. Slapenkoth, 
“Eurasianism: Past and Present,” Communist and Post Communist Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 129-151.  
24 "Nazarbayev Says Kazakstan Leading Way to Greater CIS Economic Cooperation," SWB (28 January 
1993), SU/1598 B/3, Interfax in English 1632 gmt (26 January 1993).  
25 "Niyazov on CIS summit," SWB (29 January 1993), SU/1599 B/5, Interfax in English, 1633 (26 January 
93).  
26 Olcott, p. 56.  
27 For Niyazov, "horizontal, bilateral ties, rather than blocs and consultative, not coordinating bodies" were 
much favourable. See “Ashkhabad Central Asian leaders meeting cancelled,” SWB, SU/1664 B/16 (16 April 
1993), Interfax 1320 gmt (9 April 1993).  
28 “Turkmen and Uzbek Presidents comment on CIS and Central Asian Unity,” SWB SU/1670 B/11 (23 April 
1993), ITAR-TASS 1335 gmt (15 April 1993).  
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possibility of a Central Asian confederation on the political bases.29 When Nazarbayev, 
Akayev and Kerimov met in Chimkent on 28th of May 1993, at a commemoration 
ceremony for the Kazak national figures Tolebi, Kazbekbi and Aytekebi, they jointly 
declared these three Kazak heroes as common historical heroes of all three states.30 
Kerimov was still too reluctant about Russia and explained his commitment to bilateral 
relations with Russia, as he summarized this stand with such words; "we need Russia like 
air, like water."31 Rakhmanov was in power in Tajikistan only with the help of the CIS 
"peace-keepers" among whom considerable number of Uzbek, Kazak and Kyrgyz draftees 
existed. It was also no secret that, in Tajikistan, Tajik opposition had an important enmity 
towards the very term Turkestan and the Turkic Union.32 The idea of a Central Asian Union 
was still too much a "paper project", with lots of good will but nothing on the ground yet. 
Kerimov was yet at that stage trying to understand the motives of the Turkestanist 
opposition and the best way to increase Uzbekistan's regional role. Nazarbayev, by all 
means a champion of formulas for the resurrection of the Soviet Union in a more civilized 
manner, was still after developing his Eurasian Economic Union idea. Akayev of 
Kyrgyzstan was a close follower of Nazarbayev and was one of the advocates of Russia's 
leading role in every kind of new association among the former Soviet States. Disappointed 
by the ignorance of Slavs of Central Asians in their efforts to keep the unity of the former 
Soviet peoples, the second phase of the regional summit diplomacy was more concentrated 
on developing a means of integration. However, members of the "troika", Kazakstan, 
                                                
29 “Nazarbayev rules out idea of Central Asian confederation,” SWB SU/1682 B/3 (7 May 1993) ITAR-TASS 
1352 gmt (5 May 1993).  
30 “Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan sign friendship declaration,”SWB SU/1702 B/12 (31 
May 1993), Kazak Radio 2300 gmt (28 May 1993).  
31 “Karimov defends his policies against accusations of strong-arm tactics,”SWB SU/1713 B/11 (12 June 
1993). Trud (26 May 1993).  
32 As early as May 1992, slogans like "Curse Turkestan and Turks" were common among the Tajik opposition 
rallies in Dushanbe. See Vanora Bennett, "Tajikistan: Clans, Mafias and Poverty," Reuters (07 May 1992).  
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Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, were also following their own agendas in their bilateral 
relations with the CIS and Russia.  
 
7.4 The Third Phase: Summit Diplomacy of the "Troika" 1993-1998 
It was at the second ECO summit in Istanbul, Nazarbayev "expressed his conviction 
that a “Central Asian Common Market” will one day come into being".33 Simultaneously, 
Egemen Kazakstan and Kazakstanskaya Pravda were accusing the leaderships of three 
Slavic states, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, for exploiting Kazak President's ideas on 
integration while isolating Central Asia from this new union. "The newspaper interpreted 
the formation of the alliance as a response to the recent establishment of an economic 
alliance of Turkic-speaking countries in Istanbul."34 At the same time, the renowned Kazak 
poet, Olcas Süleymanov, as the leader of the Peoples Congress Party, proposed to form a 
Russian-Kazak confederation.35 The failure of three Slavic states to invite Kazakstan to 
their Economic Union [claiming that Kazakstan preferred membership to ECO, with 
Pakistan and Turkey] in fact "bewildered" Kazak political circles.36 
At the sixth Central Asian summit, which was held on the 29th of July 1993 in 
Alma-Ata, both Nazarbayev and Kerimov called for further integration and signed a six-
year economic integration treaty between their states.37 This was followed by the August 
1993 Moscow summit of Russia and the Central Asian states on the Tajik issue. With 
Nazarbayev's proposal, the summit "had adopted an appeal to CIS to move further towards 
                                                
33 SWB, ME/1735 c/1 (8 July 1993). Turkish Agency Report on First Session.  
34 "Kazak newspapers criticize economic alliance of Russia, Ukraine and Belarussia," SWB, SU/1743 B/4 (17 
July 1993).  
35 SWB, SU/1743 B/5 (17 July 1993), Interfax 1818 gmt (5 July 93).  
36 "Kazakstan bewildered by failure to invite it to economic union," SWB, SU 1754 C1/5 (30 July 1993).  
37 “Kazakstan and Uzbekistan sign agreements on economic cooprration,” SWB (2 August 1993), SU/1756 
C2/7. ITAR-TASS, 1440 gmt (29 July).  
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the creation of an economic union".38 At this summit, Nazarbayev initiated the re-
integration idea, which was also supported temporarily by Kerimov, who desired more 
stability in the region even at the cost of the continuation of the Russian existence in the 
region.39 
 The seventh summit of the "troika" was held on the 26-27th of August 1993 in 
Kokchetav. This was mainly on mutual economic ties and called for further economic 
cooperation.40 Forced out of the Ruble Zone, just prior to the introduction of national 
currencies, Kerimov hoped to introduce a single currency in Central Asia, at least both in 
Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.41 However, Nazarbayev had a quite different agenda; he was 
more concerned about keeping the territorial integrity of Kazakstan and was quite alarmed 
by the danger of disintegration due to tribal and clan differences. He said: "relative 
independence of the regions is being taken advantage of by the local elite to establish tribal 
ideology and clan-related-protectionism".42 Then, in an election speech in November 1993, 
the Russian nationalist leader Zhirinovskiy's proposed the creation of a "Tashkent 
Province" out of five Central Asian states. Taken very seriously by the Central Asians, 
Zhirinovsky's remarks were condemned by many; while countless references were made to 
the great past of Turkestan in the Central Asian press.43 
 
                                                
38 “Moscow summit adops appeal for CIS economic union,” SWB SU/1762 (9 August 1993), ITAR TASS (7 
August 1993).  
39 “Nezavisimaya Gazeta on Unperecdented Meeting with Central Asian States,” SWB SU/1762 C2/1 (9 
August 1993). Vitaliy Portnikov. "Russian Turkestan Union," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (6 August 93). 
40 “Informal Kazak, Kyrgyz and Uzbek Summit on strengthening economic ties,” SWB SU/1783 G/1 (2 
September 1993), ITAR-TASS 1209 gmt (30 August).  
41 “Uzbek president hopes Kazakstan and Uzbekistan will have the same currecy,” SWB SU/1793 G/1 (14 
September 1993). Interfax in English 0900 gmt (4 Sept 1993).  
42 “President Nazarbayev alarmed by rise of tribal differences,” SWB SU/1823 G/1 (19 October 1993). Holos, 
Kiev in Ukranian (13 October 93), p.1.  
43 “Condemnation of Zhirinovskiy's idea of Tashkent Province,” SWB SU/1859 g/6 (30 November 1993). 
Ostankino Chanel 1 TV, 1500 gmt (26 November 93).  
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7.4.1 Uniting Central Asia: Single Economic Zone and Central Asian Economic Union 
(CAEU) 
A significant milestone in the search for a Central Asian integration was the eighth 
summit which took place on the 10th of January 1994, when Kazak and Uzbek presidents in 
Tashkent agreed to set up a single economic union and strengthen their cooperation in all 
fields.44 The next day in Nukus, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the Russian Deputy Premier Yuriy Yarov met to discuss the 
ecological situation of Aral Sea.45 The ecological disaster in the Aral-Turkestan basin had 
then become another component, providing Central Asian leaderships a common platform 
for working out the common problems of the region.  
In 1994, Nazarbayev ratified the agreement on the creation of a single economic 
zone with Uzbekistan, which called for abolishing the customs checkpoints on the borders 
with Uzbekistan and encouraging the free circulation of goods between the two countries.46 
By April 1994, Akayev was the only supporter of the Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union 
project.47 Kerimov, considering it a path to the past, was categorically rejecting this project 
of a Eurasian Union.48 This situation heated up the relations between the two presidents, 
Nazarbayev and Kerimov. At this point, Akayev played the role of the mediator and 
organized a summit in the Kyrgyz resort Cholpon Ata at the weekend of 30th of April - 1st 
                                                
44 “Kazak and Uzbek presidents agree single economic space,” SWB SU/1896 G/1 (15 January 94), ITAR-
TASS 0632 gmt (11 January 94).  
45 “Central Asian Summit agrees measures to save Aral Sea,” SWB SU/1896 (15 January 94), ITAR-TASS 
1408 gmt (11 January 94).  
46 “Nazarbayev ratifies economic agreement with Uzbekistan,” SWB SU/1947 G/6 (16 March 1994). ITAR-
TASS 1709 gmt (14 March 94). Author was at the Kazak-Uzbek border during the very time customs ceheck 
points were removed on both sides.  
47 “Eurasian Union a promising Idea, says President Akayev,” SWB SU/1965 G/2 (7 April 1994), ITAR-TASS 
0834 gmt (1 April 94).  
48 “France and Uzbekistan sign economic cooperation agreements,” SWB SU/1989 G/6 (05 May 1994). APN 
Uzbek News Agency, 0000 gmt (27 April 1994).  
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of May 1994, where a prospect for a reconciliation was reached.49 This was the ninth 
official summit of the "troika". Kerimov criticized Nazarbayev quite harshly, by stating that 
this Eurasian project "is merely a new slogan, purposefully declared to strengthen this 
leader's personal authority, which would lead to Yugoslavization of the former Soviet 
space".50 At the summit, although the relations between the two presidents were better, both 
kept their earlier stands concerning the Eurasian Union idea. 
 
7.4.2 Nazarbayev the Eurasianist 
Nazarbayev was enthusiastic about his project; and he refuted the accusations that it 
was a plan for resurrecting the Soviet Union.51 On the same day he declared his 
commitment to the project, Nazarbayev arrived in Tashkent for the celebration of a Kazak 
cultural festival, where he echoed Kerimov in calling for further integration between their 
countries as well as within all CIS countries.52 While some argued that sensitive ethnic 
balances in Kazakstan had required such a policy,53 Nazarbayev was insisting on the 
                                                
49 “Kazak-Uzbek relations improve after Kyrgyz summit,” SWB SU/1991 G/1 (02 May 94), Izvestiya (4 May 
94), p. 3. By Vladimir Ardayev and Shakhabuddin Zaynutdinov.  
50 “Karimov rejects Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union Plan,” SWB SU/1997 G/2 (14 May 1994), ITAR-TASS 0722 
(11 May 94).  
51 “Kazakstan reiterates commitment to idea of Eurasian Union,” SWB SU/2007 G/1 (27 May 94). ITAR-TASS 
0910 gmt (25 May 94).  
52 “Kazak and Uzbek leaders call for closer cooperation,” SWB SU/2009 G/1 (30 May 1994), ITAR-TASS 
1004 gmt (25 May 94).  
53 V. Moiseev, "Ne inostrantsy, no i ne svoy," Rossiiskaya Gazeta (27.8.1993), p. 7. Anti-russian historian in 
mass comunication, it is a struggle of emographic majority although it is said we, people of Kazakstan not 
peoples of Kazakstan.  
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unification of all of the “structures” of the union members.54 Kazak Foreign office also 
declared this idea as being their new foreign policy concept.55 
Like Kerimov, Turkmen president Niyazov also opposed Nazarbayev's project, 
finding it “premature, unnecessary and separatist” within the CIS.  
What is Eurasian Union? Does anybody know what sort of union it is? Is it just a 
sign to replace the CIS or is it a new, natural kind of commonwealth or a new 
confederation? What is it? I simply do not see the mechanism, function or task of 
that Eurasian Union and I fail to understand why a group rose up immediately that 
supported it, and a group rejected it.56 
 
Probably the original engineer of the project, Olcas Süleymanov, then the leader of 
the People's Congress Party, was claiming that a confederation or a union of independent 
countries in Eurasia was historically inevitable.57 Nazarbayev, for the rest of 1990s, 
adopted this view and kept his stand concrete.  
The tenth summit of the troika was planned for Chimkent on the 1st of July 1994, 
but moved to Almaty on the 8th of July. The meeting was to concentrate on the issues of 
regulating the free economic zone and the free circulation of labor among the three states.58 
Prior to this summit, Kerimov had made himself clear once more on his opposition to the 
idea of the Eurasian Union. According to him, the union was basically a political 
                                                
54 Interfax (31 March 1994). "Nazarbayev: concept of Eurasian union is a subject for discussions with 
common wealth partners". It is just an idea, not an official proposal, to replace CIS with single coordination, 
economic and military policies and a single currency, single parliament, council of defence ministers, defence 
complex, a single citizenship, with official Russian language. During his visit to Moscow in his speech in 
Moscow state university.  
55 Interfax (15 april 1994). "Former Soviet Republics will unite Kazakhstan" Kazak foreign minister Terleutai 
Suleimanov; Eurasian Union is declared as the new foreign policy goal modeling EU structures.  
56“Russian reporters question Turkmen President on Economy, personality cult,”  SWB SU/2009 G/4 (30 May 
1994), Ostankino Channel 1 TV, 1120 gmt (22 May 1994).  
57 “Leader of People's Congress Party on Eurasian Union,” SWB SU/2028 G/1 22 (June 1994), ITAR-TASS 
0635 gmt (21 June 94).  
58 “Central Asian presidents to hold economic summit,” SWB SU/2035 G/1 (30 June 1994). Kyrgyzkabar, 
1000 gmt (28 jun 94).  
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superstructure to replace the dead Soviet Empire.59 Irrespective of Kerimov's opposition, 
Nazarbayev submitted the plan for the Eurasian Union60 to the UN General Assembly on 
the 1st of July 1994.61 However, the summit was not a failure. There, an interstate council, 
an intergovernmental commission and other bodies of integration were set up among 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where the Kyrgyz president expressed his 
continuing support for a Eurasian Union.62 At this meeting, the agreements concerning the 
establishment of a common Central Asian Bank, joint ministerial councils63 for the 
implementation of the common economic zone plans were signed. To accomplish these, an 
intergovernmental commission and interstate council were set up. At this meeting, 
Nazarbayev declared his strong opposition to the Russian “Near Abroad” policy and 
concept. Akayev was rather supportive of everything Nazarbayev said and announced his 
strong support for Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union plan. Kerimov was rather trying to assert 
that this Central Asian trilateral integration would have no contradiction with their devotion 
to the progress of commonwealth treaties.64  
 Within the troika, Kerimov was left alone. He was very uncomfortable with 
Akayev's support for Nazarbayev's Eurasian Union plan, and ruled it out by declaring it a 
                                                
59 “Karimov interviewed on Eurasian Union,” SWB SU/2040 G/1 (06 July 1994), Ostankino Mayak Radio, 
0211 gmt (4 July 94).  
60 For the program of this project see Nezavisimaya Gazeta (8 June 1994).  
61 “Nazarbayev submits Eurasian Union Plan to the UN,” SWB SU/2043 G/1 (09 July 1994). ITAR-TASS 2056 
gmt (1 July 94).  
62 “Uzbek-Kazak-Kyrgyz summit held in Alma-Ata,” SWB SU/2045 G/1 (12 July 1994) ITAR-TASS 0530 gmt 
(8 July 1994).  
63 Following the summit, a council of primiers, a council of ministers of foreign affairs, and a council of 
ministers of defence were established. And after few days, Serik Pirimbetov, perivious head of the CIS 
department in Kazakstan's presidential office was appointed as the Chairman of joint Kazak-Kyrgyz-Uzbek 
interstate council. See the text of joint comminuque, “Uzbek, Kazak, and Kyrgyz leaders issue statement after 
summit,”SWB SU/2048 G/1 (15 July 1994), Narodnoye Slovo, Tashkent (12 July 1994), p. 2, and SWB 
SU/2048 G/2 (15 July 1994) “Chairman appointed to new Central Asian joint Committee,” ITAR-TASS 1236 
gmt (13 July 1994).  
64 “Uzbek Kazak Summit held in Alma-Ata,” SWB, SU/2045 G/1-G/4 (12 July 1994), Narodnoye Slovo, 
(Tashkent: 9 July 1994), p. 1, Kazak Radio 1400 gmt (8 July 1994).  
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“new attempt to create a super-state structure”, and also an intrigue against the idea of 
Turkestan: 
They [certain forces] don't want the idea of Turkestan to be prevalent among us, 
they don't wish to see it implemented and they cannot accept it... To reach this goal political 
matters must not be rushed. Nothing can be achieved with hustle. 
 
About the idea of the Eurasian Union he was quite clear: 
 
What is this talk? I personally think there are many factors and aims behind these 
moves-recreating the old former USSR. I recall a saying...'to once again tie a rope 
round our necks and be taken off and tied up in a cattle shed'. Our aim is first and 
foremost for every country and state to be independent. It is necessary for us to 
strengthen our independence, and then we will naturally get closer to each other in 
the economic, intellectual and cultural fields, and if necessary in other areas, and 
there will be many possibilities for this. First of all it is necessary for the state to be 
independent, and then one can create a formation, like the European Union in 
Europe. The word union is good word but it has different meanings... The peoples of 
Central Asia, Middle Asia must first be brought closer to each other so that they live 
together, and then we will look into other things.65 
 
 Kerimov's paranoia about the other two leaders led the two unite against him at the 
summit, which in turn necessitated another intermediation by Akayev. Only ten days after 
this summit the three presidents met again at the summer residence of Kyrgyz president on 
the shores of Issyk Kul.66 Again, another temporary reconciliation was reached during this 
two-day meeting. There, they decided to leave the working out the details to the premiers of 
the three countries.  
 For this purpose, Kazakstan’s premier Sergey Tereshchenko, Uzbekistan's premier 
Abul Kasim Mutalov and Kyrgyzstan's premier Apas Cumagulov held a meeting in 
                                                
65 “Uzbek leader seeks closer Central Asian ties but no recreated USSR,” SWB, SU/2045 G/10 (12 July 1994), 
Uzbek Radio, Tashkent, 1000 gmt (8 July 1994).  
66 “Central Asian presidents to rest at Issyk Kul,” SWB, SU/2053 G/1 (21 July 1994), ITAR-TASS, 1251 gmt 
(18 July 1994). This was an un-official meeting and no joint comminuques were declared.  
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Bishkek on the 5th of August to work out the details of the integration – namely the setting 
up of the Central Asian Bank for Development and Cooperation, the statutes of Councils of 
Ministers and other details.67 The Central Asian Economic Union was now officially 
registered and became active.  
 However, the plan for a Eurasian Union was still the first priority of Nazarbayev's 
diplomacy. The Kazak officials were trying to assert that the plan was rather economic than 
political. For the Kazak deputy premier Akecan Kacegeldin, the idea of the Eurasian Union 
was purely economic, which would facilitate the best market for Kazak exports.68 However, 
the devotion of the Kazaks’ desire to establish political and legal bases of the plan was 
unshakable. The Kazak leadership even organized an international conference to 
materialize the plan for the Eurasian Union.69 Despite Kerimov's hysterical protests, 
Nazarbayev proceeded with his plan of advanced CIS integration and the creation of a 
Eurasian Union.  
Strategically Kazakstan cannot do without Russia, just as Russia cannot do without 
Kazakstan... Our idea of Eurasian Union has pushed all politicians and presidents to 
adopt fair decisions on setting up the CIS Interstate Economic Committee, on 
working out a customs and payments union, and on more vigorous activity by the 
CIS Interparliamentary Assembly.70 
 
                                                
67 “Central Asian Premiers approve two Kazak officials for interstate bodies,” SWB, SU/2071 G/1 (11 August 
1994). Kazak Radio, 1400 gmt (5 August 1994).  
68 “Kazak deputy premier reports on state of republic's economy,” SWB SU/2090 G/2-4 (2 September 1994). 
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda  (19 August, 1994), p.1and 3.  
69 SWB SU/2110 G/1 (26 September 1994). Kazakstan hosts conference on idea of Eurasian Union, ITAR-
TASS 1002 gmt (22 September 1994). "A- three-day conference on President Nursultan Nazarbayev's 
Eurasian Union proposals, ended in Kazak capital on 22nd  September with calls for greater integratiıon 
between the CIS republics... The conference also suggested specific steps to bring about integration betweeen 
the former Soviet states, including seting up a Eurasian institute of legal insurance of economic integration 
and to set up an International Nongovernmental foundation on the problems of Eurasian economic 
integration." 
70 “Nazarbayev on greater integration among CIS states,” SWB SU/2193 G/1 (5 January 1995), Interfax, 1427 
gmt (30 December 1994).  
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 The Turkmen leadership, promoting bilateral relations with Russia, always declared 
the "present democratic Russia" as the key partner for Turkmenistan; and even explained 
the close ties with Iran in this connection.71 For Niyazov, Russia was the sole guarantor of 
the Turkmen independence in the region.72 However, Niyazov was always cautious - 
underlining consultative rather than coordinative nature of the CIS.73 The Turkmen 
establishment had used this as a propaganda item to show the sensitivity of the 
“Turkmenbaşı” about their independence. On the other hand, Akayev was complaining 
about Russia's ignorance of Central Asian affairs.74 
 The only concrete result of the tenth summit was the actual establishment of the 
Central Asian Bank. The first Chairman of Central Asian Bank was appointed in late 
August 1994 by a decree of the three presidents, the name was the former deputy chair of 
Kazak Alem Bank [Kazak Eximbank], Satıbaldı Sazanov.75 Even before the official 
establishment of Tsentralazbank, Central Asian national banks set up a coordinating body 
to promote integrated economic structure among the Kazak, Kyrgyz and Uzbek 
economies.76 The need for a common financial and monetary policy in the region was 
apparent and the establishment of the common bank was the first step towards achieving 
this objective.  
                                                
71 SWB, SU/2090 G/9 (2 September 1994), ITAR-TASS 1107 gmt (24 August 1994).  
72 “Turkmenistan sees Russia as guarantor of independence,” SWB SU/2117 G/1 (4 October 1994), ITAR-
TASS 0817 gmt (1 October 1994).  
73 “President Niyazov stresses independence within CIS,” SWB SU/2131 G/3 (20 October 1994) ITAR-TASS 
2257 gmt (17 October 1994).  
74 “Akayev: Russia cannot abandon Central Asia,” SWB SU/2126 G/1 (14 October 1994) Izvestiya (5 October 
1994), p. 4.  
75 “First Chairman of Central Asian Bank appointed,” SWB SU/2092 G/1 5 September 1994, Kazak TV, 
1400gmt (29 August 1994).  
76 “Central Asian national banks set up coordinating body,” SWB, SUW/0358 WB/3 (11 November 1994), 
Slovo Kyrgyzstana (27 October 1994), p. 1.  
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In October 1994, the presidents of Turkmenistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan arrived in Istanbul for the second Turkic Summit, which was quite a show of 
unity against the Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs' protests to the summit.77 Although 
many have debated the nature of these Turkic Summits, it was still a sign of joint will to 
attend the summit in spite of strong reactions from the Russian officials.  
Kerimov, while hailing bilateral ties with Russia and praising the CIS integration, 
ruled out the idea of a Eurasian Union once again. He blamed the opponents of this idea as 
being saboteurs of CIS integration.78 Nazarbayev's disappointment with the ignorance of 
Kerimov to his Eurasian plan led him to develop closer ties with Russia.79 Thus, he 
distanced himself even further from the Islamic and Turkic organizations. When Kazakstan 
was invited to full membership into the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
Nazarbayev said that the organization was too politicized; and added "Neither Pan-Turkism 
nor Pan-Islamism could be accepted by Kazakstan. We have made a different choice".80 
 Kerimov, being in an undeclared battle against the Eurasian [or Nazarbayev] Union 
plan, just before departing from Tashkent for the CIS summit on 9th of February 1995 in 
Alma Ata, once again, declared the Nazarbayev's plan “as an attempt to resurrect the 
USSR”:  
                                                
77 “Turkic states issue declaration at the end of summit,” SWB SU/2133 G/1 (22 October 1994). TRT TV 1200 
gmt (19 October 1994) and “Russia Warns Turkic states against isolationism,” ITAR-TASS 1722 gmt (18 
October 1994).  
78 “President Karimov says no alternative to CIS, dismisses idea of Eurasian Union,” SWB SU/2173 G/3 (8 
December 1994), Interfax 1657 gmt (29 November 1994).   
79“Kazak and Russian presidents meet,”  See SWB SU/2207 G/1 (21 January 1995) Interfax 1046 gmt (20 
January 1995), and “Russia and Kazakstan to set up joint armed forces this year,” Interfax 1212 gmt (20 
January 95), SWB SU/2210 G/1 (25 January 1995), “Russian and Kazak presidents hail closer integration,” 
Ostankino Radio Mayak 1538 gmt (20 January 1995).  
80 “Kazak President says OIC too politicized,” SWB SU/2218 G/7 (3 February 1995), ITAR-TASS 0024 gmt (1 
February 1995).  
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...And if at the next meeting there are attempts, if our friend [Nazarbayev] again 
speaks about his Eurasia, we have said clearly and we are ready once more to 
express our opinion: independence, independence and once again independence.81  
 
During the CIS summit, three leaders agreed on the establishment of the Interstate 
Council on 10th of February 1995 in Alma Ata, as a permanently functioning body of the 
Central Asian Union with a standing executive committee. It had three structural bodies: 
councils of prime ministers, foreign ministers and defense ministers.82  
 The eleventh Central Asian Summit, attended by all five leaders, convened in 
Turkmen city Tashauz on the 3rd March 1995 for a conference on the status of the Aral Sea 
and the environmental problems.83 They set up a bank called the Aral-Eco Bank to 
coordinate projects for the Aral Sea.84 Aral issue continued to provide a common platform 
for the meetings of the all five leaders of the region.  
Around the same time, Kyrgyzstan was taking steps to join Russian-Kazak-Belarus 
customs union by signing a series of documents in March 1995.85  
 
7.4.3 Kerimov the Turkestanist  
The twelfth official summit of the Troika leaders was held in Chimkent on the 14th 
of April 1995 to discuss the economic integration and the prospects of Uzbek and Kyrgyz 
memberships to the Customs Union created by Russia-Belarus and Kazakstan.86 However, 
                                                
81 “Uzbek President again objects idea of Eurasian Union,” SWB SU/2225 G/7-8 (11 February 1995). Uzbek 
TV 1530 gmt (9 February 1995). 
82 “Kazak-Kyrgyz-Uzbek agreement on interstate council,” SWB, SU/2233 G/1-2 (21 February 1995), 
Express, (15 February 1995), p. 2.  
83 For the details of this meeting see “Kazak and Uzbek leaders review Aral Sea conference,” SWB SU/2248 
G/1-2  (10 March 1995), Kazak TV 1600 gmt (5 March 1995).  
84 “Central Asian summit on Aral Sea sets up Aral-Ecobank,” SWB, SU/2245 G/1 (7 March 1995), Interfax 
1012 gmt (4 March 1995).  
85 “Kyrgyzstan to join Russian-Kazak-Belarus Customs Union,” SWB SU/2260 G/1 (24 March 1995), ITAR-
TASS 0820 gmt (21 March 1995).  
86 “Central Asian Summit-text of communique,” SWB SU/2279 G/1 (17 April 1995) Narodnoye Slovo (15 
April 1995), p. 1.  
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the emphasis of the summit remained the same: promoting further regional integration. One 
of the main concerns of the leaders was the escalation of the civil war in Tajikistan. The 
details of this summit were worked out by the summit of the troika premiers on 24th of 
April 1995 in Bishkek, including the issues of economic integration program, common 
investment projects and the creation of a single economic zone.87 In this meeting, they have 
prepared a scheduled program to create a single economic zone in the region by the year 
2000.88 
It was not until May 1995, after crushing the last bids of the democratic - 
Turkestanist opposition in Uzbekistan in the 26th March referendum extending Kerimov's 
mandate until 2000, that Kerimov was public vocal in “his Turkestan union ideas”. In his 
address to the Uzbek parliament, he delivered his critically important new slogan 
"Turkestan our common home". President Karimov, on 5 May 1995, during the second 
session of the Oliy Maclis, announced his "Turkiston-umumiy uyimiz" (Turkestan Our 
Common Home) policy.89 It was the Uzbek approach to the issue of Turkestan-Central Asia 
integration.90 
Dear citizens, just imagine our fatherland Turkistan as a big house, a big household, 
and a big family. The closer the members of this family are to each other, and the 
more accord there is between them, the more prosperity there will be in their 
household. This boils down, as I see it, to the most vital issue today, that is the 
creation in the Central Asian region of a single zone of economic, spiritual and if 
necessary political unity... I have not the slightest doubt that all our peoples will 
support the slogan of a single Turkistan. Life itself tells us this, and it should be 
clear to all of us. Thousands of people who cherish peace in Central Asian region, 
stability and its future development, will certainly welcome this idea whole-
heartedly. I would like to say one more thing- I don't know whether it necessary to 
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broadcast this on the television or not- but if I do not open my heart to you on this 
matter I will not be at peace... But be clear that, if Uzbekistan does not regard its 
neighboring countries in the region, which is called Turkistan, with the same eye, if 
we do not concern ourselves about peace amongst our neighbors now, if we do not 
assist them and not contribute to defending them when it is necessary, then 
Uzbekistan's security will be in great danger... When we lived in Uzbekistan at the 
times of the former USSR, we were under a kind of shield, we were under 
protection. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, it looked as if a vacuum had 
appeared on the territory of the Central Asian region. At that time, when we hardly 
freed ourselves from one Big Brother, others started to act as if to occupy the Big 
Brother’s vacancy... If they conquer us, they will conquer us one by one. If we are 
united, like a fist, then can any force conquer us?... Just think how rich this region 
is: Central Asia, its potential, both economic and spiritual. We have a thousand-year 
history, culture and morality. We have faith and will in our blood from our 
forefathers. If we stand as one, then others will speak to us quite differently... I hope 
that, if we could create such a public movement which would work for integration 
and unification of the regional countries, where representatives of Kazakstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan irrespective of their social 
origins ready to struggle for our fraternal peoples' unification, then this would be 
most welcome. It would be appropriate to call the movement "Turkistan is our 
common home"... Indeed, it is our common home. It is time to say this openly. How 
long are we going to keep silent, to be afraid of someone... of a Big Brother, how 
long?91  
 
Arriving in Alma Ata on 20th May for the Days of Uzbekistan in Kazakstan, 
Kerimov made another contradictory statement, proposing to remove all the borders 
between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan. 
Today we are returning to our roots, and it is important for us to understand first and 
foremost that the roots that are feeding us all-both Kazaks and Uzbeks-are a single 
root... The main aim is for us to demonstrate again that we drink from a single 
spring, live on a single land, that our thoughts are similar, our aspirations are 
similar, and that we have one destiny... I think we should have no borders. We 
should have nothing separating us... Our common aspiration is to do away with 
these borders. And the Days of Uzbekistan in Kazakstan must set as a task this wish 
of Kazaks and Uzbeks to remove all borders and to live together.92 
 
Both Niyazov and Kerimov openly dismissed the idea of economic and political 
cooperation among the Turkic countries at the Turkic summit in Bishkek. In his address to 
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the Turkic summit in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek on 28th August 1995, Niyazov said that "a 
common language, being an important humanitarian aspect of regional cooperation, cannot 
become a platform to create a political bloc" while praising Russia's role in the region.93 At 
the same summit Kerimov was quick to reject the idea of economic cooperation among 
Turkic countries, but promoted his own idea of a Central Asian economic zone.94 Here, we 
understand that Kerimov's slogans about the Turkic roots and the fraternity of the peoples 
of Central Asia were all based on rather Soviet type slogans like the "common home", 
"eternal friendship of the peoples", etc.  
Kerimov's efforts concentrated on asserting a common, but not self-defined, identity 
for the Central Asians. In September 1995, he organized the Central Asia Games, a regional 
Olympics in Tashkent, inviting more than one thousand athletes from all Central Asian 
republics.95 Possibly, as anywhere else in the world, with this regional sport games and 
Olympics, the objective was to strengthen a regional identity.  
The thirteenth summit was another Aral Summit in 1995 (September 18-20) in 
Nukus, with the attendance of all leaders except Niyazov. The achievement of this summit 
was the adoption of common policies on the Aral issue, the use of water resources in the 
region, and the need for the introduction of an advanced irrigation technology as well as 
new methods of environmental protection.96 The Aral summits were rather popular among 
the leaders simply because they were non-political in nature, and received important 
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western-international attention. With his absence, Niyazov was announcing simultaneously 
that Turkmenistan was joining the non-aligned movement in October 1995.97 
Working on the details of the economic integration in the region, Kerimov met with 
the foreign ministers of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan in November 1995, where he stated "the 
good-neighborly relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples living on the 
ancient soil of Turan going back to the distant past".98 His usage of the very term Turan 
indeed was no different than his usage of the term Turkestan. These concepts were only 
subsidiaries for the former Soviet mottos with a slightly more reference to the history of the 
region. 
The fourteenth summit of the Troika leaders was held on 15th of December 1995 in 
Cambul, a Southern Kazak town. While the agenda was heavily on security issues of the 
region and on a common defense system, in this summit, the funds of Tsentralazbank were 
increased to 9 million dollars.99 The prospective central bank of the Union was now 
operational with a considerable budget in Central Asian standards. However three leaders 
were well aware of their dependency on Russia in security matters in the region. 
 The fifteenth summit of the Troika leaders was held on the 12th of January 1996 in 
Kokchetav to discuss the agenda for the CIS summit in Moscow to be held on 19th of 
January. However, in the communiqué they asserted that they discussed the "progress in the 
fulfillment of integration programs in Central Asia on the basis of the programs for 
harmonizing the economies of these countries in the period up to 2000".100 This time, in the 
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CIS summit, there appeared to be no crisis between Nazarbayev and Kerimov on the issue 
of the Eurasian Union because the issue was not taken to the agenda of the summit at all!  
 The Kurgan Tübe rebellion by Uzbek colonel Mahmud Kudayberdiyev caused a 
sudden collapse in Uzbek-Tajik relations from February 1996 on. The distrust between the 
two leaderships continued until 1998, Tajikistan's membership to the Central Asian Union.  
The Foreign Minister publicly announced Uzbekistan’s dissatisfaction with the CIS 
in February 1996. The CIS was unable to deal with the regional economy and conflicts; and 
unable to contribute to the stability, but CIS was rather trying to assert its will through an 
interparliamentary assembly.101 Kerimov was especially, opposing the establishment of 
these kinds of supranational bodies within the CIS.102 
 
7.4.4 A Step Towards Eurasia: CIS Customs Union 
 On the 29th of March 1996, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan signed the 
Customs Union integration treaty, formalizing the "deepening integration in the economic 
and humanitarian spheres".103 Naturally, it was Kerimov who condemned this treaty first.104 
This was followed by the official condemnation of these accords by the Uzbek 
parliament.105 Nazarbayev's reply to this was to pass the treaty from the Kazak parliament's 
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approval immediately106 and declaring the European Union as a model for this new 
Customs Union.107 The very modeling of the EU for both Central Asian Economic Union 
and the CIS Custom’s union is worthy of attention here. However these reactions did not 
stop the meeting of the premiers of the troika in Tashkent on the 5th of April 1996 to sign 
the agreement package on economic cooperation in line with the December-Cambul 
summit of the presidents.108 
The sixteenth Central Asian summit was an official summit of the Central Asian 
Economic Union, held in Bishkek on 6th of May 1996 with the attendance of Troika 
presidents.109 Apart form the plans for the implementation of the economic integration, 
there were three important items in the agenda. They were: an agreement on the 
cooperation in industrial production, a declaration on the use of water and energy sources 
and a resolution on a Central Asian peace keeping battalion under UN auspices.110 
ECO summits continued to provide a platform for all Central Asian leaders to meet, 
including Turkmen and Tajik leaders. During the ECO summit in Turkmen capital 
Ashkhabad on the 14th of May, all Central Asian States declared their unrest with the 
politicization of the organization, especially in issues concerning Russia.111 It was 
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especially Kerimov who loudly threatened other members with the withdrawal of his 
country from the organization if that trend continued.  
Although CA(E)U was a bit faster than the CIS and Customs Union in terms of 
achieving integration in the region, it was only after Kyrgyzstan signed the agreement to 
enter into the Customs Union (established by Russia, Kazakstan and Belarus in 1995) in 
March 1996, on the 25th of May 1996 that customs control points between Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan were removed.112 The Kyrgyz leadership was too quick to implement the 
conditions of the Customs Union compared to the CAU. The next step within the CIS was 
to set up the long-desired Interparliamentary Committee of the four "mostly integrated" CIS 
states, the four members of the customs union - Russia, Kazakstan, Belarus and 
Kyrgyzstan.113 Although, protested by both Kerimov and Niyazov, this committee's 
establishment meant Kazak and Kyrgyz determination would stand with Russia closely 
within the CIS affairs. While the customs control points between Kazakstan and Uzbekistan 
were removed earlier, the economic integration within the CAU was far slower than the one 
within the Customs Union. Despite every attempt to increase political and economic 
integration in Central Asia, the two largest economies of the region, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakstan signed necessary agreements to avoid dual taxation in June 1996.114 
The seventeenth summit of the troika was held in Alma Ata on the 6th of July. 
Kerimov, Nazarbayev and Akayev spent two working days on the questions of deepening 
the economic union among the three and the implementations of the previous decisions. 
They also considered the plans to establish a joint Central Asian peacekeeping force under 
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the UN auspices.115 The Central Asian battalion, established as a result of this summit, as a 
joint peace-keeping force of the CAU, made up of 500 armed men and located in Kazak-
Uzbek border in Southern Kazakstan started with the name Tsentralazbat, and was sent to 
the NATO military exercises that took place in North Carolina in the same year.116  
During this time, Uzbekistan was eager to have Tajikistan enter the CAU, and the 
first concrete step was taken by the economic cooperation agreement signed between the 
two countries on the 17th of July 1996.117 And this opened the way to Tajikistan to get 
closer to the CAU and then become a member in the spring of 1998.  
Then the eighteenth summit of the troika "plus two" (Tajikistan and Russia) was 
held in Alma Ata on 23rd of August 1996. This time Tajikistan and Russia were accepted 
into Central Asian Union in “observer” status. This was the first time, after a long-time, 
Tajik president Rakhmanov attended a Central Asian summit, with enthusiasm.118 
Agreements creating a single economic zone among the troika by 1998 were signed in this 
meeting.  
Kerimov was still keen on developing multilateral relations with the rest of the 
Turkic states. That was why he hosted the 4th summit meeting of the Turkic speaking states 
with great enthusiasm on 21st of October 1996.119  At the beginning of the summit he made 
his purpose clear by labeling the summit prompted by “a common history, not political or 
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even less so military-political cooperation,” and by calling all leaders to cooperate against 
terrorism.120 In the text of the declaration of the summit, despite the urges by Kerimov on 
non-political features of the summit, 17 different articles exist, each about deepening the 
integration among each other.121 
Kerimov was determined to achieve Uzbekistan’s leadership position in Central 
Asia. This was one of the reasons why the Uzbek leadership kept itself away from other 
regional initiatives, especially the ones under either Iranian or Turkish control.122 
Uzbekistan was not a part of a greater space; it was the center, the very initiator of the 
Turkestan Union itself. 
 
7.4.5 Security and the Taliban Threat 
Having taken the consent of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, the 
Central Asian governments were rather relaxed in the issues related to the NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace program as well as the preparations for the Central Asian Battalion, 
which was under way in the Kyrgyz capital with the support of Turkish, American and 
Danish NATO officials.123 The Kyrgyz side, who was the most excited by the 
establishment of such a peace-keeping force, offered the Interstate Council of the Central 
Asian Union to deploy this force in the mountainous Karabağ.124 The function of this new 
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unit would be free from the CIS bureaucratic structures, at least in issues concerning the 
region itself. Kazaks were rather complaining about the slow bureaucratic functioning of 
the customs union and the security agreements between Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan; and had a desire to activate their structures.125 So, there was still no consensus 
among the Central Asian states on the security issues.  
However, the rapid advance of the Taliban towards the North worried Central Asian 
leaders. Nazarbayev called a Central Asian summit in Almaty on the 4th of October 1996 
with the attendance of the presidents of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan and 
Russian premier Chernomyrdin, adopting a communiqué reminding Taliban the Collective 
Security Treaty of Central Asian states with Russia.126 During this summit, Kerimov’s 
major concern was to stop the Taliban somehow at the Salang Pass and to prevent them 
from gaining a foothold in Northern Afghanistan.127 Strategically and geographically, there 
was nothing to stop Taliban infiltrating Central Asia if it could make a stronghold in 
Northern Afghanistan, which is historically Southern Turkestan. The anti-extremism 
campaign of the leaderships in each country supported Russian-dominated or secular 
opposition movements as in the case of the Russian-dominated Kazak democratic 
opposition (Azamat), which was calling for further CIS integration to halt the influence of 
religious extremism in the region.128 
These concerns over regional security accelerated the CAU’s efforts in the field of 
defense cooperation. During a meeting in Almaty, the Kazak, Uzbek and Kyrgyz defense 
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chiefs decided to unite their countries’ intelligence, counterintelligence, anti terrorism, anti-
drug trafficking frameworks through an interstate defense body.129 
This was exactly the time when a hot debate over the issue of NATO expansion was 
in the agenda. Several Russian and Central Asian figures proposed setting up a new 
military bloc to counter NATO’s eastward expansion and it was only Kerimov who 
opposed this proposal.130 Surprisingly, Akayev, arriving in Tashkent for an official visit on 
the 24th of December 1996, joined Kerimov in this opposition. He especially made it clear 
that they would not offer their territories to any power for attacks against any of their 
neighbors, namely Afghanistan.131 The defense chiefs of the troika met in Almaty in the 
late January 1997 to finalize the preparation for the Central Asian maneuvers and the last 
checks of the troika’s Tsentralazbat.132 On the issue of defense, Central Asian leaders were 
quite decisive on creating a “Troika plus Russia” defense alliance to counter the Taliban 
threat.133  
 
7.4.6 CAU versus Customs Union 
In November 1996, Kerimov ordered the re-writing of Turkestani and Uzbek history 
by independent historians, and “not by the former Kremlin and Communist Party 
sycophants”.134 These four volumes represented the new version of Uzbek history, based on 
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the Turkestani heritage and Uzbekistan’s progressive role in Central Asia. That was why 
Uzbekistan was protesting any union between CIS states [Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and 
Kyrgyzstan] constantly, as a step backwards toward the restoration of Soviet rule.135  
In the last days of 1996, Nazarbayev reiterated his pet Eurasian Union plan again: 
“Trade confederations will not give us anything. If Russia continued to advance on the path 
of democratic changes, kind feelings would arise about it, and then Eurasian Unity will 
become a reality”.136 His plan had more than economical concerns; it was indeed a political 
action plan to create a mythical union of the peoples of Eurasia politically. Nazarbayev 
simultaneously launched a program to have 4.5 million diaspora Kazaks living in 44 
different countries come back to Kazakstan to achieve the demographic superiority for the 
Kazaks in the country. Nazarbayev wanted to have them all back.  Between 1992-1997 only 
138 thousand of them returned to Kazakstan.137 Another sign of Nazarbayev’s “nationalist” 
drive was seen in his decree changing the name of  Jambul city to its original Taraz.138 
In 1997, in his Kazakstan-2030 Manifesto, he said:  
Our greatest weapon to satisfy our peoples short and long term national interests is 
integration. It is necessary to develop and strengthen a Central Asian alliance-union 
among Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan with the principle of the non-
interference to internal affairs of each other.139 
 
The first armed conflict in the region, which became an “interstate” debate, was the 
Uzbek-Tajik confrontation in Tajikistan. It was in early January 1997 that the major 
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problem between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan broke out, a rebel Uzbek colonel of the Tajik 
army, Hudaberdiyev, seized the city of Tursunzade and the factories around it.140 From then 
until 1999, both Hudaberdiyev and the Uzbek minority in Tajikistan became an important 
issue in Uzbek-Tajik relations.  
The nineteenth summit was held on the 9th of January 1997 in Bishkek. The Summit 
was a working meeting of the troika leaders for two days on the details of the Central Asian 
Bank and the establishment of the peacekeeping forces in the region.141 In the treaty of 
eternal friendship between the three Central Asian nations, it was stated that “the three 
Central Asian states have undertaken not to allow their territory to be used for armed 
aggression or any other activities hostile to their cosignatories”.142 The very same day the 
summit started in the “Switzerland of Central Asia”, the major opposition party Erkin 
Kyrgyzstan’s chair Topçubek Turgunaliyev was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for 
campaigning against the “Akayev’s character”.143 Akayev was the loyal supporter of the 
further integration of the CIS, emphasizing economic motives, deeming it as the only 
market for Kyrgyz products.144 
 
7.4.7 A New Approach Against the Taliban 
In June 1997, Karimov was awarded with the highest order of Kazakstan for his 
efforts and contributions to the integration of Central Asia and the eternal brotherhood of 
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the two peoples.145 This was Karimov's first official visit to Kazakstan since 
independence.146 In July 1997, the Cholpan Ata summit was a celebration of the integration 
in the post independence of Central Asia.147 Here, most of the technicalities of integration 
were worked out.148 
The twentieth regional summit was held in Alma-Ata on the 28th of February 1997. 
The announced agenda was the ecological situation of the Aral Sea. In practice, the whole 
agenda was devoted to the “Taliban threat”.149 Seeking a solution to counter the 
approaching Taliban threat, all Central Asian leaders attended this summit. Kerimov was 
greatly concerned. He said: “it is difficult to imagine the consequences of the euphoria in 
which Afghanistan’s Taliban forces will be, should they come close to the Amudarya”.150 
Following the summit, as traditionally, Kazak, Kyrgyz and Uzbek premiers met on the 14th 
of March 1997 to sign the documents strengthening the economic cooperation between 
their respective countries.  They signed all the necessary documents at this meeting to set 
up a single economic space by the year 1998.151  
However, Kazakstan was not free from anti-Russian sentiments, especially after the 
deployment of the Russian Cossack units on and along the Russian border with Kazakstan 
                                                
145 Ozbekistan Avazy (5 June 1997), p. 1. "Biz adadiy elkadosh khalqlarmiz" Karimov in Kazakstan in 2-3 
June, Nazarbayev in 2 june 1997 with a farman awarded Karimov with Altın Kıran (Golden Eagle) orden for 
his contribution to the friendly, brotherly relations between the peoples of both countries and stregthening 
with further economic security and other fields in the central asian region, more economic integration on, 
cenrtrazbank etc.  
146 OA (3 June 1997), p. 1. "Prezident Almatiga zhunab ketdi" This was Karimov's first official visit to 
Almaty-Kazakhstan. "Eternal friendship and cooperation among Uzbekistan Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan".  
147 A. Aşırakhmanov. "Bir tuugan elderdin baktısı uçun" Erkin Too (ET) (30 July 1997), p. 1. Çolpan-Ata 
summit the Central Asian Union anniversary was celebrated by the leaders.  
148 "Kun tartibinde: integratsiya" ET (25 July 1997), p. 1. Çolpan-Ata summit for the integration; finances, 
Central Asian Bank, integration mechanisms.  
149 See the full English translation of the declaration of this summit at “Central Asian States Issue Declaration 
on Aral Sea,” SWB, SU/2864 G/1 (11 March 1997), Narodnoye Slovo (4 March 1997), p. 1., signed by all the 
five presidents of Central Asian Satates.  
150 “Central Asian Leaders Voice Concern at possible Taleban Advanve,” SWB, SU/2858 G/1 (4 March 1997), 
Interfax, 2137 gmt  (23 February 1997).  
151 “Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek Premiers Sign Cooperation Accords,” SWB, SU/2869 G/1 (17 March 1997), 
Kyrgyz Radio, 1200 gmt (14 March 1997).  
 276
in March 1997.152 Apart from that, the Russian Cossack organizations within Kazakstan 
itself were quite active in politics and demanding an autonomous region in the North, even 
union with Russia. This was basically the reason why Nazarbayev,153 who had been 
hitherto the champion of integration, joined Kerimov154 in protesting Belorussian attempts 
to strengthen the CIS structures through the sophistication of the Customs Union. Akayev 
was again a close follower of Nazarbayev whereas Niyazov refused any attempts to create 
supranational organs within the CIS.155 Economically, during the 1992-1997 period, Kazak 
and Kyrgyz policy of trade was heavily oriented to the CIS-markets; whereas, Uzbekistan 
preferred to strengthen trade ties with non-CIS countries.156 So, Nazarbayev and Akayev 
would not be as independent as Kerimov in terms of regulating their relations with Russia. 
The 1997 events in Eastern Turkestan had created a tension in Kazakstan; some Russian 
media covered the events as an organization of the Kazakstan-based Uygur Associations,157 
which created fear and protest on the Kazak side.158  
The advancing Taliban threat together with the activities of the so-called “Islamists” 
movement in the Central Asian states accelerated further defense cooperation between the 
CAU countries, especially helping them to explain their stands on the Central Asian 
                                                
152 “Kazakhstan Criticizes Russia for Placing Cossack Units on Border,” SWB, SU/2879 G/1 (28 March 
1997), RIA News, 1930 gmt (25 March 1997).  
153 “Kazakh President Warns Forced Integration Could Ruin CIS,” SWB, SU/2880 A/6 (31 March 1997), 
Interfax, 1747 gmt (28 March 1997).  
154 “Uzbek Ledaer Seeks CIS Cooperation Without Supranational Elements,” SWB, SU/2880 A/6 (31 March 
1997), Interfax, 1716 gmt (27 March 1997).  
155 “President Niyazov reiterates Objections to Supranational CIS,” SWB, SU/2879 G/3 (28 March 1997), 
ITAR-TASS, 1708 gmt (26 March 1997).  
156 For a detalied Report and analysis of this issue see “Kazakh Newspaper Views Central Asian Foreign 
Trade,” SWB, SUW/0479 WE/3-5 (28 March 1997), Ekspress (18 March 1997), p. 3.  
157 In the post-soviet Turkestan, there were sevaral Uygur associations, in Kazakstan; Uyguristan Azatlık 
Teşkilatı,  Uygur Halıkara Ittifakı and Şarki Türkistan Azatlık Milli Birlik Satı, in Kyrgyzstan; Kırgızistan 
Cumhuriyettik Uygur İttifagı and in Uzbekistan; Uygur Medeniyat Merkezi. See Doğu Türkistan’da Öğrenci 
Hareketleri Sempozyumu: Bildiriler (Ankara: Türk Yurdu Yayınları, 1995), see pp. 50-51 for a full list of 
Uygur associations all over world.  
158 “Kazakhstan Criticizes Russian Coverage of Xinjiang Unrest,” SWB, SU/2915 G/2, ITAR-TASS, 1419 gmt 
(7 May 1997).  
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Battalion and NATO Partnership for Peace program.159 The relations between Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan were very tense; there were mutual accusations of supporting terror. The 
successive Tajik governments persistently claimed that Uzbekistan was supporting the 
renegade colonel Hudayberdiyev and attempts on the life of the Tajik president 
Rakhmanov.160 Uzbekistan, on the other hand, accused Tajik authorities of supporting the 
Uzbek armed Islamic armed opposition, which was based in the mountains along the 
Uzbek-Tajik border.  
For Russia and pro-Soviet forces within her, the CAU was not perceived as a threat 
at all; because it was open to any country and Russia could become a member whenever 
she desired to and could even sabotage this regional grouping merely by becoming a 
member.161 However, according to Russian press, along with the Russia-Belarus Union, the 
CAU too was a barrier to CIS member to integration.162 The CIS was basically slow to 
integrate its members but the CAU was quite effective compared to it. However, a regional 
grouping of China, Russia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and even Tajikistan was 
realized in 1997 as Akayev formulated it in a speech.163 
The twenty-first summit was held on 24th of July 1997.164 The Troika presidents met 
again in Cholpan Ata to discuss security issues in the region and the formalization of the 
                                                
159 “Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz Defence Ministers Meet in Tashkent,” SWB, SU/2907 G/2-3 (1 May 1997), 
Uzbek TV, 1430 gmt (28 April 1997).  
160 “Uzbekistan Reportedly Denies Involmenet in Attempt to Assasinate Rahmanov,” SWB, SU/2908 G/2 (2 
May 1997), Voice of Free Tajikistan, 0300 gmt (1 May 1997).  
161 "CIS: Three Interesting Spheres-Regional Groupings," Jane's Information Group, Foreign Report (15 May 
1997).  
162 Mehman Gafarli, "Novaya Organizatsiya," Nezavisimaya Gazeta (11 July 1997), p. 3.  
163 “President Akayev Says China, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan main Partners,” SWB, SU/2963 G/3 (5 
July 1997), Interfax, 1642 gmt (2 July 1997).  
164 OA (26 Juy 1997) no: 87, p. 1. "Markaziy Aziye: integratsiya yanada mustahkamlanadi" In Chulpan Ata 
summit: Nazarbayev, Akayev, Kerimov met in 24-25 July. They have established Centrazbank and discussed  
Afghanistan problem. Kerimov there stated that; “economic integration is key to further integration.”  
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Tsentralazbat, a joint peacekeeping force of the CAU countries.165 In this summit, 
surprisingly, it was Nazarbayev, who persistently stand for the development of CAU 
structures to promote integration among the three states.166 One of the important outcomes 
of the summit was the decision of the three leaders to set up a common policy on the 
Afghan question.167 Following this summit, as it had already become a tradition, the 
premiers of the three countries met in Almaty to sign the official documents on the 
decisions taken during the summit.168 The agreements signed in this meeting covered 
harmonization plans on the “population migration, railways tariff policy, the establishment 
of a coordination council for scientific and technological development and the work of the 
Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development, as well as the creation of an 
intergovernmental commission to draw up projects for international consortiums”.169 From 
this summit on, the collective use and management of the scarce water sources of the region 
slowly became another asset of the regional cooperation in Turkestan.170 
The official or semi-official Uzbek media, as well as many commentators in the 
international media were interpreting Kerimov’s move to call two thousands Uzbek 
students back from Turkey as a move against the Islamic Welfare Government in 
Turkey.171 The underlying story was much more complex, however. Kerimov’s hysteria for 
any Islamic movements was well known. But, more importantly these students affiliated 
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169 Ibid.  
170 “Central Asian States Seek Common Strategy for Water Sources,” SWB, SU/3037 G/1 (30 September 
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themselves both with the democratic system and the pan-Turkist and Turkestanist circles in 
Turkey, including the Erk Democratic Party of Muhammed Salih. Indeed, a considerable 
number of these students were supporters of Erk already.172 This democratic environment 
provided by Turkey was becoming more and more unacceptable to the Kerimov regime, 
which was trying to strengthen strict controls over freedom of thought and human rights.  
The Turkestan Peoples Movement, established in 1991, under the leadership of 
Bahram Gayeb, went far beyond Erk or Birlik in order to propagandize the idea of a 
Turkestan union, without confronting Kerimov in internal politics, as the sole program of 
the movement.173 
Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism was very lucid in 1997; he even at one time explained 
that one of the reasons for moving the capital to Akmola-Astana was establishing a great 
capital right “at the heart of Eurasia, closer to Russia.”174 He was trying to persuade the 
international public the very decision to move the capital had nothing to do with ethno-
politics but it rather about very practical concerns. It is believed that, if there was a political 
side in this move, it was only his Eurasian concerns. However, the calls for regional 
(Turkestan) integration were voiced from Kazak and Kyrgyz sides as well.175 The CAU’s 
anniversaries became regular celebration days in the republics.176 The issues handled at the 
Cholpan Ata summit were celebrated as gigantic steps towards the rising of a new regional 
                                                
172 Author himself personally witnessed several Erk activities in Turkey. 
173 For more on the issue see William Fierman, “Political development in Uzbekişstan: Democratization?” in 
Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, pp. 381.  
174 “President Nazarbayev Denies Breach of Ethnic Russian’s Rights,” SWB, SU/3061 G/4-6 (28 October 
1997), NTV, 1540 gmt (22 October 1997).  
175 A. Asan. "Integratsiya: Bul aktivduu ish-araketter," ET (10 Dec 1997), p. 2. Central Asias common energy-
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economic means and also social-cultural side. And primers asked for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to join this 
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176 A. Aşırakhmanov. "Bir tuugan elderdin baktısı uçun," ET (30 July 1997), p. 1.  
 280
power.177 There were even times the CAU acted as the intermediator in solving internal 
conflicts in Tajikistan.178 Kyrgyzstan was also trying to rehabilitate the victims of the 1930s 
repression as the “sons of the nation”.179 In Uzbekistan, the memory of Basmacıs was 
resurrected and the official ideology declared them to be the “freedom warriors of 
Turkestan”.180 It was said that the descendants of these Turkestani warriors should be aware 
of the heritage they possess.181 The peoples of troika, according to Kerimov, were eternally 
brothers.182 
The relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were at their worst during this time 
given the repeated Tajik accusations against the Uzbek leadership of aiding the rebel Uzbek 
elements dominant in Northern Tajikistan under the command of colonel 
Hudayberdiyev.183 The Uzbeks of Northern Tajikistan in this period organized themselves 
both politically and militarily. The political wing of the movement was the Azad Tajikistan 
Party, a former ally of the president Rakhmanov. The military detachments of colonel 
Hudayberdiyev had been forming regular units by the time.184 The Tajik leadership’s 
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183 “Uzbekistan Denies Helping Tajik Rebels,” SWB, SU/3006 G/2 (30 October 1997), Interfax, 1411 gmt (27 
October 1997). See also “Uzbek President Denies Involvement in Tajikistan Unrest,” SWB, SU/3065 G/2 (1 
November 1997), Interfax, 1548 (30 October 1997).  
184 Author hosted the president of the Azad Tajikistan Party’s ledar Yaraş Kurban on several occasions in 
Ankara and met with Colonel Khudayberdiyev in Uzbekistan same year.  
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response was tolerating the cooperation between UTO (United Tajik Opposition) and the 
IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). 
In early December 1997, the premiers of the Troika met to prepare the leaders’ 
summit to be held on the 12th of December 1997 in Akmola, Kazakstan.185 This was the 
twenty-second summit. At the summit, the CAU member states decided to set up five 
regional consortiums in energy, agriculture (and water), industry, oil extraction and 
security.186 The summit also coincided with the inauguration of the new Kazak capital 
Akmola, the future Astana.187 
The Eurasianism of Nazarbayev and “some Russian circles” were the primary 
targets of criticism by the Uzbek Foreign Ministry.188 The same day, the Uzbek Foreign 
Minister Kamilov said that the Uzbek government opposed any Eurasian plans;  
Nazarbayev declared his desire for greater integration among the CIS countries under the 
Eurasian flag.189 
 
7.4.8 Revisiting History and Brotherhood 
Nazarbayev had declared Uzbekistan to be the "brother state" and considered the 
existence of almost one million Kazaks in Uzbekistan as a “bridge between the two 
peoples” in 1998.190 In December 1997, in the new Kazak capital Akmola, the three leaders 
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met to celebrate Kazakstan's transfer of the capital from Almaty to this Northern city of 
Akmola.191 In Uzbekistan, criticisms about the sacrificing of Uzbek soldiers during the 
WW II were voiced during this time.192 The national ideology of Uzbekistan, “freedom at 
any cost”, has been explained as a non-controversial point in Turkestan Union idea.193 The 
very idea of the “Türk Birliği” (Turkish Union) was declared as the spiritual cause of the 
nation.194 The Uzbek-Kazak fraternity was the leading force of the Turkistan Union idea,195 
and the patriotism on both sides were valued as the faiths serving this greater Turkestani 
cause too.196 And the only way to achieve full independence was seen as the achievement 
of full economic sovereignty.197 That was why the leaders of troika wanted to establish an 
economic union before having a political one.  
Even among the Kirghiz, who are considered to have the least Turkestani 
consciousness, an important Turkestanist stand started to be observed among the laymen.198 
In the meantime, however, there appeared a new version of the official Kyrgyz history. 
Although recognizing the fact that the Kyrgyz were part of the greater Turkish identity, 
instead of Turkestan, Kyrgyz intellectuals initiated another ethno-geographical concept for 
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the use of the Kyrgyz public: the Turan.199 Similar to the Kazak nationalist approach over 
the course of time, Kyrgyz claimed the heritage of the Turkic Empire and the Orkhun 
Turkic language.200 As in the official Turkish historiography, Kyrgyz historians were eager 
to associate themselves with the Huns and presented them as being their forefathers.201 
Additionally, Kyrgyz people's past was related to the Timurid-Baburid heritage as well as 
the Kokand Khanate.202 This concept was also strengthening the Kyrgyz claims over Osh at 
the same time.203 
 
7.5 The Fourth Phase: CAU Enlargement and the Central Asian Economic 
Community 1998-1999 
 
The twenty-third Central Asian summit was held on January the 5th-6th, 1998 in 
Ashkhabad with the basic objective of persuading Turkmenistan and Tajikistan to join the 
CAU - with a "three plus two" (CAU+Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) formula. At this 
summit, which was attended by all five leaders, the Tajik president Rakhmanov announced 
his country's desire to become a member, while Niyazov of Turkmenistan did not display 
any interest in joining in.204 In Ashgabat, attempts to develop a common CIS policy on the 
regional countries also failed due to the differences of opinion among the neighbors.205  
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Almost simultaneously, Kazak nationalists were declaring Kazakstan to be an 
indivisible part of Greater Turkestan with its spiritual capital, the city of Turkestan.206 
Apart from the persistent emphasis on the Turkness of the Kazaks, the importance of 
Turkestan city for the Kazak national identity was also much praised.207  
For the forerunners of Turkestani unity in the 1990s, namely the Uzbeks, it was 
quite clear that the last 130 years of their history was a story of colonial208 rule under the 
Tsarist and then the Soviet Russians.209 In the literature, more than anything else, the pride 
and honor of being Uzbek was glorified; and “nomad-settled” or Uzbek-Kazak differences 
were attempted to be minimized.210 Thus, the new national ideology was based on an anti-
colonial policy with a strong nationalist development model. From 1996 onwards, 
Karimov's "Turkestan Our Common Home" approach had become the basis of Uzbek 
policy for inter-Turkestani relations.211 A poem by Bozor Melik in the Ozbekistan Ovozi of 
August 7, 1997, summarized literary propaganda of this policy very well:212 
 Sun is your heart, Turkestan 
 Blood brothers, Turkestan 
 Table is in the middle 
 A legend in the tongue Turkestan 
 Uzbek-Kazak like one 
 Tajik-Kyrgyz allied 
 With the Turkmen friend 
 Great land Turkestan 
                                                
206 Qazaq Eli (QE) Mamır, (29-Mausım 4 1998) no: 22 (150), p.1 "Jumıla Köterer juk jetkilikti..." Hasen 
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211 Akbar Aliev, "Uzbek-Kazak kardaşlar: Turkistan-Umumiy uyimiz," Vatan (16 October 1997), p. 3. 
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212 OA (7 August 1997), no: 92, p. 1. A poem by Bozor Melik "Türkistan"  
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 It has a city called Gürügi 
 It has a hero like Manas 
 It has a man like Alpomish 
 Beautiful motherland Turkestan 
 Its fortune sun is the source of light 
 It has the greater respect 
 It has all bread and food ready always 
 It is the light of the darkness 
 It is the land of Yasavi 
 Its past is victory and pride 
 A Rich place Turkestan 
 It has the word of Emir Timur 
 It has the signs of the forefathers 
 Ancient Turan, Turkestan. 
  
It was just prior to the Customs Union Leaders’ summit in Moscow on 22nd of 
January 1998 that Nazarbayev reiterated his call for a Eurasian Union at least for the four 
standing Customs Union members, which would mean a full and “final integration” 
phase.213 Apparently, during the summit, none of the other leaders, including Akayev, 
responded to this call.214  
Another integration attempt was made at the preparatory meeting for the March 
CAU summit, where the Tajik, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Kazak foreign Ministers met in 
Dushanbe on the 3rd of March 1998 to discuss Tajikistan’s upcoming official admission as 
well as the rising threat of Islamic extremism in the region.215  The twenty fourth summit 
was convened in Tashkent in March 1998.216 The four leaders of Central Asia officially 
invited the Turkmen leadership to join the Central Asian Union, the existence of which was 
believed to strengthen economic and political integration.217 This summit also signified the 
growing ties and cooperation between Tashkent and Dushanbe, particularly on the anti-
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terror and security issues.218 The five leaders of Central Asia were celebrated as the 
architects of a new and strong region.219 The scarcity of water and energy sources was 
another factor forcing the Central Asian governments toward further integration; the 
Kyrgyz saw this as an inescapable “fraternal” cooperation with the Uzbeks.220 At this 
summit, Tajikistan was officially admitted into the CAU.221 In the joint statement by the 
four presidents, one can see that the political side of the integration had as much weight as 
the economic one: 
The heads of state ..., on the basis of the historical and cultural community of their 
peoples, recognizing the important role of interstate cooperation in various spheres, 
wishing to create conditions for the creation of a common economic space and 
acting in the name of the peace, security and socioeconomic progress of the peoples 
of Central Asia... They consider the integration of Central Asian States as a natural 
and objective process... to strengthen eternal friendship... and fraternal relations.222  
 
While Tajikistan became a member of the CAU, the Turkmen leadership felt the 
necessity to activate her foreign policy and gave more weight to the ECO meetings and 
activities.223 By 1998, Iran had become the most active member of the ECO, allocating a 
huge building to the organization's secretariat in Tehran; and having closer relations with 
Turkmenistan224, who also became one of the most active members of the ECO, by then.  
                                                
218 OA (5 January 1998), no: 2, p. 1. Rakhmanov arried Uzbekistan in 4th January for bi-lateral talks on 
security and further integration, one day working cist.  
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March 1998).  
222 “Central Asian Presidents Issue Post-Summit Statement,” SWB, SU/3189 G/4 (31 March 1998), Tajik 
Radio, 1000gmt (28 March 1998).  
223 "Turkmenistan Hosts Successful ECO Summit in Ashkhabat," US PR Newsline (20 May 1997).  
224 "Alma-Ata Declareation Issued at end of ECO Summit in Kazakstan," BBC Monitoring Service: Middle 
East (19 May 1998).  
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At this time, Tajikistan also applied to Customs Union for membership to balance 
her position in Central Asia.225 This way, Tajikistan was trying to satisfy both Uzbekistan 
and Kazakstan in terms of regional cooperation alternatives. The ECO summit on the 11th 
of May 1998 was another platform that brought the Central Asian Leaders together in 
Alma-Ata. There, problems of regional cooperation were discussed with a special emphasis 
on the non-political nature of ECO by all Central Asian presidents.226 It was around this 
time, Uzbekistan started to ask for the handing over the Uzbek “terrorist” groups based in 
Tajik opposition governorships.227 From May 1998 on, Uzbekistan started a punitive 
campaign against the Islamic circles in the country, which were mostly based in Valley-
Namangan regions.228 This was the time, when the famous “Wahhabi”229 cases in the courts 
started to be opened by the public prosecutors one after another.  
The Turkic Summit in Astana on the 9th of June 1998 ended up with 
disappointments, without any decision for integration or whatsoever. Also, there was a 
warning from Kerimov saying that any relations with Uygurs would upset the relations with 
the “great” China.230 (China, had openly used every means possible to influence the Central 
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Asian leaders to follow an anti-Uygur policy, speculating also the existence of Uygur 
“Wahhabi” terrorist organizations in Central Asia.) 
The five nations summit of China, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan in 
Almaty on 3rd of July 1998 was the third step towards the creation of a new security pact in 
Eurasia, after the Shanghai Summit in 1996 and then the Moscow Summit in 1997.231 The 
joint communiqué of the summit was a text of deepening cooperation, in exactly 
Nazarbayev’s Eurasian terms.232 It was at the end of this summit that Nazarbayev agreed on 
the transfer of 407 sq kms of Kazak territory to China, thereby ending the territorial 
disputes between the two countries.233 This border deal was ratified by the Kazak 
parliament on 3rd of  February 1999.234 
 The twenty-fifth summit was held on the 17th of July 1998 in Cholpan Ata. This 
summit marked the final stage for the establishment of the Central Asian Economic Union 
for further economic integration among the three republics. The three leaders agreed on 
establishing a Central Asian (Central) Bank for common monetary policies and a special 
security system for eliminating terrorist threats, emanating from Afghanistan. During this 
summit in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan joined the Troika, and this new quadripartite economic 
union was named as Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). So, after this date 
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Central Asian Union and all multilateral treaties signed under it were adapted into CAEC, 
modeling a sort of EU model.235  
Meanwhile, the defeat of the Uzbek General Reşid Dostum in Northern Afghanistan 
and the rapid Taliban march towards the North of the country alarmed all Central Asian 
leaders. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan strengthened ties with Russia in order to prepare to halt 
any possible Taliban attack.236 Uzbeks were more concerned about the fate of their kin in 
Northern Afghanistan.237 Russian troops in Tajikistan were reinforced to stop any Taliban 
infiltration into the country. This new development was accompanied with the cries of 
Central Asian leaders to struggle against Islamic “terror”. Defense ministers of Russia and 
CAEC met in Dushanbe on the 20th of August to decide on joint action against the new 
threat.238 This was also an opportunity for Nazarbayev and Akayev to call for further CIS 
integration in defense and security policies.239 
 
7.5.1 Ideology and Integration: the Kyrgyz View 
In this process, Kyrgyz nationalism was developing along the same lines as Uzbek 
and Kazak nationalisms - all emphasizing the historical roles of their respective nations in 
the region.240 In addition to the Turkestanist position of the official nationalism, terms like 
                                                
235 "Four Republics Unite in Central Asian Economic Community," BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR 
(21 July 1998).  
236 “Uzbekistan and Russia warn Taleban to halt Military Action in North Afghanistan,” SWB, SU/3302 G/1 
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240 Cumagul Saldanbekov, "Bizge Kanday Ideologiya Kerek?" Erkin Too (ET) (7 October 1998), pp. 4-5. See 
for the formation of new Kyrgyz nationalism on ideological legs of; 1. Principals of social bases of national 
ideology, 2. National base for national ideology like Manas, 3. Practical political program. 
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Turan and Türk Elleri (Turkic Lands) were also commonly used in the literature. The 
genealogical tables of the Kyrgyz tribes were shown as the proofs of the unity of the 
Turkestani peoples.241 Akayev, on the other hand, was asserting his poorly tailored “Jibek 
Jolı” (Silk Road) project as an alternative to Eurasianist and Turkestanist stands.242 
According to Akayev, the Silk Road project was basically a promotion of peace and 
security through enhancing commercial ties among the nations. However, Kyrgyzstan’s 
being part of Central Asia had never been discussed.243 The commonalities and common 
heroes were not only historical elements but heroes like Cengiz Aytmatov were the signs of 
the continuing close interactions among the peoples of the region.244 The new historical 
approach was even calling Kyrgyz history an indivisible part of Turk(ic) history.245 The 
idealization of the Kyrgyz national-communists murdered by the Stalinist terror, was 
another element in the new ideology.246 Despite governmental warnings, an anti-Russian 
Kyrgyz nationalism was also rising.247 It is also interesting to note that Kyrgyz, living in the 
rural areas of the country and in China were calling the lands they inhabited Turkestan, 
rather than any other regional or governmental name. 
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1998), p. 5. See for nationalism and anti-russian reactions for the creation of a national state.  
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Just as in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, re-writing of the official history, free from 
Soviet propaganda, was the center of local Slavic criticism.248 The idealization of Kazak 
hero Kenesarı by the Kyrgyz was basically a sign of their commitment to sharing a 
historical heritage with the Kazak brethren.249 Apart from that, the very practical reasons 
like sharing the water and energy resources of the region were presented to the Kyrgyz 
public as the basis for regional integration.250 The heritages of historical Huns,251 the 
Orkhun Turkic Khaganate and language were also accepted during this time.252 The New 
Kyrgyz history also claimed the heritage of the Timurid dynasty, especially of Babur who 
first ruled in the Ili and Fergana regions. The Kyrgyz intelligentsia became very committed 
to the necessity of an “only and clear” national ideology.253 However there were also 
problems like the heritage of the cities. Just as Uzbeks celebrated the 2nd millennium of the 
city of Samarkand, and Kazaks celebrated the 2nd millennium of the city of Turkestan, the 
Kyrgyz also celebrated the 3rd millennium of the city of Osh, as an ancient Kyrgyz city.254 
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7.5.2 The Uzbek-Tajik Confrontation Revisited 
In early November 1998, Uzbek colonel Hudayberdiyev re-attacked Tajikistan’s 
second largest city Hocend, seizing all government buildings, which led to another great 
crisis between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.255 This time, Kerimov offered his full support to 
Rahmanov, causing rebels to retreat from the city.256 However the Tajik media continued to 
accuse Uzbekistan of involvement in the seizure of the city.257 Kerimov in his turn accused 
the Russian FSB of provoking an interethnic and interstate confrontation in the region.258 
Infuriated by these allegations made by the Tajik leadership, Kerimov cut gas deliveries to 
Tajikistan immediately.259 A one month-long gasless cold winter forced Tajikistan to pay 
all her debts to Uzbekistan in early January 1999 before receiving gas again.260 
As the CIS’s collective security treaty was to expire in April 1999 and Uzbekistan 
was the first nation to declare her desire officially to withdraw from this treaty.261 The main 
reason for the Uzbek discontent was the Moscow’s  “too close” relations with the Tajik 
leadership and the unfair treatment of Uzbekistan’s security concerns within the system.262 
Kerimov was increasingly becoming critical of Russia’s “lack of policy” on the Central 
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Asia.263 He argued that, not only the economic treaties were not working264 but the security 
treaty and almost all the rest of the CIS were not functioning at all.265 
In an interview given to Turkistan newspaper in February 1999, Kerimov stated: 
Certain political forces are propagandizing the “virtues” of this [Russian 
Belarussian] union in order to attract other CIS countries and peoples…. Another 
ideological threat, which could have a negative impact on us, is distortion of the 
history of the Uzbek nation. Pseudoscholarly interpretations of history and some 
political slogans are intended to deprive us of our history. In accordance with the 
statements of certain foreign politicians and scholars, there is no such a nation as 
Uzbeks but there are in general Turkish people. That is, why should there be an end 
to such concepts as Uzbek, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tatar, Bashkir, Uighur and 
others? We can never agree with such views… Of course, we recognize that our 
historical roots are connected with Turkish people; we have the same language, 
religion, traditions and values. But we have always thought ourselves as an 
independent nation-the Uzbek people, and we are proud of this.266 
 
Only a few days later, on the 16th of February 1999, four blasts shook Tashkent, 
destroying a bloc of flats as well as main prospects of the city.267 These blasts totally 
changed the agenda not only of the Uzbek leadership but also for the whole region. This 
had influenced the Central Asian politics for the next two-an-a-half years, until 11 
September 1999. This period of two-and-a- half years can be called as the reign of terror, 
for the governments and oppositions alike, in Central Asia.  
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7.6 The Fifth Phase: Reign of Terror 1999-2001 
The bomb blasts took place at exactly the same time as Colonel Hudayberdiyev’s 
rebel forces were getting ready to cross the border from Uzbekistan into the Hocend region 
of Tajikistan.268 With the bombings, an emergency summit of the troika presidents, held in 
Astana on the 19th of February, which was dedicated to the second anniversary of the 
eternal friendship treaty, signed by the three states.269 In fact, the twenty-sixth summit was 
called for discussing the latest events in Uzbekistan.270 These events also were the end of 
the series of the Uzbek incursions onto Tajik soil.  
Tajikistan’s entrance to the Customs’ Union was certainly a blow to Kerimov’s 
Central Asian policy. He criticized this new grouping as a sabotage of the CIS itself.271 
Alarmed by the bomb blasts in Tashkent, Central Asian states started dialogue with the 
Taliban.272 The same year, not only the Kazak and Kyrgyz diplomats but also the Uzbek 
Foreign Minister met the Taliban leader Molla Muhammed Ömer in Kandahar.273 
Kerimov’s first accusations against Turkey and certain Turkish circles operating in 
Uzbekistan whom he linked with the bombings had frozen Turkish-Uzbek relations. 
Turkish President Demirel took the initiative and went to Tashkent on 15th of March.274 
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During the visit, Demirel declared his open support for Kerimov in his war against terror.275 
Despite all of the preventive measures that have tried to be taken, bombings marked the 
beginnings of an anti-Turk, anti-Islamic and even anti-Turkestani policy by the Uzbek 
leadership. Kerimov’s Turkestanist stance was shifted to a pure “Central Asian” union plan, 
without even mentioning the word Turkestan. 
Simultaneously, the IMU declared Kerimov’s regime a an “evil government” and 
asked for a peaceful retreat; and made threats of further aggression against the Uzbek 
regime though Iranian radio.276 In late March, a small IMU detachment raided a bus in 
Ürgenç and got into an armed conflict with the local police, leaving nine dead and a dozen 
wounded.277 
The decision by Russia and Tajikistan to set up a new permanent military base for 
the 201st motor rifle division caused a protest by Kerimov who opposed the idea by asking 
“who is the base is aimed at?”278 Tajik response by a high-ranking source in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was interesting. He said: “Uzbekistan should finally accept the idea that 
Tajikistan is a sovereign state, and not an autonomous area within its influential 
neighbor”.279 Kerimov’s response was even more interesting, he said: “… they [Uzbeks and 
Tajiks] are one nation speaking two different languages”.280 
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The five presidents of Central Asia met at the twenty-seventh summit, in Ashkhabad 
on the 9th of April 1999, to discuss the status of the Aral Sea. Presidents supported 
Niyazov’s decision to withdraw from the CIS visa-free regime.281 Through the Voice of 
Islamic Republic of Iran Radio, the IMU leader Tahir Yuldaş officially threatened Kerimov 
to quit or face more bombings.282 The first positive response from Russia to Nazarbayev’s 
pet Eurasian Union plan came from a high ranking military figure, Col-Gen. Leonid 
Ivashov, who said “Russia should set up a Eurasian Union as a counterbalance to 
NATO”.283 Bombings in Tashkent also caused the tightening of the security along the 
Uzbek-Kazak, Uzbek-Kyrgyz, Uzbek-Tajik and Uzbek-Turkmen borders.284 Practically, 
these latest developments represented serious backlashes against creating a single Central 
Asian region concept. 
The CAEC premiers met on Bishkek on the 17th of June 1999, signing several 
documents on regional cooperation on mining, common monetary policy, and joint 
ventures funded by the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development.285 
Following this meeting, the presidents of the four members of the CAEC met in Bishkek on 
24th of June 1999, for the Interstate Council of the CAEC meeting.286 This was the twenty-
eighth summit. At this meeting, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine were granted the status of 
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observers in the CAEC. The emphasis was on the single economic union in the Central 
Asian region.287  
Meanwhile, the six death sentences for the suspects of car bombings in Tashkent 
caused a great anger on the side of the “mujahedeen” of the IMU, who warned Central 
Asians to rebel against the Kerimov regime.288 Tashkent was trying to win the hearts of 
Uzbek Muslims by imposing long prison terms against the local missionaries called “Incil 
Massikhiylar”.289 Kerimov also ordered to erect a memorial monument in Tashkent to 
honor the Martyrs of the Soviet colonialism and “aggression by the Soviet-Russian 
oppressors.”290 The Bomb trials during 1999 were also used as a means to attack and 
destroy the remaining fragments of democratic opposition in Uzbekistan.291 Indeed, the 
terror acts in Tashkent gave the Kerimov regime a free hand for the next two-and-a-half 
years to oppress the whole opposition.292 The members of the IMU and their families had 
taken refuge in Tajik territories since the winter of 1992-1993 in the Jirgatol district and 
Karategin regions, which had been under the UTO control. The Uzbek air force started to 
bomb this region from mid August on.293 The same day, several hundred the IMU gunmen 
entered Kyrgyzstan through the mountain passes. On the 17th of August, Tajikistan decided 
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to repatriate Uzbek refugees.294 Also, on the 16th of August 1999, Uzbekistan started to 
bomb the Kyrgyz territories neighboring Tajikistan, as Kerimov criticized Tajiks and 
Kyrgyz for failure to control bandits.295 
Muhammed Salih, becoming too critical of the US, accusing the US of supporting 
the aggressive regime on the Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran Radio, began to loose his 
chances of being recognized as the leader of the democratic opposition in Uzbekistan.296 By 
the 23rd of August, the IMU guerillas were settled in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, 
capturing four Japanese geologists and several Kyrgyz citizens, including the commander 
of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Interior troops Major General Şamkeyev.297 The first estimates 
were that there were around fifty IMU guerillas in Batken but within a few days it was 
understood that there were more than one thousand guerillas who had infiltrated into the 
region.298 Kyrgyzstan asked Russia to help her overcome this crisis with all kinds of 
military intervention.299 Shanghai Five leaders met in a summit in Bishkek on 25th of 
August 1999 for discussing this new situation.300  
The Foreign and Defense Ministers of the four CAEC states met in Osh on 28th of 
August 1999 to sign a joint anti-terrorism declaration and to work out plans for a common 
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security policy to tackle rebels.301 From the end of August on, Uzbek air raids in 
Kyrgyzstan were stepped up, and Kazakstan began arms shipments to Uzbekistan to 
continue fighting against rebels.302 However, for the first time in the 1990s, Kazakstan 
began to establish military posts along the Uzbek border.303 The Kyrgyz leadership and 
public were highly scared by the events and were trying to solve the problem with the 
guerillas through negotiations after several defeats in the skirmishes with the 
mujahedeen.304  Uzbeks accused the UTO of helping the guerillas.305 On the 24th of 
September, the Customs Union (CU) presidents met in Astana to sign final documents on 
establishing a single economic union among themselves.306  
The Russian response to the Kyrgyz call for help came from the PM Putin vowing 
to fight against terror and ammunitions only.307 Towards the end of September, the 
mujahedeen attempted to cross the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan, with the objective of 
establishing an Islamic Emirate there.308  
On the other hand, Nazarbayev, in a cultural and scientific forum of Central Asian 
explained on the 29th of September 1999, that: 
The republics of Central Asia must enter the 21st century as independent states; this 
does not mean that we cannot unite the region in geopolitical and geo-economic 
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terms… Our strategic and economic goal is to form a common economic space, a 
common trade and customs zone, a common currency union and a common 
economic strategy… We are talking about achieving the kind of integration of states 
that Western Europe already has… The countries of the region have more solid 
preconditions for that than European countries once had… including the following 
common factors: external threats, cultural and historical roots, religion and 
ecological problems…we inherited common economic, financial, educational and 
ecological standards from the Soviet Union…309 
 
In this year, Uzbekistan became a member of GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) in order to balance CU with this grouping.310 By 
mid-October, guerillas in Batken started to retreat to their bases in the Tajik Mountains.311 
They released all of the hostages.  
Uzbeks were by no means happy with the Kyrgyz “peaceful” handling of the crisis, 
especially with the negotiations between the mujahedeen and the Kyrgyz officials.312 Thus, 
Uzbekistan unilaterally started border demarcation with Tajikistan, and setting up huge 
mine fields in the border regions.313 
After the IMU mujahedeen’s retreat to their Tajik bases, Uzbekistan put an 
enormous pressure on the Tajik side threatening a cross border operation.314 However the 
IMU members resisted Tajik governments’ promises to force them out of the country and 
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the UTO leaders began to mediate.315 After that, in months, the IMU members started to 
leave in convoys to Northern Afghanistan that was already in Taliban hands.  
In the mean time, the ethnic Russian public associations confederation (ARSC - 
“Association of Russian, Slavic and Cossack Public Associations”) in Kazakstan started to 
demand a referendum on Kazakstan joining Russia-Belarus Union.316 Tashkent just relaxed 
from the tension of the Batken invasion, suddenly on 15th of November, the IMU 
mujahedeen attacked police stations in the Yangiabad district of Tashkent, where several 
dachas of the Uzbek nomenclature were located.317 Armed clashes continued for more than 
two weeks in the region, leaving at least twenty dead in Yangiabad. 318 The OSCE Summit 
in Istanbul on 18th November 1999 was attended by all Central Asian presidents, each of 
whom emphasized the importance of struggling with Islamic “terrorism” in the region.319 
 
7.7 Eurasian Dream Realized 
The five members of the CU signed the Treaty establishing Eurasian Economic 
Community on 10th of October 2000 in Astana.320 It was exactly at this moment that Putin 
found the long dreamed of ideological atmosphere for his policies: the Eurasianism of 
Nazarbayev.321 After the ratifications of the treaty in the parliaments, the first meeting of 
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the Interstate council was held in mid September 2001 in Almaty.322 The Uzbek president 
criticized and protested this new step.323 Niyazov soon joined Kerimov in protesting the 
new union. The stance of the Turkmen intelligentsia with regard to the pan-Turkestani 
ideas of the time was considered rather obscure and unclear. However Saparmurat Niyazov, 
the “Türkmenbaşı,” in his last book, Rukhnama, argued that Turkestan was the country 
given by Noah to his son Yafes, who was believed to be the first known ancestor of the 
Turks and Turkmens.324 
The five members of the Eurasian Economic Community (Kazakstan, Belarus, 
Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) met in a regular session of the Interstate Council on 13th 
of May 2002 in Moscow where Nazarbayev said, “I’d like to dream aloud. We should turn 
the community to Eurasian Union with real integration processes”.325  
At the twenty-ninth summit of the CAEC, which was held on 5th of January 2001 in 
Almaty, regional political stability was the first item on the agenda.326 In this summit, the 
four Presidents decided to establish a permanent economic forum as an organ of the CAEC 
in Tashkent.327 At the December 2001 summit in Tashkent (on the 28th of December 
2001), the decision was made to transform CAEC into a Central Asian Cooperation 
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Organization [according to Uzbek sources] or Central Asian Forum [according to Kazak 
sources].328 
By the 11th of September 2001, Central Asian countries were already in a “reign of 
terror” for the last two-and-a-half years, struggling to stop IMU (in May 2001 IMU 
changed its name to Turkestan Islam Party-TIP) to dominate Ferghana Valley region.  
 
7.8 Turkestan re-Divided or re-United-Conclusions 
 For many, in the Western academia or even in the “Newly Independent States,” the 
decade of 1990s was a decade of the “rising of new nations.” Turkestanism was already an 
out-dated Uzbek émigré ideology by the beginning of the 1990s, out of the Soviet Union. 
Only thanks to the efforts of renowned scholar and activist of Turkestanism, Baymirza 
Hayit, it was in a state of survival. Its rebirth came from Turkestan again, at the end of 
1980s, but especially at the beginning of 1990s. For the first half of the 1990s, 
Turkestanism remained as one of the most dominant and main arguments of the Central 
Asian democratic opposition parties, especially in Uzbekistan, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Democratic oppositions had little chance within the still surviving Soviet style apparatchik 
politics and soon, disappeared from the political scenes. However their legitimacy 
continued and even claimed by the Central Asian leaderships.  
 Central Asian leaders re-positioned themselves after the elimination of democratic 
oppositions in their countries and strengthening of their own powers. Kerimov, Nazarbayev 
and Akayev met in more than thirty summits privately in the course of ten yeras following 
independences. They also met in a higher number of international gatherings and in the 
meetings of other regional groupings. In fact, Central Asian leaders met with eachother 
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more than with their own cabinets. Ker,mov was the chanpion of Central Asian Unity and 
Turkestan Union ideas during the 1990s. Nazarbayev’s response to that was to launch a 
program of Eurasian Union idea, which would give Uzbekistan no way to become a 
regional hegemon. Akayev’s Kyrgyzstan was rather a sattelite of Nazarbayev’s Kazakstan 
in many respects. Tajikistan joined the Central Asian Union lastly but integrated its 
structures with the union quite quickly, irrespective of being the most pro-Russian 
administration within the region. Turkmenistan remained the outsider to all these 
developments whereas attended, especially after 1996, most of the summits with an 
observer status. 
 The end of the 1990s and the beginning of the second millennium marked a new 
and fresh beginning in the region concerning the strengthened regional economic and 
political alliances. However it also marked the rise of Afghanistan-sourced fundamentalist 
terror that forced the regional countries to unite their security and defense networks as well. 
All Central Asian Leaderships made it clear that they have modeled their plans for their 
Central Asian Union on European Union structures, aiming to have a single currency, a 
customs union, a common armed forces and even a common foreign policy in the region in 
the close future.   
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
The conceptual anarchy in the literature about Central Asia is not a new, 20th 
Century phenomenon. However, western and to some extent Turkish scholars have not 
dealt with the issue to any significant degree. In general there has been a kind of willful 
ignorance and even to some extent a negative attitute towards the Turkestan concept as 
such. For some, this was even “forbidden” territory: not to deal with it at all! For some 
others, it was a sacred term, not to be discussed but to be accepted as a dogma. Especially, 
Western revisionist scholars refused to deal with the “dark history” of the region; but 
accepted the current main stream terminology and the “new born nations” as granted. 
 The prohibited has its attraction, of course, which account for the present work. The 
observed ignorance had become one of the strongest motivation for the researcher to study 
this topic.  
One of the basic objectives of this study was to bring conceptual clarifications to the 
uses and misuses of the concept of Turkestan which would clear the way to the explanation 
of  the related terms used in the literature - such as Central-Inner-Middle Asia, Sart, Turks 
(of Khorezm and Fergana), Uzbek, Kazak, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tajik, etc. 
With a comprehensive literature review conducted mainly from the primary sources, 
first hand observations and interviews in the region, the writer trusts that this study may 
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provide new visions for those bewildered by the complexities of the daily politics of the 
region.    
The evidence, and overall impression revealed in this study suggest that, while there 
exists: no “Turkestani nation” in western meanings of the term, no single “Turkestanish 
language” in modern terms, no contemporary political entity called Turkestan, and no 
consensus over its geography; the concept of Turkestan has survived through the centuries 
and its heritage has been claimed by the modern political cadres of the region. 
Extensive review of the encyclopedical and general reference sources has shown 
that there is no single definition of the concept which enjoyed an overall scholarly 
consensus. In defining the term Turkestan, there have been two main approaches in the 
literature: a limited political approach and a broader-regional approach. These represent 
different stances, different camps over the issue. The limited political approach defined 
Turkestan as the political identities of historical Turkestan - Governorship General and 
Turkestan ASSR - whereas the broader-regional approach employed a rather inclusive 
definition with a greater geographical, ethno-linguistic and political meaning, Uluğ 
(Greater) Turkestan.    
Outsiders have had a decisive effect on the use of such terminology. Their impact 
was twofold. For the first group, terms such as “Bilâd-ı Türk,” (the lands of Turks) were 
given to the region by the conquering armies, in their own languages, as exact synonyms 
for Turkestan, the land of Turks. Other terms such as the Steppe of Ten Thousand Kirghiz 
etc. can also be considered in this category. They all covered the whole of Western 
Turkestan. The second category of such terms was given or rather imposed by the political 
wills of the conquering empires as well as by the studies of their scholars. For example, the 
Steppe and Turkestan Guberniias were the creations of the Tsarist administration. [the 
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Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate were the two traditional crypto-states that 
survived until the revolution.] Uses such as Turkestan and Steppe, Central Asia and 
Kazakstan, Middle Asia and Kazakstan are similar examples of such attempts. 
However, for many scholars, the term Turkestan remained as an ancient-historical 
name representing the whole or parts of  Central Asia. For some others, it reflected 
contemporary circumstancesi in that it had its partisans, and that there was de facto native 
consciousness. Positions taken on this issue had been highly correlated with the political 
stances of scholars of the subject. On the “politically correct” Western side, Soviet-Russian 
literature was the sole source of information on the region, where, use of the term 
Turkestan had been ruthlessly suppressed so as to eliminate any chance the natives might 
re-unite. For the “nationalist” émigré historians and the native intelligetsia within  Soviet 
Central Asia, however, Turkestan was a sacred term, emanating a golden glaw from a past, 
when all Turkestanis were united under one flag and “ruled the world.” It was also a 
sacrosanct term in the contemporary sense, as being most inclusive ethnically and 
geographically for the natives. So, it is quite a political choice to use any of the terms for 
the region. For example, if one uses the term Turkestan to cover the whole region, this can 
be called as a Turkestanist position. If one calls the region Middle Asia and Kazakstan, that 
is the other end of the spectrum; one might possibly call it the anti-Turkestanist position. 
Meaning simply “the country (land) of the Turks,” the term Turkestan was even 
used, at times, for the whole of the Ottoman Empire, for Central Anatolia, for Central Asia 
and/or for Middle Asia. Especially, during the Tanzimat period the term Türkistan was used 
to refer the Ottoman Empire by some leading Ottoman officials and intellectuals. For the 
last quarter of the 19th and the first quarter of the 20th centuries, the term Turkestan meant 
politically either the Tsarist Turkestan Governorship General or (between 1918-1924) 
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Turkestan ASSR of the RSFSR. However, its political territories did not match the 
geographical and ethno-national boundaries of the Turkestan region at all.  
The expressions, “Central Asia,” “Middle Asia” and “Inner Asia” had not been 
inventions of the Soviet regime as such. They were not necessarily reflections of Russian 
imperialism over the region at all. There were instances where these were being used in 
Western literary sources, especially in the course of the 19th century. However, they had no 
clear cut borders that would match the term “Turkestan.” Furthermore, these expressions 
were not presented as alternative pieces of terminology to be used for Turkestan. They were 
rather used for political purposes with broader or more limited meanings of the term. 
However, the Bolsheviks in the 1920s employed these terms, solely for political pursposes, 
simply to eradicate the concept of Turkestan. In the current scholarship on the region, the 
term Inner Asia reflects the territories of Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Eastern Turkestan and Mongolia. The term Central Asia is more inclusive 
adding Tibet, Kashmir, Northern Afghanistan, Gorno-Altai, Tuva, Buryatia and Inner 
Mongolia to the above mentioned list. However the concept of Middle Asia is much more 
limited, in affect to the territories of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
the Southern Kazakstan region which were the Syr Darya and Jetisu (Semirech’e) oblasts of 
the former Tsarist Governorship General. On the other hand, the concept of Turkestan (if 
applied not as Greater, Eastern or Southern Turkestan, the concept means Western 
Turkestan) matches with the geographical and political boundaries of the five former Soviet 
republics in the region. Controversially, all terms mentioned above are subject to new 
definitions by authors writing about the region. This has become another source of ongoing 
conceptual anarchy.      
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The separation of Turkic ethnic identities in 1924 was the continuation of a previous 
Tsarist policy of arificially interfering with the ethnic identities in the region. In the 
literature, this policy was labeled as the “Il’minskii-Ostromov line” with the basic objective 
of diversifying the Turkish elements in the region: creating different languages from 
different Turkic dialects and different national identities out of the different tribes living in 
the region. It was simply a policy of deepening the existing differences even more, while 
trying to eliminate the existing common factors among the peoples of Turkestan in culture, 
literature, customs, scripts as well as politics. The level of knowledge in the West about the 
region was far less than any prediction. Just to give an example, in many Western sources, 
all inhabitants of the region were referred to  as Tartars even at the beginning of 20th 
century!  
Although, most of these issues were discussed in the journal of the Commissariat 
for Nationalities during the revoltionary period, Zhizn Natsional’nostei, many national 
communists, apparently stood for a unified federal Turkestan model, rather than a total 
disintegration of Turkestan ASSR. One of the most important findings of this dissertation is 
the fact that razmezhevanie was supported, and even initiated by the will of several 
Turkestani national communists led by Feyzullah Hocayev and Ekmel İkramov, who 
managed to establish a cotton rich-Greater Uzbekistan at the outcome of razmezhevanie. It 
is also understood from the archival documents used in this study that delimitation was 
realized despite the constant resistence and opposition of some leading Bolsheviks in the 
region, in Moscow and in the party elite in general, with the will of Stalin and his “trusted” 
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native comrades in the region.1 It is important to note that this thesis has not been deployed 
either by Western academia or by the Soviet and currtent Turkestani or even past émigré 
Turkestani literature.  
From the 1924 on, the Soviets began to wage a war to eliminate the usages of the 
term Turkestan for the region. Politically correct approach of Western academia and the 
mass media quickly adapted to the new Soviet policy in the post-Second World War period. 
Even in Turkey, there was a silent consensus in some universities in employing the terms 
Central or Middle Asia (Orta Asya) instead of the term Turkestan.  
The worst blow to the usage of the concept in the literature came of course after the 
1924 delimitation which destroyed a Turkestani state (with the name Turkestan in it) - 
Turkestan ASSR. While the concept was never clearly defined, in some literature, the 
Turkestan Gubernia and later the Turkestan ASSR were accepted as the rough borders of 
the term Turkestan. This was so, inspite of the fact that their territories were subject to 
constant changes. The destruction of the Turkestan ASSR ended the political meaning of 
the term; thus abondaning  the term to history alone! However, Turkestanism never died 
out completely among the natives, both in the émigré and within Soviet Central Asia. Until 
1991, when five Soviet Central Asian states gained their independence, Turkestanist tones 
in literature and even in politics appeared. Again until 1991, a Turkestanist émigration, 
somehow, survived the Cold War era against all difficulties and the varying ideas which 
developed among them. 
Scattered all over the world, Turkestani émigré groups formed one organization 
after another. However in the efforts of Mustafa Çokayoğlu, Zeki Velidî Togan and Osman 
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Hoca (Kocaoğlu) the émigré struggle continued quite successfully until the Second World 
War. The publications of Yeni Türkistan and then Yaş Türkistan marked an almost fifteen 
years long émigré re-grouping for the liberation of the motherland from enemy invasion. 
Then came the usual émigré intriques and fights over “nothings”. However, this time the 
problem was an academic one: the very name of the homeland, Turkestan became the issue. 
The pan-Turkist group favored, Zeki Velidî’s “Türkili” version [a Turkified version of the 
Turkestan term] whereas the Turkestanist Çokayoğlu group remained loyal to the 
traditional version, Turkestan. From the early days of their émigré struggle, Turkestanis 
tried to persuade the Western public that their country had been a colony first of Tsarist 
Russia and then of the Soviet Empire, not much different from the overseas colonies of 
Britain and France.  
The last chance to unite the Kazak-Kyrgyz of the Steppe and the Sart-Uzbeks of 
Turkestan was missed in January 1918, when they failed to unite with each other under an 
autonomous Turkestan, when Northern Kazak Alaş Orda leader Alihan Bükeyhan refused 
to unite with Turkestan. By 1924, Uzbek national communists were promoting the 
disintegration of the Turkestan movement. The Uzbek initiative to dissolve Turkestan in 
razmezhevanie and the Kazak (i.e. Turar Ryskulov in KPT) opposition to delimitation were 
not the permanent positions of the two tribal groups. The “father of Turkestanism” Mustafa 
Çokayoğlu in emigration was a Kazak just as was Mağcan Cumabayulı, author of the 
“Turkestan” poem in 1929, who later became one of the millions of victims of the Great 
Terror of Stalin in 1930s. By the end of the 1970s, Turkestanism had become more of an 
Uzbek phenomenon in the émigré circles, after the secession of the Kazak wing of Haris 
Kanatbay and the establishment of a distinctly pan-Turkist stream among the émigrés.  
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A review of the émigré literature suggested that “this region was Turkestan from the 
time immemorial and is accepted as Turkestan by the natives.” Although Çokayoğlu once 
argued that the worst sin of their ancestors was failing to unite under one political banner 
and national identity, the main stream émigré literature used the term extensively for the 
whole region, i.e. Uluğ (Greater) Turkestan.  
The findings of this study show that a common Turkestani identity, although very 
loosely defined, came after several other identities such as a Muslim-religious identity, or a 
city or tribal one, or even sub-tribal-clanic ones. Moreover, a Turkestani nation, in the 
Western meaning of the term, never existed; instead, a loosely defined, politico-geographic  
term, Turkestan, with an unquestionable ethnic connotation was used extensively. Thus in 
the 1980s Turkestanism among the native elites of the Soviet Central Asia flourished anew 
and became an important political movement by the early 1990s.  
The very story of the Turkestan Legions within the Waffen SS started with the death 
of Mustafa Çokayoğlu in 1941, following his visit to a Turkestani POW camp in Poland. 
His leadership was succeeded [because Osman Hoca was on the anti-Nazi camp] by the 
youngish pro-Nazi Veli Kayyum “Han” who performed his duty until his death in early 
1990s. The Turkestani Legions were late comers in the war theatre and they did not 
perform well in battle. However, with the help of the Nazi propaganda machine, they 
managed the introduction of several thousands of Turkestanis with Turkestanist and in 
some cases pan-Turkist ideals, but always in the service of Reich. Some of these young 
men entered the service of the US during the Cold War, as did many other former Nazi 
colloborators, and continued their Turkestanism through different means.  
The period between 1917-1924 in Turkestan can be summarized as the era of 
Turkestanist struggle against the Bolsheviks. The anti-imperialist tone of this idea needs 
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stress. As in the case of many other anti-colonial nationalisms, Turkestanism represented 
common ground for a very diverse socio-political community of Turkestani elites.  
Virtually all the anti-imperial movements of any significance could be, and in the 
metropoles generally were, classified under one of the three headings: local 
educated elites’ imitation European ‘national self-determination (as in India) [read 
Jadids and Alaş-Khokand political activists in Turkestan, H.A.K.], popular anti-
western xenophobia (an all-purpose heading widely applied, notably in China) [read 
nationalist native communists in Turkestan, i.e. Turar Rıskulov, Feyzullah Hocayev 
and Ekmel İkramov, H.A.K.], and the natural high spirits of martial tribes (as in 
Morocco and desserts of Arabia) [read Basmacıs in Turkestan, H.A.K.].2 
 
The three different categories established by Hobsbawm in his theory on the rise of 
anti-imperial nationalisms, in fact, co-existed in the Turkestan of the 1917-1924 period and 
fit the three different stratas of native population. However, as Hobsbawm also pointed out 
very openly, in most anti-colonial nationalisms the very term “unity” was closely related to 
the very existence of the colonial power.  
On the other hand territory-oriented movements for liberation could not avoid 
building on the foundation of what common elements had been given to their 
territory by its colonial power or powers, since often this was the only unity and 
national character the future country had.3 
 
It must be added that as in the case of Turkestan after the fall of the colonial power, 
(either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union) what was left to the national elite as 
concepts and self definitions were mostly inherited from the colonial power itself.  
Turkestanism became a main regional foreign policy tool of the Uzbek leadership 
throughout the second half of 1990s. Although it was understood by the Kazak, Kyrgyz and 
even Tajik neighbors as a tool of Uzbek hegemony in the region, they did not dissent from 
the Uzbek leadership’s efforts at further economic and political integration in the region. In 
                                                
2 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, p. 151.  
3 Hobsbawm, p. 138.  
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the process, with this concept in mind, regional leaders developed different formulas which 
also included the unification of Central Asian states - such as the “Central Asian Union 
movement” and “Eurasianism”. For the layman on the streets of the Central Asian capitals, 
Turkestanism is still a sacred term referring to a “golden past” of the region, with 
connotations as the “zenith of Muslim power” in the world. Even for the class of 
Communist Party’s otvetchiks (repliers to the 1bourgeois falsifiers”) before 1991, the very 
concept Turkestan itself implied a great potential for the nationalist and anti-Soviet 
movements in the region. It is true that every “new nation” in the region has developed its 
own version of nationalism – i.e. as Kazak nationalism, Uzbek nationalism and Kyrgyz 
nationalism. It is also true that, however, probably the most respected common element is 
their similar Turkestanist positions. The study of the “nationalisms” of Kazak, Uzbek, 
Kyrgyz, Turkmen and even Tajik states during and after Soviet rule demonstrated the 
existence of an important phenomenon, tribalism and/or localism, which overwhelmed 
nationalist tendencies. More importantly, this phenomenon, though causing tension among 
the elites of the same “ethnic group,” did not imply any negative attitude towards 
Turkestanism.  
For the Turkestanists, the Turkestani nation consisted of sub-tribes of Kazak, 
Turkmen, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Karakalpak. However from 1924 on, after the Tajiks 
first gained an autonomous status within the Uzbek SSR, Tajik ethnic identity became 
increasingly separated from a common Turkestani identity and in the 1990s there were even 
some hostility among the Tajik political circles towards the very concept of Turkestan.  
Turkestan is a concept that has come out of a necessity, rather than as a luxury. 
Ethnically and geographically, the region has constituted a whole; and throughout history, 
people needed to call it by an overall umbrella name. The term Turkestan has been the most 
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popular  and the longest surviving one. This was why the post-Soviet leaders of Central 
Asian states felt an urgent need to combine their political decision-making structures. Their 
economies were obviously united throughout history; and the Soviet period made this even 
more the case. They have also, more or less, a common literature with no need for 
translators to communicate with each other.   
Maybe one of the most important reason for the survival of the term Turkestan 
among others, from the 7th century AD on, is the simple fact that the term was used and 
preferred by the natives themselves. This is the first name ever known to delineate the 
region as a whole.  
In this study, the common perceptions of Western academia as to the proper uses of 
the term Turkestan are challenged, in so far as they use the concepts Central, Middle and 
Inner Asia on two grounds. First, it seems that Western academia did not assimilate the 
changes in Russian and Soviet literature as the metamorphosis of the concepts; rather they 
imitated and even directly promoted its conceptual anarchy. Second, the Soviet-Russian 
literature was heavily ideologically oriented as was most of the other literature on the 
region. This was so, especially after 1920 when the decision to launch a national-territorial 
delimitation of Turkestan was taken and especially after 1924 when the national-territorial 
delimitation plans began to be implemented. The process of razmezhevanie coincided, of 
course, with the writing of a new history for the region and for each new “nation” there.  
The concept of Turkestanism has been analyzed with a special emphasis. The 
concept simply represents the political stance of the Cedid-Turkestan Autonomy (Alaş 
Orda as well up to certain degree)-Yeni Türkistan-Yaş Türkistan-Turkestan Legions-Millî 
Türkistan-Dergi line discussed in the previous chapters. Alaşism, Cedidism, Bukharanism, 
Khorezmizm, Basmacılık, were all united under one banner “Turkestanism”, each claiming 
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the true heritage of Turkestan Autonomy and Turkestani independence. It is possible to 
define it as an ethno-political nationalist movement aimed at the unification of the peoples 
of Turkestan within one political unit - Turkestan - as the members of a unified “Turkestani 
nation”– or as “The United States of Turkestan.”    
It is hoped that, all of the evidence and discussions presented in this study will 
contribute to a better understanding of the semantics of the concept of Turkestan, including 
native and foreign attitudes towards the concept and its potential power to unite the natives 
of the region.  
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